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1INTRODUCTION 
Where the Problem Lies
1.  Issues Surrounding Obstructed Education Spending
(1)  Risks and Social Security in a Society with an Aging Population  
and a Declining Birth Rate
According to Vital Statistics published by the Ministry of Health, Labour, and 
Welfare, the number of live births in Japan in 2012 dropped to 1,037,231, the 
lowest since the end of World War II. Meanwhile, the number of deaths exceeded 
1.2 million, indicative of the country’s aging population. The difference between 
the number of live births and deaths in 2012 indicated a decline of more than 
200,000 people in the population. The required birth rate to maintain the cur-
rent population level is called “replacement level fertility.” In Japan, the live birth 
rate has remained below the replacement level fertility since the late 1970s, a state 
referred to as sub-replacement fertility (Wada, 2006). The persistent state of sub-
replacement fertility has been attributed to employment instability, inadequate 
provision of the environment for raising children, and huge education expenses; 
employment instability includes increased non-regular employment among 
young people and the widened gap between regular and non-regular employment, 
whereas the inadequate provision of the environment for raising children includes 
childcare-facility shortage as well as lack of or inadequate childcare support poli-
cies at companies and public institutions (Higuchi and Zaimushō Zaimu Sōgō 
Seisaku Kenkyū-jo, ed., 2006; Yamaguchi, 2009; Matsuda, 2013).
 The declining birth rate will reduce the working-age population in the long 
run. At the same time, the number of elderly citizens will increase as the aver-
age life expectancy rises partly owing to improvement in medical and health envi-
ronments. Hence, the expansion of the elder population will lead to increased 
social security government spending that relies mainly on taxes. The government’s 
heavy reliance on direct taxes, such as income tax, will inevitably impose an undue 
burden on the working-age population, particularly the workers. In addition, tax 
avoidance by corporations and high-income earners increases as globalization and 
borderlessness of the economy advances; for instance, corporations relocate their 
headquarters to locations with less taxation and high-income earners move to 
“tax haven” countries where there are almost no taxes (Shiga, 2013). According to 
Shigeki Morinobu, corporate tax in Japan is considered high and seems remark-
ably higher compared with that in other developed countries. Corporate burden 
includes taxes and social insurance premiums for employees. This burden is lesser 
in countries in continental Europe, such as Germany and France, and greater in 
the United Kingdom and United States when all factors are taken into consider-
ation. As such, the situation presents difficulties given that the worldwide compe-
tition for lower corporate tax makes corporate tax a less than promising candidate 
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for government funding source (Morinobu, 2010: 203–237). Such circumstances 
cause indirect taxes, such as consumption tax, to attract more attention.
 Nevertheless, satisfying people’s lives only through social security policies on the 
assumption of simple lifecycle has become increasingly difficult as the economic 
center shifts from manufacturing to service industries and lifestyles diversify. 
Moreover, women’s social advancement in the workplace has made it particularly 
urgent to arrange childcare facilities for infants. The increasingly borderless econ-
omy of Japan indicates that the nation’s economic condition has become more sus-
ceptible to foreign economic influence, rendering economic forecasting difficult. 
In Japan, even large companies can no longer afford employee benefits, which they 
have conventionally been able to provide. This situation has exposed workers to 
the risk of unemployment even with the slightest change in the economic environ-
ment. Although it is the government’s responsibility to react to changes in the eco-
nomic environment, it has not been able to cope adequately because the changes 
have been abrupt. This has been seen as the government’s failure and resulted in 
people having extreme distrust with government policies (Taylor-Gooby et al., 
1999).
 A strong distrust of pensions has been created particularly among young peo-
ple partly owing to extensive news coverage of the Japanese public pension sys-
tems (that mostly leave out key aspects of the system); this has roused people to 
question whether such system is sustainable (Kenjo, 2004: 106–110).1 Although 
opinions are divided whether the media coverage is correct, people with limited 
knowledge will lose confidence in the public system. The loss in confidence will 
drive people to take a defensive stance, such as saving money for the future; peo-
ple’s saving behavior, in turn, will promote an economic downturn. This behav-
ior causes people to be concerned about their post-retirement years (especially as 
the cultural expectation that “children have to look after their aged parents” has 
been changing, even after the parents have covered their children’s huge education 
expenses), and consequently, their motivation to bear and raise children declines. 
Of course, people consider raising and caring for a child not only as future invest-
ment; these are also viewed as sources of invaluable happiness and fulfillment. In 
fact, many couples want to bear and raise children but they are unable to do so; 
women struggle to get pregnant. Such efforts are done not only because of the 
potential future returns that the parents will gain from their child. However, apart 
from the numerous factors inhibiting childbirth and childcare in Japan, the prob-
lem is that the choice of bearing and raising a child has generally become one based 
on financial burden and significant risk as the period of paying education expenses 
has become longer owing to the popularization of higher education. As described 
above, the issues arising from having an aging population and a declining birth 
rate are closely related. Japan is seemingly caught in a vicious cycle where a fail-
ing social security system causes more people to take a defensive stance, increases 
the number of people who do not consider childrearing because of an uncertain 
future, and results in a declining birth rate.
(2)  Unequal Education Opportunity in a Society with a Widening Educational 
Disparity
Here, I wish to review briefly the educational situation in Japan.
 Figure Intro-1 shows the changes in the percentages of students continuing their 
education and high school graduates securing employment in Japan since WWII. 
The high school enrollment rate, which was only about 50% immediately after the 
war, rapidly increased during the high economic growth period. Subsequently, it 
exceeded 90% and reached the state of saturation in 1974. The enrollment rates 
in universities and higher education institutions include graduates in the previ-
ous fiscal year (so-called ronin or students who failed their school entrance exam 
and tried again). Higher education institutions include technical colleges, a system 
launched in 1962, technical high school teacher training schools (1961 to 1966), 
national school nurse training schools (1967 to 1977), and specialized training 
college’s upper secondary courses (1977 and later). The figures show that the 
higher education enrollment rate continued to stagnate through the 1980s after 
hitting 50% for the first time in 1978. The figures likewise show a stagnation trend 
as well as a slight decrease in university (undergraduate) enrollment rate, despite 
an uptrend for a certain period until it settled at nearly 30% in 1975. This uptrend 
in the university enrollment rate through the 1970s is mainly attributed to the pri-
vate school sector. The establishment of universities was aggressively sought during 
Figure Intro-1   Higher Education Enrollment Rates and  
the High School Graduates Employment Rates, 1955–2012
Source: FY 2013 Statistical Abstract (Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology)
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the 1960s to address the growing number of baby boomers and industry concerns 
on technical labor shortage. Other ministries and agencies would have been care-
ful with the expansion measure given the concerns on budget cuts in existing allot-
ments, considering that the measure required a large budget. The higher education 
sector expanded, nonetheless, without establishing a financial foundation, with 
the government (particularly the Ministry of Education) relying on private univer-
sities, which in turn relied on tuition to expand. Low public spending on higher 
education in Japan is not new. Such a government policy exacerbated the educa-
tional conditions at universities and increased the barriers for low-income people 
to advance to higher education; moreover, poor educational conditions gave rise to 
violent student movements (Pempel, 1978, trans. 2004).
 The establishment of new universities dwindled eventually as the government 
adopted a decentralization policy to avoid the concentration of universities in 
urban areas. The university enrollment rate was also suppressed during the 1980s 
owing to the adoption of the private school subsidy program, which tightened the 
management of university enrollment quota. The program was partly in anticipa-
tion of the declining birth rate. In fact, the university enrollment rate began to 
increase after the 1990s when the second wave of baby boomers started to take 
college entrance exams. The higher education enrollment rate increased propor-
tionally. Consequently, the number of high school graduates who immediately 
obtained employment, which was large at the time, suddenly dropped. Although 
the percentage of students who became employed immediately after high school 
graduation was already below 50% by the 1970s, it fell below 30% by the early 
1990s and then dropped to below 20% at the beginning of the 2000s. These fig-
ures show that those who become employed right after high school graduation 
were a minority among current high school students; the vast majority, in con-
trast, advanced to another school level. The percentage of those who advanced 
to university (undergraduate) began to stabilize at around 50%. Toru Kikkawa 
presented the rate of “college graduates vs. non-graduates” as among the leading 
indicators that divide Japanese society; this finding suggests the advent of a society 
divided by educational attainment (Kikkawa, 2006; 2009).
 However, the number of households paying the cost for higher education has 
not changed significantly. Kazuhisa Furuta looked into the Student Life Survey 2 
data and found that the number of individuals advancing to university rapidly 
increased among the low-income segment; these students were even attending 
expensive private universities. The increasing number of low-income univer-
sity students had been possible via the “scholarship3” expansion policy imple-
mented by the Japan Scholarship Foundation (currently Japan Student Services 
Organization, or JASSO) in 1999. Furuta examined the cause of this increased 
enrollment rate in the low-income segment by carefully taking into consider-
ation all possibilities other than the JASSO “scholarships”; he concluded that 
the increased JASSO “scholarships”  significantly reduced the gap in university 
enrollment by income class. However, the definition of “scholarship” in Japan as 
a loan (debt) that imposes repayment obligation is an important consideration. 
Moreover, the amount of repayment is fixed, which is different from the student 
loans in the United Kingdom where repayment is based on income level after 
obtaining employment. Furuta comprehensively considered the abovementioned 
points and warned that this “scholarship” system could result in imposing the bur-
den of tuition only on students from the low-income segment (Furuta, 2006).4
 Problems such as disparity and inequality in educational advancement oppor-
tunities are also main subjects in sociology, such as in educational sociology and 
social stratification theory. Many studies have been conducted in these streams, 
but it is impossible to list them all. Previously, international comparative studies 
held the predominant view that the disparity (inequality) in opportunities based 
on social class remained constant despite the increase in educational opportunities 
(i.e., an increase in school enrollment rate) (e.g., Shavit and Blossfeld, eds., 1993). 
However, in recent years, a number of scholars have questioned this finding and 
stated that the expansion of education has helped reduce inequality in opportuni-
ties in the long run (Breen et al., 2009). It has been noted that the sample size of 
the survey data used in past studies was relatively too small to obtain reliable results 
(i.e., a sufficient statistical power had not been obtained in the past). Results simi-
lar to the ones Breen and others obtained from their analyses on European coun-
tries have been confirmed in Japan (Kondo and Furuta, 2009; 2011). These results 
might seem contradictory to the recent trends in the active debate on a society 
with a widening educational disparity. However, these data analyses are typically 
studies on a wide range of age groups, whereas the scope and interest in the said 
debates seem to be found in more recent and short-term changes. Dividing the 
existing data into cohorts and analyzing them to compare trends and identify such 
recent and short-term changes would make the sample size of each cohort small, 
thus potentially increasing the estimated error. In other words, the current survey 
data cannot detect the type of trends mentioned in the said debates owing to the 
nature of the samples in the surveys conducted. Therefore, the results do not pos-
sibly contradict the issues raised in the debates depending on the survey design; 
continuing careful long-term observations (surveys) in the future is thus neces-
sary. Another reason is that significant changes, such as an increase in the num-
ber of unstable non-regular employment workers among younger people, can be 
observed using the same data that Kondo and Furuta used (the Social Stratification 
and Social Mobility Survey in 2005, or the so-called “2005 SSM Survey”), as in 
the work of Sato and Ojima, eds. (2011).
 Japan’s image of a prosperous society with increased equality in educational 
opportunities has made people overlook the issues of inequality, disparity, and 
poverty. In Japan, educational expenses are largely covered by households in a sce-
nario where the percentage of private schools increases as the school level goes up. 
Further, there is no sign that this trend will suddenly change in the future. It is 
no longer possible to expect a considerable increase in earned income that comes 
with age as it did before. Analyses on such equality in educational opportunities 
as well as discussions on the security of educational opportunities have emerged 
partly owing to Japan’s poor scholarship policy (e.g., Kobayashi, 2009; Yotoriyama 
and Fukushikokka Kōsō Kenkyūkai (Research Society of Welfare State Plan), eds., 
2012). The weight of the educational expense burden on households needs to be 
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recognized as an increasingly important issue.
(3)  Small Public Spending on Education and People’s Attitude Reflecting this 
Fact
Many studies have shown that the percentage of the Japanese government’s pub-
lic spending on education relative to its economic scale is small compared with 
other countries. Its education spending is also at the lowest level among developed 
countries. Figures Intro-2 and Intro-3 prove that public spending on education 
in Japan is very low relative to its economic scale. The percentage of educational 
expense in the overall public spending is also small. Particularly for higher educa-
tion (OECD statistics mainly include universities and colleges, excluding voca-
tional schools), Japan is almost at the lowest level. This scenario has not changed 
for a long time; however, the growing educational spending per capita is attributed 
not to an improvement in public spending but to an unchanging public spending 
on education despite a rapid decline in birth rate.5 This is seemingly reflected in 
recent policies such as making high school education free, which was implemented 
as a result of the change in administration to the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ).
 These figures might promote the view of “focusing more on education as the 
cornerstone of the state and directing more public funds there.” Further, these data 
might also increase support for raising and caring for children, which has been 
considered inadequate under the welfare policy in Japan. The core policies of the 
DPJ, which replaced the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in 2009, included those 
that focused on childcare and education. However, a slightly disenchanted reality 
contradicts these sentiments.
 For example, the morning edition of Asahi Shimbun on August 30, 2010 pub-
lished the results of an Asahi/University of Tokyo Joint Survey. A year after tak-
ing over the administration, the DPJ was defeated in the House of Councilors 
election. This defeat created the condition called “Divided Diet” where the party 
in control of the Lower House does not control the Upper House. Among the 
contributing factors to this defeat was the Hatoyama administration’s misman-
agement of various issues, from the Prime Minister’s own issue of “politics and 
money,” to the issue on the Marine Corps Air Station at Futemma, and to the 
policies they listed as election pledges that were not implemented. Hence, voter 
ratings remained low despite the DPJ legislators gaining high satisfaction from the 
DPJ’s featured policies on child allowances and household income support sys-
tem for farmers, which were implemented albeit with limitations due to financial 
constraints. According to the poll conducted immediately after the inauguration 
of the Hatoyama administration and published on September 18, 2009 by the 
Asahi Shimbun, 71% of the respondents supported the administration (14% did 
not), whereas 60% said the child allowance policy should be implemented and 
30% said otherwise.6 Thus, although the expectation for the DPJ administration 
was high based on the September 2, 2009 opinion poll, which was conducted 
immediately after the inauguration of the administration, only 31% supported 
to abolish spousal deduction for income tax and provide child allowance, whereas 
a greater number (49%) opposed it. Those opposed accounted for 37% of the 
Figure Intro-2   Percentage of Public Spending on Education in Overall Public 
Spending (%)
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Figure Intro-3   Percentage of Public Spending on Education to GDP (%)
Source: Both figures were prepared based on Table B4.1 in “Total public expenditure on education (2010)” 
(OECD, 2013: 218).
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people who voted for DPJ candidates in the proportional districts for the House of 
Representatives election (43% supported) and more than half of those who voted 
for other parties. These figures indicate that the change in regime did not neces-
sarily occur because of people’s preference for DPJ’s featured policies, such as child 
allowance and free highways.7 In fact, the administration was even criticized for 
“throwing money away” in addition to addressing the lack of funding sources for 
the policies, including child allowance and free high school tuition.
 An even harsher reality has been pointed out by Masakazu Yano. According to 
the study conducted by Yano and others, those who believe society should bear the 
cost for university education are the minority; 80% believe it should be paid for by 
the individual or family. Moreover, he states that there is no relationship between 
this tendency and respondents’ demographics, such as educational attainment 
(Yano, 2013). An analysis based on the International Social Survey Programme 
(ISSP) data yielded similar results.8 Figure Intro-4 shows the results of the four-
point scale responses to the question on government responsibility as regards 
“giv[ing] financial help to university students from low-income families” under 
the Role of Government IV section in the ISSP. The data in the survey are tabu-
lated and show that the respondents with a larger score (to the right) believe it is 
the responsibility of the government and the ones with a smaller score (to the left) 
believe it is not the responsibility of the government. Japan (JP-Japan) is listed in 
the third row from the top, the second column from the left. The shape of Japan’s 
graph is spread on both sides with a large variance and shows a number of respon-
dents to the left, indicating that a considerable number of people are opposed to 
this opinion. Japan seemed to be the only country where a certain percentage of 
the population opposed such opinion. The percentage of naysayers (two left bars) 
is small in most of the other countries and is insignificant in certain countries. For 
instance, the percentage of opposing opinions is extremely small in the United 
Kingdom (GB-Great Britain) and United States (US-United States) (found in the 
last row, the third and fourth columns, respectively), the countries often associated 
with neoliberalism.
 As the implementation of policies usually reflect people’s opinions, policies such 
as tuition assistance for college students or making school free of charge would 
then be considered unpopular even without touching the issue of funding sources; 
these unpopular policies do not earn votes for politicians. Meanwhile, this attitude 
might have been formed by past circumstances surrounding the burden of tuition 
in Japan for it could not have been formed instantaneously. In other words, the 
tradition that individuals (family/parents) pay for college tuitions turned into a 
fait accompli and became established as a common understanding that “it is some-
thing to be done as the individual’s (family/parents) own responsibility” (Yano, 
2013). Such data alone could not tell to the extent such attitudes reflect contem-
porary beliefs. The data also could not tell whether people have partly given up and 
accepted that individuals have no other choice but to pay tuition on their own as 
they foresee an unchanging reality brought about by such factors as the Japanese 
government’s financial circumstances, although they recognize that education 
expenses impose a significant burden on households. Available data have shown 
that the opinion of holding the government responsible for educational expenses 
is probably not as robust as expected by those involved in education, including 
researchers.
 Nevertheless, education expenses are weighing heavily on household finances: 
an issue that cannot be left unaddressed. Further, the anticipation of costly educa-
tion expenses could become a factor preventing people from having children. For 
example, Fumihiro Maruyama said that tuition increases certainly do not imme-
diately lead to outcomes such as deciding not to enroll in school, even while such 
increases occur annually. Households can manage their finances, as they may have 
already made (upon childbirth or, in other cases, before childbirth) long-term life 
plans, including preparations for college enrollment in anticipation of tuition fee 
increases. Considering these circumstances, cutting down on other expenses rather 
than those for education becomes a rational choice for families with children. For 
those who wish to have children in the future, reducing the number of children or 
not having children at all would be a more rational choice given the conditions, 
including educational expense burden (Maruyama, 1998). Of course, these deci-
sions perceived to be most rational from a personal viewpoint are irrational at the 
macro level as social security and welfare policies are maintained on the premise 
of the country having a certain level of working-age population. However, people 
often do not consider the broad perspective in their decision making. Even while 
they recognize the problem, their decisions would probably be based on their 
Figure Intro-4   Distribution of the Responses on Covering the Expenses for Entering 
University in the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP)
Note: Tabulated by the author based on ISSP 2006–Role of Government IV
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current living environments. A problem might be apparent in the current situa-
tion, but it will not be easily resolved until a political party promoting increased 
public spending on education wins the majority through election. As a premise of 
the debate over public spending on education, accepting the fact that people have 
such an attitude toward educational expenses is necessary. The following questions 
are crucial: Why people do not believe in increasing public spending on educa-
tion even while such spending is considerably lower than that in other countries; 
and why many Japanese do not consider providing school enrollment support to 
economically poor families, a position considered as a matter of concern in other 
countries.
(4)  Issue of National Burden
Placing more financial burden to the government is not plausible without address-
ing the current issue on Japan’s financial resources. The DPJ took over the admin-
istration by advocating waste reduction and drew the media’s attention to budget 
review and prioritization. However, the financial crisis worsened because the bud-
get review and prioritization were not done for financial retrenchment. The DPJ’s 
calculation was also too optimistic.
 Everyone understands this situation in theory, but when the government imple-
ments a program requiring a large expenditure, the funds do not materialize by 
themselves; ultimately, the people must bear the burden in the form of taxes. 
Sourcing funds, hence, becomes a difficult task. One solution is to reallocate funds 
currently allotted for another item to education. Where reallocation is not pos-
sible, increasing the national burden is the last resort. Japan’s national burden is 
small relative to its economic scale (see Figure Intro-5), and people are beginning 
to recognize this fact. “National burden” can be divided roughly into (1) tax bur-
den, such as national and local taxes; and (2) social security burden, such as pen-
sion and medical insurance. Figure Intro-5 shows the sum of these two.9
 I will discuss the national burden further in Chapter 3. The low level of Japan’s 
national burden is nothing new. This level has been consistent since the end of 
WWII. Employee benefits and women working under the gender division of labor 
are among other factors that have compensated the shortfall created by this low 
burden. In recent years, however, a trend to cut down on employee benefits has 
emerged as women’s social advancement increases and corporate competitions 
intensify owing to globalization. The difficulty currently facing society is in decid-
ing whether to build a system that will allow the government to assume employee 
benefits and the functions that have been fulfilled mainly by women since the end 
of the war.
 If the direction of not expanding the functions of the government continues, 
the likelihood of societal instability increases as social ties connecting individu-
als loosen and disparities expand. Meanwhile, people would probably want the 
current society to remain stable. Unless people are extreme anarchists, then they 
would expect the government to contribute in maintaining the status quo. A 
notion prevails that a society might fall apart unless supported by institutions and 
systems. Filling the gap left by the institutions and systems is, therefore, necessary. 
Neoliberals, hence, prefer a smaller government that emphasizes ideals such as 
familial love and patriotism. The decision to emphasize such emotional connec-
tions is often made to maintain social ties without incurring financial costs.
 Going back to the main discussion, the Japanese national burden is not heavy 
compared with other countries; in fact, it is deemed rather manageable. Nordic 
countries are often mentioned as model welfare states; without exception, these 
countries have a heavy national burden. The principle is that a citizen obtains wel-
fare services in exchange for carrying the burden. In contrast, the United States, 
which has a strong emphasis on freedom, self-responsibility, and minimal govern-
ment responsibility, has a lower national burden. Japan is similar to the United 
States in terms of national burden.
 Many people tend to remain unconvinced even after seeing the above objective 
data. This is because the objective data do not always directly reflect people’s sub-
jective (actual) perception. I will examine this scenario in Chapter 5. At any rate, 
people probably become frustrated because they cannot receive their expected 
benefits. The likelihood is high that people will understand a heavy national bur-
den only if they reap the appropriate benefits that would provide them with peace 
of mind. At this point, the core issues are the extent of people’s expectations from 
the government and the amount of burden they will pay for these expectations.
 People who criticize the government, particularly the neoliberals, have a strong 
distrust of the government. The idea is that a free market yields better results than 
the government’s artificial policies, which are seen as often wrong and leading to 
inefficient results. Based on this idea, then welfare states, such as Nordic countries, 
Figure Intro-5   Percentage of the National Burden Rate in OECD Countries 
(compared to GDP, 2010)
Source: Website of the Ministry of Finance
(http://www.mof.go.jp/budget/fiscal_condition/basic_data/201303/sy2503o.pdf )
Among 34 OECD countries, Turkey was excluded. The data for Australia and New Zealand are as of 2009.
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which have big governments, should have managed their economies inefficiently 
and be on the verge of bankruptcy. Figure Intro-6 shows, however, that the national 
burden rate and outstanding government debt are not correlated. A regression line 
was drawn to test the data, but the determination coefficient is almost zero.10 Thus, 
there is almost no relationship between the scale of government and its outstand-
ing debt. The problem lies in the people’s expectation on the balance between the 
scale of government and national burden. If their expectations are contradictory 
such that they believe the government has to fulfill certain roles and functions but 
they resist an increase in the national burden (rather than creating a small govern-
ment along the veins of pursuing non-governmental/self-help efforts and other 
options that ease the national burden), then there will be no revenue–expenditure 
balance, and the debt will bloat. While leaving this issue unaddressed may pose 
more crises, no decisive measures have been taken to date.
 Neoliberal ideas are probably difficult to implement, although many people 
have taken this position. Living without the assumption of a welfare state system is 
almost impossible since it is prevalent in people’s lives. Moreover, having an aging 
population has placed Japan in an inevitable position of requiring increased gov-
ernment spending, especially on social security. Therefore, status quo requires that 
a discussion on welfare and educational services enhancement goes hand in hand 
with increasing the national burden. The DPJ administration’s failure to identify 
wasted spending and find financial resources indicates that the budget has been 
limited and the government could not afford to cut down on other items to redi-
rect the funds to educational expenses.11 Spending on public works, which used to 
be criticized, has been greatly reduced. The adverse effect of the sudden reduction 
has become noticeable in recent years.12 This means that the root of the problem 
lies in the budget. In response to this situation, a review of viewpoints such as 
“how to reevaluate the way people view tax and their attitude as taxpayers” and 
“how to ask them to take on the national burden that is reasonable for the services 
that they demand” is ongoing (e.g., Miki, 2012: 216–219; Ide, 2013, etc.).
 This book shares a similar awareness of the issue. As we live in a modern society, 
provision for equal educational opportunities is of absolute importance. I believe 
that not being able to access the opportunity to pursue further education owing to 
various situations is undemocratic, unfair, and absurd; it is a problem that must be 
resolved. I believe that people would widely accept such value of equal educational 
opportunities as a common opinion in contemporary Japan. However, the key is 
in properly drawing people’s attention to this type of problem and eventually solv-
ing it.
2.  Can We Increase Public Spending on Education?
I have observed a strong tendency among education-related researchers and people 
involved in education who are highly aware of these problems to criticize the gov-
ernment regardless of whether the problem is a result of government inaction or 
the government representing the interest of the wealthy. The same people merely 
demand the government to increase public spending on education. I highly criti-
cize their take on the issue.
 The government is not a monolithic body. We say “the intention and will of the 
government,” but this phrase has unclear implications when closely reviewed. It 
is common for two central government agencies to have conflicting interests, and 
it is not unusual for different ministries and agencies to hold inconsistent views 
(Imamura, 2006).13 The government certainly has tremendous power; people in 
the government could possibly abuse their power to implement a policy that does 
not reflect the people’s intentions (demands). Hence, a critical look at government 
actions is indeed imperative. However, we can also demand indirectly from the 
government through our voting behaviors, which is a pillar of democracy. Unlike 
in a dictatorship, policies and businesses carried out by the Japanese government 
cannot be completely independent of the public’s demands and opinions.
 First, a simple plead to the government will not resolve the problem on increased 
public spending on education, for instance. Second, Masakazu Yano lamented a 
lack of economic perspective among educators (Yano, 2001). As pointed out ear-
lier, Japanese people do not seem to share the opinion that the government should 
cover educational expenses. A significant change to a situation is difficult to achieve 
unless people’s demands evolve. While the opinion of promoting equal educa-
tional opportunities through enhanced scholarship programs is growing among 
certain people in a society with widening disparity, the voice is occlusive. The issue 
might have gained ground among certain people, but it is surely not widely shared 
by the public. Thus, the demands to increase public spending on education have to 
reach not only the government but also society and the general public. This book’s 
mission and objective are to provide materials to initiate a discussion for such a 
Figure Intro-6   Relationship between National Burden and Outstanding 
Government Debt  (2010)
Source: OECD (2012) Economic Outlook No. 92
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progression.
 Below I explain the structure and content of this book.
 The book consists of two main parts. The first half examines the situation sur-
rounding the education policy in Japan by comparing the policy with other sub-
ject areas as well as with those in other countries. In the first chapter, I employ 
sociological theories to examine the social role of education by examining the 
functions of education in society. School education is a system that was estab-
lished at the beginning of modern times. In sociological terms, this system has 
occurred in parallel with modernization processes, such as bureaucratization of 
organizations and social division of labor. In addition, society’s central foundation 
shifted from the naturally occurring ones of family, relatives, and communities to 
artificial organizations (e.g., administrative and for-profit organizations, such as 
companies); the separation between residence and workplace has widened. Under 
these circumstances, education was given two functions that have completely dif-
ferent directions. One is the human development that enables people with dif-
ferent roles to coexist; second is the allocation of people with different abilities 
to various positions in society. Other functions of education include proving a 
person with appropriate abilities for a given position in a modern society where 
people can choose an occupation as long as they have the ability for such. To justify 
this function, the screening process needs to be transparent and convincing to 
people. While the written test-oriented education system in Japan has achieved 
this to a great extent, it has made people perceive competitions as fair. This percep-
tion, in turn, made inequality in educational opportunities less apparent despite 
its continuous existence. This resulted in a reinforced self-responsibility argument. 
I will point out the possibility that the perception “Japanese education and screen-
ing systems are fair” creates the notion that educational choice, particularly at the 
higher level, is simply a private matter; this further makes it difficult to increase 
awareness among the public even while the issue requires public support.
 In Chapter 2, I examine education that plays a social function as reviewed in 
Chapter 1 and its relationship with the state and government. In general, the 
education community is wary of governmental intervention in education; this is 
understandable considering Japanese history, particularly during the pre-WWII 
period. Nonetheless, the education system is closely related to the existence of the 
government because it is more or less financed by taxpayers’ money. First, I exam-
ine the justification for the government to maintain the education system in this 
way. I look at how the formation of the educational system had been sociologically 
examined during the establishment phase of the modern state. Then, at the end of 
the chapter, I briefly touch on neoliberalism, which is said to have a strong influ-
ence on the state, tax, and field of education in recent years.
 In Chapter 3, I will discuss social security and welfare as programs and services 
that the government undertakes in the same way as education. I describe how 
opinions are divided on where to position education: either as part of welfare or 
something completely different. I take this issue and review its financial aspects 
from the perspective of international comparison. Social security in Japan places 
a considerably disproportionate emphasis on pensions and medical care for the 
elderly while ignoring or downplaying other policies. Further, the function of 
education varies between primary/secondary education (which emphasizes equal-
ity) and higher education (which emphasizes the difference from others and the 
assignment of positions). This causes confusion when looking at the relationship 
with welfare policies. Therefore, I look at the historical data on why Japanese wel-
fare policies came to overemphasize the elderly and medical care while neglecting 
social security in other areas. I confirm that the Japanese-style welfare system has 
reached its limit owing to the globalization of the economy and women’s social 
advancement, even while it has a scheme to incorporate private sectors. I use an 
international comparison of financial data to explain the characteristics of the 
Japanese welfare system in terms of its relation and positioning in policies in other 
areas as well as in Japan within the global context.
 Chapter 4 explains the structure of people’s attitude, which is the basis for form-
ing and maintaining the social security and welfare system explained in Chapter 
3. First, as a fundamental problem, I discuss the remarkably low level of trust that 
Japanese people have for the government. Although it is not easy to identify a 
causal relationship, this lack of confidence and difficulty in raising taxes or the 
large outstanding debt generated because of the inability to raise taxes, are deeply 
related. Second, I explain that while expansion of the government’s role would 
presumably involve an increased tax burden, the connection between an increased 
burden in personal areas and the overall scale of government spending is weak 
according to the Japanese perception of education and social security system in 
general. This seems to indicate that Japanese people consider the method by which 
taxpayer money is spent as a more important concern than wanting a smaller gov-
ernment. I will further show that this does not imply that they want the scale of 
welfare to further expand and that the overall consensus to maintain the current 
state is strong. The discussion will also reveal that the attitude to public spending 
on education is not very different from that in Scandinavian countries (where the 
level of public spending on education is already high) even though the level of 
public spending on education is low based on the world standard, whereas the 
level of support for increasing public spending on education is relatively low com-
pared with other countries.
 In Part II, I focus on the financial aspects of the characteristics of Japan in rela-
tion to other countries. I examine the reasons why and how Japan has been shaped 
this way. In Chapter 5, I review the overall characteristics of Japan’s financial and 
budget system. I briefly touch on educational finance as well as children’s schooling 
expenses. In particular, I examine the function of the government’s fiscal invest-
ment and loans fulfilled under the financial structure of Japan and how it has led 
to the present budget deficit and the sense of tax burden among people. The key is 
to reevaluate the functions of the state and government. I argue the importance of 
the “public” that connects the state authority with ordinary individuals, families, 
and companies.
 In Chapter 6, I summarize the various trends related to the increase in tuition 
and school expenses by focusing on the post-WWII period. After the war, junior 
high school was established in Japan as a completely new system. As junior high 
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school became compulsory education, developing high schools was prioritized. As 
a result, public spending on higher education did not increase significantly. The 
government then adopted the beneficiary-pays principle during the crisis. This 
idea became accepted by the general public. Consequently, the soaring education 
costs were perceived as a responsibility that parents must endure but not for soci-
ety to bear.
 In Chapter 7, I point out that the glaring issue regarding the national burden. 
There is a need to find the necessary financial resources to implement social poli-
cies when economic growth slows and income growth becomes sluggish, which 
was the case after the bubble economy collapsed. As the idea of jointly providing 
support or the idea of public good remained less popular when life became seem-
ingly comfortable and equality in life conditions became available, individuals had 
become responsible for their own outcomes. Consequently, recipients of public 
assistance became a target of attack for the middle class. People interpreted edu-
cational attainment as personal investment and achievement without considering 
the social benefit aspect. I discuss this perception among Japanese people by spe-
cifically considering attitudes to several policies that the DPJ administration had 
presented. In addition, I will review the significance of the DPJ administration’s 
policies, the methods by which these policies were communicated, and the notion 
on education and government involvement.
 In Chapter 8, I examine the cause of the recent strict stance that Japanese people 
have taken against the government (government employees) through an organi-
zational sociology lens. I describe why bureaucratic organizations tend to move 
away from the public opinion as well as why the criticisms against bureaucratic 
organizations are likely related with the neoliberal standpoint. Then, I argue that 
political parties need to set forth a responsible public pledge that includes a finan-
cial source; when they do, voters’ choices will be presented. I further explain how 
the DPJ had a decent level of support based on voting behavior through the 2010 
House of Councilors election according to the results of a panel survey, albeit 
limited to the younger segment. However, a considerable number of those who 
had consistently voted for the DPJ voted for other parties in the 2010 House of 
Councilors election. In addition, I look at the favorability of political parties to 
show that it was not only the security issue (in which the difference in ideology 
between parties was clear) but also the attitude to welfare and social security that 
distinguished the favorability of parties.
 Based on the above points, I enumerate in the final chapter the key issues needed 
to be discussed in expanding the debate over public spending on education.
NOTES
1 In addition to Kenjo (2004), Hori (2009) similarly criticized the theory of collaps-
ing pension. The feature story on pensions published on the October 31, 2009 issue 
of Weekly Toyo Keizai summarizes the theory of collapsing pension and points out the 
issues.
2 The Ministry of Education (currently Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science 
and Technology) used to conduct this survey every other year. The Japan Student Services 
Organization (JASSO) has taken over the survey.
3 Although scholarships are normally provided as benefit (the Longman Dictionary 
of Contemporary English, for instance, defines it as “an amount of money that is given 
to someone by an educational organization to help pay for their education”), nearly no 
scholarships had been provided as benefits in Japan; the loan-style scholarship provided 
by the Japan Scholarship Foundation (current JASSO) has historically been recognized 
as a “scholarship.” Based on this information, I will use quotation marks when referring 
to the word scholarship. As a note, OECD statistics categorize scholarships in Japan as 
“student loans.”
4 Students in the high-income bracket do not have a repayment obligation after being 
employed as they do not need a “scholarship.” Many children do not “repay” the tuition 
paid by their parents. However, student loans or the borrowed money via the “scholar-
ship” of the low-income segment students could follow them for a long time after gradu-
ation. Further, a student’s income bracket and the ranking of the university that he or 
she enrolls in correlate; the problem becomes acute when individuals in higher income 
brackets are more likely able to enroll in universities that have competitive advantage for 
graduate employment while those in lower income brackets are more likely to enroll in 
universities with less advantage.
5 According to the OECD (2013: 178), when the year 2005 was set as the base, expense 
(spending) per person in 1995, or 10 years ago, was only 78% because although the 
total public spending on education in 1995 was 97%, the number of students was to 
1.24 times the base value. The educational expense per person increased by 1.09 times in 
2010 because the educational spending increased by 1.04 times even though the num-
ber of students declined to 96% in 2005.
6 As a note, many opposed the policy on making highways free of charge: 24% sup-
ported and 67% opposed.
7 The issue of children on the waiting list of nursery schools was becoming serious espe-
cially in urban areas owing to cash payments, such as child allowances; subsequently, a 
stronger clamor for improvement in childcare environments emerged (Nihon Saiken 
Inishiachibu, 2013: 173–180).
8 The ISSP data were obtained by downloading from the ISSP website made available 
by GESIS (social science data archive in Germany).    http://www.issp.org/index.php
9 The national burden rate is calculated by adding the tax and social security burdens 
together and dividing the total by the national income. This indicator is often used in 
Japan but it is rarely used in international comparisons. See Naruse (2001) for more 
information on this issue. The current statistics published by the Ministry of Finance 
(MOF) include not only the traditional figure divided by the national income but also 
the figure divided by the GDP. As the nature of social security is the receipt of ben-
efits in the future, discussing it only as a one-sided burden is problematic, although this 
method is possible with taxes. Naruse pointed out that individuals typically cover their 
own social security expenses unless provided by the government.
10 At 0.035, Pearson’s product-moment correlation coefficient was also at the level where 
a no correlation conclusion is feasible.
11 For example, arguments such as “cut and redirect defense spending to education and 
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welfare” were often heard during the Cold War period. These ideas may be ideological, 
but it is difficult to imagine that many people will indeed support them when the recent 
situations are taken into consideration. The judgment on whether spending is wasteful 
varies depending on the people’s viewpoints. As such, obtaining consensus on cutting 
budget items is difficult.
12 Japan had many roads built all at once during the high economic growth period. 
This means that their useful life will end almost at the same time. In fact, numerous 
piers and tunnels are said to have exceeded their service life and become dangerous in 
recent years. The fallen ceiling board accident that occurred in the Sasago tunnel on the 
Chuo Expressway in December 2012 is still fresh in people’s minds. The need for seismic 
reinforcement work on many old buildings should be recognized as well, in light of the 
increased disaster prevention awareness following the Great East Japan Earthquake in 
March 2011. A huge budget is needed to invest in these infrastructures.
13 For example, the Cabinet Office, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 
(METI), and the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) have esti-
mated the impact that the TPP (Trans-Pacific Economic Partnership Agreement) will 
have on the GDP, and while the Cabinet Office and the METI estimated a large benefit, 
the MAFF estimated a large loss, resulting in a difference that amounts to the order of 
trillions of yen (the morning edition of Asahi Shimbun, October 23, 2010). In addi-
tion, there is a fierce discussion between the MOF and the Ministry of Education, 
Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) over the budget of the MEXT. Refer 
to Chapter 3 for more on this topic.
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CHAPTER 1
Reconsidering the Social Role 
of Education
1.   Society where Education Takes Root
Education takes place in a variety of settings. It begins at home with our parents 
(or guardians) taking the role of teacher during our early formative years. Most 
children enroll in elementary school after a communal life experience in kinder-
garten and nursery school. Children experience school education as attending 
elementary and junior high schools, which is generally mandatory. Schools are 
the central place for education after enrolling in an elementary school, but other 
places to gain education include the home and local community. Individuals may 
choose to continue to an advanced school and obtain employment after gradua-
tion. At the workplace, employees often undergo in-house training. Continued 
learning is essential as technological innovations continue to evolve rapidly. A 
number of employed individuals even return to universities and technical colleges 
to continue their learning beyond graduation. Others find new hobbies or attend 
public lectures at cultural centers and local governments. As the phrase “lifelong 
learning” indicates, educational opportunities in public places for people, regard-
less of age, will certainly increase when people’s life courses diversify.
 Popular notion holds that education takes place under public organizations and 
systems (e.g., school system) and has been considered important; this notion has 
become a standard since the modernization of society. Leading a normal social life 
in a modern society requires having skills aside from basic knowledge of reading, 
writing, and arithmetic. Moreover, the importance of knowledge is increasing. 
Then again, knowledge acquisition is not necessarily confined to school atten-
dance. The school is not a place where we merely absorb knowledge. As we spend 
most of our childhood and youth in school, we also learn from extra-curricular 
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the purpose of protecting individual rights rather than certain authorities, who 
control the world as they please, has gained popularity (Omoda, 2013: 13–14). 
The call to “be vigilant watchdogs of the government” is meaningful to an extent 
because the state and bureaucracy indeed have the power over individuals, with 
many instances where individuals had no control over state power. Although the 
power of the state is tremendous, the present relationship between the govern-
ment and the people is not necessarily one-sided where the government suppresses 
the people. In another point of view, citizens (the people) pay for the government 
services, which include education, social security, and welfare. In other words, the 
government collects money from the citizens and then reallocates the funds in the 
form of direct human services or money. Hence, the operation of public school 
education is paid using such funds, which were mainly sourced from the people’s 
taxes.
 To an extent, we are inclined to believe that the government is collecting tax 
from us against our will; the government’s existence, however, is completely 
independent of us, and its responsibilities include providing such services as edu-
cation and welfare. Although such viewpoint is understandable given that taxes 
may not always be spent according to our priorities, it is still a superficial and 
problematic idea. I believe that the tendency to look at the state and individuals 
as opposing parties became strong after WWII as a response to previous circum-
stances; people were concerned about the state authority imposing its ideologies 
that strongly reflected the dominant political party’s agenda during the pre-war 
period. Nonetheless, school education was established under state authority. As 
long as the education system is organized under state authority, its curriculum and 
educational materials will never be neutral. Thus, it is necessary to examine school 
education critically with consideration for the possibility that the government and 
organizations could move away from the will of the people and become uncon-
trollable. At the same time, the demand, which is a legitimate one, has often been 
to make educational services free or inexpensive. It might sound rude, but I view 
it as making a demand to a certain type of authority: “We will not allow any inter-
vention, but pay out the money.” It would be different if Japan was under a dicta-
torship that does not reflect the will of the people; however, as long as we advocate 
for a democratic nation, we need to realize that a complaint to the government is 
also a complaint to the people (citizens). If we increase public spending on educa-
tion, we need to collect funds from the citizens in certain forms to be allocated to 
education. We would have to reallocate the funds used for other purposes to edu-
cation; if we cannot afford to do so, we have to increase the national burden. In 
this system, it is inadequate to show open hostility to the government and merely 
demand an increase in education spending as if the government is a dominative 
existence standing remotely from us. The intention of the government is not 
always unilaterally imposed on the people. It is possible, albeit indirectly, to cor-
rect the methods of the government through personal involvement. Therefore, it 
will be necessary to increase public awareness on why larger education spending is 
necessary and to have such advocacy reflected in political parties’ public commit-
ment. By increasing public awareness, it might be possible to encourage people to 
activities and school events, which are considered important in school life in 
Japan. In fact, many people have these as their fondest school life memories.
 Schools are found throughout the country. At present, a world without a school 
is no longer imaginable. Even with a declining birth rate, the number of teachers 
in 2013 was over 417,000 for elementary schools, over 254,000 for junior high 
schools, over 235,000 for high schools, close to 9,000 for junior colleges, and 
close to 179,000 for universities.1 These figures add up to over one million educa-
tors. Apart from the mandatory schools, there are vocational schools and private 
educational institutions, such as cram and prep schools. As such, school education 
has become a major source of employment as a major industry.
 If school was for simply gaining knowledge, we could say that the need to 
outsource education to institutional schools is fading owing to such factors as 
advancement in communication technology. Denying the existence of school 
is considered an extreme albeit valid opinion. As various problems emerge and 
debates are ongoing, people continue to believe in schools and seek improvement 
measures; we do not hear opinions such as “reevaluate the existence of schools 
where problems are piling up” (unless the individual is unconventional or has an 
extreme view). In other words, any discussion on education cannot ignore the 
existence of institutions and schools.
 Institutional authorities (such as both the national and local governments) typ-
ically manage the school system. Even when the operation itself is performed by 
private citizens, a certification to establish a school is issued by the government; an 
example of such certification is one that ensures the school’s legitimacy. However, 
school-like organizations and institutions could exist independently from the 
state and the government. Studying at a school gives life profound meaning, 
although in the case of studying in private school-like spaces, the meaning may 
not be recognized by society. Graduating from or completing one’s schooling has a 
social meaning only when the government has certified or established the school. 
Regardless of how we argue about the details of school education, we need to rec-
ognize that this type of institutional foundation is founded through education.
 Although I mentioned that education takes place in many settings, I will limit 
the discussion to education in public school systems. This limitation also supports 
the book’s main subject, which is looking at the dimensions of school education 
where going to school is costly even while there are public schools. Moreover, 
although the government certainly has immense power over individuals and 
private organizations, it cannot suppress and control the people under the demo-
cratic system of government. In theory, a government that reflects the people’s 
will is maintained through the voting system. Therefore, the government’s direc-
tion is not completely independent of the people’s will; certain policies also reflect 
the people’s aspirations even if only partially. In Japan, limiting the state’s power 
was a major concern as the country strived to build a post-WWII war democratic 
society, partly because state power was out of control and led to tragedies during 
the pre-war period. Consequently, the state and individuals were perceived as 
opposing parties, with the means to protect individuals from the state becoming 
the focus of discussion. Further, the concept that the state has been created for 
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Revolution owing to frequent changes in the administration, building a stable 
and peaceful society was an urgent concern. Under such circumstances, func-
tional differentiation of the entire society advanced after the Industrial Revolution 
and individual differences were emphasized. Consequently, people in a simple 
communal society led self-sufficient lives. They communicated with only the 
people around them; the types of available work were limited (roughly divided 
into farming and hunting as work is basically for securing food for survival). 
When problems arose, people addressed them on their own. Durkheim likened 
spontaneous communities to annelids. Annelids or ringed worms, which appear 
to be connected by joints, are characterized by their ability to connect because 
their “joints” have similar features. In the case of a spontaneous community, such 
community is composed of individuals who share many similar elements and, 
through kinships, one can handle an issue when it arises (i.e., regardless of who 
handles it). Durkheim likens individuals in such society to machine parts; that is, 
broken parts could be easily replaced so that the machine will operate again. As 
such, he called the people’s connection in such society a “mechanical solidarity” 
(Durkheim, 1893, trans. 1989).
 However, it became impossible for a limited number of people to perform 
everything in a modern society where economic activities had become brisker and 
complex. In addition, communities had expanded geographically. This process is 
in line with the increased bureaucracy, which Weber listed as among the charac-
teristics of modernized organizations (Weber, 1956, trans. 1960). The division of 
labor (functional differentiation) within an organization inevitably increases as 
businesses expand; one person can only handle so much. In large organizations, 
a large job can be accomplished by assigning a range of roles to individuals rather 
than having one person perform everything. In manufacturing, likewise, the divi-
sion of labor largely improves productivity and reduces the cost of training work-
ers. The so-called Ford system was created based on this idea. The above example 
shows that the overall productivity of a society in modern times increases when 
people work together and perform their own roles. Durkheim calls such domi-
nant connections of people in modern society as “organic solidarity.” Modern 
society is like a biological organism; it has internal organs with their own func-
tions and a particular organ cannot replace another. Surviving as an advanced 
biological organism becomes possible only when organs with different functions 
are combined. This “organ” is a metaphor for the various professions in a society. 
While each individual has their own profession and is devoted to a particular type 
of work, the overall performance of a society improves when individuals fully per-
form their roles corresponding to their own professions (Durkheim, 1893, trans. 
1989). However, when a large society is formed by combining different individu-
als, people usually do not think of undertaking joint work by cooperating with 
others who seem to be different from themselves because each individual’s views 
and interests are limited. This is when education becomes important. The main 
role of education is to plant seeds and nurture certain physical, intellectual, and 
moral states in children as required by society as a whole and by a part of a special 
environment within such society. This means that one’s education would help him 
support political parties that lay down such policies, thereby shaping people’s vot-
ing behavior.
2.  Modernization and Education:  
  A Sociological Look at School Education
(1)		Function	of	School	Education	in	a	Modern	Society
What is the social meaning of education?
 Socialization in the post-modern era society, compared to that in primitive 
society, is complex; the spaces for children to grow up and adults to work are 
separate. The historical development pertaining to this, as detailed in L’enfant et 
la vie familiale sous l’ancien régime by Philippe Ariès in France (1960, translated 
into English as Centuries of Childhood: A Social History of Family Life in 1962 by 
Robert Baldick), is well known among education specialists. In summary, it states 
that the modern era produced the notion of “childhood” as a growth stage as 
well as a pure and innocent existence to be protected and shaped by “adults.” The 
development of such views on children is deeply related to the establishment of 
the modern school system.
 As the urban concentration of the population intensified and factory labor 
developed into large-scale operations during the industrial revolution, adults’ 
workplace and children’s living space became separated. Consequently, the place 
for children to learn as well as master technology and knowledge by observing 
how adults work was lost. Organizations themselves became complex after the 
modern era, a wider perspective and more experiences were required at the work-
place. In sociology, we typically ask “what is modern era?” as among the main 
research subjects. In many cases, Émile Durkheim from France and Max Weber 
from Germany are studied. In particular, Durkheim personally taught educa-
tional science courses at the Sorbonne (University of Paris) and proposed educa-
tional science to shed light on education-related phenomena as social facts. He is 
regarded as the founder of educational sociology (Aso et al., 1978).
 Durkheim perused the history of school education in France and found its 
origin in Christian Sunday school. Religion functions as a mechanism for social 
integration that cohere individuals. Christian schools did not only communicate 
knowledge but also imparted holistic values that are consistent with the Christian 
doctrine; they instill these values so that people practice them in their lives. 
Schools, therefore, were created as a result of popularizing such religious beliefs. 
While local churches and temples had played a major role in maintaining the 
sense of unity among people, societal development eventually led to the creation 
of an organization called the state, which is regarded above communal societies 
that are spontaneously created, such as settlements and villages. Durkheim’s argu-
ment is that the function of popularized school is to educate people to become 
members of the state (Durkheim, 1938, trans. 1966).
 As these spontaneous communities shifted to a society centered on organiza-
tions and institutions regarded as artificial, people’s way of communicating (soli-
darity) also evolved.2 In French society, which had been unstable since the French 
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from the upper echelon right down to the bottom of society. America took the 
opposite setup where everything started with the communities, which formed 
counties and then the Federation. It can be said that the Puritans had to adapt 
to America’s setup when they settled in New England. However, it may be that 
humans could have a type of unhealthy freedom stemming from ignorance. This 
is a threat to a peaceful life, and God is opposed to such freedom. God wishes for 
us to have civil liberties and moral freedom. Therefore, according to Tocqueville, 
to obtain the knowledge provided by our ancestors to create the foundation that 
leads to obeying God and, thereby, realizing these civil liberties, people must 
establish schools in every community and require parents to send their children 
to school. To maintain the community’s philosophy, they created complete legal 
and civil service systems and imposed obligations on membership to society 
(Tocqueville, 1888, trans. 1987: Vol. 1, Chapter 2).5
 Tocqueville’s Democracy in America was originally written for French readers. 
The European societies at the time, including France, were in transition from a 
class to an equitable society (albeit at a slow pace). However, European societies 
were rooted in the aristocracy, and the nature of the aristocracy included inequal-
ity in the system. As the only way to reduce inequality was to reject the old power 
that maintained the aristocracy, it led to a violent revolution. Europeans, who 
believed in the ideals of equality, carried out the democratic revolution. However, 
they fell into a paradox where self-indulgence increased as equality was achieved; 
this paradox made it difficult to achieve a free society (Tocqueville, 1888, trans. 
1987: Vol. 2, 534–552). As such, achieving both freedom and equality is an 
extremely difficult task even though both ideals often go together as among the 
basic human rights.
 Although freedom and equality are also ideals often presented in relation to 
education, pursuing one tends to sacrifice the other. David F. Labaree classified 
the objectives of education into three points, namely, democratic equality, social 
efficiency, and social mobility (Labaree, 1997). These points represent people as 
citizens, taxpayers, and consumers, respectively. Hence, the first point refers to the 
idea that schools should strive to develop good citizens. The second corresponds 
to the notion that schools should develop individuals to become useful to society 
as workers. The third applies to the idea that people participate in friendly compe-
titions for specific and limited positions so that only competent talents are chosen. 
Through competition, people could secure opportunities available in whatever 
profession they choose regardless of their roots. While all of the three points are 
frequently noted as the objectives of education, it is impossible to achieve them all 
at the same time.
 The first objective of education during the initial developmental phase of soci-
ety would be to have all residents achieve a certain level of literacy. By doing so, 
people gain the ability to think, determine their paths, and make choices on their 
own. Having the opportunity to express opinions or undertake work alone would 
not do much unless the individual can take advantage of such an opportunity. 
Education thus provides a person with the minimum capabilities to survive in 
society.
or her reach a certain position that society requires all of its members to achieve. 
Moreover, education helps a person master the skills and knowledge necessary to 
belong to a particular group where he or she would perform a role. This point of 
view corresponds to the function of compulsory education that helps individuals 
master the minimum skills and knowledge required to live; the function of higher 
education and vocational/technical education, meanwhile, is to help individu-
als master advanced and specialized vocational skills and knowledge. Durkheim 
coined “methodical socialization (socialisation méthodique)” to refer to the process 
of guiding individuals to demonstrate their own abilities so that they take roles 
and function in a society (Durkheim, 1922, trans. 1976: 58–59).3
(2)		School	Education	in	the	Emerging	Society	in	America
A similar discussion has been developed in the United States by John Dewey, a 
distinguished philosopher and education scholar. He said “a modern society is 
many societies [that are] more or less loosely connected” (Dewey, 1916, trans. 
1975: 42). In fact, a modern society is composed of independent communities, 
such as families and relatives, local societies, occupational groups, and clubs. As 
geographical movements become active along with the development of com-
merce, communication, and transportation, among others, people and groups 
with different backgrounds begin creating even larger communities and societ-
ies. For children, learning through imitation of their parents might be sufficient 
in uncivilized, relatively homogeneous local communities. However, in a society 
composed of people with a variety of backgrounds, education facilities that offer 
a balanced environment become necessary for people to master skills for carrying 
out community life with others from all walks of life. Thus, it is essential to have 
schools as an institution to educate and train children with a purpose (Dewey, 
1916, trans. 1975).4
 Unlike Europe, America started from a blank slate where there was no social 
class system (except for the existence of Native Americans), and the availabil-
ity of vast frontiers promoted equality. In contrast, Europe needed a revolu-
tion to achieve equality because of the existence of a solid social class system. 
Thus, various types of effects (reactions) occurred as a result of the revolution. 
Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America, a book written on the premise of 
the difference between Europe and America, has been a must-read classic even 
today to understand how American society evolved (Uno, 2007). According to 
Tocqueville, among the English immigrants to America, Puritans who settled in 
New England were originally from a wealthy educated class; they abandoned their 
assets in their homeland and moved to the America with their wives and children. 
In England, they were persecuted for trying to practice their strict Christian faith. 
They traveled to America in search of a land where they could live freely and 
practice their religion. In America, their individual roots and social class were of 
no importance. Many parcels of reclaimed lands that produced products would 
have been necessary for the aristocracy to work. As such a concept did not exist in 
primitive America, they only needed their own efforts. In contrast, Europe’s polit-
ical realm (especially in France) assumed a scenario where information traveled 
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demands of the middle class (Labaree, 1997).
(3)		American-Style	Liberalism	and	the	Education	Philosophy
In the United States, there are dynamic discussions over freedom, a concept 
rooted in their history since the country’s founding. Opinions on the govern-
ment are divided as well in terms of whether the form of government leads to 
oppression of or a means to freedom. Liberalism is applied in the opposite way 
in Europe. Policies against laissez-faire, such as aiding the underprivileged or the 
so-called welfare, are considered means to guarantee freedom and promote the 
formation of a group of Democratic Party supporters. This is the idea of liberal-
ism (Watanabe, 2010).6 This means that while we tend to perceive being liberal 
entails blocking the state from interfering with individuals, the United States 
government takes a role to ensure the freedom of every citizen. From this stand-
point, freedom is not merely self-indulgence or being selfish. In financial terms, 
it is true that the spending on welfare initiatives is small in the United States; the 
country might not qualify as a welfare state. The United States also often takes a 
stance to minimize regulations on economic activities. However, as pointed out 
by Shogo Takegawa, the United States is characterized by its extreme sensitivity 
to equal opportunity and numerous regulations that strictly prohibit discrimina-
tion against demographics, such as race, gender, age, and people with disabilities 
(Takegawa, 2007: 42).
 Establishing regulations may cost less than offsetting manifested disparities 
through redistribution. However, the laws and regulations for equal opportunity 
are not necessarily inadequate in Northern European countries with a big govern-
ment. Rather, thes differences in stance indicate the differences in philosophies on 
freedom and equality among countries (or societies). Although it depends on the 
definition of a welfare state, saying that the United States is not a welfare state by 
only looking at its financial output could be a hasty conclusion. While a regula-
tory welfare state and a welfare state with generous benefits are not necessarily in 
a trade-off relationship, issues in Japan are clearer when we explore Japan’s stand-
point through an international comparative view.
 The idea of public management where a modern state governs and understands 
all citizens—i.e., the idea to try to prevent problems and diseases, such as the con-
cept of public health and public education—emerged in Europe and later came 
to the United States. However, Americans have been very cautious of state control 
since gaining independence; freedom has been highly celebrated.7 It was not until 
around the mid-19th century when public education was established as a sys-
tem. Horace Mann, who played a central role in the common school movement 
in America and became the education secretary in Massachusetts, believed that 
humans intrinsically had a moral conscience, and education systems should be 
developed to help children exhibit such conscience. He reasoned that it was nec-
essary to finish forming their personality before children become adults because 
adult minds are considered “iron molds” and lack flexibility (Tanaka, 2005: 
194–213).
 Being successful in American society is linked to an economic advancement. As 
 However, as education becomes widespread and ubiquitous in a society, and 
the content of study also becomes advanced, differences in abilities and prefer-
ences among people naturally become evident, and their needs diversify accord-
ingly. The educational level and the specifics of study subjects that the labor 
market requires also diversify. The education system responds to these needs to 
save people from the risk of unemployment; however, there will be differences in 
wages and salaries in the labor market based on job description and social status. 
The function of education at this point is to highlight the differences in abilities 
and skills among people rather than bring everyone to the same level. On the one 
hand, this is generally described in a positive picture when emphasizing the aspect 
of bringing out the differences in abilities. On the other hand, it has a negative 
image when these differences are directly linked to, for instance, disparities in sal-
ary in the labor market.
 We cannot overlook education’s disadvantageous aspect, which differentiates 
individuals by salary; however, the notions such as “instilling similar values and 
knowledge within the same community” tend to be emphasized in education. 
The contradiction in the objectives of education is evident in these aspects. If 
education helps people obtain a desirable social status, people will try to obtain a 
higher education. Common phrases such as “others cannot do this, but I can” and 
“I graduated from a more prestigious school than others” are applicable to situ-
ations where education and educational attainment are useful at the individual 
level. High wage and status are guaranteed because the person has advantage over 
others. As such, people compete to get into prestigious schools. In certain cases, 
a school’s overall quota for new students is increased in an attempt to loosen the 
admission criteria because of fierce competition. However, another criterion 
would be created, and the competition once again becomes fierce for that small 
quota. This is what happens in the ever-changing nature of competition in Japan. 
Everyone aims for the same kind of affluent life and strives to go to college, as 
college education is valued. This attitude intensifies the competition in college 
entrance examinations, leading to the negative effect that the college admis-
sion quota is increased to solve the problem (i.e., the enrollment rate increases). 
Choosing another college becomes the next problem. If such competition is 
unavoidable, surviving the competition becomes a serious concern for the edu-
cation-obsessed middle class. The middle class concern basically lies in the desire 
for distinction rather than achievement of equality. As people in the middle class 
are considered major taxpayers, they demand an education that is suitable to their 
needs, claiming that they are taxpayers. This is, however, contrary to the prin-
ciple of equality. While public schools have focused on creating the first common 
and equal education, those in the middle class who are disappointed with public 
schools, which fail to meet their needs, opt to attend private schools. As such, it 
is possible that those who attend private schools become increasingly dissatis-
fied with paying taxes for public schools as they do not benefit from such schools 
directly. The current educational reform focuses on the efficiency aspects and 
consumers of education services; we are faced with a difficult question as to how 
we maintain the democratic equality of public education while responding to the 
People’s Attitude and the State of Policy Regarding Education Spending30 Reconsidering the Social Role of Education 31
liberalism, however, lost its credibility owing to the recession during the 1970s. 
Low-cost new capitalism was preferred as there was not much difference between 
how both viewed the role of government.
 New ideas such as government-managed society and economic democracy 
emerged as a response to the recession. Both ideas criticized new capitalism and 
welfare-state liberalism, saying that these represent the interests of specific groups. 
New capitalism focused on increasing the safety of individuals and distributing 
economic growth to bring social harmony among various unequal populations. 
This could be achieved when people in various sectors collaborate while the gov-
ernment’s administrative agencies engage in management based on technology 
and expertise. Once the mechanism starts to work and generates benefits for the 
wider population, it is highly likely to result in an ironic ending by retrogressing 
against social harmony because people often assume an even more personal atti-
tude. As capitalistic activities (excluding the process until obtaining benefits) are 
for one’s self and family, people are prone to think that the benefit they obtain is 
attributed to their own achievement and performance. Meanwhile, welfare-state 
liberalism emphasizes the empowerment and enabling of citizens to participate 
in new systems while questioning the government-managed style in the context 
of bureaucracy restricting freedom. Nevertheless, both new ideas ended up rely-
ing on experts because the important question of whether the people have proper 
management skills remains; in terms of being expert-dependent, both are similar 
(Bellah et al., 1985, trans. 1991: 310–327).
 Americans are fundamentally skeptic toward the government’s power because 
of historical events since the country’s independence. Therefore, it was rare for 
them to grant public authority or objectives to the government. For example, the 
introduction of Medicare, a publicly funded health insurance for the elderly and 
disabled, saved many people. However, the federal government was faced with the 
need to reevaluate its priorities as regards healthcare facilities as well as implement 
various adjustments because taxpayers criticized the abuse of the system. This is 
among the reasons the United States federal government collects various data. The 
government is supposed to make a new decision based on data; however, when 
there is no common moral foundation on which people base their decisions, it 
becomes difficult to only hold a public debate over such matters as what is the 
objective of such a system, who pays for it, and what parts should be regulated 
(Bellah et al., 1991, trans. 2000: 24–26).
 Looking back on the history of how such individual freedom and the nature 
of the public are balanced, we can see that individual demand is especially grow-
ing in recent years. This growth shakes the viability of the common foundation in 
society. James Coleman summarized and identified four elements of the equality 
of educational opportunity, a concept that has been shared by Americans for a 
long time. The first element indicates that anyone can receive an appropriate edu-
cation to enter the labor market at no cost. The second posits that anyone can take 
classes under the same curriculum regardless of social background. Third, indi-
viduals with different backgrounds learn in the same location at the same time. 
Lastly, as long as public education is paid from the taxes, the same education is to 
many Americans work at companies and public institutions, instead of profiting 
from personally managed stores and farms, an economic advancement (obtain-
ing profit through work) does not always result directly and immediately in per-
sonal happiness. Being successful on the job means helping the company’s profit 
increase and moving up the social hierarchy of the company. However, devoting 
oneself to work for this purpose does not always coincide with the goal of spend-
ing time and developing a good relationship with one’s family.
 Meanwhile, the characteristics of individualism include maintaining one’s dif-
ference from other people and isolating oneself from family and friends. While 
individuals might be able to create a small society according to their own tastes, 
this behavior tends to make them indifferent to outer society. In this way, indi-
viduals are trapped in their own minds. Such a contradiction exists between the 
personal pursuit of economic interests and individualism. According to Robert 
N. Bellah and others, participation in religion and voluntary democratic activities 
amends the contradiction between the two. Moreover, those organizations and 
activities move against the tendency of the centralized government to tighten its 
regulative and administrative controls (Bellah et al., 1985, trans. 1991: 26–45).
 In the United States, a conflict between establishment and populism over 
visions for the public good emerged during the period between the 1880s and the 
First World War. The establishment was associated with the elite group, which 
built a network by providing funds to private institutions, such as universities, 
hospitals, and museums. Meanwhile, populism stressed an egalitarian ethos. 
According to the populism of Thomas Jefferson, America’s third president, citi-
zens have the wisdom to decide on their own. Both sides, however, recognize that 
the industrial as well as enterprise economy community needed to be included in 
public morals and order. Progressivism, a political reform movement in the early 
20th century, attempted to build a community by borrowing visions from both 
sides. This movement thought that government intervention was necessary for 
public interest because market fundamentalism, which would widen the disparity 
and divide public society further, could not be trusted. As such, people expected 
the government to improve the healthcare and education sectors as well as regu-
late large corporations for public interest. They emphasized rationality and science 
to advocate for public management, such as social engineering that will promote a 
more efficient national society.
 Subsequently, visions such as new capitalism and welfare-state liberalism 
emerged from the enterprise economy, which collapsed owing to the Great 
Depression. Under new capitalism, which Reagan later emphasized, the govern-
ment’s purpose is to protect peace and security necessary for people to engage in 
economic activities for their own and their family’s benefit. Welfare-state liberal-
ism, a movement rooted in Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal policies that 
allowed government intervention in the market, considers sharing the benefit 
of economic growth as a public good. This means that the government must 
promote economic growth and ensure a fair opportunity for people to reap its 
benefits. Both welfare-state liberalism and new capitalism believe that the govern-
ment exists so that individuals could pursue their personal agenda. Welfare-state 
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which were not directly linked to the social class system, was already established 
under the philosophy of economic success (Kariya, 2004: 62–69).
 Takehiko Kariya examined the educational ideology of Lester Frank Ward, 
one of the founders of American sociology. Kariya identified an indication for the 
view “there is no relationship between specific social categories (race, gender, etc.) 
and genetic abilities,” an idea widely shared in today’s education community. At 
the time, the opposite view that race, gender, and class were genetically related to 
intellectual ability was dominant. Today, such a view is seen as discrimination. 
According to Kariya, Ward denied the differences in ability by social category and 
adopted the environment theory: differences in ability by individual exist, but 
the ultimate difference in intellectual ability is overwhelmingly affected by the 
environment.
 Ward believed that the apparent difference in intelligence by class, race, and 
gender is due to the difference in the environment in which people are placed, 
rather than a difference in genetic ability; thus, educational intervention is not 
useless (Kariya, 2004: 132–144). To guarantee the freedom of choice allow-
ing individuals to become anything they want, common education, rather than 
a profession-specific apprenticeship, must be provided for as long as possible. 
Education also helps individuals consider and discover their identity. Education 
in America evolved through a repeated trial and error in an attempt to achieve 
the values of freedom and equality, which at time come in conflict (Kariya, 2004: 
340–348).
 Although the difference is gradually fading in recent years, school education 
systems in Europe and the United States differed previously. A multi-track school 
system fully corresponds to the structure of external social hierarchy by branch-
ing off to multiple courses at the early stage upon admission so that the range 
of schools one can advance to is determined based on one’s course. However, in 
modern times, education cannot be divided into courses at the primary school 
stage where common education is provided. A relatively common system is the 
branched type where the schools for advancing to college are clearly separated 
from those for obtaining employment; this separation occurs at the secondary 
education stage, which comes after the compulsory education. Germany and pre-
WWII Japan are examples of countries that applied the branched school system. 
The United Kingdom had previously used this type of system as well. Meanwhile, 
a single-track school system allows individuals to advance to a higher level regard-
less of schooling stage as long as they want to advance and then pass the exam. 
This type of system is applied in the United States and post-WWII Japan.
 Ralph H. Turner noted that the range in which competition and social mobi-
lization can occur is extremely limited under the multi-track and branched types 
because the competition takes place within particular classes or among those who 
advance to higher education as a matter of course. Turner called such mobilization 
patterns “sponsored mobility.” In contrast, in “contest mobility” under the single-
track type, competition is always open to all classes, and it is easy for competition 
and social mobilization to penetrate throughout society, including its adverse 
effects (Turner, 1960). Such differences in education systems reflect historical 
be made available in the given area (Coleman, 1968).
 As mentioned earlier, there is a strong trend that educational policies and 
reforms are based on the market-oriented principle. These policies and reforms 
try to restore confidence and improve public schools to fulfill fundamental indi-
vidual demands. Despite respecting the free choices of individuals, it prompts a 
question of why such schools must be paid using public funds. The principle of 
public education includes important objectives such as forming the foundation 
for a common community. This particular objective, however, does not fit into 
the economic aspect of utilizing education in the labor market. This is related to 
the third and fourth elements of Coleman’s definition. Thus, schooling (espe-
cially basic education) needs to be provided publicly and operated using public 
funds. Education is one of the few services in the United States that people con-
sider should be provided for free (operated using public funds). It can also be 
interpreted that this reasoning is valued all the more because American society 
is composed of people with various backgrounds. Introducing excessive market 
principles would naturally lead to considerable disparities and, as a result, could 
create social divide. I have mentioned earlier that it is impossible to achieve 
simultaneously and adequately the three objectives of education listed by Labaree 
(democratic equality, social efficiency, and social mobility). Ultimately, the only 
way is to find the balance among the three while maintaining the premise that we 
are all standing on a common social foundation; promoting one thing could dis-
tort the way education should be.
(4)		School	Systems	and	the	Societal	Role	of	Education
The establishment of educational institutions has become an essential require-
ment for the modern state. Schools under a state are the mechanism and institu-
tion for instilling common knowledge, skills, and morals, among others, to its 
members. At schools, people socialize as citizens of the state through a common 
language for the purpose of promoting social control (Mori, 1993; Takegawa, 
2007: 225–226).
 In Europe, connecting people beyond the social class system and forming a 
society took time even while it was possible to unite social classes and professional 
groups based on similar interests through the school institutions that had been 
developed early on. The main purpose of education at the time was to commu-
nicate religious doctrine, but school was not the only means for education.8 The 
first compulsory education system was established in Prussia in 1717; according 
to Ikuo Amano, it was strictly for the purpose of developing loyal subjects to the 
state and king, and it was separate from the secondary education for training 
elites. Separating primary from secondary education in this way was similar with 
the case in France (Amano, 2006: 94–97).9 The idea that one can gain knowledge 
through education and use this to obtain higher status and economic benefits did 
not appear in these circumstances.
 The United States, meanwhile, was different from Europe in that the former 
started by building a single-track education system available to all. This was 
because educational institutions from primary and secondary to higher education, 
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struggle to put food on the table each day and a society where people lead a mod-
erately comfortable life, notwithstanding social disparities. Empirically and sta-
tistically, it is not that there are many people who are recreating the occupational 
class in the true sense (i.e., an individual is taking up exactly the same occupa-
tion as his/her parents). Although disparities are much debated, questions such 
as “why is it important to eliminate disparities?” are being raised but only a few 
people address it. In the field of social hierarchy research, scholars commonly 
posit that inequality in education opportunities by social class still remains in 
Japan. However, many people in Japan believe that the issue of structural inequal-
ity and disparity is not accurately understood or even not socially necessary to be 
resolved. We are faced with the need to examine the cause for such a view as well 
as the structure and mechanism of people’s social perception (Kondo, 2001a).
(2)		Japanese	People’s	Sense	of	Injustice	as	regards	Educational	Attainment
According to Hiroyuki Kondo (2001a; 2002), who analyzed the Social 
Stratification and Social Mobility Survey in 1995 (the SSM Survey)10 data, many 
Japanese believe that there is unfairness in Japanese society based on educational 
attainment. Many people have said it is unfair that “life is largely determined by 
what kind of school you graduated from.” Meanwhile, others find it absurd to 
think that educational attainment, which is merely one indicator, is overrated and 
used for determining everything in life. What about opinions such as “educational 
attainment fairly reflects the person’s ability” and “academic performance and 
educational attainment depend on how much effort the person put in”? Normally, 
it would make sense to think that determining a person’s life based on the school 
he/she graduated from is unfair because “educational attainment does not reflect 
[one’s] true ability” and “whether the person put effort does not matter.” Thus, 
those who believe that there is unfairness based on educational attainment should 
more likely oppose the latter two opinions. Yet, the responses to both of these 
items did not differ whether they thought there was unfairness based on educa-
tional attainment: 40% agreed with the former whereas about 60% agreed with 
the latter.
 Kondo found that being unable to continue education owing to the economic 
environment at home was a common occurrence as the disparity between the 
rich and the poor in Japan was larger at the time. Therefore, the story about being 
unable to pursue education even though the person is adept was frequently heard. 
The perception that “educational attainment does not equal capability” was also 
widely shared. However, as most people now attend high school and those who 
do not continue their education after graduating from high school are becoming 
a minority, cases of being unable to continue education despite personal capabil-
ity have become exceptions and are unlikely to be perceived to occur universally 
across societies. As the perception that educational attainment reflects personal 
capability becomes more common, we need to recognize the possibility that 
people are gaining a sense of educational attainment-based unfairness from a dif-
ferent angle. A further review of the same SSM Survey data in terms of status and 
allocation of economic resources showed that highly educated young people are 
backgrounds; people’s views on school education and expectation on the function 
of school education are also based on such historical backgrounds.
3.   Reconsidering the Social Function of Education
(1)		Equalization	and	Human	Resource	Allocation
Education was once regarded as the symbol of hope among people. This is because 
obtaining education was a means to rise in a society when the entire society was 
poor. In fact, this is still true in poor societies in developing countries. Many 
private organizations are providing a variety of aid to help build schools and 
spread school education. However, such knowledge was reexamined in a society 
where school education became ubiquitous. In the modern era, going to school 
has become mandatory instead of a choice. Managing a school attended only by 
those who want to attend is relatively easy. As students consist of individuals who 
are highly motivated to learn to begin with, it is not necessary to question the 
rationale for learning. Students’ strong desire to learn even overpowers the teach-
ers’ shortcomings. However, as Teruyuki Hirota stated, school education in post-
modernization has become a tool for forcing all children to learn whether they 
like it or not. Therefore, it became necessary to design teaching techniques that 
will rouse interest and motivation among unmotivated students. The tendency 
to consider popularized school education as commonplace in today’s educational 
settings presents us with extremely difficult tasks. The emerging educational issues 
are not necessarily simple, such as the deteriorated leadership of teachers (Hirota, 
2009: 96–98). Leaving these issues unaddressed will cause people to lose confi-
dence in school education.
 Paradoxically, school education is a mechanism not only for equalization but 
also for differentiation from others. Those who perceive education in a utopian 
way tend to ignore this differentiation function. Through education, people can 
increase their income or obtain a higher position from the advantage of receiv-
ing better education or graduating from a more prestigious school. Without this 
aspect, people would have never realized the importance of the role and function 
of education. In the field of pedagogy, we are used to discussions that critically 
view how school education facilitated the choices of whether to pursue higher 
education and what occupation to pursue. However, school education would not 
have become popular if education did not have such a function (Hirota, 2004: 
12–14). Moreover, if education did not have the sorting function that allocates 
people to various occupations when modern society evolved to a society of divi-
sion of labor, then school education in society would have no reason to exist 
(Kondo, 2001a). The criticism on the sorting function of school education was 
strong that it restrained, if not creating a taboo, the questions on the relationship 
between education and occupation in Japan. As a result of this criticism, schools 
stopped actively pursuing vocational education, and the perception that knowl-
edge taught in school education is useless widely spread.
 People’s attitude to disparities and class structure as well as awareness of the 
problems would certainly differ between a society with many poor people who 
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according to one’s academic ability in the same school or students who are behind 
in class are chosen for tutoring sessions, people viewed it as “providing special 
treatments to particular students” or “discrimination because it has been embar-
rassing to be seen as an incapable child.” Arguments such as “entrance exami-
nations should be completely abolished” and “an integrated selection system11 
should be introduced” emerged in the education community in the past to elimi-
nate the difference in treatment as well as the sense of discrimination triggered by 
such differences. In such a society, equal outcomes refer to the state in which the 
differences in treatments themselves or the systems that create differences in treat-
ments are eliminated.
 In American society where people have diverse backgrounds, equal outcome 
is achieved when social attributes are taken into consideration and the difference 
in school enrollment and graduation rates based on social category (e.g., race and 
gender) is eliminated. Many systems, such as affirmative action,12 had prompted 
various debates over the opportunities needed to achieve such equal outcomes. 
More debates on how these specific measures achieve equal outcomes also 
emerged.
 However, the above standpoint on achieving equal outcomes has not yet 
reached Japan’s general public. As people are concerned with implementing 
entrance exams under the same conditions, examination estimations or data 
are unavailable for examining whether students’ background and environment 
are equal. People also tend to focus on shallow discussions such as aiming for a 
reduction in the competition and consideration of a wide range of personalities 
as regards entrance examination reform. As such, people perceive equal outcome 
as “providing standardized education service”; arguments such as “this type of 
‘equal outcome’ violates equal opportunity (i.e., takes away the opportunity from 
capable students)” thus go unchallenged (Kariya, 2004: 349–354).
(3)		Equality	Debates	and	Public	Education	that	Accounts		
for	Individual	Potential
Further, if we consider the capability approach conceived by Amartya Sen, we can 
understand that treating everyone in the same manner in an educational setting 
does not necessarily signify equality (Miyadera, 2006: 5–7).
 Sen’s argument can be explained in the following situation. Assuming there 
is an extremely poor village and we provided home appliances to them as aid. 
However, electricity is not available in the village or no one can explain how to use 
these appliances. In such a situation, the aid becomes useless. Therefore, before 
providing such aid, it is necessary to first make the electricity available and provide 
education to enable them to explain how the items can become useful. Simply 
handing them whatever we think is good for them will not immediately provide 
benefits. Unless we understand the environment and situations of the recipients 
and provide aid based on such understanding, the benefits would be wasted.
 As such, providing a place where anyone can take the exam would not guaran-
tee equal education opportunity. In an extreme example, making arrangements 
for an identical examination venue for blind people to take the same test as people 
becoming more likely to believe that performance should be emphasized; more 
than half of university graduates think this way. In the past, highly educated 
people were more sensitive to social inequality. (They were also more knowl-
edgeable and aware of Japan’s social inequality. During those times, it was easy 
to identify the people who were unable to pursue education because of the clear 
disparity in wealth.) As such, it would have been difficult for them to conclude 
that performance should be emphasized. Meanwhile, those who were not highly 
educated might say “look at the true capability (performance) rather than edu-
cational attainment, given the cases [where] people could not pursue education 
despite having the capability.” However, such perception will no longer work once 
the view that “educational attainment equals performance” becomes dominant. 
Hence, the number of those who support the emphasis on performance will not 
increase among the less educated people (Kondo, 2001a; 2002).
 The specifics of equal opportunity are not straightforward when fairness of 
competition is considered. When we say “provide equal opportunities,” we tend 
to imagine doing so in the exact same manner. Although not inherently incorrect, 
it usually refers to the condition where a system is established to guarantee oppor-
tunities for everyone without discriminating based on race, origin, age, and gen-
der. In the case of entrance exams, it would mean that everyone has the right to 
take without conditions (except for completion of a certain school level). Further, 
the entrance examination system in Japan has been using a method of administer-
ing a simultaneous written test in a fairly uniform and controlled environment 
(although it has become more diversified). While the entrance exam is a type of 
competition, extensive considerations have been given to ensure that the condi-
tions of the competition are completely identical.
 In reality, however, students have countless differences in their respective back-
grounds. These include the differences in the type of home environment one grew 
up in, educational resources the parents have provided to the child, and quality 
of education one has received. These differences could work against the students 
entering the competition. The simultaneous written exam masks these differences 
in the students’ previous environmental conditions while giving a strong impres-
sion of equality among exam takers. As a result, the exam’s outcome is seen as a 
reflection of the person’s capability and effort. It would not be surprising if the 
so-called winners in Japan’s educational attainment-oriented society overlook 
their own privileged circumstances and believe that they “win” because of their 
effort and talent and that those who “lost” are responsible of their own defeat. 
Hence, winning a competition becomes one’s own merit and losing a competition 
becomes one’s own responsibility. This perception might be spreading as people 
enjoy a seemingly comfortable life. It has become difficult to see the differences 
in people’s lives. This standpoint could also be among the reasons for the indiffer-
ence of people to debates over disparity in society.
 According to Takehiko Kariya (1994; 1995; 2004), “equality” in the context 
of educational settings in Japan means “equal treatment”; conversely, providing 
different treatments in an educational setting results in discrimination. Although 
resistance seems to have faded, especially when classes are held separately 
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For instance, being thorough on institutional equality resulted in making people 
psychologically feel that everyone can access higher education. Although entrance 
exam competitions were often considered negative, they might have increased 
the overall school enrollment rate in the country and raised the overall education 
level of Japanese people. In addition, Japan is characterized by a small variance in 
scores even while international comparisons of academic abilities tend to always 
look only at average scores. This indicates that there are no (or very few) outliers 
in both directions. It might be related to the assessment that we lack creativity in 
the sense that there are only few exceptionally talented individuals. The fact that 
only a few are exceptionally untalented is directly linked to the confidence that 
the level of knowledge and skills of the general public has met the standard set by 
employers; it might be that producing a high-quality labor force has contributed 
to Japan’s post-war economic growth to a certain extent.
 This slightly digresses from the issue but is nonetheless worth discussing. 
Japan’s percentage of spending on education relative to its GDP is not necessarily 
low when the data are limited to primary and secondary education, although it 
is still generally small. Indeed, the success in focusing on primary and secondary 
education played a role in Japan’s post-war economic development. The return on 
investment of primary and secondary education is high because, in general, the 
level of society as a whole likely rises when education becomes well established 
from the bottom up as well as when secondary education is emphasized over 
higher education, and so on. Therefore, the policy to allocate more of the limited 
resource to primary and secondary education is, in fact, valid (Ichikawa, 2000: 
11). Emphasis on primary and secondary education could be evidence of the 
Japanese philosophy that “everyone is to be treated the same” in a broad sense.
 There is the possibility that the Japanese education system, which tirelessly pur-
sues equal treatment, affects the public perception of education. For example, the 
examination system, with which we are obsessed in making uniform and identical 
to the point of neurosis, tends to attribute success as one’s merit and consider fail-
ure as one’s responsibility. That is, the student is responsible for whatever outcome 
of the exam given that everyone has taken the exam under the same conditions. 
When the trend is to recognize even a slightest difference in treatment at school as 
“discrimination (special treatment),” it is only natural that parents would want to 
provide their own child the same education as others. In fact, we often hear this 
statement from parents: “I am doing this for my child because other families are 
doing it as well.” This type of psychological pressure to provide a treatment similar 
to that given to other children expanded education and created a mass education 
society in Japan after WWII (Kariya, 1995; 1998). Such circumstances created 
a moral tone that it is a standard or a parent’s obligation to strain themselves to 
pay for school and allow their children to pursue education. As a result, statistics 
show that we are in an era where anyone can pursue higher education; therefore, 
whether one is able to advance to higher education or student performances dif-
fer, the individual is responsible for obtaining the best education. In addition, as 
pursuing higher education is paid using private funds and this makes the person 
think that “I paid for it on my own,” people are led to think that it is appropriate 
without disabilities and then saying “we provided an equal place” would be com-
pletely irrational and hardly acceptable. Examinations for students with disability 
are administered by providing appropriate measures (assistance) while still fol-
lowing the standard testing conditions. This scenario would hardly be considered 
unfair or reverse discrimination.
 Nonetheless, providing formal equality could actually lead to discrimination 
in certain cases. The full meaning of equal education in educational settings in 
Japan is often not discussed in depth. The way schools in Japan handle children 
of newcomers (different ethnic groups that newly came to Japan) ended up high-
lighting the issue of superficial equality in education in Japan. Misako Nukaga 
compared schools in Japan and the United States, with a focus on the difference 
in how teachers handle students from ethnic minorities. The resources provided 
by teachers (school) include physical ones, such educational materials, cultural 
ones related to the lecture style, and relational ones that relate to students’ sense of 
belonging to the school, motivation, and friendship. In the United States, ethnic 
minorities often have difficulties with the language and the diversity. At the same 
time, the pressure to improve academic abilities is increasing in each school in 
America; students with ethnic minority origins need to show results efficiently 
within a limited time. Hence, teachers focus first on the physical resources; they 
interact with the students individually under a limited scope while focusing on 
providing educational materials suitable to their needs. This practice is partly 
driven by the curricular and educational reform in the United States in recent 
years. However, we can presume that it strongly reflects their philosophy on 
equality, which is providing what is suitable to one’s need and personality with 
respect to individual differences.
 In contrast, teachers in Japan pay attention to how those minorities blend 
into the group of school children. Teachers focus on allocating the relational and 
cultural resources by arranging a setting for classmates to support the minority 
student on purpose or mentioning the home country of the minority student, 
among others. However, the allocation of cultural resources is considered lim-
ited as the pace of lessons does not change at all; minority students participate in 
group activities with natural-born students. Further, the same teaching materials 
are provided to both minority and other students. This indicates that the teach-
ers would not provide any special treatment noticeable enough to other children 
because, in Japan, it is of foremost importance not to be left out from the group; 
relationships among school children are emphasized. Special teaching materials 
are not provided because the allocation of physical resources would be noticeable 
as differential treatment. However, while keeping the same physical resources, 
teachers device various plans to help minority students obtain scores that are not 
far from those of other students. As Japan’s school culture values relationships 
among children, these types of responses by teachers and schools are not necessar-
ily unreasonable (Nukaga, 2003). This study, hence, poses the question whether 
affirming (not recognizing) the difference as a difference and insisting that formal 
equality is truly fair.
 Of course, there may be cases in which this formal equality has been successful. 
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the idea of institutionalized private affairs; it is also considered an act of exercising 
the right to choose an education that is desirable from the parents’ perspective. 
However, when the policymakers proposed it as the introduction of school choice 
system, people interpreted it arbitrarily; they opposed the idea and regarded it as 
privatization of education in which people merely consume simple educational 
services, however similar the idea was with the joint nursery creation movement 
in which parents could choose their own child’s education (Kurosaki, 1999).
 Such an argument works on the assumption that there is a certain public entity 
other than the state authority and that education is realized when the entity 
becomes independent of the state (Miyadera, 2006: 192–194). However, ques-
tions arise on the nature of the public entity that rises above the state and the pro-
cess by which a certain entity other than the state and government could possibly 
collect resources from people to operate schools. In theory, however, volunteers 
could gather and establish a school, but the operating income of such schools 
must rely on tuition. In such a case, these entities would have to increase tuition 
drastically to collect the amount of money required for labor and school opera-
tion. Hence, people’s opportunity to go to school depends on their ability to pay. 
As sending all children to school is a matter of principle in a civilized society, it 
is not realistic to collect huge tuition from individuals (especially with respect to 
variety in individual backgrounds). At the core of the issue is whether it is logi-
cal to share the burden only among beneficiaries or among members of society 
in general, given that the overall running cost will be the same as long as school 
education exists. If it is unreasonable to share the burden only among beneficia-
ries, the only way to operate is to use funds such as taxes. When this happens, no 
agency other than the state (government) seems capable of systematically collect-
ing taxes and reallocating funds.
 Further, there is no guarantee that a school the citizens themselves create would 
become valuable to society. Those involved in such a school-launching move-
ment are often people from a higher social class enjoying social privileges. While 
it might meet their interests, there is no guarantee that it will result in creating a 
school that upholds the common public interest. The school management must 
be centered on a group of guardians who take charge. This type of civil move-
ments that criticize schools should not assume “strong children” of “strong citi-
zens” (Hirota, 2004: 37).
 In Japan, people are sensitive to the issue of state control over education 
because of circumstances in pre-WWII education. It seems futile to look at the 
state and the government as the enemy as if the leaders live completely isolated 
from the general public and operate the country with completely different values 
from those of the general public.13 The debate over education spending also seems 
to claim that the government, which is considered separate from public existence, 
should assume more of the burden. However, the source of funds for public edu-
cation is tax paid by the people; how the fund is spent is determined completely 
independently of the people’s needs. Although this is not limited to education 
spending, people have a strong inclination to think that financial affairs are some-
body else’s problem despite advocating democracy. I will reevaluate this issue in 
to attribute the merit to the individual. Further, educational choices are also 
regarded as a private matter and the public meaning becomes less visible under an 
overall privatization trend.
 Many people, hence, understand the social meaning of education only in the-
ory. However, there are not many situations where one sees such social meaning 
in Japan.
(4)		The	Meaning	of	the	Government’s	Involvement	in	Education
The following discussions are educational administration scholar Isao Kurosaki’s 
summary on the public nature of education as discussed in the field of educa-
tional administration and general pedagogy in Japan. Education is not originally 
a state’s monopolistic business; it was widely recognized as citizens’ freedom. 
However, as the educational activities of the organization called the school have 
an extreme impact on national society, the state and local public organizations are 
held accountable for school education activities. Schools are also established only 
by the state, local public organizations, and school corporations. This is the pub-
lic nature of education in terms of legal interpretation. Meanwhile, the private 
nature of education is also emphasized with consideration for the historical risk 
of education being placed under state control for political purposes. Therefore, 
people begin claiming that they (or their guardians) can determine on their own, 
with appropriate provision of information, which school to attend. Public and 
private education do not necessarily conflict each other; rather, the public is 
responsible for establishing a foundation that will allow the people to accomplish 
private educational endeavors. Developing such philosophy further leads to the 
conclusion that “public education is an institutionalization of private matters,” as 
proposed by prominent pedagogy scholar Teruhisa Horio. It is a pole for building 
a new public nature rather than leaving private matters private. Receiving the type 
of education that allows people to achieve these private matters would be regarded 
as a human right.
 Although the board of education system modeled after the American one was 
adopted after WWII, the popular election system, which was the popular control 
principle of the board of education, was abolished. Subsequently, “reactionary” 
movements gradually became conspicuous. The field of educational administra-
tion in Japan led by Seiya Munakata called themselves “anti-educational admin-
istration.” This administration was more inclined to the legal interpretation 
and rights arguments in opposing the unfair intervention in education by the 
State and the Ministry of Education; its approach blocked substantive analyses. 
However, “public education as an institutionalization of private matters” has 
fallen into simplistic dichotomies, such as “democratic education vs. reactionary 
education” and “education movement vs. education policy.” These dichotomies 
simply indicate that democratic education and education movements are good 
because they were launched by parents and the people, whereas reactionary edu-
cation and education policy are bad because they are imposed by the state, the 
Ministry of Education, and the government. For example, the movement for 
creating joint nursery facilities as a form of shared custody is an embodiment of 
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individual.
 Although I highlighted education and employment (labor) here, on-the-job 
training (in-house training) may be sufficient education for the purpose of obtain-
ing employment. In fact, the true meaning of public education may be to study 
liberal arts and general subjects that are not directly linked to jobs (Jinno, 2007). 
As this type of knowledge cannot be applied immediately, it tends to be consid-
ered useless. There are also limited circumstances where one can make use of this 
knowledge (there may be many individuals who cannot recognize it). However, 
human life does not consist only of work and economic activities. Subjects such 
as literature, art, history, and natural science may not produce outcomes imme-
diately. However, people’s lives have humanness because of these types of activi-
ties. In fact, many people must have experienced instances where they felt like 
engaging in a cultural activity and picked up a new book even though it is not 
directly connected to their work; they might even had an “aha” moment. The 
government’s role becomes meaningful because these moments are not generated 
by simple economic activities (market mechanism). It might be bold to say that 
the meaning of public education, in truth, lies in providing elements that do not 
become useful immediately.
 As such, a debate on the correct amount of public funds that must be allocated 
on education is imperative given that people’s lives today are not always easy. 
Resources do not automatically materialize by themselves. As we move forward, it 
is important to obtain a consensus that we need to share the burden and continue 
providing public education rather than merely criticizing the government. Japan 
is currently faced with a financial crisis, and there are also strong demands to 
expand the social security budget as the aging population further grows. The chal-
lenge is to find a basis to overcome those constraints to be able to expand public 
spending on education as well as ways to convince the general voters and taxpay-
ers (Ichikawa, 2000: 70–72).
NOTES
1 All based on the Basic School Survey by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, 
Science and Technology.
2 In sociology, there are certain pieces of literature that can be considered as classics 
on the changes in the methods of such organizations and groups. Gemeinschaft and 
Gesellschaft by Ferdinand Tönnies is particularly famous (Tönnies, 1887, trans. 1957). 
It examined how human will can be classified into spontaneous “essential will” and 
calculative, profit-seeking “arbitrary will”; he also examined how society (community) 
shifts gradually from one ruled by the former (which he called gemeinschaft) to that 
ruled by the latter (which he called gesellschaft).
3 Education and Sociology, translated into Japanese by Sasaki, uses the term “systematic 
socialization” instead of “methodical socialization.”
4 It was because he had such a sense of purpose that Dewey emphasized allowing chil-
dren to learn by socially associating what they are doing. However, as mentioned in 
Chapter 19 of Democracy and Education: An introduction to the philosophy of education, it 
Part II.
 In addition, the center of the debate over Japan’s current education spending 
revolves around higher education with expensive tuition. When the higher edu-
cation enrollment rate is low, those who completed higher education are more 
highly valued in the labor market, as graduating from higher education has a 
high social value. Thus, they are more likely to receive preferential treatment in 
terms of wages than those who did not complete a higher education. Further, 
as the opportunity to pursue higher education itself varies by social hierarchy, 
individuals from a higher social class have an advantage over others. Therefore, 
directing public funds toward higher education and making school expenses a 
public burden can be interpreted as moving the tax money collected from those 
who do not (cannot) advance to higher education to those in a higher social class 
(see Wilensky, 1975, trans. 1984: 77). This means that a policy that is completely 
the opposite of correcting disparities and redistributing income is implemented. 
However, this does not imply that we do not need to do anything; rather, we 
study how we can expand the opportunities among those in the lower social class 
to advance to higher education.14
 Once the school enrollment rate increases and pursuing higher education 
becomes common, the disadvantage rather the advantage of not pursuing higher 
education becomes noticeable. Nevertheless, as it still does change the fact that 
there are disparities in opportunities to advance to higher education based on 
social class, certain assistance to ensure sufficient opportunities will be necessary.
 Moreover, higher education institutions such as universities are generally posi-
tioned not only as educational institutions but also as research institutions; the 
results of this research development will be returned to society. As economies 
become borderless and globalized, the return on investment to society are not lim-
ited to economic and monetary ones. As higher education institutions are exposed 
to the pressure of competition, government support, among others, becomes nec-
essary for them to be able to compete. Producing Japanese researchers who might 
be chosen for international academic awards, such as the Nobel Prize, or athletes 
who might win a medal in the Olympics do not generate monetary/economic 
benefits for the general public, but it is also not easy to measure their impact on 
society. However, it would certainly give pride to the people living in that society.
 Moreover, society could “produce people who achieve success to become a 
driving force to attract talented people and, if such a cycle of attracting human 
resources becomes successful, the overall level will further increase.” This is called 
“externalities in higher education.” Although the concept of externality can be 
understood, it is not easy to measure its actual degree of impact. If public aid is 
provided despite insubstantial benefit, it will be considered an excessive invest-
ment. There are those who question externalities by saying the number of univer-
sities is increasing in recent years (Yano, 1996: 92). I will touch on this in Chapter 
4. In the present discussion, opinions that support public spending on higher 
education are not necessarily strong in Japan compared with other countries. The 
perception of the general public regarding higher education policies is unsym-
pathetic; higher education is regarded as a personal choice that benefits only the 
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of schools. In such a case, multiple schools belong to one school group. The number of 
applicants who will fill the total quota of a high school in a given school group would 
pass the exam. Entities such as the board of education would randomly determine (in a 
way that it will not result in different levels of academic ability) which high school the 
applicants would actually attend. In this way, the apparent gap in academic ability is 
“corrected.”
12 Affirmative action has evolved while being torn on how to views the two issues of 
equality and minority’s disadvantages. The views can be divided into traditional and 
proactive non-discrimination. In the former, exactly similar treatment is provided 
regardless of a person’s personal attributes. The latter believes that equalizing only the 
formality will merely preserve the disadvantages created by previous discrimination 
because the disadvantages certainly occurred as a result of intentional treatment, given 
that minorities have historically been subjected to a variety of discrimination types. 
Thus, that affirmative action should first provide preferential treatment to fill the gap 
that has been created artificially (Pedriana, 1999).
13 There is an old concept called “the iron law of oligarchy” that is well-known in sociol-
ogy. Proposed by Robert Michels, it says that once a group of people enter the position 
of authority, they have no choice but to rule for a few individuals even if they originally 
advocated a democratic agenda. This, in turn, eventually creates a gap in perceptions 
between them and the general members, and then results in an opposing relationship. A 
democratically created organization is initially operated partly because the philosophy is 
shared; however, leaders inevitably become bureaucratic once the organization expands 
and likely to forget their original philosophy over time. This perception is based on the 
premise of a scheme of power politics.
14 On the basis of the perspective on effectively using limited resources, public funds 
cannot be directed inexhaustibly to higher education even for the purpose of equalizing 
opportunities. This raises the question of how opportunity to pursue higher education 
is increased (i.e., how much increase in school enrollment rate will be made) when pub-
lic funds are used. According to Yano’s estimate (1996: 93), the tuition must be reduced 
by 42,000 JPY to raise the application rate by 1% and, as the increase in school enroll-
ment rate is only 6.1% even if the tuition is eliminated, it is problematic in terms of 
cost-effectiveness.
was not that Dewey followed the simple dichotomy of “professionally useful knowledge 
(utility)” vs. “knowledge merely for enjoyment (culture)” and valued only the former. 
We need to pay attention to the warning that such a dichotomy leads to a half-hearted 
compromise in curricula and that utility and culture cannot be easily separated; further, 
there are concepts that do not necessarily contradict one another (Dewey, 1916, trans. 
1975: Vol. 2, 98–104).
5 The history of communities in the United States is short because the history of 
Europe where they came from had been cut off. Individuals who were completely unre-
lated gathered and built communities from scratch. Therefore, they had a sense that 
they were voluntarily participating in the communal society in one form or another and 
shared the pride of creating prosperity with their own hands. In this way, the commu-
nity’s prosperity became the individual’s prosperity and the community’s fate became 
the individual’s fate. This is the foundation of patriotism formed in the United States. 
Tocqueville explained this by comparing the scenario to his home country of France 
in the context of personal and national interests, which appeared to be in conflict, to 
foment unity that would produce patriotism (Tocqueville, 1888, trans. 1987: Vol. 2, 
138–143).
6 Based on the reasoning that it is merely coincidence that a person is born with a 
particular talent under a given environment and conditions, John Rawls argued the 
principle of disparities that individuals would ultimately make a choice to maximize the 
benefit for people who are the most disadvantaged if they are surrounded by the “veil 
of ignorance” (the state in which they have no idea into which environment they were 
born). Rawls is often cited by leftists. His take on this issue is the reason he is called a 
liberalist.
7 We can surmise that behind the birth of the idea of free education by Jefferson was an 
urgent situation for trying to resolve the social situation in America at the time (Tanaka, 
2005: 160).
8 “School education spread gradually in some rural villages where people realized 
the importance of practical knowledge” in France during the second half of the 18th 
century. However, the French revolutionary government was not keen on organizing 
primary education to impart knowledge to the common people. The authorities were 
instead interested in elite education to carry forward the republic and became commit-
ted to secondary and professional education. Although France is similar to America 
in terms of adherence to “freedom” and “equality,” both countries applied different 
approaches during the early days of the education system (Amano, 2007).
9 The case of the United Kingdom is examined in Chapter 2.
10 The Social Stratification and Social Mobility Survey has been conducted by sociologists 
in Japan once every ten years on years ending in five since 1955. It is referred to as the 
SSM Survey, from the initial letters of “social stratification” and “social mobility.” It is 
one of the few national surveys of Japan that are known internationally.
11 This is among the high school entrance examination systems used by a number of 
local governments. It was introduced to reduce the entrance exam competition for 
entering certain schools for preparation to university. Under the normal entrance exam-
ination system, students would directly apply to the school and take the test. Under the 
integrated selection system (although with variations), students take a test for a group 
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CHAPTER 2
The State/Government and Education
1.   Education from the Perspective of the Government
(1)		The	Role	of	the	Government	in	Education	from	the	Perspective	of	Economics
The norm that “the government (the state and local government) must take on 
the responsibility of public education” is not obvious in theory. People are begin-
ning to recognize the value of the public nature not only in education but also in 
areas such as welfare. Under the present situation, private organizations are getting 
involved in both school education, which was started as a national project, and 
various welfare and social security services. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the move-
ment to reevaluate the public nature under such circumstances seems to assume 
the existence of public spheres that are not intervened in by the state. The sense 
of resistance and caution against the state authority’s intervention in education 
is particularly strong. Therefore, the view that “educational undertakings should 
be implemented in a form that is independent of the state” is generally dominant, 
actually making “public education” a concept that is opposed to national educa-
tion (Miyadera, 2006: 192–194).
 Nevertheless, this book will not deal with the contents of education, i.e., “what 
the state (government) teaches,” which tends to draw attention when the relation-
ship between education and the state is discussed. It will simply look at the role of 
the government by focusing on its financial concerns. In public economics, the 
role and function of the government are always discussed first.
 Richard Musgrave, a well-known financial scholar, divides the government’s 
budget policy targets into three categories: (1) adjustment of resource alloca-
tion, (2) distribution of income and wealth, and (3) stabilization of the economy 
(Musgrave, 1959, trans. 1961: 6–40). First, allocation is the function of purchasing 
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goods and services that are socially necessary but not produced in the market, as 
well as providing them to the public. For example, the government would cover 
the cost of school education and then provide that service to the public (children), 
since school education is not something that readily results in monetary benefits. 
Distribution is a matter of how to divide the collected goods among the people 
again. In other words, the government collects wealth in small increments in the 
form of taxes and then redistributes it to the disadvantaged, such as the elderly, 
people with disabilities, and the unemployed who no longer have an income. This 
is a so-called income redistribution policy. Stabilization is an attempt to suppress 
price fluctuations and maintain full employment as much as possible.
 Discussions on public economics are primarily related to (1) and (2); however, 
there is the further matter of handling market failure as a particularly important 
government function. According to Joseph E. Stiglitz, market failures can be 
divided into the following six types (Stiglitz, 2000, trans. 2003: 95–106).
 The first is the failure of competition. Goods and services are efficiently traded 
in the market and at the optimal price because there is competition. “Full compe-
tition” refers to the state in which there is fierce competition among companies 
to produce the goods and services preferred by consumers; however, when there 
is only one company (monopoly) or only a few companies (oligopoly), they can 
manipulate the price as they like, and consumers lose the ability to trade at the 
optimal (the lowest) price because there is no price competition.
 The second is the presence of public goods, which are goods and services that are 
socially necessary but not supplied in the market, or else they in extremely short 
supply when they are, in fact, supplied. Furthermore, although the cost of produc-
ing normally traded goods and services incrementally increases with the number 
of beneficiaries, this does not apply to public goods. Conversely, while there are 
people who will definitely receive benefit from the supplied goods and service, 
even if some have not paid for any of the cost, they cannot be excluded from usage, 
even on such basis; in other words, when left to the market mechanism, everyone 
would become a free rider.
 The third is externality. As mentioned in Chapter 1, externalities are roughly 
divided into positive and negative, with the former considered applicable to edu-
cation. In effect, although each individual that receives education (i.e., enrolls in 
school) may be driven by personal desire, we can think of a scenario such as the 
following: “when individuals with such desire get together and devote themselves 
to study, the intellectual level and productivity of the entire society improves to 
facilitate economic development and contributes to the establishment and main-
tenance of democratic systems.” In other words, there are effects beyond the trans-
action between the involved parties. Such costs and benefits not related to the 
transaction itself are not taken into consideration in the market mechanism. For 
example, environmental issues are often cited in relation to negative externalities.
 The fourth is incomplete markets. Insurance and loans are often mentioned as 
examples. Goods and services supplied at a cost that is lower than the price indi-
viduals are willing to pay should always be available in a normal market. However, 
the market mechanism does not work well in an incomplete market because the 
suppliers of goods and services, as well as the consumers wanting these goods and 
services, have information that is too biased or inadequate. In the case of insur-
ance, insurance companies would want to determine the premium by estimating 
the risk; however, the premium would become too expensive and no one would 
purchase the insurance if the risk were overestimated; on the other hand, if the risk 
were underestimated, the insurance company would incur a large loss because they 
would face the actual risk more frequently.
 The fifth is the failure of information. The market mechanism works on the 
assumption that both the supply and demand sides will openly provide accurate 
information to allow details to be compared. 
 Finally, the sixth are macroeconomic disturbance factors such as inflation and 
unemployment. 
 With respect to the finance of public education, the market failures that are 
especially important are the second and third issues. However, the fourth issue also 
comes into play in relation to education expenses.
 Considering the functions of public education as mentioned in Chapter 1, only 
teaching what people want would not be enough to inform a curriculum for school 
education. Furthermore, although everyone understands the need, it is difficult to 
maintain a school education system with only those who receive education paying 
for the cost, because the amount is large. In particular, charging tuition fees for 
elementary and secondary education which everyone goes through would be at 
odds with the compulsory system, and it would be almost impossible to effect in 
reality. In other words, unlike the normal trade of goods, it does not follow that 
not paying the fee (tuition) would eliminate the student in the case of public edu-
cation. Creating individuals who did and did not attend school at the elementary 
and secondary education stage would result in a disparity at an early stage that is 
beyond the will of the children themselves. It might also promote a social divide, 
increase the risk of unemployment and insecurity, and ultimately increase social 
costs. Therefore, basic elementary and secondary education, in particular, has the 
nature of being a public good provided free of charge.
 Furthermore, in order to provide decent education, the quality of educators 
must be maintained, and in order to do so, a certain level of remuneration for 
teachers must also be maintained. Because such costs cannot be lowered, the 
amount would be enormous if the parents sending their children to school were to 
cover it all. It is not realistic to make the parents bear all of that burden. Moreover, 
if we did, there is no doubt that the declining birth rate would drop even further 
because the economic burden imposed on individuals (parents and guardians) 
would become too heavy. In addition, the social benefit of spreading education 
throughout society is large since it provides broad and basic knowledge and skills 
to the people (relating the issue of externality). Another concern is that those who 
want to receive a higher level of education would need obtain a scholarship or 
education loan. In the case of loans, in particular, lenders usually assess the bor-
rower’s repayment capability. However, it is highly likely that the typical borrowers 
of education loans stemming from a more difficult family background would have 
no collateral. In that case, it is improbable based on market logic to loan money 
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to these people. If this is left unaddressed, a higher level of education will become 
something that only privileged people can receive (raising the issue of an imperfect 
market). This is why there is room for the government to intervene.
 It is true that there is a private education industry, including cram schools and 
distance learning. Private education has played many roles particularly in higher 
education in Japan as well. Therefore, there might be doubts as to whether it is 
really necessary for the government to provide education. However, cram schools 
and distance learning presuppose the existence of the public school system. As for 
private schools (which I will also touch on in Part II), the reality is that they are in a 
difficult situation, as they are expected to operate only by means of tuition revenue. 
At the same time, tuition is extremely expensive from the perspective of students. 
The private school subsidy program was created for the purpose of improving such 
a situation. Considering the above, we can see that completely leaving it up to the 
market is unlikely to work in the world of education. Hideyuki Takechi positions 
education, healthcare, welfare, housing, and pensions as quasi-public goods under 
partially working market mechanisms. He argues that it is necessary for the gov-
ernment to intervene because quasi-public goods may have an inadequate market 
scale and require the demand level to be increased; otherwise, consumers may not 
be able to take correct consumption actions in the market (Takechi, 2000).
(2)		Introduction	of	Quasi-Market	Reform
Nowadays, a reform that incorporates the market mechanism is often implemented 
in the education community as well. This has been examined in detail by Hidenori 
Fujita, who focuses particularly on the trends in the United States (Fujita, 2003). 
Here, let me introduce a part of the reform based on Fujita’s explanation.
 The characteristic of school and education reforms in recent years commonly 
observed not only in Japan but also in the United States and the United Kingdom 
is based on the premise that promoting competition among schools by emphasiz-
ing the freedom of choice, founded on the logic of self-determination and self-
responsibility and letting people choose schools freely, will make socially efficient 
education possible, as well as improving the overall quality of education. However, 
the operating expenses of schools are paid by public funds in not all but most cases: 
it is a “quasi-market style” in the sense that it only introduces market mechanisms 
and is not completely privatized.1 There are five examples that Fujita discusses as 
quasi-market reform: school choice system, educational voucher system, alterna-
tive schools, charter schools, and schools operated by for-profit companies.
 The school choice system virtually eases or eliminates the regulations on the 
school district system; and the voucher system is a more radical version of the 
school choice system. Although both presuppose being publically funded, the 
voucher system differs from the school choice system by the fact that it also 
includes private schools. The voucher system was advocated by Milton Friedman, 
who is known for popularizing the argument for neoliberalism. The voucher is a 
kind of ticket to cover educational expenses. In short, the system works by dis-
tributing vouchers to children (or guardians), who freely choose a school and sub-
mit their vouchers to it. The schools that collect more vouchers will receive more 
government subsidies.
 Alternative schools aim to attract school children and their guardians by 
implementing unique educational programs within the framework of the public 
school, providing a traditional, uniform curriculum and education without being 
restricted by such uniformness. Some alternative schools are schools called “mag-
net schools,” which were created to draw students—like magnets—from outside 
the school district by offering a unique curriculum and various advantages through 
cooperation with universities.
 Charter schools are schools established by teachers and volunteer guardians 
who—also dissatisfied with the existing public schools—get together and sign 
a contract with the Board of Education (with the authorization granted by the 
Board of Education referred to as a charter). Although volunteers establish a school 
based on their own educational philosophy, it is publicly funded. Therefore, there 
are stipulations such as not to use social attributes and academic achievements 
as requirements for children to be admitted to the school. The founders are fur-
ther held accountable for performance, such as improving the children’s academic 
abilities. According to Fujita (2003), moreover, it could be a for-profit company, 
rather than volunteering teachers and guardians, that signs a contract with the 
Board of Education. 
 Though I will not discuss these quasi-market style of reforms any further 
because that is not the aim of this book, the increase in the type of schools that 
does not fit into the traditional framework prompts discussions such as the level of 
educational expenses that should be covered by the government and what its role 
in education should be. While these reforms that define the role of the government 
in a limited way are observed frequently, especially in Anglo-Saxon countries such 
as the United States and the United Kingdom, Japan is also following such a trend.
 For example, the renowned economist John Kenneth Galbraith deemed any 
measure or regulation that prevented or may prevent the American society from 
providing or producing more of better things to be a society of manufacturing 
supremacy to be opposed no matter what. Only private manufacturing is consid-
ered important under such manufacturing supremacy, which he believed to result 
in an increase of national welfare and wealth. On the other hand, he considered 
the existence of public services to be harmful, or at best a necessary evil, because 
public services provided by the government represented a burden, and private pro-
duction might stagnate and decrease if this burden became too large. What people 
needed was food, clothing, shelter, and an orderly environment in which these 
items could be provided. Most of the food, clothing, and shelter had normally 
been secured in a voluntary matter, without relying on the power of the govern-
ment and state. In contrast, since the order provided by the state cost money and, 
in some cases, took away the means of living from people in the name of keep-
ing the order, or was even used as a means for a person in power to fill their own 
pockets, the government was inherently untrustworthy. For this reason, economic 
liberalism in the 19th century considered a state that provided trustworthy order 
at low cost without requiring anything else to represent the ideal.
 However, once food, clothing and shelter became available to some extent, 
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people would begin to seek goods and services of a higher standard to be provided 
universally. This would include many items that are collectively necessary, such 
as infrastructure, education, public health, police, and military, which must in 
any case be provided publicly. This is because they are not economically viable 
unless publicly provided, and nobody in the private sector would provide them. 
However, even when the government eventually provides these services, they will 
get a bad reputation as untrustworthy, incompetent, reckless spenders, intrusive, 
and as posing a threat to freedom. In this way, the inclination to respect things that 
are private and look down on things that are public becomes stronger and stronger 
(Galbraith, 1998, trans. 2006). As a result, those who can afford it will buy services 
provided by the private sector and those who cannot will have no choice but to 
rely on what is publicly provided. Once such a flow is created, those who receive 
public services are perceived negatively, and the differing relationship between the 
government and its service recipients and that of the private sector and its service 
recipients becomes even more evident, widening the gulf between the two.
 Let us apply this trend to the subject of education. As the entire society becomes 
more affluent and lifestyles become more personalized, freedom of choice is 
emphasized. Therefore, the education provided by public schools with tax money 
becomes too uniform to bear for some people, and the preference for the private 
sector (i.e., private schooling) that provides a flexible service increases. People who 
choose the private sector are often financially well-off. Furthermore, since the ser-
vice level they require is also high and the school needs to respond to that need, 
this ultimately creates the ranking consciousness that the private sector is better 
than the public service. Such a chain-reaction actually assigns the meaning of a 
certain social stigma to choosing a public school (Takegawa, 2007: 110–111).
 According to Charles Taylor, the fact that Americans do not try to rely on the 
government can be attributed back to the movement for American independence. 
The American Revolution was characterized by the need to realize a republican 
society in order to fight against the authority of the mainland (i.e., the British) 
monarch. It aimed for sovereign independence in which public society is gradu-
ally pursued by each individual and finally enjoyed equally by every single person. 
The evangelists of this philosophy, who were gentlemen from the relatively upper 
classes, thought that the leader should be a fair and disinterested individual who 
devotes himself to the public good. And so sovereign independence became a real-
ity through high economic growth, the expansion of the domestic market, indus-
trial development, and the pioneering frontier. They are thought to have left their 
family, broke off with their community, and also cut traditional connections to 
step out onto the new road of self-reliance. Here, although only the part concern-
ing the breach with traditional ties tends to be highlighted, at the same time, they 
created a new individualism extolling those who work diligently, behave patiently, 
and can depend on themselves. This maxim and moral principle gradually built a 
new order and connections among people.
 These people later brought an enormous economic interest, which became the 
foundation that supported society. Ultimately, it was sought to promote virtue 
for the entire society rather than dividing it. In other words, the American society 
is one where individuals who are characterized by being independent, self-disci-
plined, having an entrepreneurial spirit, and being able to live a self-reliant life in 
good faith are considered free and worthy of the utmost respect and praise. Such 
Americans also came to be socially recognized by creating charity businesses while 
generating wealth and assuming leadership positions (Taylor, 2004, trans. 2011: 
212–217). While it might be true that the financial role played by the government 
is small, such a culture of donation by individuals and corporations who have gen-
erated enormous wealth has taken root in the United States. We should highlight 
a little more of the fact that a certain percentage of finance is supported by private 
companies, organizations, alumni, etc., at universities in the United States (Tani, 
2006: 46–58).
2.   Establishment of Modern States and Development of 
Education Systems
(1)		State	and	Bureaucracy
The state is an organization created by humans. While this may seem obvious, 
Kan’ichi Fukuda states there was some debate among Japanese people in response 
to the notion that “Japan had lost the previous war,” for example, that “the country 
remained,” and that “as long as there is a national land, Japan has not perished.” 
However, they did perceive this as a denial (or collapse) of the national organiza-
tion (or national polity) at the time. In fact, it is not self-evident that the state came 
to be regarded as an organization (Fukuda, 1970: 101–105). The picture of the 
modern state that we imagine when referring to the “state” may go all the way back 
to an absolute monarchy in Europe, and its characteristics can be attributed to the 
installation of bureaucracy and a standing army. Absolutism, a patrimonial state in 
which the state itself is considered the private property of the monarch, is a society 
in a certain region conquered by force that has turned into a power structure. So, 
bureaucracy emerges to deal with how to maintain the finance of this patrimonial-
ism and gains even more power as it becomes a public means of political authority. 
Then, a standing army is also organized to enforce that authority. However, since 
authority cannot be exercised well by merely repressing the people one-sidedly, 
public welfare and people’s well-being come to be addressed through the strategic 
use of religion. That is to say, in terms of the Reformation, there were multiple 
religions instead of one, and the authority began choosing one. The authority 
then forced people to believe in a given religion and created a state church system 
in which the state and religion were tied together. They strengthened absolutism 
by using religion, since not believing in this would mean that the individual was 
unpatriotic (Fukuda, 1970: 74–79). In this regard, the first case of building the 
picture of a modern nation out of an absolute monarchy was the United Kingdom, 
and its historical development cannot be ignored.
 According to Anthony Giddens, a well-known British sociologist, a post-
modern nation-state is characterized by the fact that the well-organized admin-
istrative power is centralized in an area, referred to as territory, that is based on a 
clearly defined boundary (or border). Furthermore, since the activities of such a 
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nation-state require necessary information to be collected, initiating the compila-
tion of so-called “official statistics” would also appear to be an important charac-
teristic of the beginning of a modern nation-state (Giddens, 1985, trans. 1999: 
55–64, 208–210). It was the Northcote and Trevelyan Report in 1854 that first 
clearly defined the characteristics of civil servants in a modern sense, such as work-
ing in a government office, or as people who worked in an administrative organiza-
tion as government employees. It mainly stated that official positions were divided 
into senior positions (intellectual, management works) and junior positions (rou-
tine, blue-collar works), with candidates hired on the basis of an open competitive 
examination administered by an independent committee; promotions were merit-
based; and staff members were transferred as needed for purposes such as staff 
placement and the unification of government affairs, etc. (Burnham and Pyper, 
2008, trans. 2010: 9–10).2
 The details on public services found in the Northcote and Trevelyan Report agree 
with the characteristics of bureaucratic organization that Max Weber examined. 
According to Weber, governance structure in society transitions from traditional 
domination and charismatic domination to legal domination based on a legal 
system. The form of domination in modern times is democracy, in which repre-
sentatives are chosen each time by election rather than a certain influential indi-
vidual hereditarily passing down the authority. In order to operate such a modern 
state, bureaucrats with expertise are essential, and functional differentiation based 
on each expertise in the organization increases. Furthermore, a democratic soci-
ety means that it must be guaranteed that anyone can get a government posi-
tion regardless of origin, as long as the individual has the relevant expertise. The 
diploma, therefore, was used in order to indicate that an individual had the exper-
tise. As it then became a prerequisite to obtain a government job, it turned into 
economic benefit; and with it, the social prestige of education began increasing 
(Weber, 1956, trans. 1960: 135–138).3
 The modern era is the time in which functional differentiation of every social 
institution and system progresses in this way under a legal authority to drastically 
complicate such institutions and systems. Weber referred to it as bureaucratiza-
tion, considering this to be an unavoidable phenomenon in modern society. When 
we hear “bureaucracy,” we generally think negatively, such as this representing “an 
inflexible organization with a silo mentality.” However, the term here is used neu-
trally, merely to indicate the characteristic of an organization.4 The management 
of the modern state is made orderly, and the scope and duties of the authority are 
also stipulated by the law (or rules). And such a bureaucratic organization rules 
not only the government offices but also the private economy, fully developing 
under the modern state and capitalist society. In other words, the characteristics 
of a bureaucratic organization can be summed up by the presence of the authority 
based on rules, hierarchical government positions and a promotion system, red-
tapism, the principle of separation of public and private, and the specialization of 
duties, etc. (Weber, 1956, trans. 1960: 60–62). The advancement of specialization 
and division of labor makes it necessary to complete a well-defined curriculum 
and obtain professional qualifications, which become a prerequisite.
 In a society that has become complex, it is impossible for one individual to be 
well-versed in all policies or to formulate and implement a policy from scratch, no 
matter how competent he/she is. This is why those at the top create appropriate 
departments, have professionals to prepare a draft plan, and then oversee those 
plans. Doing so also clarifies the scope of roles of each department and makes it 
easier to define the required competencies for individuals to work there. It allows 
one to identify the field one should study in preparation of assuming a particular 
position and also makes it easier to develop human resources. Therefore, personal 
aptitude must be evaluated or education must be provided to train individuals 
who are suitable for a particular position. A modern society with bureaucratic 
organizations will always require qualification systems and develop examinations 
to judge the qualification as well as school systems to provide the preparatory edu-
cation. And the school system itself will also gain characteristics as a bureaucratic 
organization.
(2)		Bureaucratization	of	the	Education	System
While examining the establishment of a school system in Boston, Michael B. Katz, 
who specializes in American education history, summarized the characteristics of 
school bureaucracy in terms of the following six points. The first is the centraliza-
tion of control and supervision, which refers to the control by an education agency, 
such as the so-called Board of Education, and the central government agency. The 
second is the differentiation of function. The differentiation of duties, the depart-
ment system, the differentiation of specialized subjects, and the birth of a grade 
system fall under this category. Furthermore, a hierarchical structure (involving 
differentiation of job titles) emerges within the school organization, and the dis-
parity of salary also increases along with it. The third is the requirement of qualifi-
cations for the job. This refers to appointment and promotion based on objective 
eligibility requirements, which means that examinations are administered based 
on standards developed in advance and managed professionally, and whether 
to hire an individual is determined on such basis. The fourth is objectivity and 
expertise pertaining to how professional government officials begin undertaking 
reforms and making administrative decisions, so that arbitrary decisions by ama-
teurs such as individuals who are merely influential in the local community will no 
longer go unchallenged. The fifth is accuracy and consistency. Duties used to be 
executed at a whim; however, statistical data began to be collected as a required ref-
erence for standardizing duties, so that administrative decisions came to be made 
based on the data, and decision-making that put to use a consistent procedure 
became possible. The sixth is cautiousness. Personal information is protected in a 
way that when the work behavior of people employed by the organization (in this 
case the school) is evaluated, the evaluation results can be accessed only by some of 
the top executives, for example. At the same time, this led those in power such as 
managers to further strengthen their authority to manage and appropriately place 
their subordinates (Katz, 1975, trans. 1989: 118–131).
 It was probably England that first systematically developed an education sys-
tem. Thus, let us briefly review the process in which the education system in 
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England was developed by the state. According to Tomiji Nagao, although there 
were signs that they were aiming to establish a school with public funds in England 
during the period of the Puritan Revolution, the Clarendon Code (1661–1665) 
passed after the Restoration of Imperial Rule expelled nonconformists from public 
offices and prompted the Puritans to spread to the New World as well as in the 
business community (rather than in the political community). When the control 
over nonconformists slightly loosened after the Glorious Revolution, they eventu-
ally developed private schools called the Academy. However, it seems that England 
preserved the existing education system and left it to natural selection rather than 
rapidly developing a national system, because the country subsequently stabilized 
its political system and succeeded in colonializing a vast land. Schools aiming to 
provide religious education to the lower classes must have emerged under such 
circumstances, and the need for the 3Rs (reading, writing, and arithmetic) among 
these people gradually came to be recognized (Nagao, 1978: 74–81).
 While pinpointing the establishment of a public education system in the 
Kingdom of England is an issue that also relates to how this should be defined, 
there are several interpretations. Although it is generally attributed to the 
Elementary Education Act of 1870, it was not the case that this Act was swiftly 
implemented; various processes had existed in prior phases. For example, while he 
acknowledges a certain rationality in the interpretation that attributes the origin 
of the public education system to the Act of 1870, Ichimaro Matsui claims that it 
is not necessarily appropriate because there were already many education-related 
laws enacted by the state prior to 1870 (Matsui, 2008). In addition, Haruo Yanagi 
positions the year 1833, when the Treasury of the Kingdom of England began 
subsidizing school construction expenses, as the beginning of state intervention in 
education (Yanagi, 2005: 67).
 Once the Industrial Revolution took place and a massive labor force became 
necessary during the period between the end of the 18th century and the begin-
ning of the 19th century, the idea that it was dangerous to teach sophisticated 
knowledge and skills to people in the lower classes, who would become wage work-
ers in the future, emerged. Therefore, the ruled were required to further improve 
their work ethics and respect the rules and orders while the state tried to promote 
education for the purpose of maintaining security. This is how it all started.
 However, basic education for the working class had been provided mainly 
at private schools backed by religious organizations. The state became involved 
through the Parochial Schools Bill of 18075 and began providing state subsidies in 
1833. According to Haruo Yanagi, this can be regarded as the state making good 
use of the organized schools that had been expanded nationwide by two private 
religious organizations called the National Society and the British and Foreign 
School Society, which had developed the so-called monitorial system. The moni-
torial system, which is a teaching method that happened to be developed by two 
completely different private organizations at around the same time, can broadly be 
considered the prototype of the simultaneous teaching method found in today’s 
classrooms or lessons in school education. When there are many students and few 
teachers, how does one efficiently teach simultaneously? Teaching assistants are 
chosen from among the competent students to aid the teacher. While many stu-
dents gather in a large room to perform tasks according to the teacher’s instruc-
tion, teaching assistants communicate that instruction and monitor the students 
while they perform the task.
 While the individuals who devised this system were Andrew Bell and Joseph 
Lancaster, their supporters created organizations called the National Society and 
the British and Foreign School Society, respectively, in order to popularize this 
type of school system.6 The schools they invented were a novelty and could not be 
created without affiliating with these organizations. Seeking to popularize schools 
by using these private organizations, the British government made it possible to 
apply to construct a school by becoming affiliated with one of the two societies 
and also paid the subsidy (half of the construction costs) through these private 
organizations (Yanagi, 2005: 66–68).
 Upon the realization of this subsidy commitment system, they attempted to 
establish a central, national agency to control the education system, placing an edu-
cation committee under the Privy Council and a secretariat under the Committee 
in 1839. The first secretary of the Committee, James P. Kay-Shuttleworth, was 
called the “father of British public education.”
 However, Naoko Ota positions the slightly later Revised Code of 1862 as the 
introduction of modern public education. Ota reasons that, even though one 
might call it the beginning of state intervention, the education system prior to 
that had been limited to the subsidy system, based on religious education rather 
than secular education, and mainly aimed to give the working class religious and 
moral indoctrination. She focuses on the fact that this Revised Code introduced 
by Robert Lowe established a pay-for-performance system to check school perfor-
mance based on the 3Rs, allocating the subsidy based on the results. This implies 
that the foundation for basic education as a nation shifted from religious educa-
tion to secular education that included the 3Rs. Lowe was a believer of Adam 
Smith, who disapproved of making teachers government employees in An Inquiry 
into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Therefore, although teachers 
had been paid their salaries directly by the state, this was changed by the reform so 
that teachers established an employment relationship with the school administra-
tor. Nevertheless, this did not diminish the nature of public education. Rather, 
the important point is that this clearly laid out a system of pay based on students’ 
performance rooted in secular education, organized a systematic teacher training 
system and a school inspector system that was based on it, and gradually strength-
ened state control from the top (Ota, 1992: 30–33, 73–75).
 Meanwhile, education movements by workers themselves aiming for per-
sonal development and liberation also appeared due to the effect of the so-called 
Chartist movement. It was here that the idea of education being guaranteed by 
public funding saw the light for the first time. Because the demand for knowledge 
of science also spread widely due to the Industrial Revolution, mechanics’ insti-
tutes were established as well.7 The compulsion of basic education coincided with 
the expansion of democracy. In particular, it became a key point that the right 
to vote expanded to include many workers after the home ownership restriction 
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had been abolished by the Representation of the People Act 1867 (the Second 
Reform Act). Lowe thought that the state should mandate and provide basic edu-
cation rather than leaving it to the parents’ initiative, because he believed the voter 
should receive education to become someone who could make his own decisions. 
And so a debate unfolded as to how to build a nationwide education system based 
on the Revised Code, and because the Liberal Party took the power in 1868, the 
Elementary Education Act 1870 was enacted, which later became recognized 
as the foundation for the development of British public education (Ota, 1992: 
84–87).8
 What is important here is the significance of the mandatory schooling system 
being made “compulsory as an institution” based on the Elementary Education 
Act 1870.9 This is because, in reality, many children had already been attend-
ing some kind of school, which raises the question of the purpose for which this 
Elementary Education Act was enacted, given that to be the case. It can be said 
that the Act was enacted because the meaning of “mandatory schooling” as stated 
here was not limited to merely sending children to school; it meant sending chil-
dren to a “good school” that embraced standardized basic secular education, as 
stipulated by the Revised Code for 1862, accepted the pay-for-performance edu-
cation system, and accordingly accepted the state subsidies and inspections (Ota, 
1990). Using subsidy as a means, the state impelled disparate schools to proac-
tively change according to the demands of the authority, making the school side 
choose the standardized style on their own. In this way, a modern school system, 
which was subsequently imitated by neighboring countries, was gradually estab-
lished in the United Kingdom.
(3)	Introduction	of	the	Modern	Education	System	in	Japan
In Japan, Confucianism (especially Neo-Confucianism) is sometimes considered 
to be the basic ethos for education since people had a great regard for it during 
the Edo period. The basics of Confucianism (the belief in the innate goodness 
of man) can be explained as thoughts on morality that represents principles for 
how humans should live and behave in society. And these principles are under-
stood to be rooted in the nature and destiny bestowed on humans. Furthermore, 
Confucianism is based on the logic that fully developed individuals who have mas-
tered the moral principle will extend it to the family, the country, and the world 
at large, in a stepwise manner. It indicates that since human nature is consistent 
with the natural order (because it was granted from above), the natural order per-
sists in groups of humans as well (Tsujimoto, 1990: 4–6). Sokou Yamaga who 
was affected by but criticized Neo-Confucianism aimed to create consistent social 
norms by improving customs, i.e., civilizing common people, in addition to cul-
tivating the minds of those in power. Chikyō Yōroku (Governance and Education 
Digest) was written to present a vision of a nationwide school system as a theory of 
organization serving such purpose. It is the prototypical idea of pre-modern public 
education, as it were (Kaneko, 1967: 8).10
 Yamaga deemed a samurai’s duty to include not only defense preparation but 
also moral education of the three classes of people, namely, the farmer, the artisan, 
and the merchant. This is because the meaning of the social existence of samurai, 
who were originally warriors, was questioned during the stable Edo period and 
they were ultimately asked to adopt an ethos worthy of a ruler. Behind this premise 
were the work ethics that reprove idling one’s time away and endorse the value that 
one must work for a living. In addition, there was already a concept called “call-
ing” in Confucianism, intending that the highly virtuous were to govern people 
on behalf of divine will according to such virtue, whereby this calling was dis-
tinguished from a general occupation. However, Tekisai Nakamura, a Confucian 
scholar at around the same time (17th century) deemed that everyone born into 
this world has a calling to supplement what divine will lacks,11 so that striving 
to perform one’s own duty will contribute to the evolution of the universe. This 
vocational view later gained traction among the Japanese and was passed on in 
the vocational views of Baigan Ishida’s Sekimon-Shingaku (teachings that combine 
Buddhist, Shinto, and Confucian ethics), which became popular among the mer-
chants. Although this vocational view assumes the domination of the samurai, 
it practically created a foundation to accept hereditary identification as destiny 
(Hiraishi, 1997: 46–50, 82–85).12
 The development that signals the beginning of the modern school education 
system in Japan during the Edo period, according to the explanation by Masashi 
Tsujimoto, can be summarized as follows. Under Neo-Confucianism, which was 
considered orthodox during the Edo period, schools were positioned as a means of 
edification, since the purpose of education was the edification of the common peo-
ple. Therefore, sovereigns (feudal lords) reasoned that since their education was the 
foundation for the edification of the han (feudal domain), they needed to be par-
ticular about the academic sect and follow Neo-Confucianism, which did not rec-
ognize different studies. In this way, the orthodox education spread among hanko 
(feudal domain schools) and even among terakoya (private elementary schools), 
which were places for common people to study. Therefore, the establishment of 
the academic sect became paramount in Neo-Confucianism, and edification at so-
called “school” came to play an important role. Shunsui Rai, a Confucian scholar 
who worked for a feudal lord during the mid-Edo period, encouraged the general 
public to also attend hanko, created schools for townspeople, intervened in com-
mon people’s education at terakoya, and so on. In this way, han began implement-
ing policies to protect and control education (Tsujimoto, 1990: 219–229).
 Because of its inflexible nature, Neo-Confucianism in general tends to receive 
the negative evaluation of having prompted the stagnation of Confucian thoughts. 
However, it has been thought that Neo-Confucianism, which does not regard 
common people as inherently ignorant, can enlighten and improve them, not only 
ethically but also intellectually. There was a viewpoint similar to the philosophy 
of the European Enlightenment that common people were actually the subjects 
who needed to be enlightened, so that they would not be misled by illusions. This 
partially made it easier to accept the way of modern Western thinking. Such ratio-
nalism is thought to have led to the logic for samurai to unite and create a political 
system. As a result, hanko became necessary for the purpose of edification serving 
the needs of samurai education.
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 The significance of the popularization of Neo-Confucianism and the prohibi-
tion of heterodoxy in the Kansei era in the history of education lies in the fact that 
1) there was a logic (i.e., being particular about the academic sect) that proactively 
contributed as an ideology to integrating the state (feudal domain); 2) the practi-
cal goal to promote the proactive edification of the minds of the people was clear, 
and it therefore provided a reason to develop public education for the common 
people by cooperating with the public authority; and 3) samurai education in par-
ticular had a dual structure, in which they learned the elementary basics includ-
ing Neo-Confucianist morality before acquiring knowledge in various specialized 
disciplines, so that it became easier to absorb practical sciences in various studies. 
We can say that these formed the basic characteristics of the way that politics, aca-
demia, and education have related to each other in modern Japan since the end of 
the Edo period (Tsujimoto, 1990: 237–255).
 In February 1868, the new government after the Meiji Restoration appointed 
three Japanese classical scholars, including the Judicial Officer of the Secretary of 
Divinities, Kanetane Hirata, and the Assistant Judicial Officers of the Department 
of Home Affairs, Misao Tamamatsu and Harumichi Yano, to School Officers, 
ordering them to investigate the school system. As a result, they formulated and 
submitted a proposal for a higher education system called gakusha sei, which 
appears to have been based on daigaku-ryo (an ancient formal educational insti-
tution for training public officials). According to Terumoto Kaneko, the driving 
force for such a movement was Tomomi Iwakura, who stemmed from a court 
noble family. Being at the center of the regime, he was concerned that Japan was 
subservient to the foreign policies of Western countries. Meanwhile, there was also 
a circle of people trying to modernize Japan from the Western standpoint in the 
new Meiji government, leading to the appointment of Rinsho Mitsukuri, Masao 
Uchida, and other scholars of Western studies as school system investigation 
officials13 in October of the same year. Subsequently, this force gradually gained 
power and began eliminating the Imperial Way Faction. It is said that as Iwakura 
also came to recognize the growth of colleagues advocating Western moderniza-
tion within the regime, they began favoring the unified school system, including 
elementary school, junior high school, and college (Kaneko, 1967: 22–29).
 The modern school system had a completely different structure from terakoya 
or private academies that had existed in Japan up until then. It is known to have 
therefore encountered a lot of resistance, such as the destruction movement, when 
a new school system was introduced (Mori, 1993: 63–76). At the time, Japan was 
aggressively incorporating Western styles in an effort not to lag behind the West. 
Needless to say, as Hidehiro Sonoda points out, rapid Westernization did not 
necessarily incorporate such systems uncritically due to an adoration of the West; 
there is the view that Japan came to recognize the importance of identifying and 
training talents for the military, science, and technology after selecting and apply-
ing Western information as needed (Sonoda, 1993: 89–95). However, the fact 
that the education systems and school mechanisms every country introduces are 
all relatively similar, considering the diversity of the world culture, suggests that 
the spread of school education cannot be explained merely from such functional 
aspects.
3.   Development of the State Mechanism and Its Spread in the World
(1)		Spread	of	Institutional	Isomorphism	and	the	Modern	Education	System
We have reviewed the infancy of the modern education system in the United 
Kingdom and Japan in some detail. Besides the United Kingdom, where the sys-
tem was first created, the ruling class at the time sent people to Europe and brought 
in so-called “hired foreigners” to actively adopt the European style.
 If one rereads the theory of bureaucratic organization by Weber, the logic that 
works there is a type of manualization and standardization. It becomes less diffi-
cult to launch a nationwide school chain—such as the spread of British schools—
once normalization advances, because it becomes easier to convey the system to 
third parties. Mass training of human resources also becomes possible. We can see 
from these points how essential the flow of rationalization, standardization, and 
normalization is to modernization. These types of new organizations and systems 
must have looked very innovative in the eyes of the people of that time. Although 
sometimes met by strong resistance, the new does not take long to be established 
when it is clear that adopting it will result in some sort of advantage (or at least that 
it will not result in any significant disadvantage).
 I covered the economic significance of public education at the beginning of 
this chapter. While its economic significance is probably true, there are some parts 
of the education system that do not sit well in terms of social significance. There 
remain deep-rooted criticisms, such as, “what is the point of what we learned in 
school education?” and “things learned in school are completely useless in society,” 
particularly among the Japanese people. There are also those who respond by argu-
ing for education theories, saying, “it might be necessary to link school education 
and professional aspects of society to impart knowledge that is as practical as pos-
sible.” This represents an argument that the education system should be based on 
certain goals and objectives.
 In contrast, there are people who insist that the school system was not installed to 
impart useful knowledge to people in the first place. John W. Meyer and Francisco 
O. Ramirez, who are in this camp, present empirical data to demonstrate that edu-
cation systems were not necessarily installed with a functionalist sense of purpose. 
According to them, although people tend to think that the state created a school 
system because there was a substantive objective, the fact is that there are systems 
and institutions that any decent modern state should have, and a school system is 
just one of them. Conversely, their logical construction asserts that a state creates a 
school system because a society that does not even have a school system cannot be 
regarded as a legitimate state (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Ramirez and Boli, 1987). 
In other words, we can look at the fact that the new Meiji government scrapped 
terakoya, which had been functioning, albeit imperfectly, and relentlessly insisted 
on establishing Western-style schools in the face of strong resistance, and interpret 
this to have been due to a compelling feeling that the state would not otherwise 
earn recognition unless they established such schools.
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 Looking at schools from the functionalist perspective, it is natural to expect 
school education to spread once modernization advances and society becomes 
highly industrialized because knowledge becomes necessary. If that is the case, we 
can expect a correlation between the level of economic development and the level 
of school penetration (e.g., enrollment rate, etc.). However, a study by Meyer and 
colleagues overturns this expectation (Meyer et al., 1992). Moreover, popularized 
schools are similar all over the world, although their forms, lecture methods, and 
lecture content (curricula) have a variety of cultural backgrounds. This is partially 
because self-legitimacy is confirmed by imitating the systems of leading countries. 
Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell referred to such a movement as institu-
tional isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), by which is meant that these 
systems were installed for the convenience of the national mechanism, and we 
individuals are making choices within the constraints of that system (i.e., at the 
mercy of the system).
 Based on the discussion by Meyer, Masashi Fujimura explains that since mass 
education is ultimately the foundation of national formation that includes all 
people across social groups such as religion, ethnicity, gender, and class within 
the framework called the state, it becomes clear which countries lag behind in the 
implementation when the level of popularization is understood by various statis-
tics worldwide. If that is the case, an education system is introduced and popu-
larized through a sense of competition between states, apart from any reasoning 
as to whether it is useful or not. That is to say, a country where education is not 
popularized could be internationally perceived as a backward country that does 
not provide opportunities for children to be educated. Since such a system is imi-
tatively introduced, the gap between the real-world culture and the system widens, 
and it is only the formality and framework that spread rapidly without a good 
understanding of matters such as the original philosophy of the education system 
(Fujimura, 1995: 162–166). Based on this framework, it can be understood that 
“the legitimacy as a modern state is first proven by the completion of an education 
system, and then the education system grants people who study there the char-
acteristic of being citizens of a modern state,” rather than explaining it with the 
reasoning that “knowledge is accumulated among people, and the organization of 
society is promoted once an education system is created.”14
 Such a movement is not limited to the education system. Then again, it is ques-
tionable whether all systems are really the same, as emphasized here. For example, 
as mentioned in Chapter 1, school education has the function of assigning sta-
tus, and the school system is heavily involved in that process. In other words, the 
differentiation of school types is closely related to matters such as the way that 
social mobility and employment operates among people in that society as well as 
customs in the labor market. Labor practices are also related to the social security 
system. Though I will examine it in detail in the following chapters, the common 
view is that this type of social security system and welfare will not converge even 
when the economy develops. In other words, while isomorphic systems in some 
cases spread in the way explained by such institutional theories, they could also in 
other cases be established in a way that adapts to the society.
(2)		State	and	Tax
Although it is said that individualism has spread, a human cannot live alone; he/
she has no choice but to have a connection to a community or society somewhere 
in order to live. Local community, relatives, and family used to represent such ties. 
Although I do not think that the inclination to emphasize family has not weakened 
considerably, partly due to privatization and the popularization of the idea of pri-
vacy, it can be said that connections with relatives and community that go beyond 
the framework of family have weakened in general. Schools and companies are the 
alternative institutions. In addition, childcare and nursing care, which used to be 
performed mainly by family members, have come to be fulfilled by other agencies 
due to changes in the social situation. Welfare states were born out of such trends 
(Hashimoto, 2013). In short, services such as childcare, education, and nursing 
care themselves will never go away. It is a matter of who takes the burden if it is too 
much for individuals to handle; and in such case, the state and government would 
be the most rational choice under the current situation.
 However, since maintaining a state naturally costs money, tax must be collected 
from the citizens in order to secure funds for the expense. The ways of thinking 
about such tax payments to the government are roughly divided into people’s 
rights and obligations. In the United Kingdom, where civil society began expand-
ing early and had an affluent economic foundation, paying tax had a strong role as 
the right to position the market mechanism in the center of its economic activities 
and proactively reduce the burden of compensating the cost required to maintain 
such a society. Here, the idea that the pursuit of personal gain ultimately results in 
gain for the entire society took deep root. Meanwhile, lagging behind in Europe, 
Germany needed to artificially form a unified nation first, and then build a society 
in a planned manner through top-down control, since it could not otherwise catch 
up with leading countries such as the United Kingdom and France if left to its 
individual activities. Therefore, in contrast to the British idea of an accumulation 
of individuals creating the state, the state ended up controlling individuals from 
the top, and people came to perceive it as a sort of common destiny. In this way, 
paying taxes became an obligation to be fulfilled to a state that shared the same 
destiny with them.
 The German approach in which the state had to take the lead in developing 
this kind of capitalist economy society is also related to the fact that the country 
produced financial scholars such as Lorenz von Stein, Adolf Heinrich Gotthilth 
Wagner, and Albert Eberhard Friedrich Schaffle. In Japan, it is said that Hirobumi 
Ito idolized Stein. This is probably because there were some overlapping character-
istics between the way that Germany tried to compete with the United Kingdom 
by promoting state-led modernization because they were a latecomer country and 
the post-Meiji Restoration direction of modernization in Japan. It can be said that 
the fact that Japan’s first state-led financial system was established after moderniza-
tion has also had great significance in the formation of the people’s perspective on 
taxation (Morotomi, 2013: 59–61, 96–100).
 The government undertakes a variety of activities by using the taxes collected as 
a main source of funding. Such government activity, viewed from the monetary 
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perspective, is financial administration. The functions of financial administra-
tion can be generally summed up by three elements: resource allocation, income 
redistribution, and stabilization of the economy. And the main means of financial 
administration is the budget—usually an estimate of revenue and expenditures for 
one year—which is managed and controlled through the approval of the Diet. The 
rules, procedures, and customs in a series of budgetary planning steps, from pre-
paring the budget, obtaining the approval of the Diet, and enforcing the budget, 
to settling the accounts, are called a budget system.
 When the fiscal deficit expands and the current account balance drops to trigger 
a currency collapse and interest rate increase, structural reforms aimed at reduc-
ing the fiscal deficit become inevitable. Typical examples from the past have been 
fiscal restructuring in countries such as Sweden and New Zealand. In addition, 
a change in regime could also be a factor promoting fiscal restructuring in the 
sense of responding to the expectations of voters by revoking the policy of the 
former regime and starting structural reforms. This is characteristic of the United 
Kingdom, the United States, Australia, Canada, and the Netherlands. In the case 
of Japan, however, until now there have been almost no economic crises, changes 
of regime, or external political pressures, even though the ever increasing fiscal 
deficit has historically been considered a problem. This has therefore led to a situa-
tion whereby we are forced to increase taxes or cut spending in order to implement 
fiscal restructuring (Tanaka, 2013: 49–64).
(3)		Under	Neoliberalization
Ultimately, the framework of the modern state will not collapse and the issue 
remains of how far the government should bear the burden of people’s life secu-
rity. So-called neoliberalism criticizes such a bloated government. While the gov-
ernment, in theory, has the economic legitimacy (or reason) to intervene in the 
market, this does not mean that everything will work out well when they do. A 
failure on the part of the government is certainly possible. And even though social 
security and welfare are very expensive, one cannot easily revise them, far less abol-
ish them, since people’s behavior is premised on the existence of these systems once 
they are in place. Economic growth slowed down especially around the 1970s in 
Japan, despite the growing demand for welfare and social security, making deficit-
ridden finances a problem.
 Therefore, neoliberalism considers cutting government spending to be the 
number one priority. Considering that the role and function of the government 
must be accordingly reduced, there is a reason for neoliberalists to be nationalists 
or conservatives who idealize the picture of so-called “typical” family: to make up 
for what is cut in the spirit of nationalism and with personal expenses paid by the 
family. And since this might still be insufficient, they advocate the argument of 
complete self-responsibility at the same time. This is why it is also emphasized in 
education that individuals, rather than society, should compensate for their own 
failures, and that the individual must be strong enough to be able to do so.
 Since the collapse of the Cold War structure, the debate over social security 
and welfare can no longer be simply understood in terms of the dichotomy of 
“individuals vs. the government” or “whether to save the disadvantaged.” The 
government finances have become tight, but the national burden cannot be eas-
ily increased. Because public scrutiny of the usage of government spending has 
increased, it has become difficult to pay out benefits without careful consideration 
(even if the individual is socially disadvantaged). In short, it means that “since 
taxes are collected from those who work, the ones who receive benefits should 
show sincerity to some extent; it is shameless of them to obtain benefits for free.” 
Therefore, in the United Kingdom, the country that was once touted as a model 
welfare state with the phrase “from cradle to grave,” education was advocated as 
the most important policy and its budget was eventually increased when the Blair 
ministry of the Labour Party was formed. Although those in education-related 
industries, including the field of education sociology, are inclined to argue that 
“education spending is being cut by neoliberalism,” such logic is a little too sim-
plistic; it is necessary to recognize the fact that there is actually a side to neoliberal-
ism that utilizes education as compelling evidence to cut social security (Iwashita, 
2013). The fact that the trend in the field of education to assess education spend-
ing from the taxpayer’s perspective is growing stronger must be understood from a 
broader perspective, such as the one shown above.
 Studies that critically interpret education as the apparatus of power by citing 
Michel Foucault and others were frequently seen in the past. However, such stud-
ies have become less common in recent years. This might be partially due to the 
fact that criticism against power structures is becoming predictable and losing its 
novelty because the storylines generally become similar from the standpoint of 
research. In addition, there is another side to the welfare state wherein it tries to 
keep the people under power by throwing in rewards called welfare. It is clear with-
out even listing examples such as the establishment of a social insurance system 
by Otto von Bismarck in Germany that for those in power, welfare is a measure 
to prevent revolutions by socialist and communist ideologies as well as an ingredi-
ent to make the public unite in war against foreign countries. Although it is hard 
to imagine in today’s Japan, the development of social security and welfare is so 
deeply connected with war that it cannot be discussed separately from it; in fact, 
there was an overt intention for the state power to control the people.
 However, the debate over small government in recent years is making the story 
of control by such power feel less real. Whereas neoliberalists often stand by their 
conservative thoughts, people in the education community in many cases support 
deregulation and liberalization. There is a movement among people who used to 
be critical toward state control over education but who have now become wary 
of such a stance to try to defend public education. And as the increased cost of 
social security becomes a problem, education is used as an expedient to cut social 
security spending. In short, the position adopted is along the lines that “benefits 
are paid only to those who receive education such as vocational training,” rather 
than providing benefits for free. Those who refuse or are unable to receive such an 
education for some reason will end up being excluded by society (Nihei, 2009).
 Furthermore, once commercialization divides people into those who can afford 
private services and those who cannot, the rich will probably be more inclined to 
People’s Attitude and the State of Policy Regarding Education Spending66 The State/Government and Education 67
buy what they prefer on their own and avoid what is publically provided. Then, it 
is likely that they will feel that the large burden (of tax payments) is unfair because 
they are no longer the direct beneficiaries of public services. While there is an issue 
that extreme advancement of social disparities itself promotes a social divide, it 
could also make the maintenance of public services difficult, thereby further esca-
lating the social divide (Sandel, 2009, trans. 2010). Under such circumstances, 
how will education be positioned as a state policy? It is not possible to understand 
this by looking at education policies alone. It will become necessary to position 
education as services provided by the state, while examining its relationship with 
other social security and welfare.
NOTES
1 This is used in the fields of medical care and welfare as well. The discussion on quasi-
market reform by Julian Le Grand is well-known in the United Kingdom. See Akutsu 
(2008) for a commentary on this discussion.
2 In reality, however, it took time for this to be implemented as stated, during which 
time the government role expanded. Then, fiscal deficits and inefficiencies associated 
with the bloated role of the government became an issue in 1968, and the Fulton Report 
was published to state that the government services were moving away from the people 
as amateurism became prevalent and the adverse effect of bureaucratic organizations 
became conspicuous. While the Fulton Report prompted a huge debate, many of the 
reform proposals presented in it were deadlocked after meeting with strong resistance 
from government employees (Burnham and Pyper, 2008, trans. 2010: 12–13).
3 Weber uses “whether people acquired expertise through education” as one of the key 
criteria when explaining social class categories and social standing (Weber, 1956, trans. 
1960: 207–217).
4 That said, the negative aspects of bureaucracy that we can easily think of, such as a silo 
mentality and standardization (or formalism), have already been noted by Weber as well.
5 However, this bill was discarded later. Subsequently, all bills relating to education for 
the general public were dissolved until the Elementary Education Act was enacted in 
1870. This Parochial School Bill was different from other bills in the sense that it at least 
passed the deliberation of the lower of the two houses (Matsui, 2008: 76).
6 The circumstances surrounding this are detailed in Yanagi (2005). According to 
Yanagi, the National Society and the British and Foreign School Society were incompat-
ible because the former was backed by the Church of England and the latter advocated 
nonsectarianism. The National Society which had put Bell up front and tried to popu-
larize the Church of England was advantageous at the beginning. Although much was 
made of Lancaster’s schools, Lancaster was expelled from the operation of the British 
and Foreign School Society due to personal troubles. In order to compete with the 
National Society, he then streamlined and standardized schools to enable easy expansion 
in the manner of a national chain. It is said that the schools managed by the British and 
Foreign School Society, which became popular among the wealthy, gradually became 
more stable in the end than the schools of the National Society, which was absorbed with 
its religious doctrine.
7 Nevertheless, because mechanics and workers lacked basic education, mechanics’ 
institutes often continued as schools that were more open to the middle class than the 
working class. The so-called grammar school also differentiated into schools centered on 
practical sciences, such as modern natural science, technology, and business, as well as 
schools that mainly provided classical liberal arts education (Nagao, 1978: 129–132).
8 According to Ota, this Elementary Education Act alone is not something to be recog-
nized as the foundation of the modern public education system in the United Kingdom; 
rather, it should be recognized as something that institutionalized basic secular edu-
cation throughout the nation by taking the Revised Code of 1862 into consideration 
and settling the chaotic history of basic education in the United Kingdom (Ota, 1992: 
128–129).
9 The mandatory schooling system only applied to the school districts in which an aca-
demic affairs committee elected by public vote was established per Article 74 of the 
Elementary Education Act of 1870; therefore, it had not yet been introduced through-
out the nation at the time. This was because “good schools” that abided by laws and 
regulations were then still short in supply, and it was thought that the supply of “good 
schools” would be guaranteed in districts with a school board directly elected by the citi-
zens (Ota, 1990).
10 Another individual who had a considerable impact on the shogunate politics by 
criticizing Neo-Confucianism, as Yamaga did, was Sorai Ogyu. He disagreed with 
Neo-Confucianism, which deemed human nature to be innate (the belief in the innate 
goodness of man), as well as with Yamaga’s argument that human disposition changes, 
thinking that it was possible to bring out human abilities that are socially valuable 
(innate personality) through education (Kaneko, 1967: 9–13).
11 This originates in the phrase “the sovereign ruler is to establish orderly moral prin-
ciples and promote justice in the world to teach people to help feed each other” found in 
the Overall Image section of the Pervading Hexagram in I Ching. It refers to an under-
taking of a saint with a virtue as large as the world to realize the stability of people’s 
welfare by helping the evolution effect of heaven and earth to grow all beings (Hiraishi, 
1997: 48).
12 As a side note, it was Robert N. Bellah, who pointed out that this vocational view of 
Sekimon-Shingaku shared some commonalities with Calvinism. Needless to say, there 
is The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism by Weber behind Bellah’s analysis 
(Bellah, 1957, trans. 1996).
13 Arinori Mori, who later made a significant contribution to the establishment of the 
modern school system in Japan, had also been appointed to this duty (Kaneko, 1967: 
27).
14 Therefore, although there could, in theory, be individuals who have already mastered 
the knowledge and skills without learning them at school, whether they have graduated 
from school is questioned first in the real world, and if they have not completed school 
by studying in formal programs, a situation could occur in which their knowledge is not 
socially trusted.
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CHAPTER 3
Relationship between Education 
and Social Security/Welfare
1.  Education as Social Policy
(1)		The	Difference	in	the	Scope	of	Social	Policy
In the previous chapters, I have examined from the perspectives of sociology and 
historical development why education is borne by the government (public). I 
have also made it clear that defining the role and function of education is difficult 
because it can be understood to have two sides: the perspective of the welfare state, 
namely, the resultative relationship in which education fulfills part of welfare mea-
sures, and the paradoxical relationship that actually conflicts with the egalitarian 
principle (Hirota, 2013).
 Jutta Allmendinger and Stephen Leibfried noted that the positioning of educa-
tion policy differs between the Anglo-Saxon countries and continental European 
countries such as Germany (Allmendinger and Leibfried, 2003). They refer to 
quotes by Thomas H. Marshall, who is a prominent social policy scholar in the 
United Kingdom, and the 1942 Report on Social Insurance and Allied Services by 
William Beveridge, asserting that education is positioned as part of social policy 
and that education reforms are mentioned more often than social security reforms 
in the Anglo-Saxon countries. For example, general information manuals and 
texts on social policy and welfare in the United Kingdom list education along with 
elderly care, health and medical care, family policy, and so on (Lewis, ed., 1998; 
Glennerster, 2003; Glennerster and Hills, eds., 2003; Annetts et al., 2009).1 The 
education sector has considerably evolved in the United States as well; accord-
ing to Allmendinger and others, the level of publicly provided education is good 
enough to call the country a pseudo-welfare state. In contrast, education policy is 
usually regarded completely separately from general social policies in Germany 
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(Allmendinger and Leibfried, 2003). As for Japan, as Shogo Takegawa observes, 
there was a time when social policies were listed side by side with labor policy 
(Takegawa, 2007: 6).
 Arnold J. Heidenheimer pointed out that the course (or order) of development 
of public education and social security in Europe was completely the opposite of 
that in the United States, suggesting that education, or social security, is linked 
to the labor market in quite a different manner (Heidenheimer, 1981). Karl G. 
Hokenmaier took this into consideration, examining the relationship between 
education and other social security from the viewpoint of public spending. The 
results showed that education and social security were to some degree in an oppo-
site (or trade-off) relationship in terms of expenditure, indicating that education 
spending as a percentage of public spending was relatively large in countries with 
a liberal regime, followed by countries with a social democratic regime, and then 
by countries with a conservative regime. Whereas upper secondary education 
was centered on general education under liberal regimes, vocational education 
was actually the mainstream under social democratic and conservative regimes 
(Hokenmaier, 1998).
 Hans Pechar and Lesley Andres state that, under the so-called welfare state 
regime, liberal regimes put considerable effort into policies like education that 
strengthen human capital in exchange for spending a very small amount on bene-
fit-oriented social security; on the other hand, a decent level of life security is guar-
anteed under conservative regimes even if people do not obtain higher education 
because vocational education in such countries is extensive at the secondary edu-
cation stage. In other words, higher education and social security are in a mutually 
exclusive relationship in both types of regimes. However, such a negative correla-
tion is not found under social democratic regimes in the Nordic countries, where 
a certain scale of spending on education is basically observed (Pechar and Andres, 
2011). In short, this means that the phenomenon whereby government spending 
increases linearly from liberal to conservative to social democratic regimes, as seen 
with general social security and welfare, is not observed with education.
 Returning to the subject of regimes, here, they are based on Gøsta Esping-
Andersen’s theory of welfare states, which—it would not be an exaggeration to 
say—is invariably cited in today’s international comparative studies on welfare 
states (Esping-Andersen, 1990, trans. 2001). This states that even though the 
theory of unilinear development has traditionally prevailed, indicating that the 
welfare system is gradually enhanced as the economy and society develop, this is 
not actually the case. Furthermore, looking at the Western industrialized countries 
in particular, they can be roughly classified into three systems. The keyword here is 
de-commodification, which is an indicator for the extent to which workers (labor 
force) are free from being traded as a commodity on the market. To put it simply, 
the labor force is de-commodified when there is a system in which the government 
compensates income for workers who fall into a situation of not being able to work 
in the labor market for some reason. And depending on the degree of de-commod-
ification, welfare states can be roughly divided into liberal, conservative, and social 
democratic regimes.
 Typical examples of liberal regimes include Anglo-Saxon countries such as the 
United States and the United Kingdom. Since they basically value the market 
economy and consider social security almost as if it were something provided for 
people who have lost in a competition, their governments tend to be the smallest 
in term of national finances. On the other hand, the Nordic countries, which are 
often referred to as model welfare states, are considered to have a social democratic 
regime. There, social security policy is in effect in every corner, and equality is 
aggressively promoted. Their governments are likely to become large in terms of 
national finances. Conservative regimes, which are positioned between the two, 
include countries in Continental Europe such as Germany and France. There, 
because entities such as professional associations are influential, even though they 
are not states, social policies are tightly associated with them. In addition, there is a 
tendency for the community of family and relatives, rather than the private sector 
or the state, to take responsibility for the social welfare function. In terms of the 
scale of national finances, they are often at the middle level. Thus, we can expect 
a certain relationship between the scale of government and the type of welfare 
regime.
(2)		Who	Receives	More	Benefit	from	Education?
While education and welfare are both undertakings of the government, there are 
various debates over their positioning, as described. Education and welfare would 
have similar functions from the standpoint of the welfare state theory that presup-
poses the equalization function of education. On the other hand, education is 
considered to have a function to create new discrimination and disparity when the 
allocation function of education is emphasized. According to the economic point 
of view examined in Chapter 2, primary and secondary education have strong 
characteristics as public goods. However, as Harold L. Wilensky stated, higher 
education is unlike other policies in the field of social security and has a different 
nature in terms of actually providing more benefits to the rich. This is because, 
statistically, those who advance to higher education are often (the children of ) 
wealthy individuals. While insurance and welfare are so-called income redistri-
bution policies contributing to the absolute equality of society, the equality of 
opportunities for higher education is not intended to realize equal outcome in 
the first place, even when equal opportunities for higher education become an 
agenda. And if everyone is paying tax uniformly, it means there will be regressivity 
to allocate income to high-income earners because those who benefit from higher 
education are the rich. This is what particularizes education according to Wilensky 
(1975, trans. 1984: 38–42).2
 Then again, as Ulrich Beck observes, we might be at the stage where there are 
excessive supplies of educated individuals today. Nevertheless, there is almost no 
chance in the labor market without pursuing higher education. Even though edu-
cation was intended as a means to pave the way to the labor market, it merely now 
provides the right to get the opportunity for employment. While a diploma is 
essential in order to obtain the opportunity to work, that alone is no longer suf-
ficient. As a result, new qualifications and requirements are added. In any case, 
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because the formation of classes based on impoverishment or through a commu-
nity created on the basis of social status is no longer possible due to the penetration 
of the welfare state policy, our times are characterized by the fact that it is no longer 
realistic to share, think, and explore some kind of standpoint based on status or 
class (Beck, 1986, trans. 1998: 167–168). Meanwhile, people who have lost their 
chance to receive an education are considered not to have not put in enough effort 
(because, on the surface, it looks as if they were offered equal opportunities). They 
then lose the opportunity to jointly raise the issue within society, and wind up 
being left behind and excluded from society as a whole.
 As discussed in Chapter 2, from the government’s perspective, education can 
actually be used as an expedient for cutting social security spending under circum-
stances in which social security spending is becoming tight. This attitude is one 
which views merely providing benefits as throwing money away, while providing 
subsidies is acceptable to some extent if the recipients are to receive training. This 
would also make it easier to obtain consent among the voters (taxpayers). While 
the sorting and allocation functions are more greatly emphasized than the equal-
ization function once education passes a certain level, equality of opportunities 
must be maintained in order to justify such allocation. Therefore, when education 
and welfare are linked, policies to secure equal opportunities for education tend to 
be focused.
 Under these circumstances, there are people who have carved out a field called 
“education and welfare studies.” Toshio Ogawa at Nagoya University is one of 
them. There, issues that fall under both education and welfare—that is, issues con-
cerning the right for children subject to social and child welfare to receive edu-
cation—have been studied as the subject area of education and welfare studies. 
In response to the increased social advancement of women, the scope has subse-
quently been widened to include issues such as expanding nursery schools and 
kindergartens as places of infant development and guaranteeing lifelong education 
(Ogawa and Takahashi, eds., 2001). In addition, a seminar named “Education and 
Social Work” has been established at Hokkaido University, and studies focusing 
particularly on poverty issues have been undertaken mainly by Osamu Aoki and 
colleagues (Aoki, ed., 2003; Aoki and Sugimura, ed., 2007; Aoki, 2010). These 
studies that take field studies into consideration are valuable references aimed at 
the relevant issues.
 That said, this book will focus more on policies at the macro level, particularly 
on the allocation of the national budget, than policies that center on these par-
ticular segments. It is not that these individual efforts are useless—in fact, they are 
extremely important given the recent situation; however, as I have discussed thus 
far, education policies are closely related to social security and welfare policies, 
rather than coming into effect by themselves.3 In terms of finance, the state has 
a range of items they should spend money on, and the resources are allocated to 
some of them based on a certain intention relevant to strategy. Individual policies 
on education and social security are implemented as a result of such resource allo-
cation. When discussing issues such as child poverty that have emerged in some 
areas in recent years, where this occurs and sufficient measures have not been taken 
to address it, it is necessary to examine its overall relationship with other policies, 
including social security and welfare as a matter of course. Within such process, it 
is also probably necessary to consider how Japan positions education in relation to 
other policy areas.
 In Japan, where the degree of de-commodification—an indicator of the welfare 
regime—is low, trying to merely mandate work or promote women’s employment 
without thoroughly deliberating their relationship with policies and systems in 
other areas could result in an increase in non-regular employment and the one-
sided imposition on women to bear the burden of housework and childcare, fur-
ther exacerbating the declining birthrate (Miyamoto, 2013: 108).
(3)		The	Ways	of	Positioning	Public	Education	Expenditure	and	their	Problems
As mentioned in the Introduction, Japan’s public spending on education relative 
to the GDP is at the lowest level among the OECD countries (see Figures Intro-2 
and Intro-3). Conversely, Japan is ranked high among the OECD countries in 
terms of personal defrayment. While this has the effect of forcing individual house-
holds to bear an excessive burden, it may further mean that the total cost for edu-
cation is too high. In fact, it is necessary to scrutinize the breakdown and calmly 
examine how far the government should cover the expense, which does not mean 
blindly trying to increase the public burden. As mentioned on the Introduction, 
opinions may be divided as to whether public spending on education is small or 
large, because how one assesses the figure is subjective; however, many people are 
not exactly enthusiastic about increasing the public burden of education costs. 
Furthermore, while the argument that the public burden should be increased is 
based on an assumption that raising the percentage of the public burden would 
considerably reduce that of the personal burden, according to Kaori Suetomi, an 
analysis based on time-series data shows that the level of personal burden does not 
decrease at all; the personal burden for both school education and education out-
side of school has actually been increasing simultaneously with public spending on 
education (Suetomi, 2010: 67–83).4
 The reality is that the personal burden has increased to a considerable level even 
when such situations are taken into account. For example, although the com-
pulsory education phase is free of charge, a considerable amount of expenses are 
personally defrayed, including school lunch and school education (teaching mate-
rials other than textbooks, etc.), a variety of extracurricular activities at school, 
participating in school events, athletic wear, and uniforms, etc. (Ozawa, 2012). 
Furthermore, the MEXT outright objected to the Ministry of Finance’s (MOF) 
claim, based on the same OECD statistics during the FY 2010 budget compila-
tion process, that “Japan’s public spending on education is at the top level among 
the G5 countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and 
Japan), considering the number of children and the scale of the entire government 
expenditure.” MEXT countered that Japan’s public spending on education was 
low compared to other countries, further pointing out that it was peculiar that 
Japan’s education expenditure was not growing while other countries tended to 
drastically increase theirs as international competition intensified, despite being 
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additionally faced with a declining birthrate.5
 Furthermore, according to the Japanese government’s statistics and the opinion 
of Takuji Ishii, who examined in detail the classification of the OECD statistics, 
public spending on education had been overestimated in the government report 
(intended for the Japanese), because the items that should have been classified 
under private education in the statistics for international comparison were classi-
fied under public spending on education. The OECD’s statistics on educational 
expenses are classified based on who pays, which feels right to some extent. In other 
words, while public education expenses are something to be completely covered 
by the national and local governments, the statistics by the Japanese government 
include school-specific revenues such as admission fees and tuition fees as well as 
the self-generated income of national schools. MEXT takes expenses such as the 
admission and tuition fees paid by beneficiaries and classifies them under personal 
expenses when submitting the data to the OECD. Therefore, even though MEXT 
seems to have at least countered the MOF’s argument in order to fight against the 
move to cut education expenses, they ended up allowing for a double standard by 
using different classifications for aggregating government statistics and interna-
tional comparison statistics (Ishii, 2012).
 In addition, a significant percentage of children are receiving out-of-school 
education at cram schools or other places. Since the burden of such tuition fees 
is also heavy, it is an expenditure that households with children cannot ignore. 
Furthermore, because higher education institutions are clustered in certain areas 
and individuals from rural areas need to relocate or travel, this naturally adds to 
the expenses, for example, relocation expenses, commuting expenses, and living 
expenses once accommodated. In other words, associated expenses must add up to 
a considerable amount in addition to the direct expense of tuition fees. According 
to Hiroyuki Kondo, the results of a study on income disparity related to college 
enrollment opportunities, which he conducted using the MEXT’s Survey on 
Student Life, showed that disparity had increased again in the 1990s due to a steep 
rise in tuition fees, although there had temporarily been signs of a reduction in 
disparity during the 1980s (Kondo, 2001b).
 Suetomi (2010), who summarized the burden of education expenses by using 
the two axes of “freedom—equality” and “welfare—efficiency,” claims that Japan’s 
public spending on education has consistently maintained the efficiency—equal-
ity principle. In other words, the principle of providing compulsory education 
free of charge to ensure equal opportunity of education and the passive principle 
of equality based on the principle of defrayment by the establishers are the only 
legally required areas of responsibility. Out-of-school education, upper secondary 
education, and higher education fall entirely under the area of free choice, mean-
ing that each household has defrayed the cost to improve the level of welfare for 
their children (Suetomi, 2010: 17–27). However, in today’s situation where one 
cannot expect to increase one’s income, the household burden is finally approach-
ing its limit. In addition, while it is generally overlooked in discussions of this 
type, we should bear in mind that the level of Japan’s public education spending 
compared to other countries can be considered passable only for elementary and 
secondary education; the level of public spending on pre-school education is quite 
low compared to other countries.
2.   Education Policy in Japan and the Welfare System behind It
(1)		Establishment	of	a	Japanese-Style	Welfare	System
As has been pointed out many times, Japan is at a stage where it is not even 
remotely feasible to call it a welfare state, both in terms of history and interna-
tional comparison, due to its national finances (Kenjo, 2001; Kenjo, 2004). Public 
spending on social security is at the lowest level among the developed countries. 
However, Japan was not necessarily a country with an extremely large economic 
disparity up until the collapse of the bubble economy in the early 1990s. Increase 
in disparity had been minimized by establishing the so-called employment secu-
rity system built on the male breadwinner model that was based on the division of 
labor by gender role. In fact, although it had not changed significantly from the 
previous income redistribution to the latter redistribution,6 the Gini coefficient 
had been relatively small compared to other countries up until the 1980s. This is 
because abundant employment was suppressing the number of households with a 
significantly low income (Miyamoto, 2009: 40–44).
 Figure 3-1 shows social security-related spending in each of the OECD coun-
tries as a percentage of general government spending (2009).7 Looking at this, 
we can see that the Nordic countries, which are usually regarded as welfare states, 
are not necessarily ranked at the top, although the European countries allocate a 
substantial amount of their government spending to social expenditure. We can 
also see that the percentage of social security-related expenditures in Japan is not 
necessarily high compared to other countries.
 Social security policies in Japan focus disproportionately on elderly policies 
such as pensions. In other words, although Japan’s social spending for family, 
vocational training, and unemployment is extremely low, the spending for pen-
sions and medical care is actually at the same level as Sweden. If the levels are high 
for pensions and medical care when the social expenditure is at the lowest level 
to begin with, it is no surprise that other policies are underserved. Furthermore, 
if the population were to continue aging farther in the future, we can imagine 
that this expenditure will increase but never that it will decrease. Indeed, while 
social spending levels might be low, the scale of spending has been increasing natu-
rally because spending for pension and medical care had to be increased given the 
demographics. In that sense, Japan is gradually becoming a mid-level welfare state 
based only on spending levels (contrary to the perception of the general public) 
(Tanaka, 2013: 238–241). Although uneasiness about pensions and medical care 
and complaints about benefit levels are often heard among the Japanese people in 
general, just maintaining the current state is already quite a challenge. Under such 
circumstances, it must be very difficult to increase social spending on other items. 
How did we come to this point? Taro Miyamoto sums up this course of develop-
ment, making it short and easy to understand. With reference to this, the relevant 
developments are briefly outlined here as follows (Miyamoto, 2008; 2013).
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 The so-called “three-law welfare system” was established in Japan after the Child 
Welfare Law and the Disabled Persons Welfare Law were established in 1947 and 
1949, respectively. The (new) Livelihood Protection Law declaring the guaran-
tee of the right to minimum standards of living was subsequently established in 
1950. However, because the disparity was widening even between people who 
were involved with large companies and able to enjoy the corresponding bene-
fits and others like primary industry workers, small and medium-sized company 
workers, and those with unstable employment after the high economic growth 
period began, solving this problem was becoming a political issue. Then, since the 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), the other party at the time of the conservative 
merger of 1955, had declared for the first time in its charter to be a welfare state, 
the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) also followed suit by aiming to establish a 
welfare state. And so the universal health insurance and the universal pension were 
established as early as 1961, albeit unintegrated with each other and insufficient.8 
However, after Hayato Ikeda took over the administration, Japan was steered to the 
so-called “income-doubling plan” to increase the pie itself rather than focusing on 
the redistribution. This, in turn promoted public works in the form of the develop-
ment of the industrial infrastructure, followed by the development of social capi-
tal, leading to Kakuei Tanaka’s later plan of remodeling the Japanese Archipelago.
 In the meantime, although people’s lives became more affluent, problems such 
as pollution due to rapid growth during the period of economic boom emerged 
and the LDP began losing support, especially in urban areas. Local government 
heads who were backed by the DPJ or the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) high-
lighting their commitment in welfare were elected one after the other in the urban 
areas, especially to the Tokyo Metropolitan Government, therefore becoming a 
threat to the LDP.9 In 1973, Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka consequently imple-
mented free medical care for the elderly and increased employee pension benefits 
in order to maintain the LDP’s approval rating, which had been on a downward 
trend for quite some time. While this year became known as “the beginning of the 
welfare era,” various systems to guarantee employment for the working generation 
had already been established, and the movement to essentially shift social security 
to the second half of life had already been solidified by this time (Miyamoto, 2013: 
116–119).
 Meanwhile, Kakuei Tanaka’s remodeling of the archipelago led to job creation 
in the rural areas. The LDP aimed to make use of this to save their approval rating, 
which was declining in the urban areas, through gaining support in the rural areas. 
A policy to protect small and medium-sized companies was also advocated, while 
employee benefits were developed for the large companies behind the high eco-
nomic growth. In other words, in Japan, large companies operating on the basis 
of long-term employment organized employee benefits backed by the power of 
their enterprise, while small and medium-sized companies and the construction 
industry formed an employment regime based on a completely different scheme. 
The former guaranteed a minimum standard of living by sporadic government 
intervention under the market mechanism. As for the latter (including the self-
employed and farmers), the mechanism worked in a way that guaranteed their 
Figure 3-1   Social Security-related Public Spending  
as Percentage to Total Expenditure (2009)
Source: OECD StatExtract (http://stats.oecd.org/)
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livelihood in exchange for supporting a given political party. Therefore, both were 
potentially in a tense relationship. However, such tension was unlikely to surface, 
partially because small and medium-sized companies, the self-employed, and 
farmers were able to stay competitive during the high economic growth period 
thanks to government intervention. In short, the low unemployment rate in Japan 
was achieved by creating a scheme in which companies could not easily go bank-
rupt because of their connections within industry, public works, and protection 
and regulation measures, rather than by public services and a wide range of social 
security systems. We could even say that, despite being in a tense relationship, 
the existence of two different employment regimes actually served the function of 
shifting income from the high- to the low-productivity sectors, or from the urban 
to the rural areas, when these were functioning well.
 At the same time, however, the unemployed and the elderly had been excluded 
from such employment regime systems. The unemployment issue did not mani-
fest until the 1980s since these systems were functioning. As for the elderly, since 
rapid aging of the population was certain, the government had no choice but to 
increase spending on pensions and medical care for them after the 1970s. And 
because the rapid increase in social security expenditure worsened the fiscal deficit, 
this led to administrative reforms and welfare programs being cut one after the 
other.
 These situations became conspicuous at the beginning of the 1980s, with the 
Thatcher and Reagan administrations of the United Kingdom and United States, 
respectively, often taken to exemplify neoliberalism. Because the state activities are 
suppressed under neoliberalism, the gap is filled by traditional values (conserva-
tism, such as the family principle) and the market function to increase economic 
activities (i.e., liberalism). This is common to all ages and all places; however, 
while welfare reevaluation was built upon anti-welfare ideologies such as mon-
etarism in the United Kingdom and the United States, that was not necessarily 
the case in Japan. Since there was no doctrine to fundamentally attack the con-
cept of the welfare state, Japan positioned itself as “an original welfare state that 
emphasizes self-help, family ties, and mutual aid” rather than denying it altogether 
(Shinkawa, 2005: 107–109). Thus, there is no political party that openly criticizes 
or insists on cutting welfare policies; by contrast, all political parties emphasize 
welfare. However, anti-welfare subjects such as self-help and familism have been 
discussed as if they were pro-welfare in the history of social security policy in Japan 
(Takegawa, 2007: 125).
 As the economy is globalized and maintaining business foundations becomes 
difficult, large companies have increased their non-regular employees while sta-
bilizing the employment foundation among regular employees to build a large 
company-specific labor-management relationship, thereby moving away from 
government control. Meanwhile, once the interests of rural areas, small and 
medium-sized companies, and farmers began conflicting with those of large com-
panies, criticism actually intensified that public works would begin malfunction-
ing. Dissatisfaction with disparity is not always caused by accurately recognizing its 
objective situation (Inoki, 2012: 116–118). In fact, Japan is no longer necessarily 
a country with low economic disparity when compared to other OECD coun-
tries. However, once the employment situation became unstable in the late 1990s, 
the difference in compensation within closed industries and employment systems 
amplified the level of anxiety, and even though the disparity was by no means 
small, people began criticizing “excessive egalitarianism” and “over-the-board 
equality” (Miyamoto, 2008).
(2)		Welfare	Systems	that	Rely	on	the	Private	Sector
Based on Esping-Andersen’s welfare regime theory, Japan can be considered a bor-
derline case: it is close to a conservative regime in Continental Europe in terms 
of the hierarchy and role of family in its social security system but can also be 
classified under a liberal regime in terms of the level of benefits and the effects of 
redistribution (Esping-Andersen, 1997). This welfare regime theory is easier to 
understand when one thinks of the idea of the market and family replacing the 
function of the government. Considering it to be a conservative regime if the fam-
ily has a function to substitute the government and a liberalist regime if the market 
(private sector, i.e., employee benefits) bears that responsibility, the way family 
and corporation reinforce each other is not something that we see in the West. 
On the other hand, it can be said that this is a form of late-starter welfare state 
that had no choice but to address welfare by mobilizing existing resources without 
waiting for the formation of public systems under high economic development. 
Furthermore, this type of welfare state was formed by the ruling party and state 
bureaucracy working together (i.e., led by the state) rather than being created as a 
result of political competition among different political forces (Miyamoto, 2013: 
96–98).
 Thus, Japan historically does not have any era in which it can classed as a wel-
fare state in terms of the fiscal spending of the government. It would seem that 
Japanese people feel that they have achieved excellent economic performance to 
the extent of even being considered exceptional, with large private companies lead-
ing such performance, and employee benefits and welfare supported by those large 
companies; or they feel that the private sector has historically supported people’s 
lives without really relying on the government. Such perception must be part of 
the reason why people feel emotions such as distrust and unreliability toward the 
government.
 In addition, as shown in the iconic example of Japan National Railways, the 
image that what the “public” provides is inefficient and old-style has spread widely 
among the people, namely, that it is more wasteful than the private sector, repeat-
edly falls into a large deficit, has staff with arrogant attitudes, and has uncompro-
mising labor movements, which seem (in the eyes of civilians) just plain selfish, 
etc. (However, in the case of Japan National Railways, problems such as politi-
cians forcibly laying local lines that are certain to lose money and constructing 
the planned new bullet train lines are probably more fundamental reasons for the 
deficit symbolized by the term “self-seeking.”) As these factors became increas-
ingly entangled in complexity, the tendency to distrust the government became a 
normal state of mind. Moreover, distrust in the authorities was exacerbated when 
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the media reported, one after the other, on the government’s collusive relationship 
with certain industry organizations, their squandering of money, and the appoint-
ment of retiring government officials to important posts in industries controlled 
by their former ministries, etc. As a result, the image of government failure was 
established along the lines that “the public sector is lazy and inefficient when the 
private sector is working so hard,” instilling a sense that increasing the national 
burden through measures such as increasing tax is absolutely out of question in the 
case of such a government.
 Furthermore, this began incentivizing politicians to use such discourse to crit-
icize government employees for the purpose of gaining votes. They then began 
turning irresponsible proposals without proper evidence or basis into campaign 
pledges and then later into election manifestos. Even though Japan is already at 
the lowest level among the developed countries in terms of labor force participa-
tion rate and the percentage of government employees’ wages of the total govern-
ment expenditure (Pilichowski and Turkisch, 2008), politicians began attempting 
to gain votes by listing campaign pledges indicating that cutting government 
employees would result in a reduced amount of waste. The situation of the DPJ 
administration taking over the regime in exchange for such a manifesto, serving as 
a kind of “contract” with the voters, and then profoundly betraying that expecta-
tion is an extremely grave one in the sense that they have yet farther spread politi-
cal distrust and resignation among the voters. There is a clear need for them to 
humbly inspect and reflect upon this situation.
 We can say that this book’s underlying awareness of the problem is to be found 
here. That is, it might be that only the feeling of evasion with regard to the defray-
ment of taxes increased for certain reasons in the perception of the Japanese during 
the history of the postwar development of Japan, while the image remained that 
the government (the state) is something that automatically provides service. The 
foundation of public service is the defrayment of taxes by the people; without it, 
public service is not possible. This means that only the perception that the gov-
ernment is not worth paying taxes to was reinforced. Even though the national 
burden is now more necessary than ever for aspects such as social security, in reality 
increasing the burden (i.e., obtaining consensus) has become extremely difficult. 
And if the government tries to obtain consensus, people will support something 
that they can personally benefit from but otherwise deny its need by saying that it 
is either useless or the individual’s own responsibility.
 Though this is an issue covered in Part II, i.e., the second half of this book, as a 
precursor, let us say that it all comes down to the debate over the type of burden. 
Considering the current fiscal deficit situation in Japan, no-one would probably 
think that there is no need at all to increase the national burden in the future for a 
while. The problem is how: whether to set up direct taxes centered on income tax 
as a foundation, as we have done, or to impose indirect taxes such as consumption 
tax as the basis. However, as we can see from the fact that it has taken consider-
able time to introduce and increase consumption tax and that the resistance is 
particularly strong in Japan, the tax system, which is closely related to systems and 
mechanisms for the entire country, is not easy to change.
 According to Kimberly J. Morgan and Monica Prasad, the United States and 
France are at opposite ends as far as the tax system is concerned. The speed of 
industrialization is faster in the United States, while the centralization of the gov-
ernment has been more advanced in France. Also, whereas the tax system in the 
United States is mainly based on direct tax (progressive income tax), that of France 
mainly operates on the basis of indirect tax (regressive consumption tax and value-
added tax). Since industrialization was already advanced in the United States at 
the beginning of the 20th century, industry asserted that the government should 
be funded by income tax rather than imposing tariffs. On the other hand, France 
preferred to impose tariffs on agricultural products from abroad since the agricul-
ture segment was strong, but the industrial sector was not yet at a stage to be able 
to discuss the abolishment of tariffs at that time. It also found itself in the circum-
stance that despite needing to create a government system to track individuals’ 
income in order to introduce income tax, this did not work out well because the 
French had a strong sense of vigilance toward the asset survey by the central gov-
ernment (Morgan and Prasad, 2009). Such differences in the process that formed 
the foundation of the tax system continue to have an influence even today. Japan 
had forecasted the aging population at an early stage and considered introducing 
a consumption tax; however, its implementation was quite difficult (Kato, 1997; 
Ishi, 2009). Furthermore, it is common knowledge that a somewhat one-sided 
negative view of the consumption tax has also widely been shared among the peo-
ple following its introduction, making it difficult to raise the tax rate.
(3)		Beneficiaries	of	Social	Security
In terms of social security and welfare policy, two approaches are relevant: selec-
tivism (targetism), which is the idea of selecting individuals who deserve a given 
service and narrowing down the target population; and universalism, which is the 
idea of trying to have as many people as possible as beneficiaries by aiming to avoid 
making such a selection in so far as possible. As in the case of the tax system, this 
difference is a point that should also not be overlooked when considering social 
security and social welfare policy.
 Needless to say, universalism cannot be practiced unless the scale of public 
finance is large in the first place. Under Swedish-type welfare, employment and 
social security have always been tightly linked. Its difference from the workfare 
seen in countries such as the United States is that it presupposes employment and 
is mainly based on the de-commodification policy that allows people to leave the 
labor market as needed. What is particularly important is the income replacement 
principle, where the purpose of publicly provided income security in the case of 
unemployment, medical care, childcare leave, etc., is to maintain the citizen’s cur-
rent income rather than guaranteeing the minimum income. Therefore, securing 
employment and raising the level of income would result in a higher level of ben-
efits. It is true that the level of benefits also increases with the income in Japan. 
However, while the amount of contribution also increases in Japan, the differ-
ence lies in various benefits directly increasing employment and income security 
in Sweden because the employers pay the social insurance premium. Conversely, 
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the level of minimum income guaranteed outside the labor market is significantly 
lower. These systems in Sweden were created by considering the incentive to work 
in addition to work ethics in order to obtain votes from the middle class. In fact, 
although Sweden is considered to have generous social security, the percentage 
of social assistance10 such as welfare is extremely low (Yumoto and Sato, 2010: 
161–176). Therefore, Taro Miyamoto states that starting with the question, “Why 
would the middle class support such a large government?” is not only wrong but 
nonsensical: the correct understanding is that the government voluntarily became 
big in order to obtain support from the working middle class (Miyamoto, 2013: 
42–43).
 On the assumption that financial resources are scarce, as in Japan, it is inevi-
table that policies to enhance the re-distribution function must rely on selectiv-
ism. However, this creates a gap in treatment between service recipients and those 
who are one-sidedly forced to take on the burden of paying tax. It means that the 
latter—the majority of whom are middle class—would almost never find them-
selves in a situation of experiencing the direct benefits. According to Walter Korpi 
and Joakim Palme, the method of selectivism that appears to create results by cut-
ting costs would result in strong opposition by the middle class, which constitutes 
a large section of the population; and that, in turn, would have the paradoxical 
result that it becomes difficult for society as a whole to gain benefit, since the bur-
den only increases and it becomes even more difficult to obtain support (Korpi 
and Palme, 1998). Today, poverty is frequently pinpointed as an urgent issue 
(Iwata, 2007). At the level of research, it has been pointed out that many individu-
als are not receiving the benefit of the public assistance system in Japan because the 
procedures of claiming benefits are troublesome and the eligibility requirements 
are very stringent (Hirao, 2002). By contrast, there has recently been some nega-
tive news coverage on public assistance and many people are casting a critical eye 
in response. This probably reflects the situation that those in the middle class in 
Japan are dissatisfied with the fact they are not receiving any benefit even though 
they are defraying the costs while the income level remains low.
3.   Globalized World and Social Policies
(1)		Economy	that	Goes	beyond	the	Framework	of	the	State
Peter Taylor-Gooby states that the following four stages have occurred in the tran-
sition to a post-industrialized society.
 First, women’s social advancement increased and participation by men in the 
labor force began decreasing. This made it necessary to earn a double-income in 
order to maintain a living. Therefore, demands for women’s equal opportunities in 
education and the labor market further increased. Second, the elderly population 
requiring social care increased, as did the corresponding cost to the welfare state of 
providing services such as pensions and medical care. Third, while the demand for 
highly educated individuals increased as the relationship between the labor market 
and education was strengthened, the risk of less-educated individuals becoming 
socially excluded increased. Fourth, in response to the movement to try to tighten 
national finance, private services, especially private pensions, increased.
 Since those at risk were mainly the elderly and the unemployed up until then, 
the objective of these policies was clear, such as focusing on those who are not 
earning wages. However, there is now a wider variety of new risks and there is no 
choice but to target a wide range of age groups (or life stages). Not only that, but 
there is also a need to provide services to cater to individuals rather than uniformly 
allocating resources. Specifically, examples of services may include assistance for 
work-life balance, education, and training (Taylor-Gooby, 2004).
 In a sense, the transition to globalization makes the framework of the nation 
state meaningless. In particular, economic activities that span the world “export” 
work in order to input labor force at a lower cost. In addition, thanks to the 
advancement of technology, goods can be produced anywhere by building a divi-
sion-of-labor system in places around the world, as long as this does not cost too 
much. And large, transnational companies responsible for such activities aim to 
expand their business to places where the tax is the lowest and the infrastructure 
is fully developed, by escaping from countries where taxes are high and thereby 
removing employment from these locations. Not only that, but such companies 
choose among different locations as places to invest in, produce, pay tax, and live, 
making nation states compete with each other. By doing so, it becomes possible 
for the individuals at the top to live comfortably and pay taxes in places with the 
lowest tax rate. Because this creates problems such as tax havens, as briefly touched 
on in the Introduction (see also Shiga, 2013), it has become a vexing issue around 
the world. And this is not only something decided at the level of political discus-
sion; it develops during the course of normal economic activities (Beck, 1997, 
trans. 2005).
 This follows the same course as the problem pointed out by Ulrich Beck in 
Risk Society, Towards a New Modernity (1986, trans. 1998), namely, that although 
it appears as if a society that is rational and feels safe is built as modernization 
progresses, risks that are difficult to see (or difficult to sense) and at the same time 
infinitely difficult to predict, going beyond the framework of the nation state, will 
surface in reality. And these risks are not dependent on the circumstances that each 
individual finds him- or herself in. Moreover, people cannot realize the risk itself; 
rather, they come to recognize it having been being pointed out by some kind of 
expert (Beck, 1986, trans. 1998). Although it might be an exaggeration to say that 
the various systems created on the premise of the framework of the state would 
become meaningless as economic activities are globalized, it would even be dif-
ficult to control them.
(2)		Social	Exclusion	and	Inclusion
I have previously made use of the term “social exclusion.” Welfare and social secu-
rity policies were originally closely related to labor legislations, and improving their 
benefits was not independent of labor movements. As the state became a welfare 
state, the standard of living of the working class improved, reducing the incentive 
for it to unite as a class called workers to undertake a movement. Instead, people 
realized that women, minorities, and people with disabilities were not covered by 
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these systems in the first place and began actively advocating their rights. In socio-
logical terms, this is the beginning of the so-called “new social movements,”11 or 
advocacy movements for minorities based on feminism, race, and ethnicity. These 
new social movements began raising awareness of various structures of discrimina-
tion that were not limited to the economic dimension. Arguments were made of 
the following kind: “merely throwing around goods until they are enough will not 
work for these people,” “these people might have been excluded from the systems 
and communities in wider societies in the first place due to institutions and cul-
tural criteria making it difficult for them to obtain employment and opportunities 
to connect with other people,” and “encouraging social participation and building 
a system that can maintain such a custom might for this reason become all the 
more important.” While the term “exclusion” is used in such context, “inclusion” 
is used as its counter-concept. Behind these assertions was the emerging need to 
respond to criticisms from the right wing regarding various social policies as social 
security put pressure on the national finances. In short, the criticizing right-wing-
ers positioned themselves entirely as neoliberalists. According to their viewpoint, 
far from increasing the motivation to work, generous benefits therefore create 
dependency and actually encourage laziness. Therefore, the left-wingers who sup-
port these policies needed to show that the roots of the problem were deep and that 
these were not policies to merely provide money and goods (Kameyama, 2007).
 According to Kengo Nakamura, the term “social exclusion” was first used in 
France and then later spread to the United Kingdom. However, the context in 
which it was used differs considerably (Nakamura, 2007). In France, the concept 
of “participation” was adopted as a counter-strategy in the Revenu minimum 
d’insertion (RMI) to promote social participation among long-term unemployed 
individuals. The term “participation” was used in the context of reconstruction of 
social solidarity under the republican tradition.12 In the United Kingdom, on the 
other hand, the concept of inclusion was established as a strategy to counter the 
neoliberalist ideology touting that welfare makes people dependent on the state. 
The term “inclusion” was used to mean using welfare to facilitate excluded people 
in becoming active in society, i.e., connecting the needy segment with the labor 
market to help them become financially independent. This was a keyword pre-
sented by the Labour Party led by Tony Blair in 1994 in order to overcome the 
situation of poverty and inequality in the United Kingdom. Having taken the 
helm of state, the Labour Party then positioned social inclusion as one of the most 
important agendas of the regime. This idea of “inclusion” in the United Kingdom 
later affected the policies of the Democratic Party in the United States.13
 The policy details of a conventional benefit-type welfare state were basically 
formulated in accordance with the vertically divided administrative organiza-
tion, which is also centralized. However, when putting forth the effort to socially 
include people who might otherwise fall through the system’s cracks, services can-
not merely provide monetary benefits; provision of actual goods (or actual service) 
becomes necessary, and cross-functional cooperation becomes important. In other 
words, issues such as employment policy, social security policy, and education pol-
icy are no longer separate; whether these policies succeed or not depends largely on 
cooperation with each other and how they are combined. Implementing flexible 
services then becomes important, making it necessary for the local governments—
rather than the centralized and vertically divided administration—to compre-
hensively govern services based on the actual circumstances of the community. 
Therefore, decentralization, strengthening cooperation across different agencies, 
and building a mechanism for mutual coordination becomes necessary; and such 
opinions do, in fact, begin surfacing, although taking the relevant actions is not 
as easy as it sounds. And if they fail here, the administrative organization itself is 
indeed deemed inefficient, as it is seen to be the government’s fault, which might 
lead to reinforcing the neoliberalist argument for reducing the size of the gov-
ernment itself; therefore, the government is truly faced with a difficult situation 
(Miyamoto, 2013: 3–23).
4.   The Relationship between Education System and Social Security/
Welfare System from the Perspective of International Comparison
(1)		Complementarity	of	the	Systems
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the theory by neo-institutionalists such as Meyer and 
colleagues on the global spread of education systems has gained a certain level of 
support and is often mentioned in the field of educational sociology. As I touched 
on there, neo-institutionalists focus on institutional isomorphism.
 However, it is known that there are actually a variety of relationships between 
education (particularly the pathway of vocational education after secondary edu-
cation) and the labor market. Such varieties do not necessarily occur completely at 
random. As stated at the beginning of this chapter, there is a mutual complemen-
tarity14 whereby the affinity of the labor market for a given education system exists 
because the labor market naturally makes use of the existing education system 
(and vice versa). In other words, since various systems are intricately intertwined 
with each other rather than existing independently, it is difficult to make changes 
independently when a problem becomes apparent with one system. To be more 
precise, because there is a kind of institutional inertia, it takes enormous cost to 
make any corrections once a system is established. In this way, a path dependency 
is created in which newer systems and mechanisms are affected by the systems that 
are already in place. The mutual complementarity among systems is meaningful 
when its existence actually interacts with various systems; a reform is meaningful 
only when various systems are forced to change across the board (Amable, 2003, 
trans. 2005, 18–21; Aoki, 2008: 39–41).
 This can be put in another way as in the following explanation. For example, 
given the opinion that the ideal economy of the 1990s would have had the Danish 
education system, Swedish technology and employment policies, the competitive 
environment of the Finish high-tech sector, and the American entrepreneurial 
environment, labor market regulation, financing system, and competitive envi-
ronment, the question is whether the best model can be created by merely com-
bining these Nordic and American systems. There is an infinite number of possible 
combinations of different institutions and systems (between different areas). And 
People’s Attitude and the State of Policy Regarding Education Spending86 Relationship between Education and Social Security/Welfare 87
there could, of course, be more than one pattern rather than a very limited number 
of combinations that produce the best performance. Conversely, this means that 
randomly combining systems that have produced a partially good performance 
would not always result in systems that produce good performance. Basically, a 
given system running well means that it is in a complementary relationship with 
other systems, so that it might not work well if that relationship did not exist 
(Amable, 2003, trans. 2005: 79–84).
 Bruno Amable, a regulationalist economist in France, divides systems in capi-
talist countries into five areas comprising product market competition, labor rela-
tions-related, financial sector, social security, and education. These systems were 
created as a result of conflicts and compromises among various groups within a 
given society. Each combination of systems was created based on the complemen-
tarity of each system rather than randomly linking them. Amable also states that 
the types of capitalist systems can be divided into five categories: market-based 
economics, social democratic economics, Asian capitalism, Continental European 
capitalism, and Mediterranean capitalism (Amable, 2003, trans. 2005: 136–142).
(2)		Education	under	Social	Policies
Let us turn to the method employed by Amable and explain it based on empiri-
cal data on the relationship between each policy. The method used here is called 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA).15
 Here, I used the OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX) and looked at 
each country’s public spending on old age, survivors, incapacity-related benefits, 
health, family, active labor market programs, unemployment, housing, and education 
compared to the GDP. Using these variables, I created a composite variable with 
high explanatory power, namely, that maximizes the variance of each original vari-
able under the composite variable.
 Here, in order to highlight the difference between the functions of higher edu-
cation and non-higher education under social policy, education was divided into 
“primary and secondary education plus post-secondary education not included in 
higher education” and “higher education” for analysis. After conducting the PCA, 
the first and second principal components with a large contribution rate (ratio of 
eigenvalues) were used as the horizontal and vertical axes, respectively, to plot the 
factor loading of each variable, as shown in Figure 3-2. In PCA, the meaning of the 
derived principal components (the axes on the figure) is interpreted by looking at 
the relative positions of the original variables (i.e., factor loadings). Variables plot-
ted closer to an axis have a higher loading for the corresponding principal compo-
nent, making a higher contribution to the component of the axis (i.e., they have a 
high explanatory power for that axis).
 The contribution rates are approximately 35% and 26% for Axis 1 (horizontal 
axis) and Axis 2 (vertical axis), respectively, and many variables are located to the 
right of the vertical axis (Quadrants I and IV). This implies that, based on the first 
principal component, there is a general relationship whereby the social expendi-
ture items shown here increase as the ratio to the GDP increases. In particular, 
labor-related indicators and health are plotted very closely together and close to 
the horizontal axis (Principal Component 1), while not contributing much to the 
vertical axis component (Principal Component 2). In other words, while labor-
related and health expenditures largely contribute to the axis of the first principal 
component, based on the values on the horizontal axis, incapacity-related benefits 
and family equally contribute to the component of the axis. The contribution of 
old age is also large. In comparison, while the contribution of education is not 
large, it is noteworthy that primary and secondary education is found on the posi-
tive side and higher education slightly on the negative side. Therefore, it can be said 
that the first principal component is an indicator for the size of expenditure per-
centage for a wide range of welfare and social security in general, and primary and 
secondary education is positioned more or less close to these welfare policies.
 As for the second principal component on the vertical axis, the positions are 
divided into positive and negative. Since those related to education and family 
are positive and survivors and old age are negative, it can be inferred that the sec-
ond principal component might be a measure of determining whether the policy 
target is childcare or the elderly. In other words, it is an indicator for explaining 
whether the service’s target segment is the children and youth generation or the old 
generation.
 Based on the factors extracted for each country as a result of the above PCA, I 
can assign a score (factor score) to each country. These scores are plotted in Figure 
3-3, which can be regarded as analogous to Figure 3-2. In other words, since vari-
ables such as primary and secondary education, family, and incapacity-related benefits 
are plotted in Quadrant I of Figure 3-2 and we can see the Nordic countries, the 
United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and other countries in Quadrant I of Figure 
3-3, it can be said that these countries are characterized by their focus on primary 
and secondary education, family, and incapacity-related benefits’ policies that are 
Figure 3-2   Factor Loading Plot
Source: OECD StatExtract (http://stats.oecd.org/)
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plotted in very similar positions. Since the countries in Quadrant II are positive on 
the vertical axis, this indicates that their overall ratio of social expenditure to the 
GDP is small, although they focus more on policies for the younger than the older 
generation (only in a relative sense). 
 Looking at this in the same manner, the countries in Quadrant III are the ones 
where social expenditure itself is small yet focused disproportionately on the 
elderly policies. Japan is one of them. Quadrant IV shows that although the focus 
on elderly policies is the same, the size of social expenditure of these countries is 
large.
 To summarize, we can see from Figure 3-2 that education is plotted in different 
positions for primary and secondary education and higher education. Although the 
explanatory power of the first principal component is not necessarily high, given 
that primary and secondary education is located on the positive side on the first axis 
while higher education is located on the negative side, we can see that primary and 
secondary education have an affinity with welfare and social security policies to 
promote equality, whereas higher education has a different vector. In addition, we 
can see from the components of social expenditure that Japan is close to some of 
the Southern European countries and positioned opposite the so-called welfare 
states in Northern Europe, as expected.
(3)		Position	of	Education	Policy	in	the	Overall	Public	Expenditure
I intend to position education in a wide range of government measures rather 
than limiting it to so-called social policies. The data are sourced from the OECD 
database in the same way; however, in order to see the positioning within overall 
policies not limited to social policies, I used education as one item rather than 
dividing it into primary and secondary education and higher education to per-
form the analysis. As a note, items with a degree of contribution too small to com-
pose the factor are often excluded from the analysis in PCA because they do not 
contribute to the overall factor component. (In such a case, the variable ends up 
coming close to the origin when plotted. In other words, its factor loading is close 
to zero under higher-ranked factors with a high explanatory power.) Here, too, 
general public services and security maintenance (police, etc.) were excluded from 
the analysis because their explanatory power (or factor loading) was small under 
the factors with a large contribution rate.
 This may mean that every country had a certain level of spending on general 
public services and security maintenance and there was not much difference by 
country. “Expense items that constitute a factor in PCA” does not mean that these 
are large spending items; it means that they make a large contribution to consti-
tute the axis or have a large variance (dispersion). Social security expenditure does 
not contribute much to the first and second principal components, although its 
increase has become a problem. This is probably because every country has a cer-
tain percentage of social security expenditure.
 Now, looking at Figure 3-4, all items are on the positive side of the first principal 
component, except for defense, which is on the negative side. In other words, most 
items are in a completely opposite relationship with the percentage accounted for 
by defense expenditure (i.e., when the former is large, the defense expenditure is 
small, and vice versa).
Figure 3-3   Factor Score Plot by Country (Social and Education Expenditure)
Source: OECD StatExtract (http://stats.oecd.org/)
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Figure 3-4   Factor Loading Plot for the PCA of Public Expenditure (to the GDP) (1)
Source: OECD StatExtract (http://stats.oecd.org/)
Data are for 2010, except for Canada (2006) and New Zealand (2005).
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them by including the third principal component. The results are shown in Figure 
3-6. When the data are plotted based on the second and third principal compo-
nents, a completely different picture emerges.
 Although it is difficult to interpret the second principal component, variables 
related to education and culture are positive, while those related to environment 
and economy are negative. Furthermore, these variables have a considerably low 
contribution rate to the third principal component. The third principal compo-
nent is relatively easy to understand; the ones that are referred to as welfare or 
social security are found on the positive side. Even though housing policy is also 
usually counted as social security, however, it is found on the negative side, in 
contrast to social security and health. In addition, looking at this third principal 
component, education is found almost on the second principal component axis 
and not really contributing to the third principal component. Likewise, economy, 
environment, defense, and culture and art do not contribute to the third principal 
component. We can gain a glimpse of the uniqueness of education (as compared to 
social security and welfare) from these plots.
 Figure 3-7 is a plot of each country’s factor score for the second and third prin-
cipal components. Based on this, we can see that Japan and the United States are 
exactly in the opposite position. Although this is partially due to the fact that not 
only education but also defense makes a large contribution to the second principal 
component, the United States and Israel are found on the positive side on the 
second principal component axis. In addition, while defense is in Quadrant IV in 
Figure 3-6, the United States and Israel are also in Quadrant IV. The fact that both 
of these countries focus on education in their own way is another characteristic. 
On the other hand, welfare states such as countries in Northern Europe are all 
 Figure 3-5 plots countries based on the first and second principal components 
in Figure 3-4. The ones that lie close to the origin are countries that are difficult 
to characterize based on these two principal components. Looking at the second 
principal component in Figure 3-4, education and health are on the positive side 
and economy and environment on the negative side. It seems that what we would 
think of when we hear the term “welfare” is found on the positive side of the sec-
ond principal component. On the other hand, looking at Figure 3-5, the Nordic 
countries seem to be concentrated on the positive side near the second principal 
component axis.
 The fact that countries such as Israel and the United States are found in 
Quadrant II, obviously reflects that their military spending (i.e., defense expen-
diture) is large. Continental European countries, including conservative regimes 
as defined by Esping-Andersen, are concentrated in Quadrant III. Japan is also 
included here. Japan’s second principal component is found on the far negative 
side. Looking at Figure 3-4, education and culture and art are located on the posi-
tive side of the second principal component axis; therefore, the fact that Japan’s 
public spending on education and culture and art is relatively small can be posi-
tioned in this way.
 Since the contribution rates of the first and second principal components were 
not necessarily large in absolute terms and were on par with each other, I examined 
Figure 3-5   Factor Score (Principal Components 1 and 2) Plot (Public Spending 
to GDP)
Source: OECD StatExtract (http://stats.oecd.org/)
Data are for 2010, except for Canada (2006) and New Zealand (2005).
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Figure 3-6   Factor Loading Plot for the PCA of Public Expenditure (to the GDP) (2)
Source: OECD StatExtract (http://stats.oecd.org/)
Data are for 2010, except for Canada (2006) and New Zealand (2005).
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found in Quadrant I.
 Japan is found almost at the edge of Quadrant II, where Continental Europe is 
concentrated. Japan is quite close to the positive side of the third principal compo-
nent axis because it reflects the results as in Figure 3-1 that social security is shifting 
toward the elderly. Furthermore, given that education and culture and art largely 
contribute to the second principal component, we can see that Japan does not 
financially focus on these types of policies.
(4)		Distance	between	Education	and	Each	Policy	Area	and	the	Classification	of	
Country	Based	on	Distance
Based on the above, the proximity (or distance) of each policy can be measured by 
using the structure of social expenditure. At the same time, countries can also be 
classified based on a certain standard by using the breakdown of national finances. 
Looking at social policies, education policies can be divided into primary and sec-
ondary education and higher education; and it has been shown that primary and 
secondary education is close to the welfare and social security policies in general 
(Figure 3-2). The Nordic countries, which fall under the social democratic regime 
as defined by Esping-Andersen, are found relatively close to Continental Europe, 
which falls under the conservative regime. However, Anglo-Saxon countries, 
which are considered liberal regimes, are relatively scattered, so that the United 
Kingdom and New Zealand are close to Northern Europe but far away from the 
United States, Canada, and Australia. While Amable defined the category “Asian 
capitalism,” there is a considerable distance between Japan and South Korea, and 
they are not exactly similar in terms of social expenditure breakdown (Figure 3-3).
 In addition, when the subject variables are expanded to cover the entire govern-
ment expenditure, what we first see is that many social policy-related expenditures 
and defense expenditures are in the opposite position. Education and culture and 
art, which are found closely together, are in the opposite position to economic and 
environmental policies. Investing in education should lead to economic develop-
ment of the society from the perspective of human capital; however, since higher 
education expenditure means lower spending on economic policies in terms of 
government spending, it does not seem that they are always in an affiliative rela-
tionship (Figure 3-4). Housing policy is also in the opposite position to social secu-
rity and health, while education is positioned in between them (Figure 3-6).
 Japan is considered to have been influenced by neoliberalism and has a small 
government; however, based on the structure of government spending, Japan is 
quite different from the United States and actually closer to Continental European 
countries, which are considered conservative regimes as defined by Esping-
Andersen. This suggests that Japan is quite different from countries like the United 
States in terms of people’s feelings toward the government as well as the country’s 
historical development. Thus, I will continue by examining the perception toward 
the government from the standpoint of international comparison.
NOTES
1 Works by Pat Thane, which have also been translated into Japanese, have separate sec-
tions for education items (Thane, 1996, trans. 2000).
2 This mostly applies to higher education. According to Christiana Stoddard, who 
examined the background of how the United States came to spend public funds on com-
pulsory education, the percentage of public spending on education was higher among 
states with fewer disparities when compared to those states with similar median assets. 
This also had the effect of increasing the school enrollment rate, particularly among the 
poor (Stoddard, 2009).
3 In terms of territory of the government authorities, whereas school education falls 
under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and 
Technology (MEXT), family policies including child welfare fall under the Ministry 
of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW), for example. However, since childcare itself 
costs a considerable amount of money, especially from the standpoint of parents raising 
children, such vertically organized administration is only logical from the perspective of 
the government offices. Education policies that are disconnected from family policies 
are meaningless, and labor policies that ignore family policies are also unreasonable. It is 
undeniable that academics tend to lopsidedly examine a narrowly defined, specific area 
as specialization increases; however, as this chapter argues, how to relate education poli-
cies to social security and welfare policies needs to be examined from a broader perspec-
tive because it affects how society thinks of education.
Figure 3-7   Factor Score (Principal Components 2 and 3) Plot (Public Spending 
to GDP)
Source: OECD StatExtract (http://stats.oecd.org/)
Data are for 2010, except for Canada (2006) and New Zealand (2005).
P
ri
n
ci
p
al
 C
o
m
p
o
n
en
t 
2 
( c
o
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
 r
at
e 
= 
21
.2
%
)
Principal Component 3 (contribution rate = 17.1%) 
2.0
1.0
0.0
-1.0
-2.0
-3.0
-2.0 -1.0 0 1.0 2.0
Iceland 
United Kingdom 
Denmark
Ireland
Norway 
Netherland 
Finland 
Sweden 
Belgium
Spain
Austria
Italy
Germany
Poland
Czech Republic
Turkey
Japan
Israel
Estonia 
United States
Hungar
Canada
New Zealand
Slovenia 
South Korea 
Greece
Luxembourg
Slovakia
France
Portugal
People’s Attitude and the State of Policy Regarding Education Spending94 Relationship between Education and Social Security/Welfare 95
4 However, the rate of increase has been slowing down in recent years.
5 The claim made by the MOF can be viewed by accessing the following document 
as of January 2014: http://www.mof.go.jp/budget/budger_workflow/budget/fy2010/
bunkyo.pdf
The counter argument by MEXT can be found on the following website: http://www.
mext.go.jp/a_menu/yosan/h22/1287930.htm
6 This implies that the effect of inequality correction by income redistribution is not 
very large.
7 This is the OECD’s public social expenditure data as a percentage of the total general 
government expenditure. The latest comprehensive data available as of February 2014 
are for the fiscal year 2009.
8 Although they had some difficulties and issues, establishing the universal health 
insurance and universal pension in 1961 was quite early compared to other countries; in 
particular, universal health insurance had only been implemented in three countries in 
Northern Europe (Miyamoto, 2008: 66–67). In that sense, the assessment that asserts 
that there was no sign of welfare is somewhat too extreme. However, in terms of the 
scale, it was insufficient.
9 For example, free medical care for the elderly over the age of 70 introduced in 1969 
by the then Tokyo Governor Ryokichi Minobe later spread to other local governments 
throughout the nation, prompting the Tanaka administration to decide to make medical 
care free for the elderly nationwide. This case is often cited as an example in which local 
policies affected the national policy.
10 This refers to the policy measure of using tax money to provide cash to individuals 
whose income is lower than a certain level.
11 Sociologically, they are said to have started with a movement that Alain Touraine in 
France argued to have emerged to replace class conflict.
12 However, according to Nakamura, although the term “exclusion” is used in the politi-
cal setting in France, it is only mentioned carefully as an unconvincing concept in the 
field of social science (Nakamura, 2007).
13 In Northern Europe, employment support has been provided through active labor 
policy. Furthermore, the national and local governments have traditionally taken the 
responsibility for improving childcare services. This means that national governments in 
particular were already implementing welfare state policies incorporating the concept of 
inclusion in the sense used in the United Kingdom.
14 “Complement” is the opposite concept of substitution. If the demand for Goods A 
increases when the price of Goods B rises, Goods A has become a substitute. Conversely, 
Goods A is a complement if its demand decreases when the price of Goods B rises. For 
example, if more people begin eating rice when the price of bread rises (i.e., they avoid 
consuming bread that has become expensive), rice is considered to be in a substitutional 
relationship with bread and becomes a substitute. On the other hand, bread and jam are 
in a complementary relationship where the demand for jam to put on the bread declines 
when the price of bread rises (causing fewer people to eat the expensive bread), but it 
increases when the price of bread drops and more people begin eating bread, so that jam 
is referred to as a complement of bread. To have mutual complementarity means one 
system exists on the premise of the existence of the other system and they are hence in a 
relationship to complement each other.
15 See Ueda (2003) on PCA.
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CHAPTER 4
The Structure of Japanese People’s Attitude 
toward Education and Social Policies  
from the Perspective of International Comparison
1.   Attitude toward Welfare Policy and Social Security
(1)		Rationale	for	Focusing	on	the	Attitude
The way the so-called welfare regime theory is discussed varies because it is relevant 
to various fields. The cohering principle among them is that the theory implies 
a rebuttal against the viewpoint that there is a unilinear relationship between 
the economic development stages and welfare system development, such as that 
welfare systems and social security services develop as industrialization and mod-
ernization advances (Uzuhashi, 1997). In other words, welfare institutions and 
systems can be seen to vary even among countries exhibiting similar economic 
development.
 For example, as an indicator of the development of the welfare system, public 
expenditure or the proportion of social security expenditure to the economic scale 
(GDP) is sometimes used. I have conducted an analysis by partially following the 
method also of Chapter 3. While this is something seen in the aforementioned 
work by Wilensky as well as Fred C. Pampel, John B. Williamson, and Francis 
Castles, among others (Wilensky, 1975, trans. 1984; Pampel and Williamson, 
1988; Castles, 1989), we need to be aware that such a viewpoint has the following 
pitfalls.
 The Thatcher administration during the 1980s is generally regarded as the 
vanguard of neoliberalism. However, looking only at the facts, the overall pub-
lic expenditure actually increased, especially for social security-related items, 
even though neoliberalism indeed seems to have had an impact on cutting gov-
ernment spending on items such as housing and education (Takegawa, 1999: 
67–70). When the unemployment rate increases, its cost is passed on to social 
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security-related expenses. Conversely, if a state of close to full employment is real-
ized, the cost is reduced regardless of the welfare system. The Japanese government 
is not in the least bit big compared to its economic scale. However, as we can see 
from the demographic composition of Japan, the social security benefit cost is 
destined to increase. Pension and medical care account for 50% and 30% of the 
total social security benefit cost, respectively; and the social security benefit cost as 
a percentage of GDP has consequently increased four-fold in 40 years. The over-
all social expenditure as a percentage of GDP, which is 23%, has also doubled in 
the past 30 years. This increase is significantly larger than other countries, with 
the percentage of social expenditure to general government spending already hav-
ing reached the European level (Tanaka, 2013: 238–241). In other words, while 
social security expenditure could increase due to rapid population aging, it will 
never decrease (unless some kind of binding power comes into play). In that sense, 
although it might not feel that way, Japan will become more of a welfare state in 
terms of government expenditure.
 In addition, although the scale of social security benefit tends to attract all the 
attention, the roles and functions of the state (or government) are not limited to 
resource allocation. As Shogo Takegawa points out, we also need to pay attention 
to the aspect of the welfare state as a regulatory state. In general, the United States 
is rarely considered to be a welfare state; however, that is when mainly consider-
ing benefits; and this does not mean that the United States has been indifferent to 
the value of equality. In fact, discrimination based on race, gender, age, disabili-
ties, etc., is institutionally strictly prohibited. Deregulations in the United States 
are mainly related to economic activities; however, when it comes to aspects such 
as equality of individual freedom and opportunities, the American society pays 
extremely close attention and deploys strict regulations (Takegawa, 2007: 42).
 In short, as shown in Chapter 3, we are beginning to understand the way the 
welfare system differs considerably even among developed countries. The educa-
tion system—also a large undertaking that the government is involved in—is not 
independent of the welfare system. The question is what explains the difference in 
these regimes (or systems).
 While numerous factors can surely be hypothesized, the people’s voice (or pub-
lic opinion) cannot be ignored in a democratic society. This is because the people 
in a democratic country are supposed to have the opportunity to realize their own 
will and desire through their voting behavior. While it does not have to be perfect, 
a policy that does not at all reflect the will of the public is unlikely to be realized. 
In addition, although the explanation here sounds as if there were a causal rela-
tionship whereby a policy is realized through politics because there is the will (or 
desire) of the people, the actual relationship is not that simple. In the case of social 
security policy, society begins to consider it a matter of course for beneficiaries to 
receive benefits once a system has been put into place, so that further expansion of 
the program might become necessary in some cases. In other words, it seems that 
there is tendency to no small extent for policy to rouse the demand.1
 In this chapter, I will continue looking at the issue from the perspective of inter-
national comparison and examine to what extent people recognize education, 
along with other social security and welfare policies, as the government’s role by 
focusing on attitude toward the public burden of education costs.
(2)		Competing	Interests	for	Public	Spending	on	Education
The need for services provided by the government is basically increasing more and 
more. Meanwhile, the government must secure funds to accommodate that need. 
While this is a common problem among developed countries, it is not easy to 
secure funds. Tax avoidance behavior is becoming conspicuous, especially among 
high-income earners, as economic activities become more globalized and the com-
petition to reduce corporate tax continues worldwide in order to attract companies 
that ultimately bring employment. Under such circumstances, the only option 
that can ultimately surface in an attempt to somehow secure funds is to persuade 
the people, or the taxpayers, on an increase in tax.
 However, generally speaking, higher taxes tend to be considered as an increased 
burden. Therefore, the idea is unlikely to gain support, while politicians are 
unlikely to advocate such policy for which it is difficult to gain support because 
they could face tax revolt and be defeated in the next election if they did.
 Japan is currently in the midst of such difficult circumstances. Ideologically, the 
appropriate information is supposed to be provided in a democratic society for 
individuals to refer to in order to make a decision to vote for a political party or 
candidate he/she considers suitable. However, it is difficult to judge the appropri-
ateness of the information to begin with. There are also various positions regarding 
tax increases, and the reality is that each party is communicating the information 
that they consider to serve their own purpose. Unless one has the expertise, it is 
difficult to judge the appropriateness of the information. Systems related to social 
security and welfare are particularly complex and require a considerable amount of 
knowledge. Even experts sometimes state their opinion from completely opposite 
positions. At the end of the day, it is unreasonable to assume that everyone has the 
same detailed knowledge on these systems. In addition, an extremely biased image 
and understanding could become popular, and people might in some cases vote 
based on such misconception.
 According to the analysis by Taylor-Gooby and others, although relatively accu-
rate information is prevalent in the United Kingdom regarding services such as 
the National Health Service (NHS) that everyone can receive, there is a tendency 
to overestimate the cost for income redistribution policies targeting specific seg-
ments (such as the unemployed and single-parent households, in particular). 
Furthermore, the highly educated as well as relatively affluent segments such as 
the middle class are more likely to have this knowledge. In terms of type of policy, 
those such as the redistribution policy that are beneficial to the low-income seg-
ment are more likely to be judged harshly. Not only that, but it is said that the seg-
ments that would benefit the most from the redistribution policy are more likely 
to vote on the basis of an inaccurate understanding (Taylor-Gooby et al., 2003).
 To state it very simply, taxpayers consider an expenditure justifiable if they can 
see it benefit for themselves somehow but do not tend to support an expenditure 
for which they do not see any direct benefit. Everyone undoubtedly has experience 
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of receiving education and should have enjoyed some of benefit at the personal 
level; however, the period in which people go to school is generally limited. In 
addition, those who pay some kind of personal cost for education are limited to 
families with children who go to school. Assuming that whether or not to have 
children is a personal choice, it is possible that some people consider the educa-
tion cost incurred for children to be something that should be paid for by the 
individual because it is a consequence of their own choice at the micro level (i.e., 
the act of bearing and raising children itself ). As for expenditures in areas related 
to social security, however, anyone may be at risk of falling into the position of 
having to rely on the benefits of medical care and the elderly pension, for example 
(and the possibility could be high or certain when considered over the long term). 
Therefore, these types of social security expenditures are issues for everyone. It can 
be said that policies in favor of welfare and social security in general can more eas-
ily get support because no one can avoid aging eventually. In that sense, education 
might be an area that people cannot fully appreciate. For this reason, we can also 
say that those in urgent need are limited.
 As pointed out by Samuel H. Preston, the difference between the expenditure 
on measures for the elderly and the money spent for children and youth, such as 
education, is that while the implication of the former is more on consumption, the 
latter is not merely consumption but social investment (Preston, 1984). However, 
Kenneth S. Y. Chew states that policies to be supported from a long-term perspec-
tive—particularly public investments related to children—will have a hard time 
receiving support due to an increasingly individualistic orientation in addition 
to demographic factors such as the declining birth rate, high divorce rate, and 
aging population. In general, highly educated people tend to agree with direct 
public funds for education; however, this tendency weakens as people get older. 
This might reflect the fact that it is the elderly who have strong traditional values 
that parents should raise their own children (Chew, 1990).2 It has been observed 
in the United States that people who are paying for education as parents are more 
likely to support public spending on education (Chew, 1992).3
 In many cases, the demand for spending on elderly welfare and health ulti-
mately increases while the demand for spending on the youth segment decreases 
in developed countries as their birth rates continue to decline and the popula-
tion further ages. And as the service sector economy flourishes and women begin 
advancing in society, the instability of family increases and single-parent fami-
lies, unstable employment, and unemployment manifest as new risks. Meanwhile, 
however, underfunding is also a common issue. The emergence of the problem of 
how to allocate limited financial resources reflects the beginning of the era of the 
post-industrialized society. In southern European countries and societies where 
the arrival of post-industrialized society has been late, expenditure on pensions 
tends to become disproportionately large, while education and family policies are 
overlooked (Tepe and Vanhuysse, 2010).
(3)		The	Low	Level	of	Trust	in	the	Government	among	the	Japanese
The reason why the problems faced by Japan are extremely difficult to solve lies in 
the complicated attitude of the public. In a democratic country, the policy direc-
tion is basically selected according to the interest of the majority. As for Japanese 
people, there is still an extremely strong sense of avoidance of increased tax and 
burdens, although the tendency appears to have somewhat weakened recently as 
they have become more acutely aware of the country’s financial crisis. In fact, the 
call to cut down the amount of wastefulness has been receiving a certain level of 
support. It would be easy to understand the situation if such voices were coming 
from a so-called “small government orientation.” Aside from whether or not one 
personally agrees, if the people persist in insisting on cutting the amount of waste-
fulness and not increasing tax because they strongly prefer a small government, 
and if that is the choice of the majority of the people, such policy must be imple-
mented under a democratic system.
 However, the problem is that it does not seem that many Japanese are thinking 
that way. It is somewhat questionable to what extent people commonly under-
stand the fact that the Japanese government is considered one of the smallest 
among the developed countries in terms of national burden and number of gov-
ernment employees, and that we have already reached the limit at which there are 
no more wasteful departments to cut. In addition, many Japanese probably want 
a stable pension and healthcare system and are uncomfortable with the idea of 
entrusting everything to the private sector. In other words, it could be that a con-
siderable number of Japanese remain convinced that “since there is still enormous 
wastefulness in Japan, increasing the tax is unthinkable until it is cut.”
 Therefore, we have a contradicting attitude structure whereby people do not 
wish to increase the burden even though they wish for a stable and extensive wel-
fare society (and even though the national finances are in a deficit and the govern-
ment is considered small enough in terms of the number of government employees 
and the rate of national burden). The situation has become difficult because there 
is no logic to views such as “we don’t want to increase the burden because we want 
a small government” or “we will accept some increase in the burden because we 
want extensive welfare” (Miyamoto, 2008: iii–iv). I will touch on this later in this 
book as well . Economic crises in the Southern European countries such as Greece 
have often been talked about in recent years. It is said that people in these coun-
tries do not have much trust in others and their so-called public morality is low 
because of the fraudulent government and large underground economy. Since the 
trust in the government is compromised when public morality is low, it ultimately 
become difficult to support welfare state policies.
 As for Japan, while there is a moderate amount of welfare and level of trust 
in others, the level of trust in the government is extremely low. It is not that all 
countries with extensive welfare (i.e., countries with a big government) have fallen 
into financial crisis. In the case of Japan, the level of trust in the government is 
extremely low relative to the range of roles that the government thinks it should 
play, and people have fallen into the reasoning that they do not want to take on 
any more burden.4
 Figure 4-1, which was prepared based on Chapter 1 of the 2013 edition 
Government at a Glance by the OECD, shows the relationship between the level of 
People’s Attitude and the State of Policy Regarding Education Spending102 The Structure of Japanese People’s Attitude 103
trust in the government and the outstanding debt. This problem has been attract-
ing so much attention that even the OECD has dealt with the trust between the 
government and the people in the reference work that they published. This only 
shows a simple correlation and does not indicate that there is some kind of specific 
causal relationship. That said, we can see the relationship that the larger the gov-
ernment’s debt, the lower the trust in the government. Whether the government 
is not trusted because the debt is large or the debt has become excessive because 
people distrust the government and are not cooperative is unclear. Nevertheless, 
Japan stands out for the size of its excessive debt and for making a considerable 
contribution to support the relationship between these two variables.
 This type of research that focuses on the sense of trust in the government has 
been actively conducted in recent years by several economists in France. According 
to Philippe Aghion and others, people tend to put more pressure on regulating 
the government when their general sense of trust is low (Aghion et al., 2010).5 
Furthermore, Yann Algan and Pierre Cahuc have pointed out that those who 
immigrated to the United States still have the level of trust they used to have in 
their home country, and that there is a correlation between the sense of trust among 
immigrants by ethnicity and the sense of trust in their home country. They also 
showed that this sense of trust contributes to economic growth (i.e., the higher the 
sense of trust in a given society, the more their economy has grown). Solely on this 
basis, it might seem that sense of trust is determined by the ethnicity-specific cul-
ture; however, such a correlation actually weakens and almost disappears among 
the second generation of immigrants (Algan and Cahuc, 2010). In other words, 
it shows that the sense of trust created through relationships with others in their 
home country could change as they live out their lives in the place to which they 
have emigrated as part of American society.
 Toshio Yamagishi compared the sense of trust in Japan to that in the United 
States and noted that Japanese people tend to trust others as long as they are 
acquainted but become suspicious if they are not acquainted, so that the sense of 
trust toward complete strangers is lower compared to Americans. Yamagishi also 
notes that highly educated individuals are more likely to have a stronger sense of 
trust toward unacquainted third parties (Yamagishi, 1999). Furthermore, Algan, 
Cahuc, and Shleifer point out the importance of education in fostering a sense 
of trust. Attending many one-way lectures in which one only copies from the 
blackboard means that one will not have many opportunities to learn skills for 
interactive discussion and communication and cannot easily build cooperative 
relationships with others. In contrast, attending many lectures that emphasize dis-
cussion and group work allows students to actually develop skills for communica-
tion and negotiation, contributing to building social capital (Algan et al., 2013). 
In other words, these studies indicate that the level of trust is not necessarily invari-
ant and fixed; it could sufficiently be changed depending on the social conditions.
2.   Determinants of Social Policy
(1)		Relationship	between	the	Welfare	Regime	and	Attitude
There must be certain factors that support the situation of each country if welfare 
states do not necessarily converge in one direction. If the role of the government is 
to realize the requests of the people who live there, the expectations of the people 
should be in keeping with the reality of social security and welfare, and their atti-
tude toward social security and welfare policy should also change.
 Using two ideas called power resources theory and welfare production regimes, 
Torben Iversen and John D. Stephens identified and classified the differences in 
the manner of investing in human capital by government into three categories.
 The first is the model of “coordinated market economies with a proportional 
representation electoral institution without a strong Christian democratic party,” 
which is observed in Scandinavian countries such as Denmark and Nordic coun-
tries such as Finland. It makes a high level of investment in the redistribution 
policy and public education and provides industry and occupation-specific educa-
tion. In these countries, people are encouraged to acquire sophisticated knowledge 
to become (non-professional) technicians or skilled workers. Their societies seek 
to enable people to utilize their acquired skills and move between companies as a 
result. In addition, their public childcare systems are well-developed to enable par-
ents to participate in the labor market. This makes a high birth rate and the provi-
sion of early childhood education possible, in turn, making it possible to maintain 
a wide range of welfare systems.
Figure 4-1   Confidence in the Government and Outstanding Debt
Source: OECD (2013) Government at a Glance: Figure 1.8 on page 32
The data on confidence in the government is based on the Gallup survey. The data on debt is from the OECD 
National Accounts Statistics.
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 The second is countries that have “coordinated market economies with a pro-
portional representation electoral institution with a strong Christian democratic 
party,” like Germany and Italy, where investment in public education is relatively 
small, even though there is extensive social insurance and company and indus-
try-specific vocational training. Although Christian democratic societies gener-
ally focus on skilled work, they are not very interested in non-skilled work and 
not enthusiastic about publicly absorbing the cost of early childhood and primary 
education. The biggest difference from the Scandinavian countries is that they are 
not eager for women’s social advancement; in fact, they maintain a tax system to 
encourage women to stay at home.
 The third is countries that have “liberal market economies with a majoritarian 
electoral institution” where investments in knowledge and skills are made person-
ally and investments in public education and redistribution are modest. Education 
and training systems are not well established and the institutional linkage between 
schools and the labor market is not very common in these countries. The level of 
public burden for early childhood and primary education also remains low. The 
polarization between winners and losers increases, and there are not many oppor-
tunities for the middle class who are winners to sympathize with leftist assertions 
in these countries since people are expected to get good grades. Therefore, they are 
unlikely to have any incentive to change their voting behavior to improve these sit-
uations. The three economic systems presented here can be considered to roughly 
correspond to Esping-Andersen’s welfare regimes of social democratic, conserva-
tive, and liberal regimes, respectively.
 However, Mads Meier Jæger points out that many previous studies have indi-
cated there to be no strong correlation between welfare regimes and people’s 
support for and attitude toward public policy. He cautions that the variance of 
the relationship between regimes and attitude must also be observed rather than 
merely looking at the average level of support. In terms of redistribution policy, 
the average level of support gradually increases in the order of liberalism, social 
democracy, and conservatism. Looking at this based on variance, however, it 
increases in the order of liberalism, conservatism, and social democracy. In the 
case of liberalism, support for redistribution policy rarely becomes a political issue 
in the first place because it is not recognized as social problem when the support 
is not large. In the case of social democracy, there are not many people who advo-
cate further increasing redistribution because extensive redistribution is already in 
place. The policy also tends to become a political issue (and thus a larger variance) 
because it is highly visible. Conservative regimes are basically inclined to set their 
“ideal” allocation at a high level (because they are in between liberal and social 
democratic regimes). They are also inclined to perceive the scope of redistribution 
within the same trade rather than for the entire society (because of their corporat-
ism scheme); this might be the reason why the variance remains modest (Jæger, 
2009).
 Using the United States as a representative of the liberal regime, Sweden of 
the social democratic regime, and Germany of the conservative regime, Pil Ho 
Kim investigated where Japan falls based on people’s attitude toward welfare. The 
results indicated that while political attitudes such as leftist and rightist ideologies 
and voting behavior directly affected the attitude toward welfare in the United 
Sates and Sweden, the effect was weak in Germany, and there was no significant 
effect in Japan. Thus, he concluded that Japan is close to Germany’s conservative 
regime in the sense that political ideology does not affect attitude toward welfare 
(Kim, 2004).
 When researching attitude, it is necessary to pay full attention to its context 
and surrounding environment because its nuance can be perceived in a com-
pletely different manner on such basis even if the responses to a survey are the 
same. For example, according to Jonas Edlund, people’s distrust toward the wel-
fare state policies in Sweden does not necessarily lead to their opposition of wel-
fare state policies. Such distrust often concerns not providing sufficient services 
to meet expectations; the percentage of people who increased their sense of dis-
trust because they agree with neoliberal small-government ideology (or due to the 
spread of such ideology) is not very large (Edlund, 2006). In other words, even if 
the number of responses indicating distrust in government policy increases, it is 
somewhat hasty to conclude that the number of advocates for a smaller govern-
ment is increasing or that neoliberalist ideology is becoming common among the 
general public.
 It is necessary to focus on aspects such as the tax system and whether to imple-
ment public assistance or social insurance in addition to looking at the welfare 
regime. For example, since the taxpayers are more likely to feel being heavily taxed 
in a country with a higher percentage of direct taxes, such as national income tax or 
property tax (due to the visibility of the tax),6 anti-tax and anti-welfare movements 
are likely to occur in countries such as the United Kingdom, the United States, 
Japan, and Denmark. In addition, since public assistance and social insurance are 
systems based on completely different ideas, with public assistance considered 
“charity for the lower class,” or income transfer in a manner of speaking, the sense 
of burden among the taxpayers increases when public assistance becomes conspic-
uous (i.e., the percentage becomes relatively high). On the other hand, because 
social insurance is a social security system for the middle class and only those who 
pay the insurance premium can enjoy the benefits, there is a sense of entitlement 
and relatively fewer objections. According to a theory by Sara A. Rosenberry, anti-
tax and anti-welfare movements are likely to occur in the United Kingdom, the 
United States, and Denmark because the proportion of public assistance is high 
(Rosenberry, 1982). Furthermore, the existence of anti-tax and anti-welfare move-
ments depends on whether labor organizations are strong or not. Regarding this, 
Toshimitsu Shinkawa concluded that there was no noticeable anti-tax and anti-
welfare movement in Sweden, for example, where the visibility of tax is high and 
public assistance is relatively extensive because there is strong labor organization 
power to maintain the corporatism system (Shinkawa, 2005: 216–221).
 What are the requirements to have these type of powerful labor organizations? 
According to Yoshikazu Kenjo, a country must have a high level of dependency on 
trade and a small population. By contrast, Japan has never met these requirements 
and is most likely never to meet them in the future. Capitalists under capitalism 
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would normally advocate liberalism since it is not an option for them to support 
redistribution policy (because they would have to surrender their capital and 
income). Meanwhile, resisting these capitalists, labor organizations would put 
forward the value called equality to assert the value of their own existence and 
strongly support social security policies.
 Small countries have small markets. Therefore, they have no choice but to rely 
on the development of an export industry if they want people’s lives to improve. 
And so they would aggressively inject capital to leading companies and industries 
as a national policy and actually weed out noncompetitive industries by suppress-
ing the investment demand. Once the openness of the economy increases, how-
ever, the economic structure becomes fragile and the freedom of domestic policy 
is lost because the country becomes susceptible to international economic fluctua-
tions. The three parties—the government, workers, and employers—come to have 
a mutual interest in addressing such crisis and being able to deeply share awareness 
of the problem. They would then develop social security policies in response to the 
urgent need to set up a buffer against international economic fluctuation.
 Moreover, because highly productive industries are protected and the rest of the 
industries are weeded out, the protected industries become enormous and cen-
tralized. As a result, giant corporations begin requiring a relatively homogeneous 
labor force in a wide range of areas. With strong homogeneity, the workers also 
become likely to share common awareness toward problems and create a highly 
organized labor union. Then, labor unions begin creating a national center and 
centralizing negotiations in order to gain an upper hand in negotiations not only 
with the employers but also with the government. At the same time, the national 
center sometimes exercises its power over individual unions to make them cooper-
ate with policies that go against their own will, such as wage control, for example, 
when an inflationary impact arising overseas might affect the domestic economy. 
Having overcome the crisis, the national center would then demand compensa-
tion in return.
 However, like the United States, the openness of the Japanese economy is very 
low.7 In such environments, the possibility for a labor organization to grow that 
vigorously promotes the equality policy is close to zero (Kenjo, 2001: 126–136).
(2)		Relationship	between	Personal	Attributes	and	Attitude
Ultimately, social security and welfare divides people into those who can receive 
the service and those who cannot. As described in Section 2-(3) of Chapter 3, 
the conflict of social interest is lessened if the provision of government services is 
based on universalism; however, the difference between the beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries becomes obvious in the case of selectivism. Therefore, those who are 
eligible to receive the service are more likely to support social policies in a country 
with a small government that tends to target specific segments. In general, low-
income individuals, those without a stable job, the elderly, and those prone to 
get ill, as well as women and parents raising a child in terms of family policies are 
probably likely to be in favor of social security and welfare services. As for educa-
tion, the number of individuals who think it is the role of the government, or that 
the government should bear the cost, is naturally expected to increase in the par-
enting generation with children.
 However, I have already mentioned that whereas other social security and wel-
fare policies are characterized, if anything, by more of a redistributing, equality-
type of policy, education—particularly higher education—has a slightly different 
characteristic. Individuals from a higher class are more likely to advance to higher 
education to begin with. On the other hand, because a lower cost would be wel-
comed even among those from a higher class, they might actually be more in agree-
ment with having the government cover the cost.
 According to Morten Blekesaune and Jill Quadagno, although public aid for 
unemployment, medical care, and the elderly are all likely to be supported by 
women and people who are familiar with egalitarian ideology, there is no differ-
ence in the level of support by an individual’s employment status (i.e., employed 
vs. unemployed) for medical care and the elderly, probably because these tend 
to be perceived as a risk for everyone. Although the tendency to support public 
aid for the unemployed also increases at the country level along with the rate of 
unemployment, the level of support to provide public aid for medical care and 
elderly welfare is not related to the country’s penetration rate of egalitarian ideol-
ogy (Blekesaune and Quadagno, 2003).
 Stefan Svallfors also examined the support structure with regard to the level of 
people’s support for income distribution policies and their demographics by refer-
ring to Esping-Andersen’s welfare regime theory and selecting countries that fall 
under each regime type. The results showed that the difference observed between 
these nations can be explained by the level of support (i.e., social democracy and 
conservatism had a higher level of support, while liberalism had a lower sup-
port level); moreover, the support structure 8 as to who among them was likely 
to support income distribution policies was similar regardless of the regime type 
(Svallfors, 1997).
3.   International Comparative Analysis
(1)		The	Data	Used	and	Angle	of	Analysis
Here, referencing previous studies and based on a questionnaire survey on atti-
tude conducted in multiple countries simultaneously using the same question-
naire, I will examine 1) whether there is a relationship between people’s attitudes 
toward social security, welfare, and education policies and the scale of the welfare 
regime and government; and 2) whether each policy tends to be supported by the 
supposed beneficiaries. Regarding 2) in particular, while there are many previous 
studies on social security and welfare policies for redistribution, the elderly, and 
medical care, there are no concrete results on education policy, and its support 
structure is also unclear.
 Therefore, I will use the 2006 survey by the ISSP mentioned in the Introduction. 
The ISSP chooses a topic every year,9 prepares a questionnaire on the basis of 
the topic, and conducts the survey simultaneously around the world. In Japan, 
the NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute serves as the contact and 
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implementation entity. The data can be downloaded at no charge from a dedicated 
website,10 as long as it is for research purposes (however, one needs to fill out a brief 
explanation about the research purpose in English). A survey on the role of gov-
ernment in particular has been conducted in the past as the ISSP project in 1985. 
Since its first iteration, the survey has been conducted three times in 1990, 1996, 
and 2006, which is the most recent at the time of writing. It is undeniable that the 
data feel slightly old, given that they predate the collapse of the Lehman Brothers 
and the effects of changes due to the financial crisis centered on Europe; however, 
they represented the best data currently available for the purpose of international 
comparison of attitudes toward the government role.
 The major attitude questions that this book will focus on are as follows. The first 
is a question regarding government spending, formulated as: “Listed below are 
various areas of government spending. Please show whether you would like to see 
more or less government spending in each area. Remember that if you say ‘much 
more,’ it might require a tax increase to pay for it. (Please tick one box on each 
line.)” Although the question lists items A through H, I only examined health, 
education, retirement, and unemployment benefits in this book corresponding to its 
areas of interest, instead of including all items.11 The choices were based on a five-
point scale including “spend much more,” “spend more,” “spend the same as now,” 
“spend less,” and “spend much less.” 
 Next, under the question “Here are some things the government might do for 
the economy. Please show which actions you are in favor of and which you are 
against. (Please tick one box on each line.),” I will only look at Item A, cuts in gov-
ernment spending, out of Items A through F. This is also based on a five-point scale 
comprising the options “strongly in favor of,” “in favor of,” “neither in favor of nor 
against,” “against,” and “strongly against.”
 Finally, I will look at the question “On the whole, do you think it should or 
should not be the government’s responsibility to... (Please tick one box on each 
line),” examining the following five items: Give financial help to university students 
from low-income families, provide health care for the sick, provide a decent standard 
of living for the old, reduce income differences between the rich and the poor, and pro-
vide a job for everyone who wants one.12 These items are rated on a four-point scale 
including “definitely should be,” “probably should be,” probably should not be,” 
and “definitely should not be.”
 The ISSP survey in 2006 includes data for 33 countries. However, in order to 
take the scale of the national burden into consideration in the subsequent analy-
sis, the countries without the data on national burden, including tax and social 
security as a percentage of GDP, were excluded from the analysis. Ultimately, 22 
countries were included in the analysis. Such macro data were obtained from the 
OECD’s statistics’ website.13
(2)		Relationship	between	the	Attitude	that	Government	Expenditure	Should	Be	
Cut	and	the	Attitude	that	the	Government	Should	Cover	the	Cost	More
Cutting the overall government expenditure and increasing government spending 
on individual areas as shown in the title contradict each other. It is true that we 
often hear the phrase “agreed in general, but disagreed in the details.” Moreover, 
there are many cases in which people say “Japan should eliminate wastefulness as a 
whole” and “the government should be able to cut their spending more” yet pres-
ent a strong, deep-rooted argument against cutting spending by saying “it’s a bad 
idea to cut it,” as soon as individual policies are mentioned. I would like to exam-
ine such seemingly contradictory responses from the perspective of international 
comparison to see if this tendency is observed.
 There is actually a considerable bias in response tendency: based on the original 
five-point scale, there are many cases in which extreme choices are rarely selected in 
some countries. In a quantitative analysis, the standard error of estimate increases 
when such rare cases are mixed in the data. Even though there are five levels here, 
the question ultimately comes down to three levels of choice, namely, increase, 
decrease, and unable to decide. Therefore, I have combined “much more” with 
“more” and “much less” with “less” and recoded them into three levels of choice. I 
subsequently ran crosstabs between the responses on attitude toward cutting the 
overall government expenditure and individual attitude responses as to whether to 
increase or decrease spending on four areas to determine the relationship between 
the two. The expected result was that there would be a tendency for individuals 
who think that “the government expenditure should be cut” to logically think “the 
spending on each area should be reduced.”
 Table 4-1 shows the results. The figures are the coefficients called Goodman and 
Kruskal’s gamma (γ), which ranges from –1 to +1 and becomes zero when there 
is no association. Here, the cases in which the respondents think the spending on 
each area should be reduced while agreeing with cutting the government expendi-
ture, or the respondents think the spending on each area should be increased while 
disagreeing with cutting government spending have no contradiction in response 
tendency so that the association is positive. Conversely, to think that the spending 
on each area should be increased while agreeing with the cut, or to think that the 
spending on each area should be reduced while disagreeing with the cut, would be 
considered a contradicting response tendency (even though it is of course possible 
when each argument is examined), and the association becomes negative.
 When the absolute value of the gamma coefficient is below 0.1, it is almost 
impossible to see a clear tendency. A weak correlation can be identified once the 
absolute value exceeds 0.1 and a somewhat clear correlation emerges once the 
value exceeds 0.2. Looking at this, the country with a clear indication is the United 
States. The gamma coefficients are all positive, indicating that many respondents 
understand the relationship that the spending on each policy must be reduced if 
they were to carry out financial retrenchment. In other words, it is highly likely 
that the Americans are consciously choosing a small government. In contrast, 
looking at the gray-shaded line for Japan, the gamma coefficient is close to zero 
under all items. In other words, the relationship between the overall expenditure 
and itemized spending remains ambiguous under all policy areas. In fact, regard-
less of whether the opinion is in favor of the overall financial retrenchment or 
not, there is very little difference in the distribution of the opinions on whether to 
increase or decrease government spending on each area. We need to understand 
People’s Attitude and the State of Policy Regarding Education Spending110 The Structure of Japanese People’s Attitude 111
this point first.
 A negative gamma coefficient means that the relationship between the opinion 
on financial retrenchment and the opinion on increasing or decreasing government 
spending on each area is inversed. Israel has many such items. This is somewhat 
exceptional; and the basis and mechanism as to why it turns out that way is not 
necessarily clear. Other than that, it looks as if positive relationships are common 
in continental Europe in general. The country that stands out next to the United 
States is Denmark. Finland also shows positive relationships for all items other 
than education. While the tendency of Norway is not very clear, we can see positive 
relationships for health and unemployment benefits in Sweden. It is relatively easy to 
see the relationship between both variables in these Nordic countries with a social 
democratic regime as well. Other than that, France and the Netherlands also stand 
out relative to other countries. Besides Japan, it would seem that cases where there 
is no relationship between the two are often seen in South Korea as well as East and 
Central European countries. In addition, the relationship between these variables 
is not as clear in the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand as in 
the United States, although they are grouped together with the United States as 
liberal regime. The United States actually looks like a special case.
 Looking at the data by policy area, the relationship between these variables 
tends to be unclear regarding retirement which will almost certainly become rel-
evant for many people once they age. In other words, it can be inferred that there 
are a relatively large number of individuals who advocate financial retrenchment 
but are uncomfortable if it affects pensions. As for unemployment benefits, there 
must be quite a few individuals who think that it is clearly targeted for a certain 
segment of people so that it is fine to cut it down.
(3)		Basic	Tendency	with	Attitude	Responses
Figures 4-2 and 4-3 show the distribution of the questions of interest. As can be 
seen, the items on government responsibility (with four levels of choice) were 
also recoded into two levels: “government’s responsibility” and “not government’s 
responsibility.”
 First, regarding the government spending items, those who think it should be 
reduced are minorities in all countries, as expected (except for unemployment ben-
efits). Many of them seem to believe that it should be increased or that the current 
level should be maintained; however, the opinion of a large number of individuals 
who think it should be increased does not seem to correspond with the type of 
welfare regime.
 With regard to education, although public spending remains at an extremely low 
level in Japan compared to other countries, as mentioned many times, there are 
not many people who think it should be increased—it is almost at the same level 
or actually even lower compared to Scandinavian countries and Finland, where the 
percentage of public spending on education is already high. Although the number 
of people who think that spending should be increased is relatively small in France 
as well (though the number is still larger than Japan), with the exception of these 
Scandinavian countries, the number of people who think that public spending on 
education should be increased is large in the majority of countries. In that sense, 
we can say that Japan is in a somewhat unique position.
 Looking at health and retirement, too, the demand of the Japanese people is not 
particularly high. There are actually many who think that the current level should 
be maintained. The number of individuals who think it should be increased is not 
large in comparison. As for the graph for “Cut the Government Expenditure,” there 
are many yea-sayers in European countries such as France and Germany in addi-
tion to Japan. There are actually many nay-sayers in the Nordic countries where 
the governments are already big. This is probably based on the understanding that 
it would become difficult to maintain the current welfare services if the govern-
ment expenditures were cut.
Table 4-1   Relationship between Yeas and Nays for Cutting Government 
Spending and Yeas and Nays for Increasing Spending on 
Individual Items(Goodman and Kruskal’s gamma coefficients)
Education Health Retirement Unemployment benefits
United States .314 .320 .203 .267
United Kingdom .197 .093 −.017 .048
Sweden .075 .275 .026 .227
Spain .119 .023 −.014 −.023
Slovenia −.011 −.159 −.002 −.040
Portugal −.090 −.009 −.277 −.093
Poland .013 −.064 −.068 .101
Norway .092 .008 −.136 −.012
New Zealand −.020 .091 .044 .226
Netherlands .178 .139 .053 .248
South Korea −.032 −.075 −.044 −.004
Japan −.001 −.031 .040 .059
Israel −.372 −.382 −.245 .192
Ireland .163 −.070 .170 .054
Hungary −.152 .158 −.105 −.035
Germany .030 .175 −.010 .141
France .293 .143 .021 .429
Finland .084 .291 .277 .310
Denmark .147 .403 .166 .359
Czech Republic .046 .051 .043 .145
Canada .139 .176 .028 .150
Australia .093 .119 −.012 .130
Note: The data is sourced from ISSP (2006). 
These coefficients were calculated only for the countries included in the subsequent analysis.
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Figure 4-2   ISSP (2006) Tendency with Response —Whether 
to Increase Government Expenditure (a)
Note: Calculated by the author
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Unemployment Benefits
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Figure 4-2 (e)
Cut the Government Expenditure
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Figure 4-3   ISSP (2006) Tendency with Response—
Government Responsibility (a)
Note: Calculated by the author
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Figure 4-3 (b)
Provide Health Care for the Sick
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Figure 4-3 (c)
Provide a Decent Standard of Living for the Old
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 The reason for not being able to observe any relationship in Japan in Table 4-1 
might be because people thought it was necessary to eliminate wastefulness in 
order to resolve fiscal deficit. This may have been based on three assumptions that: 
1) social security is inadequate; 2) in contrast, there is considerable wastefulness 
such as in public works in Japan; and 3) meanwhile, the fiscal deficit had become 
a serious problem. However, they may also have believed that welfare, social secu-
rity, and education were not wasteful and the fiscal deficit could be resolved by 
cutting public works and the number of government employees. In fact, because 
the DPJ had not yet taken over the administration in 2006, it might be that many 
people still thought there was considerable wastefulness in Japan and the fiscal 
deficit could somehow be addressed by eliminating it. However, this is just specu-
lation (or a possibility) because attitude questions that ask about issues such as 
whether to cut public works were not included.
(4)		Logistic	Regression	Analysis	to	Predict	the	Attitude	toward		
Government	Expenditure
In the following analysis, I have coded those who think that the government 
spending on each of the four areas should be increased as 1 and other respondents 
as 0, and those who agree with the opinion to cut the overall government expen-
diture as 1 and those who disagree as 0. Using these as dependent variables, I have 
conducted regression estimations.
 The independent variables that are expected to predict the dependent variables 
are personal attributes such as gender, age, marital status, education, occupation, 
income, and whether the individual has children. The data set is in a format that 
has merged the results from each country into one. Needless to say, it is highly 
likely that the attitudes and behaviors are similar within a given country compared 
to the attitudes and behaviors of other countries. This kind of attitude of yeas and 
nays might also be related to the current level of social security policy implemented 
by the country. Therefore, explanatory variables to predict the dependent variables 
are divided into the factors that can be attributed back to individuals such as the 
ones listed above and the institutional and environmental factors at the national 
level. It clearly would not make sense to conduct the estimations using such insti-
tutional factors as explanatory variables at the personal level. In other words, the 
estimations should be conducted by separating explanatory variables into those at 
the personal level and those at the institutional and environmental levels. The type 
of analysis that has frequently been used in recent years based on such differentia-
tion is called multilevel analysis.
ln(pagree ⁄ 1-pagree) = α = βk xk + ε (4.1)
 When the dependent variable is a dummy variable coded as 1 and 0, the esti-
mation method called logistic regression analysis, as shown in Equation 4.1, is 
used. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the odds of yea-sayers and 
nay-sayers for each questionnaire item. α is the constant term, x is the explanatory 
variable, β is its coefficient, and ε is the error term. When there is no explanatory 
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variable, α equals the log odds of yea-sayers and nay-sayers in the sample popula-
tion. Normally, explanatory variables are plugged in here. When α and β get large, 
it means that the number of yea-sayers in comparison to nay-sayers has corre-
spondingly increased. At the time of interpretation, one would use the exponenti-
ated β (exp (β)) and read it as “when the explanatory variable increases by 1, the 
odds of the dependent variable also increases by exp (β) times.”
 The above equation (4.1) is based on the assumption that the variance of the 
survey sample population is random. However, as described above, it would be 
reasonable to assume that the distribution of samples in a given country would 
cluster somewhere (because they are likely to have similar opinions), and the data 
for another country would cluster somewhere else. Since the α on the one side of 
Equation (4.1) is expected to differ by country, we can formulate the following 
equation:
α = γ + υ (4.2)
γ is the log odds of each country and υ is the error between the countries. It is also 
possible to add (national level) explanatory variables to this Equation (4.2) when 
such log odds at the national level differ by environmental factors (e.g., national 
policy, etc.). The same can be said about the coefficient of the explanatory variable; 
if there is a hypothesis that the size of the coefficient itself varies by country, the 
coefficient can be decomposed as in Equation 4.2 to further include explanatory 
variables at the national level.
 Although I used a software called HLM for the estimation, it has in recent years 
become possible to use various software for such analysis. For more detail, books 
by Ita Kreft and others (Kreft and de Leeuw, 1998, trans. 2006) translated into 
Japanese are easy to understand. For readers comfortable with English, the book 
by Stephen W. Raudenbush and Anthony S. Bryk is highly rated (Raudenbush 
and Bryk, 2002).
 Table 4-2 shows the estimation results.14 The ones with a large constant term 
indicate that there are more applicable individuals relative to non-applicable indi-
viduals. As can be seen from Figure 4-2, the coefficients of constant terms get larger 
for health and education because the number of individuals in favor of increasing 
the spending has become large in general. As for cutting the government expendi-
ture, it shows that yea-sayers are not necessarily in the majority.
 Looking at the increase in each area, we can see that there are more yea-sayers 
for retirement among older individuals. This is an understandable result, consid-
ering that the elderly are the beneficiaries of pensions. While level of education, 
occupation, and income are the variables for so-called class, the one that is particu-
larly noteworthy is level of education. While highly educated individuals (univer-
sity/graduate school graduate or higher) tend to oppose increased spending on 
social security and welfare policies, they are in favor of increasing spending only 
on education. Looking at the junior high school graduate level, which is a disad-
vantageous position in terms of level of education, they are likely to agree with 
retirement and unemployment benefits; however, they rate education negatively (the 
results are all in comparison to high school graduates, which is the reference cat-
egory). Education is supposed to be beneficial to those who receive it even if they 
are from a lower class; however, they do not necessarily support increased funding. 
That said, given that this is a cross-sectional survey and many of the respondents 
have already completed their schooling, those in the less educated segment in par-
ticular have had that much shorter a period of education, potentially making it 
difficult for them to appreciate the benefit of allocating public funds to education. 
It is actually natural that they would direct their attention to their current life and 
risks as well as issues after retirement. On the other hand, one might think that 
Table 4-2   Estimation Results on the Multilevel Logit Model for the Attitude Toward 
Government Expenditure and Spending Cuts
Increase 
spending on 
education
Increase 
spending on 
health
Increase 
spending on 
retirement
Increase spending 
on unemploy-
ment benefits
Reduce 
government 
expenditure
Fixed Effect (Level 1) Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E.
Constant term 2.526 .565 *** 3.418 .458 *** .918 .388 * 1.640 .603 * −.679 .598
Female .106 .034 ** .198 .037 *** .147 .037 ** .079 .026 ** −.026 .047
Age (increment of 10) .006 .014 −.020 .012 .107 .027 ** .011 .011 .055 .016 **
Single or widowed −.033 .041 −.059 .025 * −.016 .029 .127 .037 ** −.110 .039 **
Junior high school −.094 .040 * −.044 .051 .208 .064 ** .184 .033 *** −.014 .057
Junior college .015 .048 −.129 .040 ** −.016 .049 ** −.135 .039 ** −.042 .034
University/
graduate school .201 .054 ** −.286 .058 *** −.436 .061 *** −.252 .049 *** −.181 .065 *
Professional/manager .026 .037 −.121 .034 ** −.165 .054 ** −.202 .040 *** .106 .034 **
Self–employed −.216 .077 ** −.165 .062 ** −.019 .066 −.208 .072 ** .293 .062 ***
Farmer .168 .054 ** −.134 .056 * −.271 .094 * −.219 .069 ** −.028 .080
Skilled worker −.029 .038 −.025 .064 .108 .042 * .034 .040 .005 .041
Semi–skilled/
unskilled worker −.009 .036 .035 .060 .150 .039 *** .213 .039 *** −.058 .042
Unemployed −.175 .041 *** −.018 .044 −.083 .047 + .087 .064 −.010 .046
With children .293 .051 *** .031 .030 −.100 .034 ** .005 .038 .042 .035
Income 
(below the 50th percentile)
.053 .037 .060 .038 −.137 .034 *** −.213 .056 ** −.035 .040
Income 
(above the 50th percentile)
−.052 .049 −.016 .043 −.264 .054 *** −.426 .055 *** .062 .060
Income 
(above the 25th percentile)
−.002 .052 −.181 .061 ** −.385 .051 *** −.587 .057 *** .111 .056 +
Income (non–response) −.021 .042 −.101 .062 −.149 .049 ** −.229 .061 ** .002 .045
Fixed effect (Level 2) 
National burden as 
percentage to GDP
 (in the unit of 10%)
−.496 .135 ** −.518 .127 ** −.143 .099 −.606 .150 ** .281 .159 +
+p < .10  *p < .05  **p < .01   ***p < .001
Random effects are included in the italicized coefficients and S.E.
S.E. is robust standard error;  N(Level 1) = 30149, N(Level 2) = 22
The reference categories: the level of education = high school; occupation = clerical worker, income = below the 25th 
percentile
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this variable would not necessarily become statistically significant if people were 
motivated for their children to receive education even if they themselves were less 
educated. However, the result is actually completely the opposite for education and 
other items.
 Although occupation and income do not show consistent trends as does level of 
education, there is a clear tendency for people to oppose retirement and unemploy-
ment benefits as their income increases relative to those with the lowest level of 
income. In addition, respondents with children are significantly more likely to be 
in favor of increasing spending on education, indicating that this is also likely to be 
supported by the beneficiaries.
 Looking at the fixed effect at Level 2, three areas other than retirement are nega-
tive and significant, and there is a clear tendency for populations that are in favor 
of increasing spending on pensions for the elderly to be small in countries with a 
large national burden relative to the GDP. In other words, it reflects the fact shown 
in Figure 4-2 that the ratio of those who agree to increase spending is not relatively 
high in the Nordic countries.
 As for the model to reduce government expenditure on the far right column, 
university/graduate school graduates are significantly more likely to oppose this 
(compared to high school graduates) when looking only at the level of education. 
This does not necessarily mean that those from a higher class are in opposition, as 
professionals and managers, the self-employed, and those in the highest income 
bracket are significantly more likely to support cutting government expenditure 
compared to clerical workers. It is possible that people in these occupations and 
those with a very high income feel that the benefits received are small relative to 
the tax they pay, which is considerable as based on the progressive tax system. 
However, it seems that it is the highly educated who reflect more deeply about 
concerns such as the relationship between the size of government expenditure and 
the extensiveness of social security services. It could be that these situations result 
in a tendency for the highly educated to oppose cuts to government expenditure.
(5)		Logistic	 Regression	 Analysis	 to	 Predict	 the	 Attitude	 toward	Government	
Responsibilities
Next, I would like to examine the attitude toward the responsibility of the govern-
ment in the same manner. The dependent variable is coded as 1 when the respon-
dent thinks it is the responsibility of the government and otherwise as 0 in order 
to estimate the multilevel logistic regression model in the same way. The results are 
shown in Table 4-3.
 In terms of education-related financial help for the low-income segment to go 
to college, the difference from other areas is the level of education, as might be 
expected; university graduates are particularly likely to think it is the responsibility 
of the government, which may be because it is/was relevant to themselves. This is 
a trend that differs from other areas. Somewhat consistent is the income variable: 
regardless of the area, the higher the income, the less likely the respondent is to 
think of it as the responsibility of the government. Looking at occupation, blue-
collar workers also have a strong tendency to think of it as the responsibility of the 
government, regardless of the area.
 However, unlike Table 4-2, which showed tendencies that could be considered 
opposites between education and other areas, the results here are not as clear. In 
fact, as far as the policies listed here are concerned, the results are all similar. The 
dependent variable financial help to university students in Table 4-3 can be regarded 
as more of a redistribution policy that guarantees a certain segment of people the 
opportunity to go to college than asserting it to be the government’s responsibility 
on education itself in general terms. It may be more appropriate to consider this 
to be the reason why the results turned out to be similar to other social security 
policies.
(6)		Public	Education	to	Increase	Support	for	Public	Spending	on	Education
In reality, it is difficult to increase social expenditure such as social security without 
public confidence in the government. Further, although it is a popular view that 
Japanese people only expect services by the government and do not think about 
defrayment because they are strongly dependent on the government or have the 
attitude that everything should be left up to the authorities (and I cannot say that 
this would be completely mistaken), looking at the attitude toward increasing gov-
ernment expenditure and the role of the government, the demand is not as high as 
other countries—many items actually remain at a low level. Naturally, the impli-
cations of such an attitude would be completely different depending on whether 
it purely represented support or were more indicative of a sense of resignation to 
the apparent reality of the current state of affairs. In addition, even though people 
are not expecting government expenditure to actually be increased, it might be the 
case that they wish for it at least to be maintained at the current level. However, 
given the actual financial situation of Japan, there is no other way to think about 
the issue than that of being a burden, because just to maintain the current level—
which is low by international standards—is considered difficult.
 For example, as shown in Table 4-1, there is some inconsistency in the atti-
tude toward increasing and decreasing government expenditure. Since this is by 
no means an issue unique to Japan and does not include policies in areas such as 
public works, which have been criticized by some advocates, it is entirely possible 
for the underlying idea that “since the Japanese government is generally wasteful 
and most of it has to do with public works, we can cut down public works and 
use the money for welfare and education” to take root. However, the notion of 
public works accounting for a high percentage of the budget of Japan is becoming 
a thing of the past;15 it actually seems that adverse effects and concerns related to 
extreme reduction have become apparent in recent years. In the case of Japan, the 
issue of an increased national burden cannot, after all, be avoided because social 
security-related costs should naturally increase as the population ages. Therefore, it 
is necessary to consider the issue of burden as a given problem, assuming that the 
cost will increase just to maintain the current standard for social security, welfare, 
and education.
 Although there is no obvious relationship at a glance between the type of 
welfare regime and attitude, there would appear to be some kind of association. 
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Nevertheless, even though we are inclined to recognize such association as some-
thing unchangeable and specific to a given culture when interpretatively linking 
differences in regimes with cultural differences, this does not mean that there is no 
room to change these attitudes, as previously mentioned. It is true that a country-
specific institution is difficult to change because it is naturally embedded in vari-
ous systems; however, this does not mean that change is impossible. In addition, 
as seen in the study by Algan and colleagues, the possibility that education plays 
some kind of role is undeniable.
 According to Rüya Gökhan Koçer and Herman G. van de Werfhorst, highly 
educated individuals begin recognizing the existence of income disparity in society 
because they gain a broader and more objective view once becoming highly edu-
cated (though the possibility that it is individuals with such a view that advance to 
a high level of education cannot obviously be refuted). In addition, the variance 
of opinions on whether to accept economic inequality or not becomes smaller in 
countries where education focuses on vocationally oriented materials. However, 
when the education system itself is branching out (i.e., as a school system in which 
one chooses at the secondary education stage to prepare to advance to higher 
education or to obtain employment), people begin accepting the existence of 
economic inequality and the variance of opinions on redistribution policy also 
increases.
 According to Tracey Peter, Jason D. Edgerton, and Lance W. Roberts, when 
the difference in academic performance between schools was examined based on 
the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) conducted by the 
OECD, the largest was among the conservative regimes and the smallest among 
the social democratic regimes. For countries with a social democratic regime, edu-
cation is a requirement for the equality of citizens. For liberal regimes, it means 
more equal opportunity as well as social investment. However, conservative 
regimes are distanced from all ideologies and often use the so-called branching 
education system. And this education system is associated with the labor market 
structure and social protection systems (Peter et al., 2010).
 While opinions often vary in conservative regimes as typified by Germany, this 
is because the education system in such countries tends to branch out. That is, 
the branching type of education system tends to promote opinions that diverge. 
Koçer and others suggest the possibility that diverging opinions might be reduced 
even in those countries by implementing vocational training (Koçer and van de 
Werfhorst, 2012).
 As summarized by Alan C. Kerckhoff, an education system that branches out 
is suitable for vocational education because it enables specialized education in a 
specific area. In that sense, it tends to promote a smooth transition to the labor 
market (Kerckhoff, 2001). However, there used to be deep-rooted criticism in 
Japan that specialization in upper secondary education (or the high school stage) 
turns education into a subcontract of the labor market or merely strengthens the 
function of reproducing the hierarchical social class structure. Such circumstance 
led to the establishment of a predominantly large number of general education 
courses for high school in post-war Japan while not often providing vocational 
training. Meanwhile, it is said that the transition from education to the labor 
market has been effected smoothly in Japan even though its education system is 
not the branching type, because there are employment system customs unique to 
Japan (Kariya and Rosenbaum, 1995). Yet, since such an employment system has 
no longer consistently functioned well in recent years due to a difficult labor mar-
ket, problems are beginning to be pointed out (Brinton, 2008). Therefore, it seems 
that we can expect to move toward reevaluating vocational training in Japan in 
the long run. Moreover, the voice calling for vocationally useful and practical edu-
cation appears to have been becoming particularly strong in recent years. While 
it seems necessary to think a little deeper about what being useful and practical 
Table 4–3   Estimation Results on the Multilevel Logit Model for the Attitude toward 
Government Responsibilities
Financial help to 
university students
Health care  
for the sick
A decent standard 
of living for the old
Reduce income 
differences
Provide a job  
for everyone
Fixed Effect (Level 1) Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E.
Constant term 1.644 .907 + 2.939 .638 *** 2.322 .388 *** .617 .421  1.142 .504 *
Female .045 .031  −.083 .030 * .071 .037 + .253 .035 *** .291 .380 ***
Age (increment of 10) .063 .020 ** −.014 .009 .004 .018  .049 .009 *** −.015 .015  
Single or widowed .111 .025 *** .041 .029  .026 .033 .098 .037 ** .123 .036 **
Junior high school .030 .041  .009 .034 −.010 .040  .273 .030 *** .217 .036 ***
Junior college −.001 .044 −.021 .041  −.148 .045 ** −.154 .040 ** −.212 .045 ***
University/
graduate school .151 .059 * −.051 .059  −.229 .044 *** −.136 .069 + −.240 .064 **
Professional/manager −.110 .039 ** −.076 .026 ** −.029 .037  −.212 .039 *** −.180 .035 ***
Self–employed −.171 .070 * −.011 .087  −.647 .049 *** −.053 .061   −.218 .060 **
Farmer .192 .071 ** −.072 .065 *** −.214 .051 *** −.044 .086  −.055 .057
Skilled worker .116 .038 ** .185 .046 *** .150 .060 * .142 .044 ** .155 .044 **
Semi–skilled/
unskilled worker .055 .033 + .244 .032 *** .121 .052 * .259 .048 *** .230 .056 ***
Unemployed .024 .041  .123 .042 ** −.034 .086  .044 .045  .142 .053 **
With children .192 .033 *** .055 .027 * −.053 .029 + .056 .026 * .032 .028
Income 
(below the 50th percentile)
−.197 .041 *** −.047 .022 * −.071 .029 * −.116 .050 * −.155 .045 **
Income 
(above the 50th percentile)
−.315 .041 *** −.117 .026 *** −.127 .035 *** −.374 .065 *** −.351 .055 ***
Income
 (above the 25th percentile)
−.369 .044 *** −.317 .040 *** −.276 .052 *** −.653 .084 *** −.592 .058 ***
Income (non–response) −.209 .045 *** −.155 .031 *** −.086 .039 * −.251 .054 *** −.191 .040 ***
Fixed effect (Level 2)
National burden as 
percentage to GDP 
(in the unit of 10%)
.014 .228  .019 .173  .159 .105 .072 .115  −.102 .126 
 +p < .10  *p < .05  **p < .01   ***p < .001
Random effects are included in the italicized coefficients and S.E.
S.E. is robust standard error;  N(Level 1) = 30149, N(Level 2) = 22
The reference categories: the level of education = high school; occupation = clerical worker, income = below the 25th percentile
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means, there is no doubt that we are at a point where the relationship between 
education that is merely for community members who live in the same society and 
the path of vocational training should be thoroughly reconsidered.
NOTES
1 Clem Brooks and Jeff Manza examined in detail the effect of the causal relationship 
in both directions—a policy is determined because there is a certain attitude, and a cer-
tain attitude is aroused because there is a specific system—and concluded that the latter 
effect does not exist. (Brooks and Manza, 2006).
2 The possibility certainly cannot be denied that the primary concern among the elderly 
is their own life in their golden years rather than education since they are already freed 
from raising children. However, this cannot be confirmed without looking at panel sur-
vey data.
3 However, Chew concluded that the individual’s political ideology has a larger effect 
on public spending on education, although being a parent or not is also an important 
factor (Chew, 1992).
4 In the article “Nihon wa Nan’ōka Surunoka? (Will Japan become like the Southern 
European countries?),” Kotaro Tsuru took these current situations into consideration, 
sounding a note of caution as to whether it is advisable to continue bashing government 
officials and employees to diminish the credibility of the government, ultimately allow-
ing the citizens to get away with taking the burden (Page 21 of the morning edition of 
Nihon Keizai Shimbun, June 21, 2012).
5 Aghion and colleagues also examined the association between the trust relationship 
of labor and management and minimum wage regulations. They indicate that the labor-
management relationship is good and the level of regulation is low in Northern Europe 
such as in the Scandinavian countries because a cooperative relationship is established 
between labor and management, an environment in which to directly communicate and 
negotiate is created, and the rate of labor unionization is high. In southern European 
countries, on the other hand, labor-management relations are poor, the unionization 
rate is low, and an environment in which to negotiate is not well-established because 
they do not trust each other, for which reason they must resort to relying on regulation. 
This suggests that there is a possibility that this ultimately affects labor performance 
(Aghion et al., 2011).
6 This is based on the aforementioned suggestion by Wilensky.
7 There is a strong perception that Japan is a trading nation that became a major eco-
nomic power by exporting industrial products; however, the dependence on foreign 
trade is by no means large. For example, the export dependence in 2010 was 14.1% 
and this trend has not changed much for a while. As a point of reference, the figures for 
the United States and the United Kingdom are 8.7% and 18.3%, respectively; and the 
figures are 34.4%, 31.8%, and 31.1% for Sweden, Norway, and Denmark among the 
Nordic countries. See the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications Statistics 
Bureau website (http://www.stat.go.jp/data/sekai/pdf/09.pdf ).
8 Specifically, white-collar professionals are unlikely to be in support compared to non-
skilled workers; and unemployed individuals and women are likely to be in support 
compared to employed individuals and men, respectively (Svallfors, 1997).
9 They cover a wide range of topics, including social network, social inequality, family, 
and gender-based division of labor.
10 http://www.issp.org/
11 Other items include environment, law enforcement, defense, and culture and arts.
12 Other items include keep prices under control, provide industry with the help it needs 
to grow, provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed, provide decent housing 
for those who can’t afford it, and impose strict laws to make industry do less damage to the 
environment.
13 OECD’s StatExtract website (“http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx”). Given that the sur-
vey was conducted in 2006, I used the macro data for 2005.
14 As a side note, when the standard error at the national level is expected to be larger 
than the error at the individual level, υ in Equation 4.2 is incorporated into the model at 
the time of performing the multilevel analysis. This υ is called the random effect. Ideally, 
one should assume that there will be a margin of error at the national level for all coef-
ficients as well as the constant term; however, it is basically better to estimate a simpler 
statistical model. In addition, since a multilevel logistic regression analysis is compli-
cated to estimate, setting a complex model could prevent the results from converging. 
Therefore, only the random effects that were significant at the 0.05 level were left for the 
estimation. The italicized coefficients in the table incorporate random effects into the 
model.
15 On the other hand, some would say that the percentage of public works in the gen-
eral account is not very large, and what lies behind this is the fiscal investment and loan 
program that drastically increased and was used exclusively as public investment. I will 
touch on this in Chapter 5. We also need to closely monitor the situation, as these move-
ments could change again after the establishment of the second Abe administration of 
the LDP—the Komeito coalition based on the results of the 2012 general election.
PART II
WHY HAS THE PUBLIC BURDEN OF 
EDUCATION NOT INCREASED?
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CHAPTER 5
Public Finance and Education in Japan
1.   Causes of Government Deficit Financing
(1)		Sociology	of	Fiscal	Crisis
In the first half of this book, up until the end of Chapter 4, we used an interna-
tionally comparative perspective to examine the relationship between education 
and government-provided services, particularly social security and welfare policy. 
We further looked at the stances vis-à-vis social and education policy in Japan. 
Henceforth, I examine how and why Japan built the current type of relationship 
between government and the people, and how and why the public education 
expenditure has continued to proceed at a low level, unchanged.
 Current public finance in Japan is in an extremely difficult situation. Japan’s 
level of fiscal debt is the worst in the world, even among the developed countries. 
Under these circumstances, demanding a further increase of the percentage of pub-
lic expenditure allocated for education costs alone is not that simple. The problem 
of deficit financing is not new. In the 1970s, the public finances of Western coun-
tries deteriorated, and this problem was pointed out by both the political right and 
left. Economics of public choice by James M. Buchanan and Richard E. Wagner 
concludes that the linking of so-called Keynesian economic policies with democ-
racy will “inevitably” bring about the consequence of an unstoppable expansion of 
fiscal deficit. What exactly does this mean?
 Essentially, to maintain a budgetary equilibrium and create a budgetary surplus 
it is necessary to maintain a balance between raising the real tax rate and lower-
ing the real public expenditure rate. However, in order to extend or increase the 
budgetary surplus, there needs to be some means by which to do so, such as rais-
ing taxes. Hence, such measures come with an immediate cost—the reduction 
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of disposable income. But if attempts are made to maintain fiscal equilibrium at 
a time when reducing disposable income is not possible, a reduction in public 
services will be the inevitable result—this would mean a drop in the quality of 
services. In other words, the maintenance of fiscal equilibrium and budgetary sur-
plus does not fundamentally result in anyone benefitting from this at the level of 
the individual citizen. Although there is an indirect benefit in that a budgetary 
surplus plays a role in safeguarding against inflation, this benefit cannot easily be 
felt directly by the citizens. Therefore, in a democratic form of government, the 
possibility of the citizens supporting a budgetary surplus policy is low. If there is 
justification for a budgetary deficit that provides for expenditure without taxes by 
deficit-covering government bonds, the citizens do not lose out from this and can 
therefore easily support deficit budget policy. In a representative democracy, the 
opinion of citizens is formed by giving a mandate to politicians. However, as poli-
ticians make their “livelihood” from this, it is basically in their own interests to be 
reelected. An inevitable consequence of adopting a democracy is that if politicians 
espouse an increased burden that is fundamentally disliked by the citizens, this 
will increase their risk of losing the next election. Consequently, politicians do not 
take this risk. If we link this to the expenditure habits and deficit creating habits of 
the state, it brings about a catastrophic consequence. This is the basis of Buchanan 
and Wagner’s argument that deficit financing is inevitable (Buchanan and Wagner, 
1977, trans. 1979).
 How best to respond to Keynesian policy guidelines is considered to be to 
choose either of the following two ways: 1) as the populace essentially supports 
Keynesian policy guidelines for the aforementioned reasons, a situation occurs in 
which democratic government brings about policy failure—consequently, demo-
cratic government is negated and government is made more autocratic; or 2) if 
maintaining a democratic society is given precedence, Keynesian policy is repudi-
ated and different policy principles are thought up. In this situation, Buchanan 
and Wagner state that priority should normally be given to 2), which represents a 
negation of “big government” (Buchanan and Wagner, 1977, trans. 1979: 6).
 On the other hand, Jürgen Habermas and Claus Offe write that in societies 
in late capitalism, although governments fundamentally provide social infrastruc-
ture by means of taxation, a problem emerges in that the securing of tax revenue 
becomes difficult due to the slowing of economic growth and the aging of soci-
ety. Against such a backdrop, the populace makes demands for even more services 
from the government. The populace’s acceptance in paying taxes is on account 
of their commensurate returns (or merits). Generally, however, when the popu-
lace begins receiving services, it leads to demands for even higher levels of ser-
vice. When the securing of tax revenues reaches a threshold, however, there is a 
mismatch between the quality of services and the expectations of the populace. 
This leads the populace to strengthen their mistrust of government. When collect-
ing taxes from a greatly mistrusting populace, the state’s legal force is highlighted, 
and this gradually alienates the hearts of the populace from the government. In 
response, the government strives to respond to the demands of the populace, 
which are increasingly strengthened, and the gap between the demands and the 
reality widens. In turn, the depressed mood of the populace worsens, the tax col-
lection function weakens, and as a result, the quality of services drops. From this 
emerges an unstoppable negative cycle whereby a drop in the quality of services 
leads to deterioration in the populace’s trust in the state. This is a common prob-
lem for late capitalism (Habermas, 1973, trans. 1979; Offe, 1987, trans. 1988).
 The ideological position of Habermas and Offe is completely opposite to that 
of Buchanan, but they commonly raise the same points as problems. However, 
although the problems stated here would seem to fit the crisis currently faced in 
Japan, these are problems that have already been discussed for more than 30 years 
in the West.
(2)		Causes	of	Fiscal	Deficit
The modern state is unable to survive without taxes. However, as taxes are not 
produced naturally, they must be procured under the authority of the state from 
private assets. Although this produces resistance from the citizens, the modern 
state at least does not procure taxes by legal force; rather, it only collects taxes 
by persuading the citizens and by reaching consensus among them (Morotomi, 
2013: 13). Theoretically, when implementing a redistribution policy by the gov-
ernment, the following can further be summarized about the relationship between 
the method of procuring this fiscal resource and the people’s share of the burden. 
Specifically, measures targeting all members of society are funded using general 
taxes. Clarifying the relationship of privileges, namely the benefits and burdens, 
with respect to a part of the members of society are the insurance premiums. Also, 
special purpose taxes are used to optimize the distribution of the cost burden of 
special groups in society. What to do regarding the percentage share of the burden 
of these third parties is a problem to which no optimal solution has been found 
(Naruse, 2001: 26)
 The cause of Japan’s fiscal crisis is fundamentally a shortage of tax revenue rather 
than excessive expenditure. Specifically, the repeated lowering of taxes carried 
out since the 1990s has caused an imbalance with expenditure and a noticeable 
decrease in tax revenue. Japan’s level of tax revenue is conspicuously low among 
OECD countries. What needs to be noted here is that the fundamental cause of 
the fiscal crisis is not the size of public finance allocated by the government. For 
example, in northern European countries, the size of public finance is large, in 
keeping with their image of the welfare state, and the tax revenue to GDP ratio is 
high. The size of their sovereign debt, however, is very small. In other words, the 
fiscal soundness of public finance is not related to the size of government; rather, 
it is largely dependent on tax revenue procurement capability (Ide, 2012: 9–10; 
2013: 32–34).
 Although debate has been extensive as to whether Japan falls into the category 
of “big government” or “small government,” there is a certain degree of consensus 
among experts that Japan has quite a small government if judged from the public 
finance aspect or by the number people actually working in government (number 
of government employees) (Kenjo, 2001; 2004, OECD, 2013, etc.). The problem 
is that despite this, the politicians run on a platform of “removing the excesses” 
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and “decreasing the number of government employees and lowering their pay,” 
and this is met with a certain degree of support. In terms of actual sentiment, 
citizens probably either feel that there is a strong influence of government service 
on many fronts, or they do not really feel that these efforts of the government are 
serving a useful purpose. For example, Shogo Takegawa writes that when big gov-
ernment and small government are discussed, the focus of attention should not 
necessarily be only restricted to the public finance aspect—rather, attention should 
also be given to the regulatory aspect (Takegawa, 2007). Looking at the aspect of 
cost, the securing of financial resources is not simple. Therefore, when the govern-
ment wields authority at a low cost, the provision of regulations becomes the most 
simple. Specifically, the numerous regulations place constraints on citizen activi-
ties, and it cannot be denied that this serves to conceal the smallness of the work 
activity of the bureaucrats (i.e., public servants).1 The fact that it is the strength 
of Japan’s regulations that gets pointed out is probably reflective of the smallness 
of the public finance size of Japan’s government. Moreover, affiliated organiza-
tions and industry organizations that are considered part of the private sector, have 
strong ties with the associated government authorities; and there are also some 
organizations whose actual founding was based on the influence of the will of min-
istries and agencies. People who observe this situation probably feel strongly that 
the strength of the government service is substantial (Iio, 2007: 69–71).
 The matter of trust toward the government has been previously explored in 
Chapter 4, but this strength of the regulations probably informs the perception of 
government authority and fosters an attitude among people of leaving it up to the 
authorities. Hideaki Tanaka regards transparency in budgets and public finance 
in Japan to be at the worst level among the OECD countries. Not all of the large 
amount of fiscal deficit and outstanding debt can be explained by indicators of 
transparency in budgets and public finance. Nevertheless, it is possible to observe a 
negative correlation whereby the lower the transparency of the budgets and public 
finances gets, the higher the outstanding debt becomes. If there is no transparency 
in public finance, the true shape is concealed and opportunism runs rampant. A 
lowering of trust in the government even spreads to the financial market and inter-
est rates rise. Moreover, even if the targets are achieved on paper, if this is due to 
accounting gymnastics, then naturally trust will diminish. Hence, it is essential to 
ensure there is transparency in attestation concerning achievement of targets and 
compliance with rules. But simply ensuring transparency is not good enough—
even then, if the targets are too high or the rules too strict, it invites accounting 
gymnastics. If accounting gymnastics are allowed to flourish, it is possible that 
this will cause a lessening of trust. According to Tanaka, Japan has a clear prob-
lem when it comes to the transparency of budgets and public finance. He thinks 
that this is a major cause of deficit financing having become a constant practice 
(Tanaka, 2013: 129–132).
2.   Public Finance and Budgets
(1)		Idiosyncrasies	of	Public-Finance	Activities	in	Japan
To learn about the mechanism of public finance, it is best to refer to documenta-
tion dedicated to the matter. Nevertheless, in this book, I wish to reflect a little on 
the fundamentals.
 The public finance activities of the Japanese government can be categorized into 
general public finance, and fiscal investment and loans. General public finance 
is made up of the General Accounts, the special accounts, and the government 
agencies (Yumoto, 2008: 17–30). We will first turn our attention to the budget 
of the General Account. Figure 5-1 shows the trends of the percentage share of 
the budgetary allocation of each of the expenditures on a time series using a unit 
scale of five-year intervals. Ideally, the budget should be processed by the govern-
ment in a single account for all revenue and expenditure (the single annual budget 
principle). However, for specific projects it has become possible to establish special 
accounts, such as in cases when carrying out operations where specific funds are 
held or when there are specific revenues and it is better to distinguish from general 
revenues and expenditure by allocating specific expenditure in line with the objec-
tives. As of February 2013, the government held 18 kinds of special accounts.
 The general account budget of the fiscal year 2012, including revisions, was of a 
size that exceeded 100.5 trillion yen. In the general account expenditure, payment 
Figure 5-1   Trend of Expense Categories in General Accounting Budgets 
Source: Ministry of Finance
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of principle interest on government bonds, social insurance related expenditure, 
and distribution of local allocation tax made up 70% of the total. Note that for 
general account expenditure such as social security related expenditure and pub-
lic works related expenditure, rather than paying it directly, the money is often 
transferred to a special account first and then paid from there. Looking at Figure 
5-1 while taking such details into account, there is a gradually increasing trend 
for social security-related expenditure, the growth of which is particularly large 
after entering the 2000s. Moreover, looking at the long-term picture, there is a 
gradual increase of expenditure for servicing government bonds. There is a trend 
of gradual decrease for education-related and science and technology promotion 
expenditure. Moreover, public works-related expenditure also appears to have 
been decreasing in recent years. However, in reality, when looking at the gov-
ernment’s public finance activities, placing attention on only the general public 
finance could invite a misleading conclusion.
 Including revisions, the budget for special accounts in the fiscal year 2012 was 
approximately 394 trillion yen, which is actually much larger than the general 
public finance. However, as mentioned above, this includes items that are recorded 
in both accounts, such as transfers from the general account to special accounts 
(more than 50 trillion yen). Therefore, simply aggregating the amounts of all of 
the accounts is not a reflection of the scale of the government’s public finance 
activities. Note that these special accounts contain reserve funds of large amounts, 
and at the time of the closing of accounts for the fiscal year 2011, the size of these 
amounts was 167 trillion yen. This is what is referred to as the “buried treasure.” 
Of this, 133 trillion yen is a slush fund for future pensions of the people, and 21 
trillion yen is in foreign currency denominated funds. As this buried treasure is 
fundamentally allocated for future risks, judgment of its size depends on the sense 
of values of the advocate. However, the management of special accounts is funda-
mentally entrusted to the respective governing agency, and a large portion of these 
special accounts are criticized as hotbeds for the inefficient use of funds in projects 
involving incorporated administrative agencies and public interest corporations. 
However, if this buried treasure is used, it can only be used once, and once gone, 
there will be nothing that remains. Therefore, it cannot become a means for fun-
damentally resolving Japan’s deficit financing (Yumoto, 2008: 178–179). First and 
foremost, a substantial cause of Japan’s deficit financing relates to the increase in 
ordinary costs from the steep increases in social security expenditure and the aging 
population.
 Moreover, an area to pay particular attention to when looking at Japan’s public 
finance is fiscal investment and loans. The sector that has been often portrayed 
as an emblem of excesses in Japan’s public finance is public works. Public works-
related expenditure is the expenditure target of construction bonds as stated in the 
general budget provisions. Fiscal investment and loans refer to the government’s 
accommodation of funds for government-affiliated institutions and local self-gov-
erning bodies and the implementation of the public investment of these funds 
as financial resources. Hence, this is not entirely synonymous with public works. 
In reality, however, fiscal investment and loans has effectively been categorized 
into public works’ categories of buildings and construction. Looking at the gen-
eral account only, from the budget of the fiscal year 1974, social security-related 
expenditure began to rise above public works-related expenditure; but, in fact, 
since the situation of the 1970s, the fiscal investment and loans have been increas-
ing at a pace clearly exceeding the public works-related expenditure and the social 
security-related expenditure of the general account (Ide, 2013: 42–44).
 The difference between fiscal investment and loans and general public finance 
is that while general public finance is a world of subtraction and addition of actual 
funds, fiscal investment and loans is a world of lending and borrowing—in other 
words, a world of financial transactions (Yumoto, 2008: 22–23). In the initial 
budget for the fiscal of 2012, the size of fiscal investment and loans exceeded 17 
trillion yen. The effect of such fiscal investment and loans on Japan’s overall public 
finance policies will be revisited later.
 As one can understand from the discussion thus far, problems with public 
finance are extremely difficult for the layman to understand due to the complexity 
of its actual content. While, on the one hand, this is unavoidable due to the scale of 
the country, on the other hand, the existence of both the general account and spe-
cial accounts does make it easy to conduct some accounting gymnastics between 
the two accounts. Not only that, but the revised budgets, which are carried out 
when there is a high level of intrinsic urgency, end up being allocated every year as 
if they had been planned all along, which also results in the difficult-to-understand 
nature of these matters and the accounting gymnastics that occur (Tanaka, 2013: 
Chapter 4). The complexity of the system causes different interpretations by advo-
cates and confusion among laymen. Democracy fundamentally reflects the will 
of the people, but it greatly depends on the people being informed by accurate 
information. However, when the opinions among the experts present views that 
are completely opposed to one another, it causes problems for the public finance, 
taxation, and social security systems. This state of confusion can surely be linked to 
the lack of trust in the government that was mentioned earlier in Chapter 4.
(2)		Mechanism	of	Budget	Compilation
The compilation of budgets in Japan does not take the form of cramming in the 
content after deciding the apportionment for each field. Budgetary adjustments 
inside each ministry and agency accumulate as the budget advances to each divi-
sion and bureau. Each ministry and agency then negotiates with the MOF con-
cerning this accumulation of adjustment items (whereby each ministry and agency 
repeatedly engages in back-and-forth discussion with the MOF a significant num-
ber of times).
 During the high economic growth period up until 1970, on account of the 
growth in expenditure, it was the Meeting of Budget Examiners in the MOF that 
finally performed the adjustments of the budgetary allocation. It can therefore 
be said that the authority of the MOF was very strong. From the latter half of 
the 1970s, however, the government issued deficit-covering government bonds. 
Moreover, by establishing a limit on the preliminary budget request (i.e., a ceiling) 
to constrain expenditure, the budgetary allocation limit was effectively passed on 
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to each ministry and agency. It thus became possible to see the existing level before 
the preliminary budget request. For this reason, before the preliminary budget 
request to the MOF, the refining of the budget inside each ministry and agency 
rose in importance, while the significance of the requested budget given to the 
MOF and the examiners’ assessment became comparatively weaker. Although the 
budgetary adjustment by this method of accumulation brought about a sense of 
stability, the situation also made it difficult to instigate much change to the public 
finance budget overall (Iio, 2007: 56–59).
 The ceiling that prescribes the preliminary budget request limit (or criteria) is 
treated strictly, which is also the case all over the world. The strictness of this ceil-
ing, however, can be viewed as the cause of the large public finance deficit. When 
the ceiling was first adopted, it was limited to the initial budget of the general 
account. Then, since the 1990s, throughout the special accounts, the size has con-
tinued to increase and the limit for the revised budget has also been expanded. In 
other words, because the ceiling in the general account was too strict, it caused a 
backlash within the LDP, and there was a strengthening of pressures, led by influ-
ential members of the Diet, to increase the items and their amounts as exemptions 
to the ceiling. The MOF negotiated partial concessions with the politicians and 
enacted special limits to allay the discontent, while he continued to maintain the 
ceiling as it was. However, in effect, the applicable scope of the ceiling was limited 
only to the general account, and it did not serve the role of cancelling the public 
finance deficit, which comprised the total budget (Amou, 2013).2
 Now if we look at the specific procedures of this budget compilation, first, 
beginning in mid-April, all the governing divisions of each ministry and agency set 
about creating a draft with the chief of their general affairs unit in charge, which is 
examined by the general affairs division inside the respective agency. Then, budget 
negotiations are conducted inside each agency between the general affairs division 
and each of the divisions in charge, and a budget proposal for inside the agency is 
decided on. Next, negotiations begin between the general affairs division of each 
agency and the division-budget division of the ministry; and by repeating this pro-
cess, a budget proposal for the ministry gets prepared. Using the ministry budget 
proposal that has been prepared in this way, the ministry then enters into negotia-
tion with the MOF (Omori, 2006: 146–147).
 Although, from the start, the ultimate objective of the MOF has been to control 
the state’s public finance, this does not entail control of the fine budgetary details 
of each ministry and agency but rather control of the size of the overall budget. 
The objective is also to adhere to the establishment and maintenance of the ceiling. 
Since 1961, the MOF has decided on the budget growth rate by comparing it with 
the time of compilation of the previous fiscal year, and each ministry and agency 
has submitted a preliminary budget request that is in line with this. On the other 
hand, once the budget is created, the MOF is disinterested in its control and the 
executed budget is often different from the planned budget (Kato, 1997: 62–65).
 Among these, the Ministry of Education has traditionally contained clearly sec-
tionalized bureau units, and each of these has the particular characteristic of pos-
sessing numerous associated institutions directly linked to the daily lives of the 
people (such as the education committees of elementary, junior high, and senior 
high schools in the case of the Elementary and Secondary Education Bureau). 
According to Masahito Ogawa, as it is not possible to execute policy without tak-
ing into consideration the voices of society, such as schools, the policies have been 
formed with importance given to a bottom-up type of consensus.3
 Specifically, according to Ogawa (2010), the public finance for education 
directly after the war was influenced by the bureaucrats and the minister of the 
Ministry of Home Affairs before the war. The fact that the Ministry of Home 
Affairs controlled Japan’s domestic portion of public finance and the pre-war 
Ministry of Education established institutions for local education with public 
finance was the reason that the influence of the Ministry of Home Affairs still 
remained. The local public order (i.e., police) was also the jurisdiction of the 
Home Ministry. Accordingly, the education policy at that time was to take con-
trol of education from the perspective of public order and efforts were put into 
controlling the local area. On this point, the Minister of Home Affairs and other 
members of the education policy tribe observed and attacked the socialists and the 
Japan Teachers’ Union, which was a significant ideological move in support of the 
ruling party. From the 1960s, however, even from inside the LDP, the education 
policy was debated as “policy,” and it became a politicized issue. It was from this 
that the modern image of the bunkyozoku, the education policy tribe, emerged. At 
that time, The Education and Science and Technology Division was established 
beneath the General Council, and while power was strengthened there, power was 
correspondingly weakened in the Ministry of Education government offices. One 
thing that is often pointed out is that Diet members were able to collect votes 
based on subsidies for agriculture and forestry, construction (land and transport), 
commerce and industry (trade and industry → economy and industry); thus, they 
wielded power in the LDP and enjoyed popularity. However, the education policy 
tribe had difficulty getting access to these subsidies and votes. Conversely, because 
there was no relationship to votes, the tribe included many Diet members with 
a strong ideological streak, characterized by a will to execute education policy to 
realize their own political beliefs and stance.
 With globalization and the collapse of the Cold War, however, the relative posi-
tion of education policy changed dramatically from the 1990s, and the character 
of the MEXT underwent inevitable and dramatic change after this reorganization 
of the Ministry of Education and the other ministries and agencies. In particular, 
with the introduction of the single-seat constituency system, the political voice of 
politicians became relatively strong, and this strengthened the cabinet’s functions. 
The reason that this led to MEXT having a stronger influence is because political 
power is necessary. In other words, when there is no political power, it is not pos-
sible to extend the budget.
 It is written above that the political voice of politicians was strengthened with 
the single-seat constituency system. This refers not to the individual politician 
but to the appeal of policies as a political party. Rather than an individual politi-
cian running a campaign on the strengths of a specific policy, it is necessary to 
appeal to a wide spectrum of policies. It is for this reason that the aforementioned 
Why Has the Public Burden of Education Not Increased?138 Public Finance and Education in Japan 139
tribe of Diet members lose influence. Sometimes, the voices of these tribe Diet 
members are criticized as being “vested interests” and “forces of resistance;” and, 
paradoxically, they sometimes use this to their own advantage during elections. 
A typical example of this was the Koizumi administration’s reform of the postal 
system, which is one example of a cabinet’s strong authority effectively working. 
Accompanying this, the organization inside MEXT also placed importance on 
adjustment by the Lifelong Learning Policy Bureau (Policy Division) and the 
Minister’s Secretariat Policy Division that dissects horizontally through the min-
istry, and there was a strengthening trend for final decisions to be made further up 
the hierarchy (Minister’s Secretariat and Minister) (Ogawa, 2010).
(3)		Composition	of	Education-Related	and	Science	and	Technology	Promotion	
Expenditure	and	Child	Learning	Costs	
Figure 5-2 shows a breakdown of expenditure categories in “Education-related 
and science and technology promotion expenditure” in the general account bud-
get (including revisions). As can be seen, the share of expenditure of the National 
Treasury’s compulsory education contribution is significantly decreasing. At pres-
ent, it has been cut by 30%. In its place, the expenditure that has increased the 
most is that of education promotion grants. The reason for this is that up until the 
budget of the fiscal year of 2003, transfers to the national schools’ special account 
were classified separately. Moreover, as the national schools’ expenditure came 
to be understood by the same mechanism as grants to private schools due to the 
incorporation of the national schools, it came to be included in the education pro-
motion grants. This is why the expenditure for education promotion grants rises 
sharply from 2005. In addition to these grants to schools, the expenditure required 
to distribute educational materials such as textbooks is also included in this expen-
diture. The share of education facility expenditure shows a gradually decreasing 
trend; and in its place, science and technology promotional expenditure shows an 
increasing trend. Scholarship loan project costs have proceeded at a consistently 
low level.
 If we comprehensively look back at the results of the “Survey on Local 
Educational Expenditures” conducted by the MEXT, the declining population 
was reflected in each of the educational fields. In recent years, the percentage of 
distribution to total expenditure has proceeded steadily at around 27% for ele-
mentary school expenditure and at around 15% for junior high school. In the 
fiscal year of 2010, expenditure for schools for special needs’ education, showing a 
gradually increasing trend, was 4%, while senior high school expenditure, show-
ing a decreasing trend, was in the lower 12%. Higher education expenditure has 
shown an increasing trend, and in recent years it has been around 15%.
 In March 2010, the DPJ Government established the Act on Free Tuition Fees 
at Public High Schools and launched the High School Tuition Support Fund 
Program. This budget proposal is reflected in the fiscal year of 2010. As Figure 5-2 
shows a trend using a time series of five-year intervals, it is somewhat difficult to 
discern, but compared with the fiscal year of 2009, there was a growth in expen-
diture exceeding 300 billion yen—the highest in the past 30 years (approximately 
5.9% of the MEXT budget). The expenditure for the Free Tuition Fees at Public 
High Schools and the High School Tuition Support Fund Program is included in 
this expenditure for education promotion grants.
 However, as already mentioned many times, the public finance education 
expenditure itself is low in Japan by international comparison. Looking at ele-
mentary and junior high school education alone, the international ranking is not 
that low, but the overwhelming share of the expenditure here is for teacher sala-
ries. In other words, the expenditure spent on items other than teacher salaries 
(educational material costs, school equipment costs, and building maintenance 
costs, etc.) is only a little more than 10%, whereas the OECD average is about 
20–30% (Ishii, 2012). Therefore, while education is compulsory in Japan, the 
actual situation is not one in which people do not have to pay for their children’s 
education. The schools operate by collecting funds and donations from the par-
ents and guardians for various accounts such as PTA costs and classroom activity 
fees. For example, according to the “Child Learning Cost Survey” (in the fiscal 
year 2012), conducted biannually by MEXT, even for public schools that do not 
impose tuition fees, the annual costs were found to be 55,197 yen for elemen-
tary school, 131,534 yen for junior high school, and 230,837 yen for senior high 
school (for all “school education costs”). Figure 5-3 shows the trend of the total 
Figure 5-2   Trend of Expenditure Categories in Education Related and Science and 
Technology Promotion Expenditure of the General Account Budget 
Source: the Ministry of Finance
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amount of learning costs (including extracurricular education) (unit: yen) based 
on this “Child Learning Cost Survey.” Apart from kindergartens, private schools 
cost the most at the elementary school level and less as the level of schools becomes 
higher. Private elementary and junior high schools exceeded 1 million yen, and 
private senior high school costs were close to 1 million yen (there having also been 
a period in the past when they exceeded 1 million yen). The sudden decrease in the 
cost in the fiscal year 2010 corresponded with the introduction of the Free Tuition 
Fees at Public High Schools and High School Tuition Support Fund Program. 
The cost for private schools also decreased in the fiscal year 2010, but as costs rose 
noticeably in the fiscal year 2012, the impact of the Free Tuition Fees at Public 
High Schools and the High School Tuition Support Fund Program is more dif-
ficult to observe than is the case for public schools.
 Figure 5-4 shows the percentage share of total learning costs for “curricular 
education costs” and “extracurricular education costs.” The costs in “curricular 
education costs” include lesson fees, school event costs, PTA costs and student 
association costs, textbooks, other books and equipment, excursions, uniform, 
and commuting costs, among others. The costs in “extracurricular education costs” 
include costs and monthly gratuities for private coaching colleges, home tutors, 
equipment and books for study at home, and arts, sporting, and other experien-
tial activities. The dark line indicates curricular education costs and the faded line 
extracurricular education costs. The continuous line signifies public schools and 
Figure 5-3   Trend of Total Child Learning Costs
Source: MEXT “Child Learning Cost Survey”
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Figure 5-4   Trend of Percentage Share between Curricular and Extracurricular 
Education (a)
Source: MEXT “Child Learning Cost Survey”
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the dotted line private schools.
 The comparative difference for elementary schools and junior high schools 
proceeds stably, but there is a large change in the comparative difference for kin-
dergartens and senior high schools. With regard to kindergartens, there is not a 
large change for the total learning costs, but the percentage share of curricular 
education costs is creeping higher, overall. Looking at this breakdown,4 there are 
no obvious trends that can be observed concerning particular increases for any of 
the cost categories. However, the public finance burden on pre-primary educa-
tion, which tends to be overlooked as an education expense problem, is also at a 
low level among the OECD countries. In the first place, not all children attend 
pre-elementary education (in recent years, the percentage has proceeded at around 
60%). Therefore, even though there is a certain level of choice regarding whether 
or not to enter kindergarten, according to this survey, the fees required will be a 
little more than 70 thousand yen for public kindergartens and a little less than 240 
thousand yen for private kindergartens. As parents with kindergarten-age children 
are in younger adulthood, some parents might find this a heavy burden. 
 In social stratification research, it is often pointed out that one’s social stra-
tum of origin affects education achievements and school performance. In order 
to weaken that effect, early-stage measures are considered to be important. For 
example, in the United States, the Head Start Program, which was initiated by the 
Democratic Johnson (Lyndon B. Johnson) administration based on a “War on 
Poverty” campaign, was truly a program that addressed this problem. However, 
in Japan, such public support for the early stage of education and child rearing 
is extremely weak, and with respect to the point that the cost of school educa-
tion itself includes numerous costs, measures of some kind probably need to be 
considered.
 On the other hand, although change has been significant for senior high school, 
the percentage of curricular education costs in particular has lowered due to the 
Free Tuition Fees at Public High Schools and High School Tuition Support Fund 
Program. The introduction of this program has effectively reduced household 
expenditure by at least 100 thousand yen, which is definitely not a small impact. 
One would think that if the burden of tuition fees were simply reduced, this por-
tion would shift to a different education costs (such as extracurricular education, 
etc.). In particular, one might expect this to be observable in data for private 
schools,5 where one assumes there to be many cases in which tuition fees are high, 
and the pupils who attend them are hence likely to be in the high-income class. 
Just from looking at the data alone, however, this trend cannot be observed. As can 
be described with reference to Figure 5-3, the educational cost burden of families 
overall has been alleviated, and fundamentally, a large increasing trend can no lon-
ger be observed in recent years.
 In the case of the compulsory education stage of elementary school and junior 
high school, the percentage share of curricular education costs used for public 
schools is becoming lower. To express this the other way around, the fact that the 
tuition fees for private elementary and junior high schools are that high is the 
cause of this result.
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3.   Balance between Burden and Benefit
(1)		Sociology	of	Public	Finance
Public finance is really governance by money, and public finance policy is always at 
the center of the political system. It differs depending on who the significant actors 
are and the establishment of the target of analysis (whether it is the budget policy 
itself or public finance policy for an individual region).
 Moreover, this changes depending on the historical context. The choices 
that actors make, depending on the system, decide the direction of that system. 
Moreover, depending on the incentive for an individual actor to strengthen his/
her own political power, his/her choices will be swayed; and what ultimately con-
trols these choices are the immediate political situation, the response of the mar-
ket, and the attitudes of the people that holds sway at that time. Furthermore, the 
system not only prescribes the conduct of the actor, but half of what the system is 
made up of represents the aspect of reaffirming the habitual state of affairs.
 The central theme of the “sociology of public finance” is an investigation into 
the relationship between public finance and the state. This is in the words of Rudolf 
Goldsheid. According to Horst Jecht, who adopted Weber’s theories, the sociology 
of public finance attempts to explain public finance by its relationship with overall 
societal and economic constructs. To show this more concretely, he centers on the 
establishment of target, which is the process by which intentions are formed relat-
ing to public finance policy, and the historical system theory, which conceptual-
izes the state as an autonomous agent and narrows down the focus of analysis to 
the relationship between the system and the actor. According to Naohiko Jinno, 
the contemporary study of public finance, while heavily influenced by German 
thought, can be categorized on the one hand into a group of thought following 
on from Musgrave (Chapter 2), who can fundamentally be positioned along with 
neo-classical synthesis, and on the other hand, into the tradition of the sociol-
ogy of public finance that attempts to analyze public finance phenomena inside 
the flow of society as a whole. The sociology of public finance can be categorized 
as follows: the neo-Weberian sociology of public finance of John M. Hobson, 
who builds on the contribution of the historical sociologist Theda Skocpol, who 
emphasized the autonomy of the state; the historical sociology of public finance 
of W. Elliot Brownlee; and a systems theory-based sociology of public finance that 
gives importance to the decision processes of government in public finance (Jinno, 
2002: 61–70).
 The state mentioned here can be regarded as a functioning principle and sys-
tem that has been artificially created based on the constraints of time and space. 
Its exercise of fiscal authority can be organized into three parts: 1) there is a flow 
of administration and control from state authority toward the people, and meet-
ing this in the opposite direction is a flow of support and consent by the people 
vis-à-vis the state authority; 2) based on the assumption of 1), there emerges a 
flow of tax payment, or taxation, from the people, and this becomes a resource 
of monetary, physical payment that flows from the state authority to the people; 
3) furthermore, against the backdrop of trust in state authority, the lending and 
borrowing of money between the government and corporations and between the 
government and the household, and the financial distribution of money through 
public finance are added (Oshima and Ide, 2006: 245–252). Although 1) is partic-
ularly important in modern-day Japan, I wish to review the relationships between 
tax and the state, and tax and the people in 2), which constitutes the premise for 
1).
 The biggest objective of the tax system is to effectively secure tax revenues. It is 
possible to carry out economic policy of some kind through the tax system (for 
example, environment tax, whereby a tax is imposed on fossil fuels to protect the 
environment, etc.). However, the purpose of such action cannot be seen as any-
thing but secondary. If that be the case, in recent years, the effective securing of tax 
revenues has become a challenging task for all countries. For example, although 
there is a progressive tax system whereby high-income earners are burdened with 
higher taxes, in recent years the level of progression has weakened and there has 
been movement toward a flatter system. As an argument against the progressive 
tax system, it has been asserted that it hinders high-income earners’ motivation to 
work. Empirical data to support this, however, is practically non-existent. Rather, 
it is the various acts of tax avoidance by high-income earners 6—mentioned in the 
Introduction—that are becoming a problem.
 In today’s globalized world, high-income earners are willing to shift their 
income overseas to a country or territory where there is hardly any income tax. The 
same applies to corporations. Due to the high corporate tax rate, if a corporation 
shifts to overseas, the number of jobs also decreases as a result. In fact, currently, 
competition seems to have arisen to lower the corporate tax rate in order to attract 
corporations to a country. Therefore, there appears to be a limit to what is pos-
sible concerning the establishment of a progressive tax system for income tax and 
securing tax revenues by increasing corporate tax if one considers the relationship 
with the tax systems of the neighboring countries. The concentration of atten-
tion on consumption tax is not unrelated to this global trend (Morotomi, 2013: 
238–246).
 Moreover, the problem with the Japanese tax system is that it has a narrow tax 
base. In order to collect tax revenues, a tax base and a tax rate are applied to deter-
mine what tax to take from what income. In other words, setting a broader tax base 
would make it possible to have a lower tax rate, and conversely, narrowing the tax 
base forces the tax rate to be that much higher—otherwise, it would not be pos-
sible to collect the equivalent amount of tax revenue. Fundamentally, the world 
trend in tax reform is to safeguard fairness by getting as many people as possible to 
share the burden (broadening the tax base) and to achieve economic efficiency and 
vitalization through the associated lowering of the tax rate.
 Since the tax base in Japan is small to begin with and tax-lowering policies to 
kick-start the economy out of a recession have been broadly implemented, the 
tax system has ended up taking the form of a “narrow tax base and low tax rate.” 
According to the estimations of Shigeki Morinobu, Japan’s scale is only half of that 
of the United States, which is often cited as a typical example of small government 
(Morinobu, 2010: 92–95). In particular, Japan has a system of many exemptions 
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in its income tax. Such exemptions are a big cause of the lowering of the tax base.
(2)		Public	Works	that	Utilize	Fiscal	Investment	and	Loans
The subject of fiscal investment and loans was mentioned earlier, but according 
to Eisaku Ide, a particular characteristic of the public finance policies of post-
war Japan, colloquially referred to as the “construction state” policies, is that they 
have been maintained and allowed to function through active use of fiscal invest-
ment and loans in the following ways: 1) lowering the tax burden by utilizing 
fiscal investment and loans; 2) gaining support from the middle class, small- and 
medium-sized business owners, and the self-employed by the reduction of taxes; 3) 
using public works to secure the employment of the low-income class while stimu-
lating the economy; 4) thereby converting the low-income class from recipients of 
public assistance into tax payers; and 5) enabling payment of insurance premiums 
by providing employment opportunities (not recipients of public assistance) and 
placing many people inside the framework of social insurance. Of course, these are 
temporary effects, and we probably ought to give credit to the fact that there was 
a period when it functioned well. However, as the population structure has since 
changed, the percentage of the population living in urban areas has risen, the pub-
lic finance deficit has rapidly increased, and criticism toward local public works 
has become severe.
 This has led to a situation where, despite never enhancing the social security sys-
tem, “wasteful” public works have been sharply cut to reduce the deficit, spousal 
special deductions have been abolished,7 and tax reduction measures have been 
curtailed or abolished (effectively resulting in an increase in taxes). This has led to a 
loss of local employment opportunities. The economic activity of Japan as a whole 
has stagnated, and it has become politically impossible to advocate any further 
tax increases. As a result, the already inadequate social security system has been 
further reduced, the discontent of the people has deepened, and a negative cycle 
has been perpetuated (Ide, 2012: 232–233). Moreover, the only thing that is now 
emphasized is the reduction of excess, and the scrutiny of the people is becoming 
ever more forbidding. In recent years, the media has repeatedly given attention to 
stories on the illegal receipt of public assistance in the form of livelihood protec-
tion, and so forth. Consequently, society has been given the impression that wel-
fare fraud is increasing. As a result, a more suspicious and tougher level of scrutiny 
is directed at the vulnerable of society, and the people are showing a less generous 
spirit.
 Clearly, it is becoming increasingly difficult for Japan to continue borrowing 
money in the same way that it has up until now. This means the budget system 
must now undergo reform. And as to be expected from a democratic state, this 
reform must have the consensus of the people. If consensus is obtained, the poli-
ticians cannot but be moved by it. The reason Japan’s public finance deficit has 
accumulated so high is because the politicians, the bureaucrats, and the people 
have been avoiding reform (Tanaka, 2013: 250–251). The people, while being 
the tax payers, also hold the voting power to select politicians. However, as already 
mentioned, this public finance system and the bureaucratic organization is too 
complicated for the people to pass judgment accurately. It is not realistic to expect 
all members of the voting public to learn such complicated knowledge and pass 
judgment accurately. Therefore, the experts, both in the government and among 
the people, are expected to play an important role (Nakabayashi, 2004).
 Looking back at post-war Japan, we can understand that Japan’s public finance 
system that has produced the current public finance deficit was already established 
by the end of the high economic growth period. Hayato Ikeda who proposed the 
so-called “doubling of income” was originally a tax expert who learned the ropes 
in the tax bureau, and his policy efforts were focused on balancing public finance 
and reducing taxes. He believed it was important to be as thrifty as possible in the 
country’s expenditure to deliver a cheap government in order to reduce the burden 
on the people as much as possible.
 At the time of the formulation of the budget of the fiscal year 1957, when Ikeda 
was Minister of Finance, there was a large increase in tax revenue due to the effects 
of high economic growth. This prompted not only the proposal of aggressive policy 
measures, but also the proposal to change the tax rate for income earners (who had 
sharply increased in number) and to introduce broad tax lowering policies. Then, 
when a policy was proposed to fix the income tax burden of the people’s income at 
about 20% and to turn excess tax revenues into tax reductions, it became partly set 
in stone. In this way, the fundamental deduction, deduction for dependents, and 
the spousal deduction system, which was established in the fiscal year 1961, were 
established. These deductions were applied to adjust the tax rate for the middle- to 
low-income class. Meanwhile, the tax rate for small- and medium-sized businesses 
was slightly reduced and special taxation measures were expanded. 
 Despite these tax reduction measures, tax revenue was generated from the high 
economic growth, and this generated a virtuous cycle in which further growth 
caused by tax reductions continued. The tax reductions were benefitting the peo-
ple’s livelihood and corporate activities, and at the same time the people began 
putting leftover income into savings. The places where these savings swelled were 
postal savings and postal insurance. The government utilized these savings to carry 
out investment activities, and these funds became a large financial resource for 
expanding public works. In other words, the funds that could be generated under 
a low tax burden were used to carry out investment for providing social capital; 
and through such investment, employment was created in regional areas as well. 
Hence, the fiscal investment and loans system can be said to have created a frame-
work for Japan’s public finance operation. Another reason why the people read-
ily accepted the assertion that tax reduction was tax reform—it collected votes 
through tax reductions and increased tax revenues by the policy of economic stim-
ulation—was because of the memories that the people held during post-war Japan. 
 Jun Saito, who himself participated as a DPJ Diet member, summarizes the 
LDP governments that continued for a long time in the post-war period as fol-
lows. The LDP, through its relationship with local support groups and industry, 
has received support in return for bringing forward these parties’ interests. This 
“pork barreling” style of politics carried with it a dilemma: if politicians ignored 
the opinions of supporter groups and industry, they would not receive any support 
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from anyone; but, conversely, if they delivered on these demands too quickly, 
that might also weaken the support structure. For large public works, such as the 
expressways and the shinkansen, construction promotion associations involving 
local government agencies were formed, and these were able to function as vote-
collecting systems. However, once the large infrastructure is completed, its ben-
efits can be enjoyed irrespective of which political party or candidate one decides 
to support. Therefore, although large public works’ projects of ambiguous neces-
sity were started one after the other, it cannot be denied that these public works 
generated a certain level of employment locally, that income was generated from 
this, and that this provided a certain contribution to tax revenues, and so forth. 
On the other hand, the increase in civil engineering works of ambiguous necessity 
and purpose, such as land improvement and dams and land reclamation, gener-
ated particular distrust among influential people in the urban areas, and they also 
resulted in a huge fiscal burden being left for future generations. Such vast fiscal 
debt has unquestionably placed huge constraints on the freedom of policy needed 
to take Japan forward. (Saito, 2010: 16–17).8
 Nevertheless, by proceeding with public works, this in some way enriches social 
capital. Consequently, ordinary people begin contemplating the future risks to 
their own livelihood, and their chief concern becomes pensions, nursing care, 
medical treatment, and so forth. However, when refocusing on concerns such as 
these, one notices that the mechanisms for socially supporting such concerns are 
pretty weak in Japan. With respect to welfare programs, large corporations in par-
ticular have been providing such mechanisms (presupposing the role of women as 
wives that become dedicated homemakers), but through globalization, companies 
have increasingly less leeway to maintain such welfare programs. Hopes can no 
longer, then, rest on the husband for raising enough salary to pay for the large 
education costs of the children with the wife continuing to be a dedicated home-
maker. Putting aside the obviously shaky basis for such sense of values concerning 
gender-based division of labor, when the wife (regardless of sense of values) con-
siders the education costs of the children, it gives rise to a situation where seeking a 
job becomes necessary.
 The working population (i.e., the tax payers) agglomerates in the urban areas. 
Meanwhile, there is an unavoidable strengthening of criticism over who it is that 
will benefit from large-scale public works in regions with decreasing populations. 
When people take a dispassionate big-picture view of their life’s course, they are 
faced with making extremely weighty decisions concerning having and raising 
children under the given circumstances, considering how much it will cost.
 As already mentioned, Japan’s social security schemes are extremely skewed 
toward care for the elderly. If looking only at the level of benefits paid to the 
elderly, Japan does not pale in comparison even to the northern European coun-
tries such as Sweden. However, the levels of Japan’s benefits paid to the working 
generation, including benefits paid to families and those paid to persons with dis-
abilities, particularly benefits in kind, are the lowest of any developed country. The 
reason for mentioning this is not to say that the working generation is making the 
sacrifice so that the elderly can have it easy (in fact, this is unlikely to be the case). 
However, the degree of imbalance is such that one may get this impression. Hence, 
the working generation, who are the chief tax payers, will actually feel they only 
have burdens and no sense of benefit. As a consequence, this situation could also 
cause what is referred to as generational discord (Ide, 2013: 155–163).9
(3)		Considering	the	Balance	between	Tax	Burden	and	Received	Benefit
The government procures funds to carry out various activities. As mentioned in the 
Introduction, the burden of the people is that of tax and social security. Although 
the social security burden is compulsory (it is compulsory to contribute to social 
insurance in Japan), unless insurance fees are paid, it is not possible to receive the 
benefit. In other words, individuals can easily see the merits of paying. However, 
in the case of tax, the government forcefully collects it and, from the perspective of 
the taxpayer, possesses gratuitousness in that the consideration in return for that 
payment is unknown. Such compulsory nature and this perception of gratuitous-
ness undeniably underlie some of the causes of opposition toward tax.
 However, as pointed out by Naohiko Jinno, it has come to be known that rather 
than a strong discontent being held toward the government, the sense of content-
edness among the people is high in countries with a large burden on the people, 
particularly the tax burden. As one line of thought, Jinno (2013: 83–94) points 
out that it is possible that the Japanese consciousness toward the “public” causes 
a warped consciousness and understanding toward tax, which is the cause of dis-
content. Specifically, although it is popularly said that the Japanese have a strong 
awareness of authority, the concept of “public” has not sunk in, and instead there 
is confusion about the difference between “public” and “government service.” For 
example, when describing a public school, it is first and foremost recognized as 
a school established by the authorities (government), and it is hardly likely that 
anyone holds the image of it as a school that operates jointly based on the burden 
that is each and every person’s tax money. In other words, Japanese have a weak 
grasp of the idea of “public” as something used by everyone rather than belong-
ing to one person, and as something that is jointly controlled through the provi-
sion of a share of the burden by everyone. Therefore, if the slogan “kan kara min 
e” (meaning: from government service to the private sector; translated as: “from 
public to private”) is advocated by the Japanese government, since the distinc-
tion between “government service” and “public” is unclear, people will become 
concerned over the idea of joint control and inadvertently interpret it to mean 
entrusting the domain of the public to the private domain made up of individuals 
and corporations.
 The government is a device for governing a society by providing special author-
ity to it for the time being to give stability to society, which could otherwise fall 
into a state of anarchy if merely left to individual private interests. In this way, 
it enables people to live in security. However, as there is the potential for a per-
son, once given the authority, to unexpectedly seize power, and to either practice 
tyranny or govern against the will of people, a mechanism has been put in place 
that reflects the public will in the form of elections. Therefore, the government is 
bestowed with the quality of enforceability, which is a strong power, as well as with 
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the quality of publicness, which is the means to reflect as much as possible the will 
of the people living there; and its formation can be said to depend on the balance 
of both of these.
 However, in the case of Japan, as it rapidly imported Western mechanisms, par-
ticularly when it was constructing the modern state, it immediately went ahead 
with replicating the systems themselves, but the intention and attitude behind 
them could not easily take root among the people. This is because the import of 
this “alien” Western system sometimes causes large opposition, all the more so 
due to its unfamiliarity (see Chapter 2). Therefore, the government or the state 
becomes one of two alternatives: something that is governed unilaterally and 
tyrannically, or something to be resisted and opposed.
 The left-wing parties of Japan have a tradition of criticizing tax increases as bul-
lying the vulnerable and have long been in opposition to it. Looking back at the 
history of thought control in pre-war Japan, it is not impossible to understand this 
as a prudent stance in opposition to the government and state power. However, 
socialism and communism are originally the ideology of controlling economic 
activity, and for this to occur, it is necessary for the government to intervene. 
Moreover, if one contemplates delivering services to the whole of society, then that 
necessitates a broad burden. In other words, people do not think in the following 
way: “First, please take the burden in the form of broader taxation for the time 
being, then the same amount of this portion will be put back into services, and the 
government will perform this intervention.” Instead, it becomes more like regard-
ing a specific “ruling class” as the enemy, with the idea that the government, who 
is in collusion with a segment of the greedy fortune-building wealthy, is exploiting 
the people. This weakens the concept of “public” in which everyone participates, 
in its place creating an “enemy” inside society, which ends up perpetuating an atti-
tude that urges the government to make those people who have money pay more. 
Of course, there are some people who accumulate wealth that may be excessive and 
not proportionate to their contribution and work in society; however, these people 
aside, frankly, this stance has not received any wide-ranging sympathy in modern-
day Japan, where a decent standard of living is maintained (in fact, such opinion 
has not earned a high level of support in post-war Japan). Moreover, because the 
universalism of public service implies mutual support by everyone, the posture of 
looking for the enemy within society causes fragmentation, and it is incompatible 
with the concept of universalism.
 Conversely, in recent years, there have been claims that the left’s assertions are 
simply selfish. This appears to be the viewpoint of conservative factions claim-
ing that the post-war education, which has taught only rights and ignored obliga-
tions, is to blame. However, these are also put forward as a reaction against the 
aforementioned leftist assertions. This view can easily lead to the opinion that the 
state should have stronger power, in which the conceptualization of “public” is 
also somewhat simple. Hence, this view runs the risk of leading to an idea that 
the power of the state exists in absolute terms and that the individual should be 
sacrificed for the state, skipping over the concept of “public,” as was the case in 
pre-war Japan. It misses the level of thought that inquires into the real purpose of 
the organ that is the government. The concept that the individual makes a sacrifice 
for the government can only be described as getting one’s priorities the wrong way 
around.
 For example, if one loyally intends to fulfill the tax burden corresponding to 
one’s income (i.e., progressive tax), then it is essential to supplement one’s income. 
As a cost arises here, a system needs to be built whereby the government can accu-
rately ascertain income in order to suppress these costs. For this purpose as well, 
investigations need to be made into introducing a taxpayer numbering system or 
suchlike (Morinobu, 2010: 140–161). This is because without such a system, mis-
trust will ultimately emerge as to who is not actually properly paying their taxes, 
leading to a loss of trust toward the tax system and the government itself. However, 
not only is there concern that unilateral control of personal information is prob-
lematic, but there also seems to be resistance, which is strongly rooted among the 
people, toward the powers that be, i.e., the Japanese government, unilaterally con-
trolling such a system. In particular, the adoption of socialist policies would make 
it necessary to expand the functions of government, and such a system would be 
essential. Yet the resistance to a unilaterally controlled system in Japan is probably 
stronger on the left side of politics. Although it is not necessarily clear whether this 
is because of the “memory” of the history of the pre-war Japanese government’s 
rule, there are some reasons for the strong resistance against giving unilateral 
authority to the state power and government in Japan, where the concept of “pub-
lic” is weak. This relationship tied in with the complex emotions of the Japanese 
surrounding “government service,” “public,” and “private” seems to be the reason 
why it is difficult for the government to establish public services.
NOTES
1 To be sure, depending on the regulation, the cost of monitoring whether a regulation 
is being violated is also considered. In this sense, when looking at the total, there is no 
general rule as to which is the cheaper cost.
2 Hideaki Tanaka also writes that because the budgetary system is too strict, it has made 
it easier to perform various accounting gymnastics aimed at presenting superficial coher-
ence (Tanaka, 2013: Chapter 4).
3 In a statement relating to a particular characteristic of the Ministry of Education by 
the current bureaucrat Kihei Maekawa, he mentioned that sectionalism was clear and 
that the mainline of policy decision making was an accumulation of the needs out in 
society (Maekawa, 2002).
4 This book does not present a breakdown, but it can be viewed in the statistics’ section 
of the MEXT website.
5 To be sure, whether or not there is a clear tendency for people in a high stratum to go 
to private schools with high tuition fees would seem to differ significantly depending 
on the region, and it is not possible to make a blanket statement that this assumption is 
correct.
6 The prime example of the overseas transfer of income for tax avoidance is the exis-
tence of tax havens. According to Shiga (2013), tax havens are countries and territories 
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without decent tax systems that have tough confidentiality protection laws but are lack-
ing in legal systems, notably financial regulations. Some high-income earners and cor-
porations, while enjoying the benefits of civilized society, move their income to these 
tax havens to evade their tax burden. Considering that civil society is maintained by the 
payment of tax, it may be said that this is a serious problem.
7 This was implemented from January 2004. Spousal deductions consist of spousal 
deductions and spousal special deductions. When a spouse’s part-time work income is 
1.03 million yen or less, a spousal deduction of 0.38 million yen is applied. For the spou-
sal special deduction, there are two frameworks. The first is made applicable to incomes 
of 1.03 million yen or less: for the first 0.70 million yen, a fixed-amount deduction of 
0.38 million yen is applied, but when it is more than that, the deduction is reduced in 
amount until it becomes 0 yen once the income exceeds 1.00 million yen. The second is 
the case in which income exceeds 1.03 million yen: as in the case of the first, 0.38 million 
yen is set as the initial value, and the deductible amount then continues to be reduced 
until an income of 1.41 million yen (this is not applied after the income exceeds 1.41 
million yen). Here, the abolition of the spousal special deduction refers to the former.
8 Actual proof of this lies in asking why there was action to split off from the LDP, when 
the LDP split in 1993, why some Diet members who had split from the LDP rejoined, 
and what the intricate relationship is between this action and the level of provision of 
large-scale infrastructure (shinkansen) in certain regions. In the regions where there was 
an insufficient provision of infrastructure, there are many cases where Diet members 
stayed in the LDP, or returned to the LDP (Saito, 2010).
9 If attempts to rectify this imbalance are made in the current situation, where there 
is strong distrust concerning the pension system, by mindlessly reducing benefits paid 
to the elderly without increasing the burden on the people, distrust toward the pension 
system will probably strengthen further.
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CHAPTER 6
Post-War History of Rising Education Costs
1.   Foundation of Post-war Democratic Education System and Burden 
of Education Costs
(1)		The	Gap	between	the	Center	and	the	Local	Areas
Creating a new education system and then implementing it was an extremely 
important issue in the establishment of the post-war democratic system. In par-
ticular, a new junior high school system was established after the war, extending 
the compulsory education age until 15 years old (which had previously stood at 
12 years of age). This means that the field of work that children could enter after 
completing compulsory education was no longer limited to agriculture. There was 
also a rapidly expanding employee class centered on manufacturing. Moreover, 
changes in the industrial structure accompanying the high economic growth 
resulted in an influx into the urban areas of young people from agricultural back-
grounds. To begin with, the employee world of the cities was one that valued aca-
demic records; and as a result, this led to the rapid explosion of the rate of students 
going on to the newly established senior high schools. Takehiko Kariya called the 
society in which there was this post-war, rapid educational expansion the “mass 
education society” (Kariya, 1995; 1998).
 From the start, the Ministry of Education realized the necessity of strengthening 
the independence of education administration from the general administration in 
the area of public finance. However, in the Basic Act on Education (which came 
into effect in 1947) and the Ordinance for Enforcement of the School Education 
Act, no rules related to the public finance system were necessary in order to enforce 
the school establishment criteria that had been (somewhat loosely) prescribed. 
Later in 1949, the Act for the Establishment of the Ministry of Education was 
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established, and more or less in parallel to this, bills related to the minimum cri-
teria for the provision of educational conditions and the public finance transfer 
system for securing financial resources required to implement this were drafted 
(Yotoriyama, 2012: 36–39).
 From before the war, teacher salaries were the greatest problem in the public 
finances of the local areas. In the pre-war period, it was mainly the municipalities 
that bore the cost of teacher salaries. The differences in these public finance capa-
bilities were directly linked to the teachers’ salaries. A system that prescribed the 
National Treasury’s share of the municipal compulsory education costs, established 
in 1918, stipulated that the government bore a portion of the teacher salaries. This 
indicates that there was an intention to eliminate this problem. In reality, however, 
under the public finance of education, there was practically no function for pro-
moting equal opportunity (Ibuka, 2004; Kariya, 2009). After the war, it was no 
longer tolerable to neglect this problem (due to the championing of the ideals of 
democracy and equality). However, establishing the new junior high school sys-
tem caused a difficult situation for the issue of public financing of education.
 The former Kokumin-gakko system (ordinary [jinjo] elementary schools) and 
the former middle schools, girls’ middle schools, and secondary technical school 
organizations became parent organizations for the new elementary school and 
senior high school systems, respectively. However, there was no school system 
that was a predecessor to the new junior high school system. Nevertheless, it was 
compulsory education. Therefore, priority had to be given over everything else to 
the establishment and provision of the new junior high schools. However, in real-
ity, this was not easily realized, and there were examples of making do with class-
rooms in elementary schools and setups in corridors, and sometimes, of temples 
and private residences being borrowed. Notwithstanding, there still appeared to 
have been insufficient funds on the books of expenditure to create the facilities 
for the new junior high school system.1 For example, in the plenary session of the 
House of Representatives on April 26, 1949, Nobuemon Oka (LDP) stated the 
following: 
As you know, our country has thrown away shield and sword and announced 
to the world that we are a state that is peaceful and cultured. I think we all agree 
that the foundation of this new culture lies in education. However, when I com-
pare the percentage share of the total budget of the post-war state allocated to 
education, I see the pathetic figures of 1.8% in the fiscal year 1946, 4% in the 
fiscal year 1947, 6.3% in the fiscal year 1948, and 5.1% in the fiscal year 1949.
 Then, when I look at the ratio of expenditure on the 6 : 3 System construction 
government subsidy and the public works expenditure, which at the moment 
are problematic, in the initial year, 1947, it was 4.7%, and it was 10.2% in 
1948. However, even though there were unavoidable circumstances, it is still 
utterly deplorable that the construction budget is nil for 1949, the completion 
year.  (“Diet Record” Plenary session of House of Representatives 5–22.)
 According to the result of the “Survey on Local Educational Expenditures” 
conducted in 1950, about 80% of educational costs were used for compulsory 
education. Moreover, 11% of financial resources were donations from parents or 
guardians in the form of “6 : 3 System contributions” and “PTA contributions,” 
whereby the ratios for kindergartens and senior high schools were particularly 
high.2 Kokichi Kakuta of the then Liberal Party (the ruling party) raised the fol-
lowing issue on February 6, 1951, in the plenary session of the budget committee:
The 6 : 3 System is considered as some kind of donation, donation is somehow 
associated with the PTA, and in the current 6 : 3 System, things are being cov-
ered by donation. This mindset still resides in farming villages. Moreover, we are 
developing and being brought up by the PTA, and even hold such feelings. The 
public finance of the local areas is in extreme trouble. Although there are equal-
ization grants, rather than allocating these to education, they go immediately to 
civil works, and when there is a disaster, they go toward that. We even feel that 
the PTA in farming villages has been developed and fostered through the dona-
tion culture. That is the current situation.
 I read in the newspaper that according to a survey by the Ministry of 
Education—assuming this is right—according to a survey of a selection of 16 
prefectures, 72% of the education budget at elementary schools is covered by 
the PTA and other contributions. In the junior high schools, 66% is covered 
by contributions, which, according to the newspaper, is also a survey by the 
Ministry of Education. 
 (“Diet Record” House of Representatives’ Budget Committee 10–8)
 According to Kyoko Tokuhisa, in the immediate aftermath of the war, through 
the intention of self-examination regarding the war and the establishment of the 
cultured state, the schema of an ideologically opposed left and right had not yet 
formed. (This later became entrenched following the post-war period of high eco-
nomic growth.) Thus, issues concerning the establishment of the new education 
system were to a degree commonly shared regardless of political position. In partic-
ular, after self-examination regarding the war, the Ministry of Education strongly 
advocated education’s independence from the general administration and neutral-
ity of education. However, this did not match the policies of the Civil Information 
and Education Section (CIE) inside the General Headquarters (GHQ); and the 
MOF which controlled public finance, was also in opposition. Moreover, the pre-
war system prescribing the National Treasury’s share of expenses for compulsory 
education was abolished and replaced with the Local Public Finance Equalization 
Distribution System. Because the supplementation measures were insufficient, 
local public finance noticeably deteriorated and it was no longer possible to secure 
education budgets. The Local Autonomy Agency, aiming for total administration, 
supported the Local Public Finance Equalization Distribution System;3 and the 
MOF was in opposition to a system prescribing the National Treasury’s share of 
expenses for compulsory education, which had the very real potential to hinder 
the equalization of public finance. However, because of the strong demands from 
public opinion, the system prescribing the National Treasury’s share of expenses 
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became essential to maintaining compulsory education and the 6 : 3 System 
required for democratic education. The then Liberal Party therefore changed its 
attitude to also supporting it.
 In this process, although the policies of GHQ’s control over Japan were ini-
tially focused on establishing democracy, due to the presence of the threat from 
the Soviet Union and the infiltration of socialist/communist ideologies as well as 
the teachers’ unions embracing this ideology and union movements becoming 
gradually radicalized, the focus of control was turning to political stabilization. 
An undeniable effect of this was that the policies of neutrality and independence 
in educational policy consequently weakened, and there was no longer talk of 
removing interrelationships with other policy from the public finance of educa-
tion, which became more susceptible to the influence of other budgets (Tokuhisa, 
2008: 286–292).
 Concerning the system prescribing the National Treasury’s share of expenses for 
compulsory education, the expenditure for compulsory education was separated 
from the Local Public Finance Equalization Contribution that had been imple-
mented before that, and the guaranteed minimum compulsory education expen-
diture was written down in law. From this, the local burden ratio was estimated 
and the resulting difference was intended to be entirely borne by the National 
Treasury. The compulsory education expenditure occupies a large percentage of 
local public finance, and the purpose was to stabilize local public finance that 
was made independent from contributions, thereby further clarifying the fiscal 
responsibilities for compulsory education of the country.4
 For the local government agencies, their spirit of local government and decen-
tralization of power would retaliate strongly if the autonomy of the local public 
finance were lost by a so-called strings-attached public finance of only the National 
Treasury’s contribution to compulsory education. Furthermore, concerning the 
scope of the National Treasury’s share of the expenses, the Ministry of Education 
intended to include teacher salary expenditure, school maintenance expendi-
ture, and facility expenditure. However the MOF and the Local Public Finance 
Committee were inflexible in their assertion that they would not recognize any-
thing other than educational personnel salary expenditure, and the then ruling 
party, the Liberal Party, made only the educational personnel expenditure from 
among the maintenance expenditure the National Treasury’s share of expenses. A 
compromise plan was therefore made, whereby a framework for issuing construc-
tion bonds would be secured for the facilities’ expenditure, and the interest pay-
able on those bonds would be borne by the National Treasury.5 
 However, later on, opposition by the Local Public Finance Committee and the 
MOF continued, labelling the plan as something that oppressed the local auton-
omy. In the end, on June 18, the bill was passed by the House of Representatives as 
proposed by the MOF, and the next day, it was passed by the House of Councilors. 
With this, the National Treasury’s Contribution System for Compulsory 
Education was established. In order for this bill to take effect, the Compulsory 
Education School Employees Act that made the education department pub-
lic servants into national public servants was submitted on February 19, 1953. 
However, according to the Japan Teachers’ Union side, the gradually intensifying 
clash between leftist and rightist ideologies reflected the conservative forces, such 
as the Liberal Party, placing limitations on political activities by teachers. On the 
other hand, the conservative forces thought that the Japan Teachers Union held 
overwhelming power at the time and that a biased education that favored socialist 
ideologies was being taught. The opposition parties and the Japan Teachers Union 
expressed strong opposition to the central control of education by the govern-
ment. Even among the Liberal Party, cautious opinions were expressed, and delib-
eration was left unfinished over what is referred to as the “Bakayaro Dissolution.” 
 Moreover, it was clear that if the system for the National Treasury’s share of 
expenses for compulsory education had been put into effect as it was, the gov-
ernment’s public finance would have been inadequate. Hence, a “Special Bill on 
Compulsory Education Expenditure” was also submitted to cut out the National 
Treasury’s contribution to wealthy municipalities, such as Tokyo, Osaka, and 
Kanagawa. However, this bill was also met with strong opposition and rejected. As 
a consequence of the passing of a budget amendment bill established in 1954, the 
following year, the National Treasury’s share of the expense of compulsory educa-
tion was distributed to these wealthy municipalities; and for the time being, this 
system for the National Treasury’s share of expenses was settled.6 
 In the United States and other countries, teachers’ salaries were calculated as the 
cost incurred for one student, on which basis the deployment of teachers was con-
sequently decided. Kariya (2009) gave this the makeshift name of the “per-head 
world.” Based on the per-head concept, if 40 students in one class are taught for 
3 hours in one day, this is calculated as 120 person hours taught. This is regarded 
as equivalent to 30 students in one class being taught for 4 hours. Moreover, if 
we make the share of one teacher 120 student hours for 1 day, the desired lesson 
time for 30 students in one class would be calculated as 4 hours. Therefore, based 
on this per-head concept, the number of teachers is calculated from the number 
of students at a school; and based on this, the school grades are compiled and 
the class teachers assigned. Moreover, based on the per-head concept, the teachers 
can meet the requirements of the individualized curriculum and teaching method. 
Such were the assumptions of this system.
 Japan, on the other hand, adopted an extremely special method: first the maxi-
mum students in a grade are established; from this, the number of classes is derived; 
and then, the number of teachers is divided up into the classes. Kariya called this 
the “standard law 7 world.” Under this system (which for the policy makers was 
an unavoidable choice, considering the tough fiscal situation at that time), the 
instruction by teachers and the unit of education can be thought of not as students 
but as classes. Moreover, ultimately, this largely contributed to the establishment 
of the concept of providing a common education with a national standardization 
of class size (representing equality of education).
 In addition, the first baby boomers were of school age; but later on, the number 
of children would sharply decrease. Initially, it was not uncommon to have classes 
of 50 students or thereabouts. When this baby boomer generation passed, the plan 
of the system was not to dismiss the teachers; instead, the plan was to ultimately 
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reduce the number of students per class and achieve improvement in the educa-
tional environment in terms of class size.8 If Japan had stuck to the per-head con-
cept, then a decrease in the number of teachers would probably have accompanied 
the decrease in the number of students (Kariya, 2009). However, by not doing 
so and maintaining the “standard law world” instead, Japan did not have to later 
settle with a low global ranking for public education expenditure for the primary 
and secondary levels.
(2)		Tuition	Fee	Rises	Directly	after	the	War
Given these conditions, after the war, the public finances were strained. The news-
paper reported that the Ministry of Education had a policy of increasing tuition 
fees at government controlled schools by 2–3 times (and also increasing the tuition 
at private schools by 5 times to match this) from April 1948, soon after Japan’s 
defeat.9 Finally, at the end of May, the Ministry of Education announced a report 
that the tuition fees of national universities, higher schools and colleges, and 
junior high schools would be raised by 3 times.10 The operation of private uni-
versities at that time had to be covered entirely by tuition fees, and the difference 
between public and private universities was extremely large. In particular, those 
universities with science and engineering faculties, such as Nihon University, 
Waseda University, and Keio University, were in a state of “management hard-
ship.” Compared with the total budget of Waseda, which included 10,000 stu-
dents, the total budget of Nagoya University, which had the lowest budget of the 
national universities at that time, was much larger.11
 Although opposition to the raising of tuition fees did not abate, the Ministry of 
Education and the MOF put forward a proposal to further double the tuition fees 
of national schools. It was reported that this would raise the new- and old-system 
national universities to 3,600 yen, the old-system higher schools and colleges as 
well as preparatory university courses to 2,400 yen, the new-system senior high 
schools to 1,200 yen, and the private universities to about 10,000 yen.12 During 
the period of reconstruction when there was no public finance base, as already 
mentioned, compulsory education had been extended by 3 years. Hence, in edu-
cation policy, the highest priority issue was the provision of new-system junior 
high schools. This meant that there was practically no available public finance to 
be put into higher education.
 These sharp increases in university tuition fees were naturally regarded as 
a problem among the new generational mindset of the time that was seeking 
democratization of education. Regarding the scholarships,13 also referred to as the 
Japan Scholarship Foundation scholarships, there was an opinion from among the 
conservatives that this was a benefit system, not a lending system.14 However, the 
Ministry of Education, rather than describing these as borrowings, preferred to see 
them as loans for the next generation. It further expressed the opinion that loans 
were appropriate because by spreading the money thinner and wider, this enabled 
more people to benefit.15 
 In 1955, Waseda, Keio, and other private universities significantly raised their 
tuition fees, and in step with this, many more private universities decided also 
to raise their own. The cost upon entrance at university, which had been 38,000 
yen for humanities and 45,000 yen for science in 1954, became as high as 45–50 
thousand yen. For example at Waseda, humanities cost 20,000–22,000 yen, sci-
ence cost 25,000–28,000 yen, and the separately charged facilities’ fee was 5,000–
8,000 yen and 8,000–11,000 yen for humanities and sciences, respectively. At 
Keio, the admission fee and the facilities’ development fee were 5,000 yen each. 
However, the former became 20,000 yen and the latter 10,000 yen, which was a 
total increase of 20 thousand yen.16 This situation attracted scathing views from 
the media, decrying the university fees as too high and printing headings such as 
“The Poor Cannot Enter,” “Suffering for Only Private University Students,” and 
“Only Rich Kids to Become Graduates.”17 On the other hand, on January 21, the 
then president of Hosei University, Marxist economist Hyoe Oouchi, presented 
a strong argument supporting the necessity of raising the tuition fees of private 
universities.18
 Because there had been a continuing rise in the tuition fees of private universi-
ties, in 1960, an estimation by the Ministry of Education showed there was a dis-
parity of about 300 thousand yen between national and private universities with 
respect to the burden over 4 years of higher education enrollment.19 Moreover, 
it was reported that the MOF had a policy of raising the tuition fees of national 
universities (which had been left untouched since 1956) from 9,000 yen to 12,000 
yen, beginning with the students entering in the fiscal year 1963.20 Early in 1963, 
the Asahi Shimbun reported an observed trend in rising prices from kindergarten 
to university, citing the rise in the cost of living for other livelihood materials and 
the wave of reform to public servant salaries. It also reported an observed upward 
trend in education costs that were difficult to perceive as anything but tuition 
fees (materials costs and extracurricular education costs).21 In the fiscal year 1964, 
because of the growing fierce opposition to fee increases amid the overall rising 
cost of living, many public higher secondary schools and national universities left 
the tuition fees as they were. Yet, on the other hand, the difficulties regarding pub-
lic finance were being pointed out.22
 Although many prefectural governments had incorporated the price rises in 
the tuition fees of national senior high schools, many prefectural governments 
postponed price rises, following the government’s lead of making no changes 
to the public fees. However, the government’s directive had no efficacy on the 
private senior high schools. In response to a question by Yoshio Domori of the 
Social Democratic Party of Japan, the Minister of Education, Hirokichi Nadao, 
responded as follows:
Although the trend of the cost of living and the like are related, I think that con-
strained circumstances are gradually emerging in the operation of each school. 
Accordingly, although I think that it is mainly the private schools at present, 
there seems to be a strong mood to raise tuition fees from the next fiscal year.
 I do not know the details, but this atmosphere appears to be present. In the 
public schools as well, we are hearing several cases of this type of mood, but we 
do not know the details. For the national schools, we would consider increasing 
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the size of the budget for school operations to respond to any shift in the situa-
tion. We have no plans that involve the raising of tuition fees. Concerning this 
problem of tuition fees, I think there has been varied discussion on the issue. 
However, the Ministry of Education has no plan to raise tuition fees within the 
category of the public fees referred to at present. When the circumstances arise 
that make it necessary to raise tuition fees, we will take the view that it will be 
unavoidable. Accordingly, it is not at all our wish to see the tuition fees of private 
schools rise. However, when it is unavoidable in order to run the school, there is 
little that can be done except accept it with a reluctant heart. 
(“Diet Record” House of Representatives’ Budget Committee 46–3, 
January 30, 1964.)
 With this answer, Hirokichi Nadao gave tacit acknowledgement that there 
would be a rise in private school tuition fees, which had been rising on par with the 
soaring cost of living in society.
 Education commentator Keiichi Shigematsu,23 points to the following con-
nection at the time between the hard-pressed education costs and examination 
competition.24 Basically, because education costs are fees decided with respect to 
other living costs, no matter what kind of household setting, there is not a large 
difference in the amounts to be paid. Moreover, when looking at the breakdown, 
it is not the rise in the expense of the direct payment to schools, but rather the rise 
in the expenses not paid directly to schools, such as reference books and extracur-
ricular education costs, that is by far the larger of the two. This is because there are 
disparities among the schools, and as part of the excessive competition to get into 
the prestigious schools, efforts are directed toward preparation for these entrance 
examinations. If this situation is left as it is, a clear relationship emerges between 
the family’s capacity to pay and academic capability, and it becomes a threat to the 
basis of the modern school system. Moreover, the problem is that it leads to the 
prevalent situation in Japan of a warped sense of responsibility toward education, 
based on the notion that it costs money and it is the duty of parents to pay for it. 
In particular, the level of post-retirement social security in Japan is meager, and 
the transferal of property and goodwill to fulfil any sense of duty of supporting a 
child is also doubtful. Many salaried workers consider that a “school record” is all 
that parents can pass on to their children. In other words, this ordinary citizen’s 
investment in education is a way of replacing the dim expectations of an insecure 
old age. It is worth noting that the issue of the large private share of burden directly 
linked to education and that of the weakness of Japan’s social security system, 
which are issues relevant even today, have been a topic of discussion since as early 
as the mid-1960s. 
 From the above, we can understand that the public finance base of Japan’s gov-
ernment has been extremely weak since directly after the war. Because the educa-
tion budgetary priority was to put funds into elementary and secondary education, 
ultimately the budget allocation for higher education became extremely small, 
which is a situation directly relevant to the present.
2.   Education Costs from the High Economic Growth Period to the Stable 
Economic Growth Period
(1)		Student	Movements	and	the	Rise	in	School	Costs
When one searches for articles related to “school costs,” “education costs,” and 
“tuition fees” in the post-war newspapers, several peaks are apparent. The first 
peak is around 1953. This was the time in which there was an overwhelmingly 
large number of articles related to the establishment of the system for the National 
Treasury’s share of expense for compulsory education. Later, from about 1960, one 
can see articles here and there concerning the protest movement in opposition to 
rises in tuition fees at universities.
 Although there are probably a wide range of views concerning the movement 
by the All-Campus Joint Struggle Committee (in Japanese, Zenkyoto), as will be 
mentioned later, one of its bases of was Nihon University. As this is the largest uni-
versity in Japan, it contributed a great deal to the mass popularization of universi-
ties in the country. On the other hand, its lack of study environments, its tuition 
fees being out of kilter with such insufficiency, and the non-transparent nature of 
university management caused discontent. This discontent was undoubtedly one 
of the main reasons for the student movement. Performing a search in the Asahi 
Shimbun Article Search Engine “Kikuzo,” there is a peak of articles related to pro-
test movements (or conflicts) concerning the rise in tuition fees (i.e., school costs) 
in 1972, which was the end of the 1970 campaign against the Japan-U.S. Security 
Treaty.
 The notable period of the movement in which the tuition fees of the private 
universities were significantly raised was from around the end of 1964. Then, in 
1965, a movement in protest against fee rises at Keio University broke out.25 This 
movement turned into a boycott on lectures. However, these protests against fee 
rises were not limited to Keio. The actual operations of private universities were 
really struggling, the bulk of which was running on tuition fees alone. However, 
many of the private universities were arduously continuing to operate by accom-
modating an over-capacity of students of 170%, and the education environment 
at private universities was deteriorating. Moreover, the salaries of the teachers at 
private universities at that time were low. As a result of operating at overcapacity, 
situations occurred in which, for example, it would not be possible to perform an 
experiment, or there would not be enough seats for all students when there was full 
attendance.26
 Later, this movement in protest against rising school costs continued at Takasaki 
City University of Economics, Senshu University, and in the following year, at 
Waseda University. Looming in the background of the rise in tuition fees at private 
universities was a big problem with personnel costs, which had had to be raised 
to meet an increase in the base salary of teachers at the rival national universities. 
Moreover, it was also a problem that the government did not contribute practi-
cally anything to the operation of private universities. On the other hand, while 
it was true that university management was experiencing hardship, there was still 
a continuing rush to increase facilities for universities, faculties, and departments 
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by making large investments. The lack of transparency related to university man-
agement caused suspicions about what it was actually doing, and this mistrust has 
been pointed out as a large reason why the movement occurred.27
 In the end, the budget bill of the fiscal year 1967 left tuition fees for national 
universities as they were. However, the MOF, thinking that one of the reasons 
for the increasing protests and riots against the rise in tuition fees at private uni-
versities was the disparity in tuition fees between private and national universi-
ties, formulated a policy to definitely raise the tuition fees of national and other 
public universities in the fiscal year of 1968.28 In that year, the conflict at Meiji 
University intensified. The Head of the Economics Department in the Faculty of 
Economics and Political Science committed suicide and students were arrested 
en masse. Meanwhile, at Chuo University, the respective policies of the Board of 
Trustees and Faculty Council vis-à-vis what action to take in response to a student 
barricade were opposed to each other, but to avoid bringing in the riot police, 
the policy of raising tuition fees in the fiscal year 1969 was abandoned. This was 
scathingly criticized by other private universities as sending the wrong message, 
namely, that if the students mobilized a strong movement, the decision to raise 
tuition fees may be retracted.29 Concerning the incident at Chuo University, it was 
pointed out that the increase was very large, and students took advantage of the 
weak grounds for such an increase.30
 As mentioned before, the point that the university operation was in a slump is 
a well-known factor concerning the conflict at Nihon University. The obfuscated 
accounting of the Board of Trustees at the time was also one of the causes of this 
incident. On November 10, 1968, a parents’ association meeting was held at a 
lecture hall at Nihon University in which all of the serving members of the board 
resigned, and a resolution was passed claiming that the Chairman had committed 
a breach of trust and embezzlement.31 With this succession of conflicts, many pri-
vate universities decided against raising tuition fees for the following year.32
 The student movement by the university students peaked from 1969 to 1970. 
The private universities (excluding the fine arts universities) also thought that the 
disparity in tuition fees compared to the national universities had widened to such 
a degree that it was not possible to raise tuition fees any further, and consequently 
fees hit the ceiling in 1970.33
(2)		Introduction	of	Beneficiary-Pays	Principle		
and	Increase	of	National	University	Tuition	Fees
In the period up until the 1970s, the provision of the compulsory stage of educa-
tion had, to a certain degree, settled down. During the high economic growth 
period, due to the high enthusiasm for academic advancement among the genera-
tion referred to as the first baby boomers, senior high schools were newly estab-
lished throughout the country. However, when the first baby boomer generation 
graduated from senior high school, there were naturally fewer students than there 
was capacity. Hence, even if no new senior high schools were established, it was 
still possible for many of the junior high school graduates to enter senior high 
school.34 This meant that, finally, there was room to shift the gaze a little from the 
concerns of compulsory education and senior high school education. Moreover, it 
was not denied that the weak higher education environment was one of the causes 
of the campus riots. In the mid-1960s, it finally became possible for higher educa-
tion to receive more attention in the public finance of education (Ichikawa, 2000: 
9).
 According to a report by the Central Council for Education made in June 
1971, commonly referred to as the “46 Report,” everyone had signed off to “Third 
Education Reform,” upon which they had focused considerable attention.35 The 
major points of this included: 1) trialing education system reform such as the 4:4:4 
system; 2) enhancement of preschool education; 3) reform of teacher training and 
improvement in teacher compensation treatment, such as the establishment of a 
graduate school of education for existing teachers; 4) diversification and provision 
of higher education; 5) reform of administration and operation of universities; 
and 6) conversion to private school policies.
 The conversion to private school policies of 6) was tied in with a system of pro-
viding subsidies to private schools. It was based on the assumption that it was 
going to be difficult for private universities to raise tuition fees any higher than 
their current level. Hence, even if the government were to assist the private uni-
versities, there was no room in the public finance to provide the assistance needed 
to bring the private university tuition fees to the level of the national university. 
Hence, from the second half of 1970 onward, the Ministry of Education and 
the LDP began attempting to raise the tuition fees of national universities. Their 
grounds for doing so were that there was a poor balance compared with other pub-
lic contributions, and that the tuition fees of national universities were unreason-
ably low in price.
 In 1965, deficit-covering government bonds were issued. These were explained 
as being necessary for the rationalization of expenditures, particularly in the MOF. 
Among this flow of events, a “beneficiary-pays” principle was put forward at a 
Fiscal System Council Interim Report in 1965. The crux of this report was that 
amid a fiscal crisis, it was selfish to receive only benefit while the tax burden was 
low. Therefore, if benefit was to be obtained, a suitable share of the burden was 
necessary. This share of the burden should be held by the people who become the 
beneficiaries. Of course, education is one investment. The recipients of the return 
of this investment were both the individual and society. Nevertheless, the level of 
tuition fees of national universities that were “unreasonably low” were leaving no 
room to support private universities. However, the private universities could not 
be left in their current state. The situation here can be interpreted as a negotia-
tion involving two sides: one advocating the merits for education of “subsidies to 
private schools,” and the other side emphasizing fiscal pressures to raise the tuition 
fees of national universities. The raising of tuition fees of national universities can 
be understood based on this social context (Ibuka, 2004: 349–358).
 An example of the above argument at the time can be seen in the content of 
the question by LDP member Yōhei Kōno during a House of Representatives’ 
Standing Committee on Education and the subsequent responses in February 
1972.
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I believe that the assistance to private universities is based only on a wish to 
bring them onto a level with national universities. However, looking at the 
national universities, if we take tuition fees as one example, I hear debate from 
here and there questioning whether it is a little too cheap in price compared 
with social commonsense. At any rate, the recent period has been one of strong 
public opinion that social commonsense should be given more importance in 
politics. On this occasion, the need to constrain public contributions has been 
given as the reason for postponing the raising of the tuition fees of national 
universities. Although there is absolutely no need for action that will play a role 
in further raising the cost of living, we need to consider things from social com-
monsense. If we make the current level of tuition fees the base of national uni-
versities, then it will be very hard for private universities to match this base. 
This is because these tuition fees of national universities are not anywhere near 
rational. Therefore, I think it is important to see this not as a fee rise but as an 
action to change the fees to appropriate tuition fees. I therefore think that we 
cannot allow these efforts to change to appropriate and rational tuition fees to 
be considered only as a measure to constrain public contributions, as we will 
end up moving forward without properly having this conversation. On the one 
hand, in special education and the like we have an extremely modest bunch of 
people working really hard at their jobs. On the other hand, we have allowed 
these irrational tuition fees for national universities to continue to this day. This 
cannot be accepted as social commonsense. I ask the Minister what his opinion 
is regarding these points.
In response to this, the Minister for Education, Michita Sakata, replied as follows: 
This fiscal year, it is true that we will desist from raising the tuition fees of 
national universities. However, we hold a deep interest in the question of 
whether the current tuition fees of national universities are indeed appropri-
ate, and we believe we must set a little more appropriate level of tuition fees 
that will meet with the acceptance of the general public. We would like to give 
a little more consideration to the period and the method. In actual fact, we are 
already considering the matter. When considering whether these tuition fees are 
appropriate or inappropriate, it should not be a viewpoint that only considers 
simply the cost of living or simply a comparison with private schools. While 
incorporating a scholarship system for Japan’s university system and the recent 
report released on university reform,36 I would like to give careful consideration 
to appropriate tuition fees. Therefore, if a stance is taken where the cheaper the 
university fees, the better, as you have just talked about, I think even students 
will not be able to understand this kind of view. I think the issue requires com-
prehensive consideration from various aspects, and it is time for examination in 
order to form one idea on what is a suitable level of tuition fees.
 Continuing on from this, the Chief of the University Academic Bureau, 
Ministry of Education, and member of the policy committee, Matsuo Murayama, 
replied as follows:  
Since the school system was established in the Meiji period, the education sys-
tem in our country has always been a system where tuition fees are collected 
even for national schools. From this rationale, national educational facilities are 
the buildings built and run by the state, and because these buildings are being 
used, there is a view that the beneficiary should take a share of the burden in the 
form of a service fee or user fee.37 However, when it comes to discussing what 
is the appropriate amount to be collected, various debates will arise in whatever 
times we are living in, and no constant clear line has been established. It may 
be commonsense for the beneficiary to take a share of the burden, but only 
to the degree that the burden does not become excessive. Hence, the amount 
appears to have been decided naturally, as consideration has been given to both 
the education and public finance sides. Lately, tuition fees for national universi-
ties have been left alone for a considerably long period due to various circum-
stances. During this period, as the cost of living and the tuition fees of private 
universities have risen, from a commonsense point of view, there is a view that 
things should be relative to each other. There is also the view that tuition fees at 
national universities appear to be cheap.
 Moreover, when one looks globally at the various viewpoints, views toward 
the tuition fees of universities vary considerably depending on the country. 
There are countries with views that it should approach the level of paying for the 
required costs. There are also countries, including not only socialist states but 
also liberalist states, that take the stance of not charging tuition fees for national 
universities.38 
 While avoiding a detailed commentary of this argument, one can be sure 
that it was not necessarily the parents or guardians who judged the tuition fees 
of national universities to be irrational or unsuitable. “Acceptance by the general 
public” and “social commonsense,” as mentioned in the reply by the Minister of 
Education, were perhaps references to the people involved in private higher educa-
tion that competed with the national universities. For those involved in private 
universities, private universities cannot possibly hope to compete with national 
universities in terms of tuition fees, because their operation would not be possible 
if their tuition fees were at the same level as national universities. In other words, 
even if assistance were provided to private universities in the form of subsidies, it 
would be pretty much impossible for this alone to cover the disparity in tuition 
fees with national universities. As it is difficult to think of any significant differ-
ences between national and other public universities and private universities with 
respect to the public function of university in a broad sense, it does not make sense 
for only the tuition fees for private universities to be unreasonably high. In accor-
dance with the principle of the beneficiary-pays, by raising the tuition fees on the 
national university side, it will correct, if only by a little, the disparity between the 
national and other public universities and the private universities.
 The student conflicts quietened following what is referred to as the Todai (the 
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University of Tokyo) Conflict. At the end of the fiscal year 1970, although tuition 
fees were raised at small private universities, there was a movement of struggle in 
opposition to another rise in education costs by large private universities including 
Doshisha, Waseda, and Hosei Universities. Although the MOF asserted that there 
should be a rise in tuition fees at national universities on the grounds that there 
were problems regarding fiscal resources and the disparity between national and 
private universities, the Ministry of Education was afraid of a flare-up of the cam-
pus conflicts that had subsided. It therefore expressed opposition to these rises. 
The reason for the MOF’s strong request was because the disparity in tuition fees 
between national and private universities had become even more pronounced. 
The rise in tuition fees had been postponed by many private universities because 
of the conflicts, but university operations became increasingly deadlocked. 
Consequently, in 1970, private universities, including Waseda, Sophia, Aoyama 
Gakuin, Kansai, and Nanzan University, had implemented fee rises.39 Ultimately, 
at the end of 1971, there were struggles in opposition to the raising of tuition fees at 
15 universities in Tokyo. In response, the Japan Association of Private Universities 
and Colleges requested that the government provide significant National Treasury 
assistance.40
 Originally, there had been practically no difference between national uni-
versities and private universities with respect to tuition fees before the war. For 
example, around the period of the 1920s, tuition fees were first raised for national 
universities, and then Waseda and Keio Universities set their tuition fees slightly 
above the tuition fees of the national universities. Then, to equalize this differ-
ence, the national universities once again raised their fees. This cycle was repeated 
several times. Moreover, although most of the private universities followed the 
lead of Waseda and Keio Universities with respect to tuition fees, there was not 
the difference between national universities and private universities that exists 
today (Kaneko, 1987). Furthermore, many of the private universities specialized 
in humanities (or social sciences), which did not require large facility investment, 
and the smallness of resources was supplemented by a method of obtaining prof-
its from special courses and preparatory courses in addition to the core courses. 
After the war, however, the criteria for the establishment of universities were loos-
ened, and the number of private universities rapidly increased. However, many of 
the private universities established in this period had even fewer basic assets than 
those established before the war; and as there was no assistance from the National 
Treasury, these universities had to rely solely on student payments, mostly in 
the form of tuition fees. Ultimately, the expansion of higher education in Japan 
brought about a contradictory situation in which there was a tendency for people 
from wealthy backgrounds to prefer to go to the national universities that strove to 
achieve opportunity equalization, that were cheap, and that were highly competi-
tive and difficult to enter, rather than to go to the private universities with high 
tuition fees (Maruyama, 2009: 62–63).
 In a commentary in the newspaper at the time, Shogo Ichikawa wrote that 
the students going to cheap national universities were often wealthier than 
those attending private universities, and with a situation in which the rate of 
advancement to university was at about 25%, it was wrong that taxes were being 
used to pay for the full amount.41 In the end, an LDP Education System Survey 
Committee found that there was no significant difference between the social roles 
of national and other public universities and private universities, reaching the con-
clusion that it was appropriate to raise the tuition fees by 2–3 times on the grounds 
of a “shrinking disparity between national and private.”42 Later, at a joint confer-
ence including the LDP Education System Survey Committee and the Education 
Subcommittee, the conclusion was presented to agree to a rise of tuition fees at 
national universities under the condition of enhancing scholarships and expand-
ing exemptions.43
 In 1972, the LDP and the Ministry of Education agreed to raise the under-
graduate tuition fees of universities by 3 times (from 12,000 to 36,000 yen/year).44 
The Ministry of Education initially expressed concerns that there would be a reoc-
currence of campus conflicts. However, at that time, the student movements were 
abating, and as a fee rise was inevitable at some point, the decision was made to 
move while the current situation was calm. Moreover, in exchange for compro-
mising with the MOF on this occasion, the Ministry of Education was said to 
have the strategy and intention to focus on an expansion of scholarship funds and 
subsidies to the private schools presented in the report by the Central Council for 
Education, as mentioned above. Then, just as the Ministry of Education feared, 
the protest movement in opposition to university tuition fee rises spread to 86 uni-
versities as of January 18 (and barricades were set up at six universities).45 However, 
that spring, 106 private universities decided to considerably raise tuition fees, and 
differences in tuition fees by university and faculty started to become prominent.46 
As there was also a sharp rise in the price of the cost of living, in the second half 
of 1972, some of the private universities apparently began considering the intro-
duction of a sliding tuition fee system to keep fees in proportion with the cost of 
living.47 Moreover, looking at the average amounts of private university student 
payments in the fiscal year 1973, it was about 200 thousand yen for humanities, 
about 300 thousand yen for sciences (and a little more than 400 thousand yen for 
pharmacy), and more than 1 million yen for medicine and dentistry.48
 In 1973, the first oil shock occurred and sharp inflation became a social prob-
lem. In April, substantial fee rises were applied not only to universities but also to 
the educational material costs and the school lunch costs of elementary schools.49 
In response to the turmoil surrounding the fee rises, the Ministry of Education 
decided to establish a “Private School Promotion Survey Committee” and start 
an examination into the National Treasury Subsidization System for private 
universities.50
 Against this backdrop of inflation, it became unavoidable for private schools 
from kindergartens through senior high schools to considerably raise tuition fees.51 
In April 1974, consumer goods rose by 3.5% compared to the preceding month. 
Although the Economic Planning Agency explained the sky-rocketing vegetable 
and education costs in April as being due to seasonal factors, the rise in public con-
tributions continued thereafter as well.52
 More than 70% of the expenditure of private universities amounted to 
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personnel expenses. Hence, they were highly vulnerable to inflation. When an 
attempt is made to maintain the level of teachers’ salaries, either tuition fees must 
rise or the student enrolment limits must increase; the latter option, in particular, 
worsens the education environment and could cause the problem that previously 
triggered the student movements. At the end of January, 1975, it was reported that 
Waseda University’s cumulative deficit had risen to 2.8 billion yen; and even if fees 
were raised, the deficit was set to grow.53 Private universities in regional cities were 
particularly hard hit, and it was reported that by 1975 it was already becoming 
more difficult for them to attract students. Against this backdrop, tough survival 
measures such as the sale of campus land or creation of sideline businesses were the 
only option.54 Finally, when this time came, there was criticism that some univer-
sities had become leisure lands, and questions were asked as to the validity of pour-
ing any more of the taxpayer’s money into them.
 According to a theory by Suetomi, the turning point for education costs in 
Japan, when there was a dramatic increase in the share of the burden of private 
costs, was in the years 1971 and 1975. The former, 1971, was the year of the 
Central Council for Education report that clearly became the grounds for the cre-
ation of the policy to strengthen the beneficiary’s share of the burden. In the latter 
year, 1975, the Act on Subsidies for Private Schools was revised in an attempt 
to increase public contribution grants to private schools. At the same time, mea-
sures were taken to correct the discrepancy between national and private university 
tuition fees by sharply raising the tuition fees of national universities (Suetomi, 
2010: 60).55
3.   Institutionalization of the Heavy Share of Education Cost Burden
(1)		Soaring	Education	Costs	Before	and	After	the	Introduction	of	Subsidies	for	
Private	Schools
Suetomi (2010) compiled the following information from newspaper articles 
showing a change of interest concerning education costs among the general pub-
lic. The 1950s was the period when the system by which the National Treasury 
bore compulsory education costs was established. The problem of education costs 
(and particularly public education expenditure) points exclusively to this issue, 
as reflected in the number of newspaper articles. However, after that system was 
established, the articles sharply decreased in number. Replacing that issue, the issue 
of household education costs began appearing here and there. In other words, it 
was from about this period that the size of the private burden of education costs 
became an issue. Then, entering the 1970s, proposals for measures to reduce the 
largeness of the education cost burden of private schools (particularly universities), 
and measures to reduce the education cost burden, such as assistance for kinder-
gartens and tax deductions for school expenses, became prominent. In the 1980s, 
following the same trend, attention was drawn to the heavy burden of private edu-
cation costs, specifically the general education costs included in household expen-
diture outside school costs (such as cram schools). This trend continued up until 
the first half of the 1990s. Then, from the period of Japan’s economic recession 
from the second half of the 1990s, the growth of household education costs hit a 
ceiling, and since then, there have been articles that have even mentioned a slight 
decline in household education costs. However, many of these articles point to the 
economic recession as the main cause and state that the burden of the education 
costs continues to be high.
 In amongst all of this, one can see a scathing opinion, particularly concerning 
the increase in costs for higher education, which is especially notable from the 
1970s onward. On the one hand, up until that time, systems related to education 
costs were still being set up to some degree; on the other hand, the livelihood of the 
people overall had become affluent and there was greater participation in advanc-
ing to higher education. Hence, higher education was not special anymore—it 
had become ordinary. Consequently, there was a prominence of criticism that 
there may have been an overestimation concerning the public function and effect 
received from universities, and that perhaps there was a surplus of universities 
(criticism of whether or not the social function and contribution that could be 
expected from universities was really being fulfilled) (Suetomi, 2010: 167–181).
 According to the analysis of Masakazu Yano, investigation into the trend of 
the average percentage share of household expenditure used for education costs 
revealed that at about the time of the first oil shock of 1973, the percentage share 
turned around from a declining trend to an increasing trend. The percentage share 
decline before the oil shock was because incomes were increasing more than the 
rise in education costs; hence, educational costs were relatively low. However, after 
the oil shock, not only was there a slowdown in income but education costs also 
increased more than the income. The soaring education costs were not just rises 
of tuition fees for higher education. Preparatory education required to advance to 
higher education (i.e., extracurricular education such as cram schools) was becom-
ing commonly utilized. Moreover, it was also due to the fact that private schools 
were considered advantageous for advancing to the high ranked universities, and 
the lowering of the age of entrance examinations proceeded. Furthermore, stu-
dents were going to university far away from their family homes, and once these 
expenses were included, the burden on the household budget was considerable 
(Yano, 1996: 44–56).
 From around 1975, rises in the tuition fees of national universities were no 
longer an uncommon occurrence, and each rise was substantial. Private univer-
sities continued to suffer fiscally, and protest movements erupted in opposition 
to tuition fee rises. However, there was also an increase in protest movements 
opposed to tuition fee rises at national universities from that time. However, at 
the time, the aftermath of the Lockheed Scandal put the Diet in disarray, and it 
was not until the autumn of the fiscal year 1976 that the tuition fees for national 
universities rose.56 On the other hand, discontent on the private university side 
was not entirely because of the disparity in tuition fees; the distribution of devel-
opment funds was also overly biased toward the national universities. For example, 
although scholarship amounts also increased in response to the rises in tuition fees 
at national universities, there was no such response to the rises in tuition fees at 
private universities. Moreover, hiring rates were also biased toward the national 
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universities.57
 For many private universities, a system of advanced payment of tuition fees was 
adopted to prevent those who had passed admission (and later passed admission to 
a national university) from absconding to a national university. In exchange for the 
rises of tuition fees at national universities, the Act on Promotion and Subsidies to 
Private Schools was put into force, and private schools began to receive official sub-
sidies from the government. This resulted in private schools being subjected to an 
increased critical gaze from the public, and the Ministry of Education announced 
an abolition on advanced payments (in October 1975). Initially, there was a reac-
tion of opposition from universities, excluding the influential private universities 
such as Waseda and Keio; but in the end, most of the private universities complied 
with this policy.
 Although higher education began to receive a slightly greater share of the bud-
get as a result of the private school subsidy system, it was not at all sufficient. 
Education costs were growing overall, and those for primary and secondary educa-
tion alone were at a level equal to the other OECD countries. The problem was the 
budget for higher education: it was clearly at a low level internationally, and even 
though the advancement rate to higher education was about to reach 40%, there 
was no growth in the budget to reflect this. In other words, there were no signs 
of enhancement of substance to reflect the actual extent of quantitative expan-
sion.58 In a survey conducted by the Ministry of Education at the time, the house-
hold education costs for elementary and junior high school students, such as cram 
schools and educational materials, had increased by 100 thousand yen, which 
means it had doubled in the space of 5 years.59 For private junior high schools and 
senior high schools in Tokyo, the annual initial-year school costs were higher than 
500 thousand yen, and the cost of expensive private schools exceeded 1 million 
yen.60 This was about the time when arguments were raised at the Fiscal System 
Council that there ought to be a difference in tuition fees between the faculties 
of national universities. Against this backdrop, the tuition fees of private medical 
universities and medical faculties as well as dental universities and faculties rose by 
a degree that could be described as exorbitant. Management of the medical facul-
ties at private universities was unstable, and the obfuscated accounting that over-
emphasized school bonds and donations at the time of university entrance was 
regarded as problematic. Under guidance from the Ministry of Education, this was 
made impossible, and the face values of the amount of payments were considered 
to be out of reach of the ordinary household. Although the average was about 7 
million for the initial year, there was an extremely big difference depending on the 
university. However, it was claimed that these universities and faculties would be 
unable to operate stably even if that amount were paid.61
 In the spring of 1978, the tuition fees of national universities were again raised 
1.5 times (from 96,000 yen to 144,000 yen). The newspapers ran features on these 
rising education costs. The estimation for the cumulative education costs from 
kindergarten through senior high school exceeded 5 million yen. If all schools 
were public, then the estimate was 2.36 million yen. If private schooling was used 
all the way from kindergarten through university, it was 9 million yen; and even 
if public schooling was used all the way, it was still over 5 million yen. Moreover, 
as the tuition fees at universities were continuing to rise, the costs were expected 
to continue to rise in the future. Education loans became a popular offering at 
banks, and there was a gradual emergence of new prevailing opinions like “what 
parents can give you is education only” and “rather than regretting it later....”62 
In illustration of this, a son of a farming family living in a remote island went to 
a senior high school in the city on the mainland; however, the family was unable 
to send him money under these circumstances. The family thus used its savings 
and took an advance on its postal insurance to move to the city, but the money 
ran out immediately and the father was unable to find work. The father quit alco-
hol and cigarettes, returned to the island by himself to earn some money, stick-
ing to his firm commitment: “I want to give my children what I was unable to 
have myself.” Education was difficult in the remote areas, and cases such as this 
increased.63 Meanwhile in the case of both senior high schools and universities, 
there continued to be the paradoxical phenomenon that it was the children from 
comparatively affluent backgrounds that were going to the public schools. At the 
time, the average annual income of a household sending a child to the University 
of Tokyo was 5.17 million yen, the average annual income of a household sending 
a child to a national university was 3.76 million yen, for public universities it was 
3.77 million yen, and for private universities it was 5.04 million yen. As the annual 
household income at that time was 2.81 million yen, one can see that the students 
of the University of Tokyo clearly came from rather high-income families.64 The 
results of the “National Survey on the Actual Life of Citizens” by the Ministry of 
Health and Welfare pointed to glaringly obvious income classes in the education 
costs from preschool students onward.65
(2)		Increase	of	Education	Cost	Burden	on	Families	during	a	Restructuring	of	
Public	Finance
Entering the 1980s, the newspaper articles related to education costs and tuition 
fees decreased in number (however, this does not mean that tuition fee rises 
stopped occurring; it was more that they had become the norm). On the other 
hand, the argument that the parents’ share of education costs was too heavy was 
continuing. In a survey conducted at the Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, Ltd., it was 
revealed that monthly expenses of 70 thousand yen were required by a university 
student in Tokyo (a little over 100 thousand yen if boarding), and this was putting 
families with housing loans in difficult circumstances.66 In a survey conducted 
at the same time in Tokyo Metropolitan Government, including school, cram 
schools, and other extracurricular education costs, monthly education costs were 
on average 56 thousand yen, which was 20% of the household expenditure. Three 
quarters of survey respondents replied that the education cost burden was “heavy,” 
and “pitiful” circumstances were reported of parents who replied “education is the 
only asset remaining.”67 Tuition fees at national universities rose 20%, from 180 
thousand yen to 216 thousand yen in the fiscal year 1982.68
 The government at the time made overcoming the deficit financing, which had 
become ongoing, a policy issue to be tackled through measures such as introducing 
Why Has the Public Burden of Education Not Increased?172 Post-War History of Rising Education Costs 173
a general consumption tax. However there was strong opposition in response to 
this, and in 1981 a Second Provisional Commission for Administrative Reform 
was established under the Zenko Suzuki Cabinet. Administrative Reform was 
then carried out on the basis of “public finance restructuring with no extra tax.” 
 In a state of fiscal deficit, the MOF sought to reduce the subsidies to private 
schools by more than 10% in the budget of the fiscal year 1983. The MOF had 
intended to reduce the percentage of subsidies to universities that were at overca-
pacity, and senior high schools and universities with considerable improvements 
in their revenue earning status. However, the Ministry of Education and private-
school interested parties reacted in opposition to the idea on the reasoning that, 
conversely, if subsidies were reduced (because they constituted 30% of ordinary 
expenses), this would likely create pressure to raise school fees, such as admission 
fees and tuition fees. In response to this, the MOF argued that over the past several 
years, the operations of private school corporations had considerably improved, 
their asset holdings had increased, and the level of teacher salaries at private uni-
versities had risen on average by 10% more than national universities, in some 
cases even 30% to 40%.69
 In response to these reductions in subsidies to private schools, the trend of rising 
tuition fees in private universities once again took hold, and under the pretext of 
“correcting the disparity between national and private institutions,” tuition fees 
at national universities once again began rising from 1984. Tuition fees rose by 
25%, from 216 thousand yen in 1982 to 270 thousand yen in 1984; converted to 
monthly payment, they for the first time exceeded 20 thousand yen.70 Moreover, 
according to the “National Survey on Education Costs” conducted by the Ministry 
of Education, the percentage share of expenditure for junior high school home 
tutors and monthly fees for cram schools had risen, now reaching 40% of house-
hold education expenditure. However, that figure of 40% also included students 
who did not go to cram schools, and the estimated cost paid by parents of children 
actually going to cram schools was at the level of 80% of the school education 
costs.71 The reduction of subsidies to private schools also continued in 1984.
 This trend of rising school costs persisted after this time as well. However, uni-
versity student protest movements in opposition to tuition fee rises had gradually 
subsided. Then, when 1985 came around, articles declaring peace and quiet on the 
student front appeared. The voices raised in opposition to the fee rises were only at 
some universities, such as Meiji and Waseda, and all was calm on most campuses, 
with the dominant opinion among students being that “fee rises were unavoid-
able.” Against this backdrop lies the fact that many private universities introduced 
school fees that followed a sliding-scale system fixed to the cost of living. This was 
to reduce the amount of fee rise every year. Moreover, as future revisions were 
taken into account at the time of admission, the system would contribute to miti-
gating the shock of fee rises.72
 However, including the costs at university entrance, the expenses of university 
life over a 4-year period rose to as much as 8 to 9 million yen. In particular, there 
was a rising trend of a “rich lifestyle” for boarders and other students. It cost as 
much as 1.9 million yen a year for private university students staying at boarding 
houses; and even at national and other public universities the cost amounted to as 
much as 1.5 million yen. The children were living a rich lifestyle, but the parents 
were jokingly referred to as poor.73 Under such circumstances, there were opinions 
at the Provisional Council on Education Reform that the public finance of educa-
tion should be expanded, as might be expected.74 On the other hand, there were 
also articles that stated there to be a lot of wastefulness in public finance. For exam-
ple, there were cases of welfare pensions being paid to dead people, and there were 
19 universities with household income criteria for exemption from national uni-
versity tuition fees that were more lenient than the Japan Scholarship Foundation 
criteria. Moreover, the criteria for class work was mostly more lenient than those 
of the Japan Scholarship Foundation. There were even cases reported of repeaters 
being regarded as students of exemplary academic performance and receiving an 
exemption on tuition fees.75 In the second half of the 1980s, Japan was passing 
through its bubble economic period. While there was an emerging societal prob-
lem of a mammoth education cost burden, it is very interesting that there were 
articles along the lines of inquiring whether this was simply a matter of increasing 
the public burden, and which suspected there actually to be a lot of wastefulness of 
public expenditure. 
 In research by Tokyo Metropolitan Government, based on an education cost 
survey conducted in 1986, data showed that education costs per household 
exceeded 70 thousand yen. In particular, in households in which the head of the 
household was in his/her 40s, it was an extremely heavy burden on the house-
hold budget. There were even examples of 40% to 50% of household expenditure 
being spent on education costs.76 Tuition fees at national universities had risen 
19% from 1987 to becoming 300 thousand per year, and the situation of tuition 
fees and admission fees interchangeably rising was persisting. Nevertheless, the 
MOF announced from spring of 1988, when admission fees were due to rise, 
that in order to narrow the disparity of tuition fees with private universities and 
to reduce the public finance burden, it was planned that tuition fees for science 
courses would rise by about 20%. In the case of science courses, they are highly 
staff intensive, and there needs to be special treatment for practical costs. This was 
an attempt to bring cost consciousness and the beneficiary-pays principle to these 
courses. However, because it broke the general principle that had been held since 
the Meiji period that tuition fees would be the same for all faculties, and because 
it would take away opportunities for people from low-income classes in particular 
to advance to a science university course, the Ministry of Education was strongly 
opposed.77 In the end, agreement was given to raising the admission fee and the 
assessment fee (for the admission examination), and the fee rise to the tuition fees 
of the science faculties was postponed. However, the Fiscal Inquiry Council, an 
advisory organ of the MOF, officially set forth from that time to introduce faculty-
specific tuition fees at national universities.78
 The soaring tuition fees were affecting not only Japan’s households but also 
international students as well. Specifically, the yen was sharply strengthening, and 
compared with the previous fiscal year of 1987, the number of persons eligible 
for exemption of tuition fees at national universities increased by 50% to 1,500 
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persons.79 Moreover, from the fiscal year 1989, at the height of the bubble econ-
omy, tuition fees at national universities rose 12% to 336 thousand yen. Although 
there were changes in the lifestyle orientations of the students themselves, the 
housing circumstances also changed due to the impact of the bubble economy. 
In particular, the extreme inflation of accommodation costs for university stu-
dents became a problem.80 Furthermore, in order to go to private university, more 
than 2 million yen was required for the first year in the case of moving from the 
regional areas to Tokyo, and this was twice the cost that it had been 10 years earlier 
(with the average incomes of parents having but grown by 1.8 times). Nonetheless, 
this did not necessarily mean that the financial situation of private universities 
had improved. The number of universities with a deficit on the simple fiscal year 
balance sheet was 60 (out of the 96 schools in the Japan Association of Private 
Universities and Colleges), and the deficit was as much as 53 billion yen.81
(3)		Trend	of	Education	Cost	Burden	from	1990s	Onward
At the beginning of the 1990s, the Second Baby Boomer Generation was enter-
ing university. Following this, the population of 18 year olds was declining along 
with the birth rate. The bubble economy had also ended, and Japan had entered a 
period of long-term economic recession. Nevertheless, the rising trend of tuition 
and admission fees continued after this. The MOF sought to further raise tuition 
fees for the students enrolling in the fiscal year 1995 on the grounds of public 
finance difficulty and correcting the disparity of tuition fees with private universi-
ties; and in the end, fees rose by 3 thousand yen per month to an annual amount 
of 447.6 thousand yen. Specifically, at that time, the MOF was planning to raise 
science-course tuition fees (through the introduction of faculty-specific tuition 
fees), and various debates were held centered on this issue.
 The tuition fees at national universities rose to 469.2 thousand yen for students 
enrolling in the fiscal year of 1997.82 After this, a sliding system was adopted for 
the tuition fees of national universities, starting with students enrolling in the fis-
cal year of 1999. Moreover, although tuition fees were applied from university 
admission to graduation from the fiscal year 1999, tuition fees would now change 
according to the new sliding system. (As a point of comparison, the tuition fees for 
students enrolling in the fiscal year 1999 were 478.8 thousand.)
 Meanwhile, as the recession persisted over time, there were increasing cases 
of people finding it difficult to pay the school fees. In October 1998, there was 
an article stating that the rate of tuition fee payments more than 3 months in 
arrears at private junior and senior high schools had risen to 1.4%.83 In Shizuoka 
Prefecture, the tuition fees for the prefectural schools were 9 thousand yen, but 
the number of students receiving full or partial exemption rose sharply to 1,855 
persons (an increase of 479 persons from 3 years earlier). The number of students 
who left school on the grounds of economic hardship was 108 persons (an increase 
of 45 persons from 3 years before). The same trend was observed in all of the urban 
areas.84
 Although the data are limited to regional areas, the Ashikaga Bank Local 
Financing Division conducted a questionnaire targeting 1,000 men and women in 
their 20s to 50s working in companies in Tochigi Prefecture, and more than half of 
the respondents answered that the “heavy burden of education costs” was the rea-
son for the decline in birth rate. In particular, 70% of people in their 40s selected 
the “heavy burden of education costs” as the reason.85 Moreover, according to a 
1995 survey conducted by the Tokyo District of the Japan Association of Private 
Universities and Colleges targeting students studying at universities or junior col-
leges in the Greater Tokyo Area, while the amount of money needed to move from 
the regional areas to the capital and enter a private university in Tokyo exceeded 
2.1 million yen, the annual income per household was beginning to decrease for 
the first time since statistics had begun to be collected. Moreover, it was clear that 
slightly over 30% of households were making do using borrowings.86
 When the economic bubble collapsed and Japan entered a long-term recession, 
the effect gradually impacted the education budget. The National Treasury’s con-
tribution to compulsory education at that time was for the government to pay 
half of the costs. However, the bodies not receiving taxes allocated to local govern-
ments were considered a wealthy municipality and had their assistance unit price 
reduced. Meanwhile, tax revenues were declining due to the economic recession, 
and Kanagawa, Aichi, and Osaka Prefectures all became bodies receiving taxes allo-
cated to local governments, for which reason it became necessary to provide that 
portion of assistance. However, the MOF refused to recognize this. In response, 
the Ministry of Education changed the respective ordinance to make the criterion 
for becoming a wealthy body “exceeding a fiscal capability index of 1.0 during the 
past three years.” This was intended to restore consistency to the system and reduce 
the assistance to these three local governments.87
 From the second half of the 1990s, there was a succession of large bankruptcies. 
School fees were not paid, for example, because a parent’s company went bankrupt 
or they were middle- to senior-aged employees dismissed as part of restructuring. 
Applications were hence made to pay in installments or delay payment. In the end, 
the problem of an increasing number of students leaving schools emerged. As a 
result, universities began low-interest school-fee financing schemes.88 For exam-
ple, according to a 1999 survey conducted by the Japan Association of Private 
Universities and Colleges, 1.38 persons per school left a private senior high school 
for economic reasons, and 10 persons per school were still late in their payment as 
of the end of the fiscal year. Among these cases, there was one in which no contact 
was possible because the telephone had been disconnected due to the inability 
to pay for phone bills. In another case, a student tried to get a part-time job at a 
gas station to cover tuition, but it did not work out and the student had to leave 
school. Even if students had wanted to transfer to a public school, no such transfer 
system had been established, and this was also deemed to be a problem.89
 Moreover, up until this time, private universities had demanded that tuition 
fees be paid before it was announced whether the student had passed the entrance 
examination to a national university, thereby preventing students from abscond-
ing to national universities if they were subsequently offered a place there.
 However, in the economic recession, there was a growing motivation to go to the 
comparatively cheaper national university, and there was an increase in students 
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who had been accepted by national universities leaving their private universi-
ties. For a while, the paid tuition fees were not refunded. However, opinions were 
raised that it was morally questionable to take tuition fees even though no classes 
were being taken. It was therefore thought that the Ministry of Education should 
provide some guidance on the issue. The public began to take a more critical view 
toward payment to universities.90 Then, in 2003, while the Japanese economy was 
beginning to see deflationary trends, the only area in which there was a noticeable 
rising trend was that of education costs. Hence, the burden on the household bud-
get further increased.91
 These soaring education costs were occasionally mentioned in newspaper arti-
cles, but ultimately this was not treated as a “societal problem”; rather, it continued 
to be seen as inevitable, and as something that people needed to put up with. As 
will be elaborated in further detail in the next chapter, there are not many politi-
cal points of contention regarding education in the broad sense. If such issues 
arise, the focus of attention tends to be from an ideological point of view; and 
consequently, the burden of education is very rarely raised as an issue during elec-
tions. The LDP, which was for a long time the ruling party, has naturally included 
education-related items in election manifestos. However, these have often been 
more regarded as matters of principle, such as emphasis being placed on moral 
education. Problems tied with public finance, such as dispensing with fees, have 
practically never been included. On the other hand, opposition parties such as the 
Socialist Party and the Communist Party have manifestos that advocate dispensing 
with fees for senior high schools and the enhancement of scholarships. However, 
either the financial resources have not been clearly enough articulated or many 
aspects seem to have lacked a grounding in reality. Moreover, because of their posi-
tion as the opposition, they did not have the means to realize these policies.
 Considering these points, it was hugely significant that the DPJ ran on a mani-
festo that included child allowance payments and dispensing with fees for senior 
high schools in the general election of 2009, took hold of the government, and 
put these policies into practice. In particular, upon entering the 2000s, as part of 
the “nothing-is-sacred structural reform” by the Koizumi administration and sub-
sequent governments, the National Treasury contribution system for compulsory 
education was reformed. Although it was not abolished, the National Treasury’s 
share was reduced from a half to a third. As a result of these circumstances, the 
education budget was in an increasingly difficult position. Against this backdrop, 
the slogan “from public works and construction to people” was put forward, and 
in the fiscal year 2010, there was suddenly the highest growth in the education 
budget for 30 years (see Chapter 5). Of course, there may still be people who point 
out that the budget is far from international standards, even with this increase. 
However, considering the historical background, it would appear to deserve a 
more affirmative appraisal from those involved in education. For example, the fol-
lowing statement was given by a DPJ Diet member during the deliberation of the 
Diet.
We have been receiving certain praise, such as for the ongoing reform to the 
education system and for our examination of the necessary reviews concerning 
how the system should be in the next fiscal year and onward, as well as for the 
revision to the act on standard teacher numbers to realize small class sizes, the 
dispensing with tuition fees for senior high schools, and the increases made to 
the education budget for the past two years.92
Moreover, a Diet member from the LDP party, which was the opposition at that 
time, questioned the purpose of raising the consumption tax rate, asking in partic-
ular whether there was a need to position as the main use of the tax not just general 
social security and welfare but also education.
If we think about things pragmatically, this constitutes reform of tax and social 
security by the Kan Cabinet. Based on the current discussion, I get the impres-
sion that the purpose of the consumption tax will be for social security. In order 
to properly secure the education budget, I think it is important to position edu-
cation as one major objective in the argument for the consumption tax.93 
 However, looking at the current state of Japan overall, it would seem that 
appraisal of the DPJ administration has been remarkable low. This is partly 
because the manifesto was impossible to realize to begin with, but showpiece man-
ifesto policies (sometimes including contradictory policies) were added, and these 
accumulated each time there was an election, due to the excessive prioritization of 
regime change. In particular, the problem of financial resources had been pointed 
out from the start, but this was not something that could be simply explained by 
the fact that tax revenues did not grow due to economic recession alone. To begin 
with, despite passionately calling out for a reduction in wastefulness, expenditure 
had increased under the DPJ administration. Initially, attention was given to the 
review and prioritization of this government program. As the original aim for such 
review was to formulate the budget with citizen participation and secure transpar-
ency of the process, securing financial resources was not its primary target from the 
outset (Nihon Saiken  Inishiachibu, 2013: 23–24). For such reason, this method 
was initially met with applause from the people, also thanks to its novelty, but later 
encountered fierce opposition.
 The 2010 House of Councilors Election ended in defeat for the DPJ, and thus 
began the government referred to as a “twisted Diet,” in which the DPJ became 
a minority in the House of Councilors. However, the relationship between the 
election results and the actual number of votes was not at all simple. For both pro-
portional representation and single-member constituency systems, the DPJ still 
obtained more votes than the LDP at that time. In the first place, the 2009 House 
of Representatives Election was a landslide victory for the DPJ, which made it dif-
ficult for them even to maintain the same level of seats. In any case, the subsequent 
defeat of the DPJ was brought about by the electoral system. They lost votes in 
the districts of regional areas in particular, resulting in the loss of many seats—
despite winning a higher proportion of votes in urban areas, this did not lead to an 
increase in votes.
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 The biggest problem for the DPJ was that it was clear that much of their origi-
nal manifesto would encounter problems with financial resources and would 
not be realized. They persisted in pulling out more “wish-list programs,” which 
only lengthened the manifesto list. Nor did they have a solid party platform. The 
regime change became an objective in and of itself, and they were not clear about 
what must be done in this new direction for government; nor did they hold a uni-
fied opinion as a party (Nihon Saiken  Inishiachibu, 2013: 248–251, 274–275). 
As for the people themselves, there may have been many who were simply annoyed 
with the LDP’s long hold on power, voting with the awareness of bringing about a 
regime change at any cost. As will be explored further in Chapter 7, the showpiece 
policies put forward by the DPJ actually included some that cannot be said to 
have gained popular support. In particular, although the education policy was an 
important showpiece policy, the general public did not seem to accurately under-
stand it.
 The following chapters will examine how politics incorporates such voices of 
the people, or even preceding such stage, what they themselves thought about spe-
cific policy measures. 
NOTES
1 For example, this is known from questions raised by Shozaburo Araki (Chairman of 
the Teachers’ Union Central Executive Committee), speaker at the House of Councilors’ 
Committee on the Budget, on June 18, 1948, and by Toshikatsu Tanaka (Japanese 
Socialist Party) at the plenary session of the House of Councilors, on April 5, 1949. 
Note that, a little later, the morning edition of the Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo) on September 
6, 1953, reported that there were still many cases of the provision of junior high school 
facilities being dependent on the borrowed premises of elementary schools, and consid-
ered whether this might be one of the biggest focal points in the budget of the fiscal year 
of 1954 for culture and education. The Ministry of Finance’s view on building junior 
high schools was that this should proceed autonomously under the municipalities; by 
contrast, the Ministry of Education argued that this should be a national burden.
2 Page 3 of the morning edition of  Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo) May 27, 1951.
3 Public finance demand estimates were carried out for each major administered pro-
gram; moreover, for local governments for which the total amount of the finance demand 
amount exceeded public finance revenues, the insufficient amount was distributed to 
the local government from the national government’s General Account. However, as 
there were no limitations on the purpose, in local areas with public finance struggles, 
there was absolutely no guarantee that this money would be allocated to educational 
expenditure (Tokuhisa, 2008: 228).
4 Page 1 of the morning edition of  Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo), December 23, 1951.
5 Page 1 of the evening edition of  Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo), April 3, 1952.
6 Page 1 of the evening edition of  Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo), February 4, 1954.
7 The common name is “compulsory education standard law,” while the formal name 
is the “law regarding standards for grade compilation and teacher number decisions for 
public compulsory education schools” (1958).
8 In other words, rather than putting educational necessity first, the following principle 
of appropriateness was adopted: the number of teachers decided should be the number 
deemed appropriate from both the educational perspective and the public finance per-
spective. The number of elementary school students peaked in 1958 and that of junior 
high school students in 1962. Using the rule of thumb of what level of compensation is 
possible so that the natural reduction of the number of teachers arises through the natu-
ral reduction of children, proposals of a stepped reduction in the standard number of 
people were made by the Ministry of Education to the Ministry of Finance and the local 
government agencies. This was agreed and the standard law was adopted. Such was the 
background to the law (Yotoriyama, 2012: 63).
9 Page 2 of the morning edition of  Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo), January 24, 1948. Based 
on this report, the fees for government universities would be raised from 600 yen to 
1,200 yen, government higher schools and colleges from 400 yen to 900 yen, and 
government old-system middle schools from 200 yen to 600 yen. Concerning private 
schools, humanities universities would be raised from 2,000 yen to 2,800 yen; science 
universities from 2,500 yen to 3,300 yen; senior high schools, technical colleges, and 
humanities’ university preparatory courses from 1,600 yen to 2,800 yen; science uni-
versity preparatory courses from 2,000 yen to 3,300 yen; and old-system middle schools 
from 1,200 yen to 2,000 yen. The Ministry of Finance had asserted that the tuition fees 
would increase threefold.
10 Page 1 editorial of the morning edition of  Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo), June 4, 1948. In 
the end, the national universities, higher schools and colleges, and old-system middle 
schools settled at 1,800 yen, 1,200 yen, and 600 yen, respectively. In addition, the edito-
rial expressed concerns over the students, comparatively privileged with respect to their 
academic advancement, demonstrating opposition through inappropriate means such 
as strikes. It argued that due to inflation, it was unreasonable to exempt only school 
costs, and that tuition fees equivalent to a monthly fee of 150 yen for university could 
not be considered unreasonable or expensive.
11 Page 2 of the morning edition of the  Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo), June 28, 1948.
12 Page 2 of the morning edition of the  Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo), February 28, 1949. It 
was reported also that entrance fees would double to become 600 yen for universities, 
400 yen for higher and technical colleges and preparatory courses, and 200 yen for new 
senior high schools.
13 When we refer to scholarships in the Japanese context, it does not mean benefits. 
Traditionally, the Japanese scholarship system has consisted of mostly loan systems.
14 For example, Hidetoshi Tomabechi of the Democratic Liberal Party (which 
later became the Liberal Party, and in a conservative merger in 1955 with the Japan 
Democratic Party, the Liberal Democratic Party) asserted this in the House of 
Representatives Budget Committee Second Subcommittee on June 29, 1948.
15 Reply by Toshihiro Kennoki Secretary of the Ministry of Education in response to the 
question of Hidetoshi Tomabechi in Note 12.
16 Page 3 of the evening edition of  Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo), January 12, 1955.
17 Page 2 of the evening edition of  Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo), January 16, 1955.
18 Page 5 of the morning edition of  Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo), January 21, 1955. Oouchi 
drew a comparison with the period before the war and compared the price of goods. 
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He asserted that, on the contrary, private university tuition fees were being kept com-
paratively low, and this was exacerbating the poorness of treatment concerning teacher 
compensation. On the other hand, however, he pointed out that the discontent at that 
time concerning tuition fees was a matter of disparity between national universities and 
private universities, at which they were comparatively high. This highlights the prob-
lem that the national budget was remarkably biased in favor of national universities. 
Moreover, considering that the beneficiaries of the Japan Scholarship Foundation schol-
arships were also favored in selection from among the national universities, the situation 
was pointed out as being extremely unfair.
19 Page 10 of the morning edition of  Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo), February 22, 1960.
20 Page 1 of the morning edition of the  Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo), December 14, 1962.
21 Page 4 of the morning edition of the  Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo), January 29, 1963. 
Incidentally, the textbooks for compulsory education are currently distributed for free, 
but this was not implemented directly after the war. Initially, in the fiscal year 1951, 
textbooks had been freely distributed for elementary grade-1 National Language and 
Arithmetic; however, due to public finance hardship, this was temporarily abandoned 
in the fiscal year 1953. Later, in the fiscal year 1963, the same free distribution resumed 
and gradually expanded to address the needs of all school grades. The current situation 
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CHAPTER 7
Battleground Issues on Education Costs
1.   Shifting of Education Cost Burden to Self-Responsibility
(1)		Formation	of	Mistrust	toward	the	Government
 In a democratic society, policy cannot be executed without broad support from 
the people. However, as our lifestyles grow more affluent, and when a certain level 
of living is guaranteed, the things that people wish for from government gradu-
ally diversify. Moreover, since politicians try to secure support from the ordinary 
people, they tend to advocate fiscally unfeasible policies, if not going as far as deliv-
ering the big treats. In other words, populist policies become the battleground 
issues. In actuality, offering only populist policies will not suffice. According to 
Toshimitsu Shinkawa, politicians must adopt the following kinds of strategies in 
order to avoid becoming the target of criticism from the public (Shinkawa, 2004):
1)  Limitation of agenda. Remove battleground issues that become the cause of 
criticism from the political agenda.
2)  Reformulation of battleground issues. With respect to policies that would 
cause loss, provide some kind of positive significance and develop compensa-
tory policy in place of loss-causing policy.
3)  Lower visibility. Two points: first, do not clearly show who is deciding the 
policy; second, lower the policy effect by introducing it in stages rather than 
all at once in order to disperse the minus effect.
4)  Find a scapegoat. Inflame the antipathy between groups that hold different 
interests and change where criticism is directed.
5)  Form nonpartisan agreements. Form agreements with parties outside one’s 
own political party and make it harder for criticism to be pointed only at 
one’s own party. 
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 Currently, Japan is in bad economic shape, and people’s incomes are not grow-
ing. Amid this situation, income redistribution policies, in particular, easily 
prompt an extremely large backlash from those who do not receive any benefit but 
must share in the expense of the tax burden (especially the middle class), as this is 
perceived as a one-way outpouring of money from the government (Miyamoto, 
2008: 45–46). Recently, even though the rate of people on livelihood protection 
is low, the media repeatedly cover the issue of welfare fraud, and this strengthens 
criticism toward the issue. For example, in a representative’s question addressed 
by Hirohiko Nakamura (LDP, Sunrise Party of Japan, Mushozoku no Kai) in the 
plenary session of the House of Councilors, he mentioned the following: that the 
issue of livelihood protection was an urgent one; that the number of welfare recipi-
ents was now in excess of 2 million people, the highest number on record; that the 
initial budget for the fiscal year 2012 had swollen to 3.7 trillion yen; that improper 
receipt of medical treatment aid was increasing, with particularly deplorable cases 
in Osaka City; that the city’s public finances were being crippled by livelihood 
protection; and that the poverty business was rampant.1 Although a policy of 
increasing the consumption tax was decided by the DPJ Noda administration, the 
public’s aversion to increasing taxes is still strong. Under these circumstances, poli-
ticians find it difficult to push ahead with cost incurring policies that would easily 
receive the people’s support. Although the “fiscal laxity” of wasteful public works 
of the LDP’s years of government had been criticized, the “fiscal laxity” in relation 
to education, welfare, and social security that was given comparative emphasis by 
the DPJ Government was also criticized (due to its weak packaging and explana-
tion in terms of financial resources and regulations). Moreover, this criticism, far 
from incurring a public backlash, seems to have to some degree rung a sympathetic 
chord among the people.
 As mentioned in Chapter 3, there are two models of social security, the target-
ism model, which extremely narrows down the recipient targets, and opposite to 
this, the universalism model, which attempts to provide services to all members 
of society. Japan’s livelihood protection system is a typical example of the former. 
This is a service whereby benefits are given only to the people who pass a review 
called means testing, which verifies whether they are entitled to benefits. Needless 
to say, in the targetism model, money that has been provided by the middle and 
higher income classes’ tax-burden is transferred to the lower income classes. As the 
middle and higher income classes do not derive benefit from this, they develop a 
critical view toward the lower income classes. Doubts are constantly raised as to 
whether people are really eligible for benefits and whether the means testing is 
being conducted fairly. On the other hand, free elementary education is a ben-
efit that anyone can enjoy. Specifically, people pay this burden a little at a time, 
and then children at the eligible aged can all receive the benefit. Fundamentally, 
the time arrives when all adults have received this benefit in the past. By plac-
ing such universalism at the center of policy, the suspicions directed at different 
people become weaker and it becomes possible to promote solidarity in society 
(Ide, 2012: 255–260). Of course, with universalism, its fundamental principle is 
to not select which persons receive merits, which also leads to an increased share of 
the burden for everyone. The merit of universalism, however, is that even though 
members of society must share in the burden, they do it acceptingly as they can 
receive this service without review, if necessary.
 It is obvious if one thinks about it, but the perceived tax pain is not decided 
simply by the absolute heaviness (or size) of the share of the tax burden. More 
than the actual paying of taxes, the thing that the tax payer is more concerned 
with is the receiving of some kind of benefit from paying these taxes. Hence, an 
important issue is whether the tax payer feels they are receiving these benefits. In 
fact, in northern Europe, a region known for its large tax burden, the perceived tax 
pain is not that high. But in Japan, the perceived tax pain exceeds the average of 
developed countries (Ide, 2013: 7–9). When one gives logical consideration to this 
matter, one can easily imagine how an extremely difficult situation arises.
 The strength of this perceived tax pain is because of the lack of perceived ben-
efit. Thus, the resistance to raising taxes strengthens, and there is even an increase 
in those who think that this kind of government is just taking taxes for nothing. 
In this way, people lose trust in the government (see Chapter 4). As the govern-
ment does not have sufficient financial resources, it becomes difficult to enhance 
services for the residents (and meet their demands). Accordingly, the residents take 
an increasingly critical view toward the government, and this develops a pervasive 
mood that raising taxes is outrageous. If the public finance deficit is expanded, 
it becomes unavoidable to put the scanty tax revenues into fiscal rehabilitation. 
When this happens, the taxes that are paid are mostly not returned to the residents’ 
actual livelihoods. In particular, the tax-paying middle classes call out more loudly 
to “reduce the excesses.” They direct their criticism to the recipients of services 
paid to the low income class, and this leads to the raising of misgivings about 
the fraudulent receipt of benefits and to resentment that, although they are not 
paying a share of the tax burden, they are unilaterally receiving benefits. This in 
turn strengthens calls to make review stricter, which means that, in order for the 
government to appease these voices, even more expenditure must be injected into 
paying for monitoring. These services for the residents gradually become squeezed, 
and this gives rise to an “intolerant” society that monitors each other using scanty 
resources (Ide, 2013).
(2)		Discontent	toward	Welfare	Recipients
As mentioned by Anthony Giddens, welfare-state policies have brought about 
a weakening of the oppositional axis dividing the haves and the have-nots. The 
problem is, however, that oppositional viewpoints have emerged with respect 
to procuring the funds required to execute these welfare policies. Increasingly, 
voters no longer have allegiance to a particular political party, and as this trend 
strengthens, political parties enthusiastically try to attract these swinging voters. 
The progressive tax system, which had previously attracted broad support, also 
gradually begins meeting resistance. Moreover, as the people of the New Right say, 
the bureaucratic organizations of the welfare state become inflexible and ineffi-
cient while wastefulness can be seen everywhere. As a result, the government gives 
the impression that they are out of touch with people’s needs. On the other hand, 
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despite concentrating their interest on economic variables (issues of poverty and 
affluence), the socialists have a tendency not to consider other battleground issues, 
including emotions, morality, and cultural issues. In contrast to this, the conserva-
tives endeavor to strike a common chord with people by compensating for emo-
tions, morals, and cultural issues by protecting traditions (Giddens, 1994, trans. 
2002: 100–104).
 To begin with, the welfare state was not something won by the working class 
through revolution. Nor was it introduced by the bourgeoisie to placate the work-
ing class. It was born out of necessity to deal with mass unemployment at a time 
when there were many right-wing governments throughout Europe. Moreover, it 
becomes necessary to bring together the economy and the society in times of war, 
and this also increases the function and role of the state.
 When there is an established welfare system, people looking to work will be 
actively incorporated into the labor market. In other words, the people’s indus-
triousness is manifested in the form of labor. Moreover, attempts to actively give 
these people the role of worker inside society are included inside the plan referred 
to as the welfare state. Furthermore, the welfare state was always a nation state 
embodying the wishes of the authorities to promote national solidarity. The pro-
cess of constructing a welfare system was inseparable from that of constructing 
a state. Hence, when discussing the welfare state, it is impossible to avoid the 
concept of the nation state. Moreover, the welfare program is one kind of social 
insurance, which makes it one kind of risk management. The nation state can be 
considered to be the structural origins of the welfare state. In particular, through 
the war experience, the people of a nation state share the risk of uncertainty, and 
this facilitates solidarity and group efforts (or industriousness). Hence, the past 
development of the welfare state has a history in which steady growth in emphasis 
of this industriousness cannot be ignored (Giddens, 1994, trans. 2002: 172–177).
 In Japan, among the social policy and the social welfare, there are elements that 
are historically inseparable from war-time structures (for example, Tomie, 2007). 
Putting aside these elements, let us narrow down the focus of debate to the con-
struction of the postwar welfare state system.
 It is sometimes pointed out that Japan does not have the type of social democ-
racy that is referred to when looking at northern Europe, such as the type embod-
ied by the Labour Party of the U.K. (Miyamoto, 2008: 90–94). Actually, the 
debate surrounding welfare policy in Japan has not been characterized by ideologi-
cally opposed positions (for example, the existence of the option of whether or not 
the state has responsibility for welfare). Instead, real ideological opposition has 
been limited to discussions about defense, diplomacy, and historical recognition, 
and a stronger motivation for the LDP has been to use welfare policy (not entirely 
successfully) as a policy to appease the left and win the hearts of the masses. On the 
left, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) of 
course took the ideological stance of placing importance on welfare. Accordingly, 
in Japan, there have practically been no political parties outspokenly opposing or 
calling for the reduction of welfare policies. In particular, from the 1960s, there 
were resident movements concerning pollution problems and a corresponding 
strengthening of citizen awareness. This steadily gave rise to reformist local gov-
ernments, particularly in urban areas. The spectacle of a reformist political party 
gathering support from the masses by implementing so-called welfare policies was 
a threat to the LDP (Shinkawa, 2005: 73–84; Takegawa, 2007: 123–125). Against 
this backdrop and that of unprecedented high economic growth, the history of 
postwar Japan was defined by a dramatic improvement in people’s living standards 
and the blurring of any ostensible differences in social stratification (classes).
 However, even if they were considered to be insufficient, expansion of the wel-
fare measures naturally led to an increase in government expenditure. The issuance 
of Japan’s long-term government bonds in the postwar era really began to rise in 
1965. According to Masaru Mabuchi, the later increase in fiscal deficits can be 
summarized as follows. In 1965, the year following the Olympics, tax revenues 
considerably dropped due to a slowing of economic growth. As a result, when 
performing the revised budget, the decision was made to issue deficit-covering 
government bonds to cover for this shortfall in tax revenue. When following fis-
cal equilibrium, because the size of expenditure is fundamentally decided by tax 
revenues, requests that are not relevant to this are not recorded. However, this 
means that issuing deficit-covering government bonds creates the vulnerability of 
not being able to limit fiscal expenditure. The MOF, fearful that there was no way 
of applying the brakes to fiscal expenditure, set limits on the use of government 
bonds (construction government bonds). It further made sure that the govern-
ment bonds were absorbed on the market and that there was no re-issuance under-
written by the Bank of Japan. However, the target of the construction government 
bonds was ambiguously defined, and in the end, their function as a supplementa-
tion for expenditure was maintained. In other words, setting limits on the use 
of government bonds did not really serve the function of putting the brakes on 
expenditure.
 Finally, when the economy shifted from high to stable economic growth, the 
government strengthened its efforts to cover the lagging development of social 
capital by more actively directing public finance expenditure into public works. As 
large-scale development cannot be completed in a short timeframe, once a project 
had been started, long-term and constant expenses were generated. Moreover, as 
the LDP held government for a long period, we saw the emergence of the “tribe 
Diet members,” who maintained close relationships with specific interest groups; 
and they further spurred the government on a path of aggressive fiscal expenditure. 
The percentage of expenses falling under the category of “natural appropriation 
increase on a committed basis” rose, and due to the loss of fiscal elasticity, the 
public finance authorities no longer had effective mechanisms of control. This is 
referred to as fiscal rigidity. To break free from this rigidity, the MOF attempted 
such measures as adopting the unified budget principle.2 However, these measures 
did not last. As the economic conditions once again entered an upturn, the MOF’s 
sense of crisis also faded.
 Furthermore, the MOF at the time adopted a technique referred to as budget 
revival. As part of the budget revival negotiations it was carrying out with various 
ministries, it gave out funds, bit by bit, by entering them into the budget under the 
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names of various jurisdictional arms of the MOF. Consequently, the total budget-
ary amount was unchanged even after the budget revival negotiations. However, 
the MOF disclosed what funds were available for these budget revival negotiations 
in advance, thereby making the process of budget compilation more effective. 
Nevertheless, as there was room for negotiation for these disclosed fiscal resources, 
this also meant that there was room for LDP intervention in the process of budget 
compilation.
 As soon as the Kakuei Tanaka Cabinet was instated, they pursued an active fiscal 
policy under their Plan for Remodeling the Japanese Archipelago, but they gradu-
ally lost popularity due to events such as the first oil shock and the remarkable 
rise in land prices. Meanwhile, the reformist parties such as the Japan Socialist 
Party and the Japanese Communist Party continued to build their popular-
ity in the urban areas. And the route of aggressive fiscal spending was, for the 
most part, transferred from public works to social welfare without much change. 
Compounding this issue, Tanaka pushed through 2 trillion yen in tax reductions 
in the 1974 budget in an attempt to gain more popularity with the people. The 
fiscal debt became decisive, and this was the basis for fiscal curtailment and a 
course of fiscal rehabilitation without increasing taxes starting from the late 1970s 
(Mabuchi, 1994).
 In a public opinion poll by Jiji Press in 1982, there was a growing interest in 
public finance among the people, and support for “fiscal rehabilitation without 
increasing taxes” had increased. When asked how to address the revenue short-
fall, 37.1% supported spending cuts, while only 2.5% advocated a tax increase. 
Putting the supporters of increasing taxes together with those advocating both 
temporary expenditure cuts and the issuance of debt-covering government bonds, 
they made up 14.7%, while the percentage of respondents resolutely opposed to 
increased taxes was as high as 52.9%. Among the respondents, there were 51.1% 
that, while advocating reductions in expenditure for the defense budget and 
Official Development Assistance (ODA), which the government had removed 
from the ceiling, thought that the government should maintain social security 
and the education expenditure to which it had applied the ceiling (Kato, 1997: 
154). In other words, the people did not want any new burdens. As social security 
was insufficient and education costs were soaring, however, there seemed to be an 
assertion that social security and education could be covered if the funds were redi-
rected from the defense budget or the ODA.
 As mentioned in Chapter 5, Japan’s public finance and its policy emphasis on 
public works cannot be discussed without mentioning fiscal investment and loans. 
While keeping the tax burden low, the government promoted a fiscal policy of 
consumer spending and savings, making these savings the resource for public 
works’ investment. These means were used not only to advance the maintenance 
of social capital but also to maintain a constant level of progress in local area devel-
opment. The striking disparities that had once existed between regions were no 
longer as big an issue. Of course, the relative economic disparities still remained. 
Considering that even food was a problem directly after the war, however, in only 
a few decades, everyone owned the basic lineup of electrical appliances and led an 
ordinary life, and one could feel a real sense of economic affluence. On the other 
hand, people were derided as economic animals, and death by overwork was a 
common societal problem. Lifestyles that gave priority to work (or the company) 
became established as matter of fact among Japanese.
 There were undeniably positive aspects that were brought about (such as 
improvement of the standard of living, economic development, and so forth). 
However, as mentioned in Chapter 1 the problems of differences emerging in 
Japanese society, which had propensities for homogenous and group behavior, and 
expectations of the same remunerative treatment were not related to “inequality 
of opportunity” but rather to “individual effort” and “personal drive.” Therefore, 
the problem of inequality of traditional social hierarchy and classes was removed 
from society. Also removed was the consciousness that the existence of economic 
disparity was unfair. This even led people to propose that it was necessary to have 
new analytical frameworks and problem establishment concerning inequality 
in an “affluent” society (Hara and Seiyama, 1999). Social stratification theories 
now have wide circulation. But as seen with the bashing of livelihood protection 
and similar concerns, while society reaches out to the socially vulnerable with one 
hand, there is also a welling up in society of discourse advocating that it is up to 
each person to look after themselves; that such persons are lazy or selfish; or that 
what comes to them is what they have brought upon themselves. For the middle 
class who carry the tax burden, their lifestyles are not necessarily pleasant, and 
their discontent is directed at the vulnerable who are the welfare recipients.
(3)		Expectations	of	Individual	Burdens	by	Parents
As has been seen in Chapter 6, the private burden of education costs rapidly 
increased in Japan. While the grievances over the pain of such burden were often 
heard, rarely would this lead to calls for a social solution to be provided. Outside 
the arena of theories, the reality for the parents is that the burden of education 
costs is a natural matter of course, and the scale and awareness of “it is the parents’ 
responsibility” has been deeply established (Suetomi, 2010: 106–107).
 This has actually been backed up by research. According to Kazuhisa Furuta,3 
relatively speaking, it is common in Japan for people to think that parents would 
naturally be expected to bear the cost of education (with more than 60% of respon-
dents thinking it natural to pay the full amount). Careful examination of this 
mindset vis-à-vis the burden of education costs shows that the wealthy class, who 
believe in impartially providing opportunities to enter university, have a strong 
tendency to think that it is natural to bear the full costs. However, for society as a 
whole, the mindset concerning this education cost burden does not correlate with 
specific academic histories, types of employment, or other such strata variables 
(Furuta, 2007).
 The Japanese households are in the predicament of individually making do 
while giving priority to education costs. The situation may not be so bad while 
the children are small, but once entering higher education, the household burden 
suddenly increases. Understanding this situation, child-rearing households will 
naturally attempt to accumulate savings. However, the time when it is perhaps 
Why Has the Public Burden of Education Not Increased?192 Battleground Issues on Education Costs 193
feasible to save is during the period of the child’s compulsory education. Yet, as 
that is a time when the parents’ incomes are inadequate, there is a limit to the 
amounts that can be saved. Moreover, in recent years, the Japanese employment 
system has broken down, and it is no longer possible to expect income to rise 
with age. Under these circumstances, it is obvious that the birth rate will decrease. 
Moreover, because of the declining number of children, we see a structure of pour-
ing money even more resolutely into education costs (Yano, 1996).
 With public services, there is a benefit versus cost relationship. Concerning the 
benefit, there is the question of whether the recipient of this benefit is only the 
individual or whether the society also benefits, and based on this, whether the cost 
burden should be considered a private one or if there are grounds for receiving 
funds from tax revenues. Moreover, Yano (2013) calculated the percentage share of 
social revenue and that of fiscal revenue to show that public finance expenditure in 
universities is an efficient public investment. Nevertheless, the popularization of 
university brought into question a deeply rooted issue in ordinary Japanese society, 
namely, doubts concerning the social benefit of university education. In particular, 
according to Yano’s research, about 70% to 80% held the opinion that it should 
be the individual’s or the family’s burden. Moreover, the distribution of opinion 
showed no significant correlations with any particular social strata. In fact, post-
war higher education in Japan has relied on private schools, and this system has 
been supported by family budgets that have prioritized education. It is probably 
due to these circumstances that this mindset toward education has come to be 
considered as matter of fact. Moreover, the government has positioned university 
education very low in its order of priorities. This issue is really not about the choice 
of whether it should be the household budget or the government that bears the 
entire burden; rather, it is ultimately about establishing a realistic mindset that is 
accepting of an appropriate balance between the two (Yano, 2013).
 In Japan, where there is a low awareness of the social benefit provided by educa-
tion, only the private investment side is emphasized. If one’s view on education is 
to emphasize equal treatment of students at school, and almost oversensitively to 
make demands on the selection methods for entrance examinations, etc., such as 
that they must be based on equity, then ultimately one’s view will also regard the 
responsibility for academic performance to lie with the individual. The unsuc-
cessful person must be content with reflecting in hindsight that his or her own 
efforts were not enough, while the successful person can consider the result to be 
that of his or her efforts. What is lacking here, however, is the perspective that asks 
whether it was a fortunate learning environment (whether there were significant 
differences in the actual learning environment between people), and that acknowl-
edges that there are various social support mechanisms at play here that are not 
in plain view. It is not unnatural to think that education is deeply established in 
society and raises the people’s intellectual level, which in turn has some kind of 
overall positive effect on society. However, this is not something that can be easily 
measured, and the reality of the situation can be difficult to grasp. Consequently, 
the current situation arises in which only households burdened with education 
costs call for a reduction of the burden, while other people lose interest in the issue 
of education. This would then likely become reflected in the view (incidentally, 
one based on individualism) that under the currently difficult fiscal situation, “if 
there is such financial leeway in public expenditure to spend on education, then 
I want it diverted to my own post-retirement social security,” (Hamanaka, 2013: 
228–232).
 The remaining two chapters, including this one, focus on opinions and percep-
tions of the government, the state, and policies implemented by the government. 
Under the current system of indirect democracy, the most common method of 
realizing the policies one would wish for is the act of voting. Moreover, the bodies 
that present these policy options are the political parties. Let us look back at how 
the political parties have been involved, or not been involved, in the issue of educa-
tion costs, and how the people have reacted to these policies.
2.   Campaign Pledges and Manifestos
(1)		The	Start	of	the	Manifesto	Election
During elections, the voters cast one vote for a political party or candidate that 
is likely to implement the policies that they favor; and by doing so, they entrust 
this wish to that candidate. If the candidate wins many votes, this means that 
the people with the same opinion have the majority. Moreover, the policies that 
are implemented will be policies that have received a certain amount of support 
from society. Hence, the campaign pledges presented to the voters before the elec-
tion have considerable significance: they are the source of the relationship of trust 
between the voter and the candidate.
 In the past, however, the campaign pledges in Japan were generally aimed at 
pleasing everybody. The slogans were many, but the actual substance was weak. 
Therefore, as pointed out by Ichiro Miyake, voters in Japan did not decide indi-
vidually based on campaign pledges. Instead, it is said that voter behaviors could 
be explained by networks of special interest (depending on participation in groups 
related to specific industries, for example, or the existence of acquaintances related 
to such networks), or by conservative or reformist ideology. It is not practical for a 
voter to be informed of the issues concerning each individual policy. In particular, 
in elections where the battleground issues are difficult to see, it is sometimes neces-
sary to pay a cost to obtain the information that forms the basis for deciding whom 
to vote for. Moreover, during the Cold War era, only the differences on ideological 
standpoints were clear. Hence, when it came to the details of individual policies, 
it was probably easier to anticipate how the policy would turn out based on the 
ideology behind it. Therefore, the ideology formed the substance of the material 
provided as information on the differences between the political parties (Miyake, 
1989: 147–148).
 However, after the collapse of the Cold War system, the differences in these 
ideologies became less clear, and the power of the conventional left, in particu-
lar, weakened significantly. Nonetheless, differences of class or social strata proved 
to be insufficient as explanatory power. According to Hiroshi Hirano, argu-
ments targeting age and vocation (in a sense not directly linked to class or social 
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stratification) were variables that have an impact on voter behavior even today, but 
arguments based on income had hardly any explanatory power (Hirano, 2007: 
15–30, 85–103).
 However, the electoral system of the single-seat constituency with proportional 
representation was introduced for the House of Representatives, and this gener-
ated a real feeling of regime change. If the ideological differences were unclear, 
voters would have to decide for whom to vote by different factors not dependent 
on left-right ideology. What the DPJ presented for voters to see here was their 
“Manifesto.”
 In the U.K., which was where the manifesto originated, a “manifesto” normally 
does not contain the “numerical targets, achievement deadlines, or specific finan-
cial resources” of a specific policy, which have become the norm in recent years.
 In Japan, as a result of the introduction of the single-seat constituency system, 
the role as a delegate of the people became clearer in the sense that political par-
ties reflected the opinions of the voters. Consequently, the method of winning the 
voters’ selection by proposing concrete policies was given great importance and 
adopted. This is despite the fact that a manifesto in its place of origin, the U.K., 
refers to the ideological guidelines of a political party. In Japan, this is not what 
was considered to be a manifesto; rather, it was the concrete policy itself that came 
to be called the manifesto. Not only that, but as the political parties regarded the 
manifesto as a mandate from the voters, they became bound to the content of their 
manifesto; and when they were unable to deliver what was written in the mani-
festo, they were criticized for “breaching the manifesto.” While the ideological 
differences by political party were unclear, the political parties had to be selected 
by the single-seat constituency system. Moreover, the increasing number of unaf-
filiated voters led to the promotion of a kind of election that presupposed the 
importance of this Japanese version of the manifesto (Nakakita, 2012).4
(2)		Historical	Transitions	of	Battleground	Issues	in	Elections
To a certain degree, the battleground issues and the voters’ concerns for the elec-
tion were of course reflected in not only the Japanese version of the manifesto that 
came to function in this way but also in the conventional campaign pledges that 
the political parties had always made. However, among all of this, what kind of 
attention was given to education? With the high cost of education having been 
such a talking point up until then, surely it must have become an issue of debate 
in the election.
 According to the data of public opinion polls conducted by The Association for 
Promoting Fair Elections after the national elections from 1972 to 2000, the vari-
ous concerns raised as battleground issues of the elections from the viewpoints of 
voters were those closely connected with daily life and the economy, such as “cost 
of living and the economy,” “welfare and nursing care,” “the tax system,” and “eco-
nomic recession.” There was an impression that the issues of “cleaning up politics, 
morals, and reform” were common issues covered by the mass media; but, in fact, 
focus was only given to these issues when political turmoil or corruption scandals 
surfaced. Although the issues of “education and culture” and “agriculture” were 
stably selected, on average, the percentage given to these was a little over 10 %, ris-
ing to 20% in 2000, against a backdrop of discourses of lax education and increas-
ing brutality of juvenile crimes. However, the issue of defense and that of the 
constitution, which are strongly reflected in the ideology of the political parties, 
did not rate that highly as battleground issues in the eyes of the voters (Taniguchi, 
2005: 19–23).
 This begs the question: just what were the battleground issues in the elec-
tions? Table 7-1 shows the characterizing traits of the elections of the House of 
Representatives in the post-war era, and the issues extracted by the author from 
a list of campaign pledges and manifestos of each political party featured in the 
Asahi Shimbun. In most cases, the method adopted for compiling the campaign 
pledges was as follows. The main items such as “diplomacy,” “defense,” and “cost 
of living,” present at the time of the election, were selected; and the policies of 
each political party were organized according to these items. The battleground 
issues were considered basically to be those items that were the topics that had 
become battleground issues during the election; and these were the issues selected. 
Moreover, although the LDP, which was the ruling party, hardly ever referred to 
education in the election, education was touched on by opposition parties such as 
the JSP and the JCP. With respect to this point, the author made the slightly arbi-
trary judgment that the policies of the ruling party had a tendency to be realized, 
and that these reasonably had an impact on later policy. Therefore, when an issue 
was not largely discussed by the ruling party, it was not deemed to have been an 
active battleground issue in the election. 
 Looking at these issues, for some time after the war, there was a strong ten-
dency for the battleground issues to clearly represent those of ideological differ-
ences between the political parties related to diplomacy and defense, such as the 
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan, 
the Self-Defense Forces, and defense expenditure. However, these issues gradually 
became lower in order of priority. In particular, after the conclusion of the Cold 
War, the issues that were given higher priority were the consumption tax, public 
finance reform, the economy, and social security issues. The issues in which the 
voters shared a concern were those intricately connected to daily life, such as the 
cost of living, the economy, and the tax system. Accordingly, it was these issues 
that were actively treated as the battleground issues in most elections.
 There have been many elections where education was never raised as a battle-
ground issue. Even when battleground issues on education were raised, these were 
not necessarily given high priority. Moreover, when there were battleground issues 
on education, they were often not centered on issues of public finance, but rather 
on issues of ideology. The election for the House of Representatives in 2003 was 
a rare occasion at which the revision on the Basic Act on Education was discussed 
and the field of education was given priority as a battleground issue of the election. 
At this time, the Koizumi administration had followed a course of “nothing-is-
sacred structural reform.” The issue of the National Treasury’s share of the expense 
of compulsory education had become a topic of debate, but this debate did not 
have the image of being a broad discussion among the people (aside from people 
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Election 
Name
Date 
Held
Election Highlights Main Contested Issues 
(based on Asahi Shimbun)
Contested Issues 
on Education
32nd 
Diet
Dec. 
27, 
1969
Sato Cabinet. LDP and friendly 
independents obtained 300 seats. 
JSP lost badly. NK and JCP 
strongly improved. Trend toward 
multiple parties in cities.
Security Treaty and return of 
Okinawa, rising cost of living, tax 
reductions, rice production
Measures to calm univer-
sity conflicts
33rd 
Diet
Dec. 
10, 
1972
Tanaka Cabinet. Plan for Remodeling the Japanese 
Archipelago, constraining cost 
of living, social welfare issues 
(pension, free medical care for 
elderly, etc.)
None
34th 
Diet
Dec. 5, 
1976
Miki Cabinet. Election called due 
to expiration of term of office for 
existing members of the House 
of Representatives. Lockheed 
Scandal.
Inquiry into Lockheed, clean up 
politics, electoral system, stabilize 
cost of living, Security Treaty, 
diplomacy with China
Elimination of knowl-
edge-skewed education, 
everyone advancing to 
senior high school, assis-
tance for private schools
35th 
Diet
Oct. 7, 
1979
Ohira Cabinet “Tax Increase 
Dissolution.”
“Tax increase” including admin-
istrative reform and introduction 
of general consumption tax, 
inflation and energy policies, 
fixing political corruption, welfare 
and public burden, diplomacy 
with USSR
Enhancement of local 
national universities, 
establishment of open 
university, entrance 
examination reform such 
as universal  examination 
for university admission 
36th 
Diet
Jun. 22, 
1980
Ohira Cabinet “Accidental 
Dissolution,” Prime Minister 
Ohira dies during the period of 
election campaign. LDP recovers 
seats.
Cost of living (inflation) 
measures, welfare and the public 
burden (realization of Japanese-
style welfare society), energy poli-
cies, Security Treaty and defense, 
administrative reform, cleaning 
up politics
Limiting class sizes to 40, 
eliminating examination 
hell, providing more 
relaxed education
37th 
Diet
Dec. 
18, 
1983
Nakasone Cabinet “Tanaka 
Decision Dissolution.” Former 
PM Tanaka found guilty in 
Lockheed Scandal, LDP majority 
was broken.
Treatment of former PM Tanaka, 
increase or reduce tax?, nuclear 
disarmament, defense budget 
interlocking with 1% GNP, 
MHW plan for 80% co-payment 
for the employee’s health insur-
ance, agricultural products 
liberalization
School system reform, 
enrichment of moral edu-
cation, realization of 40 
class limits (elimination 
of violence in schools)
38th 
Diet
Jul. 6, 
1986
Nakasone Cabinet “Pretending to 
be Dead Dissolution.” LDP gain 
300 seats alone. JSP obtains less 
than 100 seats in big defeat.
Constitution, political ethics, 
administrative reform, tax reduc-
tion and introduction of large 
indirect tax, yen appreciation 
measures, diplomacy and defense, 
nuclear power, Japanese welfare 
society
Elimination of bully-
ing, criticism of societal 
emphasis on education, 
emphasis on morals and 
individuality, entrance 
examination reform, 
reduction of education 
burden by assistance to 
public schools and schol-
arship system, promoting 
class sizes of 40 (35)
39th 
Diet
Jan. 24, 
1990
Kaifu Cabinet “Consumption Tax 
Dissolution.” LDP loses to JSP 
in the 1989 House of Councilors 
election. LDP lost seats. JSP 
gained seats, but other opposition 
parties lost seats. After Recruit 
Scandal.
Selection of administration 
between liberalism and coali-
tion between JSP, NK, and 
DSP, consumption tax, political 
corruption, rice problem, military 
expansion, land measures
None
Table 7-1   Post-War House of Representative Elections and Contested Issues 
Election 
Name
Date 
Held
Election Highlights Main Contested Issues 
(based on Asahi Shimbun)
Contested Issues 
on Education
22nd 
Diet 
Apr. 10, 
1946
Final election under Empire of 
Japan Constitution. First post-
war election as universal suffrage 
election. Shidehara Cabinet.
Inflation, food, Emperor System, 
industrial reconstruction, 
unemployment measures, land 
problems
None
23rd 
Diet
Apr. 25, 
1947
Yoshida Cabinet. Multiple-seat 
constituency.
Inflation, food, state control of 
economy and industry
None
24th 
Diet
Jan. 23, 
1949
First general election under 
Constitution of Japan. Yoshida 
Cabinet “Collusion Dissolution.” 
Inflation, company reorganiza-
tion,  administrative reorganiza-
tion, industrial revival
None
25th 
Diet
Oct. 1, 
1952
Yoshida Cabinet “Surprise 
Dissolution.” Election of com-
mittee members directly after 
introduction of public election 
system for education committee.
Rice prices, rearmament, tax 
reduction, tax deduction, unem-
ployment measures, small and 
medium enterprise measures.
Support of 6-3 System, 
National Treasury’s share 
of expenses of compul-
sory education system, 
scholarship system
26th 
Diet
Apr. 19, 
1953
Yoshida Cabinet “Bakayaro 
Dissolution.”
State control of industry, rearma-
ment (National Security Force), 
strike regulation, rice price, tax 
reduction, emergency measures 
for demand economy, small and 
medium enterprise measures.
None
27th 
Diet
Feb. 27, 
1955
Hatayama Cabinet “Voice of 
Heaven Dissolution.”
Tax reduction, housing, rice 
(staple food), Self-Defense Forces, 
unemployment measures, trade 
with China/USSR
None
28th 
Diet
May 22, 
1958
Kishi Cabinet “Discussion 
Dissolution.” First general elec-
tion after Conservative Alliance. 
Post-war record for highest voter 
turnout.
Security Treaty System, Self-
Defense Forces, nuclear issue, 
diplomacy with the USSR and 
China, new economic 5-year 
plan, small and medium size 
enterprise measures, national pen-
sion, constitutional amendment
Moral education (time 
in school curriculum), 
teacher work performance 
evaluation, elimination of 
overcrowded classes.
29th 
Diet
Nov. 
20, 
1960
Ikeda Cabinet “Security Treaty 
Dissolution.” Election follow-
ing split of JSP and Democratic 
Sociality Party (DSP). Election 
following enactment of Security 
Treaty. Assassination of Inejiro 
Asanuma, Chairman of JSP just 
before the election.
Security Treaty system (estab-
lished by the time of the election), 
nuclear armament and Self-
Defense Forces, diplomacy with 
China/USSR, “Income Doubling 
Plan (economic growth),” trade 
liberalization, prevention of utili-
ties’ rates rise, tax reduction or tax 
increase to wealthy, contribution-
type national pension.
Basic Act on Education, 
moral education, teacher 
work performance 
evaluation
30th 
Diet
Nov. 
21, 
1963
Ikeda Cabinet “Mood 
Dissolution” or “Doubling 
Income Dissolution.”
Rise in consumer prices, diplo-
matic disputes such as Japan and 
Korea, and nuclear submarine 
port call. 
Free compulsory educa-
tion, making senior high 
school compulsory, 
university administra-
tive freedom from 
government.
31st 
Diet
Jan. 29, 
1967
Sato Cabinet “Black Mist 
Dissolution.” New Komeito (NK) 
obtained seats for the first time 
in a House of Representative 
election.
Cleaning up politics, diplomacy 
with China, Security Treaty, 
defense issue, issuance of govern-
ment bonds
None
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in the field of education). Moreover, needless to say, the debate that was conducted 
over the revisions to the Basic Act on Education stressed ideologically based battle-
ground issues.
 In relation to issues directly concerning the public finance of education, educa-
tion costs and tuition fees, and the establishment of the system for the National 
Treasury’s share of expenses for compulsory education, as discussed in Chapter 6, 
became battleground issues in the 25th House of Representatives election, which 
was held soon after the war. At the time, fiscal resources were insufficient, and the 
strong advice of the MOF and the Local Government Agency was to put together 
a budget based on ordinary fiscal resources. Moreover, because the establishment 
of the 6-3 System had been widely supported among the public, the conservative 
forces also found it difficult to back a proposal that would make cuts to the educa-
tion budget related to compulsory education. However, aside from the reform-
ists, the ruling LDP, even when raising the issue of education as a battleground 
issue, practically made no proposals related to mitigating the household’s burden 
of education costs. In the 1970s, the issue of providing subsidies to private schools 
was raised; however, as already explained, priority was given to the “beneficiary- 
pays principle” due to the government’s fiscal difficulties, and the tuition fees at 
national universities underwent fee rises to “appropriate prices.” These policies did 
not lead to any easing of the household’s education cost burden.
 Considering this, the 45th election of the House of Representatives deserves 
special mention because the specific policy to reduce the education cost burden 
of households became a battleground issue. The child rearing support policies of 
the DPJ centered on the child allowance marked a switch in policy from the stance 
that child rearing was a private responsibility of the parents to one emphasizing 
society’s responsibility: namely, rearing the children who later financially support 
the social security of senior citizens should be carried out under societal and pub-
lic responsibility. In particular, child allowance came as a set, together with the 
removal of income-based means testing and the abolishment of the spousal deduc-
tion system. The reason for this was to establish child allowance based on universal 
principles. A very significant element of this policy’s intention is to signify that 
child rearing is a societal responsibility. It was pointed out that the spousal deduc-
tion system had been an impediment to the economic autonomy of women, and 
it was also necessary from the viewpoint of promoting the gender equality agenda. 
By introducing the inclusion of fertility treatment in health insurance, childbirth 
payment, child allowance, dispensing of fees for senior high schools, and enhance-
ment of scholarships, balance was restored to the welfare policies that were skewed 
toward senior citizens. It was a package that provided social support for children’s 
growth and independence. From this perspective, the policy signified an impor-
tant policy shift and was therefore not simply a case of “fiscal laxity.”
 However, there were not a large number of members of parliament within the 
DPJ Government that understood the architecture of these policies, the important 
foundational principles of which were not shared among the members of parlia-
ment. Furthermore, because the budget was a strain on fiscal resources, when the 
issues of the policy were raised, attention was only given to the monetary ones. 
Election 
Name
Date 
Held
Election Highlights Main Contested Issues 
(based on Asahi Shimbun)
Contested Issues 
on Education
40th 
Diet
Jul. 18, 
1993
Miyazawa Cabinet “Lying 
Dissolution.” Boom of new 
parties following LDP split. LDP 
became opposition for the first 
time. JSP also lost many seats.
Rice deregulation problem, 
income tax reduction, consump-
tion tax
None
41st 
Diet
Oct. 20, 
1996
Hashimoto Cabinet. First election 
by single-seat constituency. LDP 
and New Frontier Party (NFP) 
were largest two political parties. 
DPJ became third largest party. 
Downturn for Social Democratic 
Party (formerly SPJ).
5% consumption tax, administra-
tive reform (ministerial reform), 
legal framework for war contin-
gencies, becoming a permanent 
member of the U.N. Security 
Council, company group contri-
butions, history recognition
None
42nd 
Diet
Jun. 25, 
2000
Mori Cabinet “Divine Nation 
Dissolution.”
Economic measures including 
public works investment, choice 
of social insurance method and 
tax method of pension
None
43rd 
Diet
Nov. 9, 
2003
Koizumi Cabinet. After the 
Liberal Party and the DPJ formed 
a coalition, a sense of two-party 
politics between the LDP and the 
DPJ. Manifestos were released.
Revision of Basic Act on 
Education, free expressways
Revision of Basic Act on 
Education
44th 
Diet
Sep. 11, 
2005
Koizumi Cabinet “Postal Business 
Dissolution.” Overwhelming vic-
tory by LDP. DPJ failed to make 
pension a contested issue.
Privatization of Japan Post, 
economic and fiscal reform, 
reduction of public servants, pen-
sion, child allowance
None
45th 
Diet
Aug. 
30, 
2009
Aso Cabinet. Big loss by LDP. 
DPJ obtains 300 seats. Change 
of Government. The number of 
early votes was a record high.
Economic measures (employ-
ment measures), pension reform, 
income compensation for 
agricultural income, abolition 
of gasoline tax, free expressway, 
medical system for late-stage 
senior citizens
Child allowance, free 
senior high school, 
improved university 
scholarship system
46th 
Diet
Dec. 
16, 
2012
Noda Cabinet. Big loss by DPJ, 
power recovered by LDP and NK. 
Second Abe Government.
Economic growth strategy, TPP, 
energy policy such as the nuclear 
issue, reconstruction, consump-
tion tax, social security, constitu-
tional amendment
Education system reform, 
emphasis on academic 
fundamentals, school text 
books, university entrance 
examinations, action 
against bullying problem
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Consequently, the opportunity to explain and consider the foundational princi-
ples of the policy was lost. The relevant ministers (Education, Culture, Sports, 
Science and Technology; Health, Labour and Welfare; Measures Against the 
Declining Birthrate; Gender Equality) were frequently changed about. Moreover, 
shortfalls and deficiencies in the overall system were pointed out, such as the illegal 
receipt of benefits from foreigners residing in Japan and parents receiving pay-
ments when they were not actually living with their children. More than anything 
else, the expectations and the demands of the people had not been high regarding 
child allowance from the beginning of the DPJ Government.5 Therefore, it was 
necessary to properly explain the foundational principles of the policy. However, 
as there were many problems inside the party, opportunities to do so were lost. 
Consequently, these initiatives by the DPJ lost the support of the public (Nihon 
Saiken  Inishiachibu, 2013: 162–180).
 In the 2009 election for the House of Representatives, when the LDP lost and 
the DPJ Government was born, there seem to have been relatively high expecta-
tions for the new government. However, the reason for the change of government 
was not based on policies. Rather, it was because the vote gathering system that 
had favored the LDP had collapsed; it was also because the voters had abandoned 
the LDP. On the other hand, as a result of the 46th election for the House of 
Representatives in late 2012, the DPJ collapsed and a new coalition government 
between the LDP and New Komeito was born. The strong element behind this, 
however, was not active support for the LDP, but instead a loss of trust in the 
DPJ from voters because of its various failed policies and inability to deliver on 
the promises contained in its “manifesto.” However, the overwhelming victory of 
the LDP can be said to have been brought about by the single-seat constituency 
system—an electoral system that produces many “dead votes.” Let us examine this 
mechanism in the next section.
(3)		Election	Results	and	Popular	Will	in	Post-war	Japan
Figure 7-1 shows the transition of the percentage of votes received by the political 
parties that had fielded candidates in the elections for the House of Representatives 
since the Conservative Alliance of 1955 (with the establishment of the LDP). Figure 
7-2 shows the actual proportion of seats obtained in the House of Representatives. 
As long as a proportional representation system was not adopted, an unevenness 
between the percentage of votes received and the actual number of seats obtained 
would continue. Until the 40th election for the House of Representatives in 1993, 
a multiple-seat constituency electoral system was in effect. Hence, strong candi-
dates, regardless of the size of their political party, gained a reasonable chance of 
being elected. Even under this situation, we can see that the LDP had been gaining 
a greater number of seats than the actual percentage of votes received.
 Figure 7-3 shows the percentage of votes received by proportional represen-
tation since the elections for the House of Representatives adopted a single-seat 
constituency proportional representation system. Figure 7-4 shows the percent-
age of the actual number of seats obtained in the elections for the House of 
Representatives under the single-seat constituency system. Under this system, 
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Figure 7-2   House of Representatives Election: Percentage of Seats 
Received (Multiple-Seat Constituency Era)
Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC)
Notes: SPJ=Social Democratic Party of Japan, DSP=Democratic Socialist Party, NK=(New) 
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even when the difference between candidates is slight, only the candidate with 
the majority of votes (even if by one vote) will be elected and the number of “dead 
votes” increases. This can result in a large disparity between the proportion of votes 
received and the proportion of seats obtained.
 To illustrate this, from the inception of the single-seat constituency system, 
based on the number of votes received, we can observe that the LDP did not even 
then have an absolute majority. For example, in the 2005 election for the House of 
Representatives, on account of the Japan Post reforms by the Koizumi administra-
tion, despite obtaining an overwhelming victory, this can be credited to the elec-
toral system. The absolute percentage of votes received did not even reach above 
40%. Moreover, in the 2012 election, when the DPJ went back into opposition 
and the LDP reclaimed government, although ultimately gaining the same per-
centage of seats as it had in 2005, in terms of the percentage of the number of votes 
received, it was below 30%, which was not so different from the number of votes 
obtained in the 2009 election that had ended with its crushing defeat. A large pro-
portion of the reduction in the number of votes received did not go to the DPJ but 
to the other political parties, such as the Japan Restoration Party and Your Party. 
Although it might be asserted that this is simply the nature of the single-seat con-
stituency system, in the interests of reflecting popular will, the reality of the large 
discrepancy between the actual votes received and the seats obtained must also be 
recognized among the voters.
 In the case of the multiple-seat constituency system, as it was difficult for drastic 
fluctuation in the number of votes received to occur, there was no change in gov-
ernment. Both the ruling party and the opposition parties had become content 
in their respective positions, allowing for a mutual tendency to neglect to deepen 
and improve the quality of debate. Moreover, as the multiple-seat constituency 
system and the proportional representation system make it difficult for a particular 
party to obtain an absolute majority, it is easy for the foundation of government to 
become unstable due to the need to form coalition governments in order to rule. 
Furthermore, under a multiple-seat constituency system, the same party is forced 
to field multiple candidates. As this causes competition that is different in nature 
from that caused by differences in policy, it has been pointed out that this could 
lead to improper behavior or corruption.
 However, it is often possible to predict the overall level of electoral shift before-
hand, based on reports from the mass media, for example. According to a theory 
called “the spiral of silence” by Elizabeth Noelle-Neumann of Germany, if one rec-
ognizes one’s view (or stance) to be in the minority, fearing isolation from the sur-
rounding people, one restrains from voicing one’s opinions in the public sphere. 
If this occurs, then the people who recognize that their views are in the minority 
will not publicly voice their opinions in society, and gradually only a unitary opin-
ion will be observed in society as a whole. As a result, the dominant opinion will 
gain increased authority and the people not holding such opinions will be driven 
underground.
 There is a strong streak of conformity in Japanese society, and apart from a sec-
tion of people holding strong opinions (i.e., opponents), there seems to be a risk 
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of opinions easily flowing in accordance with this kind of atmosphere. In an elec-
toral system resulting in a clear distinction between winners and losers, such as the 
single-seat constituency system, if such result can be predicted in advance (spe-
cifically, in the case where the side with opinions closest to one’s own will clearly 
lose), rational voters may avoid going to vote for a candidate and party that they 
know will lose regardless of their vote. Of course, voters who think this way are not 
necessarily large in number, and there may probably be a certain number of them 
who silently exercise their voting rights with the understanding that the means by 
which to express one’s opinion in a democratic society is by voting. However, the 
problem that arises is that by commanding a number of seats in parliament that 
reflects popular will in a rather exaggerated form, the possibility of a discrepancy 
developing between the government and public opinion increases. And if such a 
discrepancy exists, then the people’s mistrust toward the government and the par-
liamentary system may deepen. This can be said to call into question the founda-
tion of indirect democracy.
3.   The People’s Verdict on the Education Policies Put Forward by the 
DPJ
(1)		Data	and	Variables	Used
Now, let us specifically examine people’s attitudes on education costs, considering 
the trends of policy and political party support in the post-war era. This chap-
ter uses data from the 2010 edition of Japanese General Social Surveys (JGSS),6 
because this survey contains questions that ask whether the respondent approved 
or disapproved of the individual key policies put forward by the DPJ at that time. 
These are valuable data providing a reliable measurement of nationwide popular 
will at the time.
 Broadly speaking, these data can be used to conduct an examination from two 
perspectives. The first is the question of how far people think the government’s 
responsibility should extend with respect to education, social security, and welfare, 
and what they consider the relationship between this burden and the tax burden to 
be. On this point, let us first examine the question, “Who do you think should be 
responsible for the following (individuals and families or national and local gov-
ernments)? Choose a number from 1 to 5 for each.” The following four items were 
listed: A) Guaranteeing the livelihood (living costs) of the elderly, B) Medical and 
nursing care of the elderly, C) Education of children, and D) Raising and taking 
care of children. The respondents were asked to select a number from 1 to 5, with 
values close to 1 (i.e., lower values) indicating the responsibility of individuals/
families and values close to 5 (i.e. higher values) indicating the responsibility of 
national and local governments. Then, in a question on public burden, there was 
the following question: “Statement A and Statement B address the issue of public 
welfare and the public burden. Which statement is closer to your opinion? Please 
choose a number from 1 to 4. Statements A and B were as follows: “A: Even if taxes 
have to be increased, public services such as welfare should be improved” and “B: 
Even if public services such as welfare have to be weakened, the tax burden should 
be made lighter.” The respondents selected a number from 1 to 4, with 1 being 
“Close to B” and 4 being “Close to A.” 
 Next, let us examine the question asking whether respondents approved or 
disapproved of the policies put forward by the DPJ. The following seven poli-
cies were listed: A) Providing child allowance until graduation from junior high 
school, B) Making education at public senior high school practically free/provid-
ing a corresponding amount of subsidies to private senior high school students, 
C) Elimination of highway tolls, D) Reducing CO2 emission by 25% by 2020 in 
comparison to the level of CO2 emission in 1990, E) Increasing minimum wages, 
F) The same wages for everybody working on the same task in a company (regard-
less of sex, age, and employment contract), and G) Abolishing tax deduction for 
spouses. Four numbers were offered as choices indicating approval or disapproval 
and one number was provided for respondents to reply “Don’t know.” This book 
compiles the five results of A, B, E, F, and G, which are considered to be relevant to 
education and social security.
 An examination of the kinds of variables used for these opinions will be pro-
vided later. For the time being, let us consider that the respondents to fall into the 
following categories: Sex (dummy variable of 1 when female.); Age (dummy vari-
able of age 10, with the standard variable being age 20); Academic History (four 
dummy variables were created: Graduated from junior high school, Graduated 
from senior high school, Graduated from 2-year college or college of technology,7 
Graduated from university or graduate school, with Graduated from junior high 
school being made the standard variable); Adult Employment (using categories 
8 that are standardly employed for international comparison), for which seven 
categories were created: Professionals and general managers, Office administra-
tion, [employed] Sales, Self-employed and Agriculture and Fisheries, Skilled work, 
Semi- and un-skilled work, and Unemployed, with office administration being 
taken as the standard variable; Household Income (for which seven categories 
were created: under 2.5 million, 2.5–3.5 million, 3.5–4.5 million, 4.5–6.5 mil-
lion, 6.5–10.0 million, over 10.0 million, No answer, and Don’t know, with under 
2.5 million being taken as the standard variable). Marital Status (dummy variable 
with “Married” taken as 1; Widowed or Separated taken as 0), Children under the 
age of 20 (dummy variable of 1 in the case of there being such children).
(2)		Balance	between	Public	Service	and	the	Public	Burden
First, looking at the question of whether to choose social welfare even if this meant 
raising taxes, about 70% of the overall respondents selected options on the side of 
“A: Even if the taxes have to be increased, public services such as welfare should 
be improved.” The respondents who wished for a small government and thought 
that taxes should be reduced even if it meant lowering services were thus limited to 
30%. The responses tended to cluster in the middle numbers of “Somewhat close 
to ...,” and strongly held opinions were few. Concerning the opinions that were 
clearly in agreement with the statements, those on improving public services and 
welfare drew about 20% of the responses, while the proponents of small govern-
ment were less than 10%, at 6%. If this is analyzed according to the political party 
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being supported, then by only considering the party platform, one can imagine 
conservative and small-government being oriented for the LDP, and a strengthen-
ing of welfare being backed by the supporters of the DPJ and JCP (although there 
are also segments where this cannot be taken to be the case). However, it is not 
possible to state any such clear results on this basis. Certainly, the will for a small 
government is comparatively stronger among the LDP and New Komeito sup-
porters (including “somewhat close to ...,” but this is about 38% and about 35%, 
respectively. On the other hand, for the DPJ and JCP, this is about 27% and about 
29%, respectively. In the case of respondents who did not support a political party, 
this is about 30%. Considering that the total sample size exceeded 2,400 people, 
the question of whether this degree of difference in percentage can be considered 
to be significant is not clear-cut. In short, opinions concerning the issue of the 
public burden and that of public services cannot be said to be clearly reflected in 
their choice of support for political parties.
 Figure 7-5 shows the distribution of responses concerning the responsibility of 
national and local governments and that of individuals and families for the four 
fields. Looking at this distribution, a tendency of support can be clearly observed 
for the field of welfare for the elderly as well as the fields of raising and taking care 
of children and education. Although there are many respondents who feel over-
whelmingly that there is considerable national and local government responsibil-
ity with respect to welfare for the elderly, this is not the case for the raising and 
taking care of children and for education, as reflected by a substantial rise in the 
number respondents regarding these fields as the responsibility of individuals and 
families. This supports the commentary of 1-(3) of this chapter.
 Moreover, as we observed when examining Table 4-1 of Chapter 4, when the 
relationship between the sense of burden and the question of whether responsibil-
ity lies with the government or the family is examined using the Goodman and 
Kruskal tau (τ), the value is very close to 0 for all of the four fields, as expected; and 
there are many people whose opinion that even if the taxes have to be increased, 
public services such as welfare should be improved does not concur with their 
awareness of the responsibility of the national and local governments. When this 
was examined by the respondents’ academic history, the higher the level of edu-
cation gained by the respondent, the greater the expected responsibility of the 
national and local governments (and the more popular the view that increasing tax 
was necessary). 
 When the level of education gained was low, there was no clear relationship 
between the issues. Although the absolute value of τ was low, with respect to edu-
cation and the raising and taking care of children, τ had a negative value for low 
levels of education; and while believing that the national and local government’s 
responsibility was strong, many of these respondents thought the tax burden 
should be reduced even if it meant reducing public services.9
 Lastly, Table 7-2 shows the results of ordered logit estimation where the respec-
tive awareness items are taken as dependent variables. It shows that the larger the 
value of the dependent variable, the larger the preference for bigger government 
(the tendency toward tolerance for tax increases along with the belief that public 
services should be enhanced or that the responsibility of the national and local 
governments should be increased). Therefore, if the coefficient is a positive explan-
atory variable, this signifies a predilection for bigger government, and if negative, 
it signifies a preference for smaller government.
 Concerning the respondents’ views on education, there was a surprisingly large 
effect by age. However, as age rose (vis-à-vis age 20s) so did the inclination to rec-
ognize provision of education as the government’s role. Looking at the different 
ages, from the age of being fresh out of school onward, the longer the time after the 
respondents’ school days, the greater the awareness they had of the national and 
local governments’ responsibility with respect to education. However, using only 
the results of a cross-sectional survey, it is not possible to determine whether this 
trend is due to the elapsing of years (i.e., the age effect) or whether it is due to dif-
ferences in generational awareness (i.e., the cohort effect).
 Moreover, although the variable of unemployed had a negative significance 
(with a greater inclination toward the responsibility of the individual and fami-
lies), this is thought to reflect the presence of stay-at-home wives.10 Another aspect 
worthy of mention when compared with other fields is the significant effect of 
whether or not the respondent has children. As this coefficient is positive, it means 
that among the respondents with children, there was an increased inclination to 
state that it was the national and local government responsibility. Moreover, for 
the fields of education, and raising and taking care of children, there was a strong 
tendency toward individual and family responsibility among the blue-collar and 
the self-employed strata.
 With respect to welfare for the elderly, the opinion that it is the responsibility 
of individuals and families becomes more evident the higher the level of educa-
tion attained. However, such tendency cannot be observed for education and rais-
ing and taking care of children. When it comes to selecting the “responsibility of 
Figure 7-5   Does the Responsibility Lie with Governments or Individuals 
and Families? (From JGSS 2010)
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Table 7-2   Ordered Logit Regression Estimation on Whether It’s the “Governments’ 
Responsibility”
 
Livelihood of elderly
Medical care of 
elderly
Education Raising children
Increase taxes, 
enhance welfare
Coef. S.E Coef. S.E Coef. S.E Coef. S.E Coef. S.E
Women −.052 .056 −.008 .057 −.027 .056 −.133 .056 * −.212 .083 *
30s .043 .112 .109 .114 .240 .112 * .121 .110 .010 .168
40s .370 .114 *** .446 .115 *** .352 .113 ** .059 .112 .235 .168  
50s .194 .111 + .313 .113 ** .399 .111 *** .109 .110 .250 .168  
60s −.004 .115 .266 .117 * .487 .115 *** .134 .114 .090 .174  
70s −.062 .127 −.077 .129 .535 .127 *** .053 .126 −.097 .197
80s −.307 .161 + −.361 .164 * .246 .160 −.129 .158 −.052 .246
Grad. senior high −.187 .084 * −.170 .086 * −.137 .083 + −.037 .083 .230 .125 +
Grad. 2–year/tech college −.186 .105 + −.139 .107 −.237 .104 * −.174 .105 + .407 .158 *
Grad. university/ 
graduate school −.302 .100 ** −.252 .102 * −.111 .099 −.035 .099 .656 .151 ***
Unemployed −.066 .086 −.067 .087 −.220 .085 ** −.130 .084 −.012 .128
Professional/management .041 .100 −.074 .102 .098 .100 .088 .100 .134 .148  
Sales −.040 .110 −.073 .112 −.086 .109 −.064 .109 −.161 .158
Self–employed/agriculture −.236 .123 + −.229 .125 + −.521 .122 *** −.306 .122 * −.325 .184 +
Skilled worker −.028 .126 −.052 .128 −.443 .125 *** −.326 .123 ** −.556 .181 **
Semi–skilled/unskilled .064 .099 .058 .102 −.224 .098 * −.208 .098 * −.367 .148 *
Household income
> 2.5 mil. yen
−.230 .112 * −.222 .115 + −.254 .112 −.218 .112 + −.068 .167
Household income
> 3.5 mil. yen
−.035 .118 −.135 .121 .013 .118 .002 .118 .141 .178
Household income
> 4.5 mil. yen
−.299 .105 ** −.169 .108 −.076 .105 −.038 .106 −.033 .156
Household income
> 6.5 mil. yen
−.201 .109 + −.162 .111 −.170 .109 −.097 .109 −.091 .163
Household income
> 10 mil. yen
−.386 .132 *** −.294 .133 * −.242 .131 + −.125 .130 −.072 .197
Household income 
undisclosed
−.117 .093 −.143 .096 −.088 .093 −.068 .093 −.015 .139
Married .055 .068 .124 .069 + −.070 .068 .010 .069 .011 .105
Children < age 20 −.102 .081 −.065 .082 .322 .080 *** .136 .080 + .159 .117
Threshold 1 −3.496 .169 −4.005 .185 −1.635 .155 −1.816 .155 −2.511 .244
Threshold 2 −2.244 .159 −2.868 .166 −.463 .153 −.671 .153 −.589 .235
Threshold 3 −.718 .155 −1.127 .158 .928 .154 .690 .153 1.725 .237
Threshold 4 .635 .155 .488 .157 2.024 .157 1.862 .156 − −
N 4910 4915 4883 4888 2426
–2 Log Likelihood 13889.494 12423.425 15034.822 15123.155 5653.935
 +p < .10  *p < .05  **p < .01   ***p < .001
individuals and families,” it is important to exercise caution in judgement over 
whether the respondents are responding with the supposition that there is a mon-
etary significance. With responsibility lying with individuals and families, if the 
respondents’ line of thinking is that the education policy for children is decided by 
the parents, then there is no reason for the national or local governments to inter-
fere. If this is the case, then it would be misleading to interpret these results just by 
looking at the aspect of education public finance. 
 Nevertheless, with respect to welfare for the elderly, as there is not a strong ten-
dency for the elderly themselves, who are recipients of the government services, to 
support the principle that it is the responsibility of the national and local govern-
ments, there does not seem to be any reason to believe that it is the people who 
stand to benefit the most at the time to hold such view. Moreover, no matter what 
one’s age, post-retirement livelihood is a risk from which one cannot escape. 
 On the other hand, the people affected by education and the raising and tak-
ing care of children are those with children of a young age or of school-going age. 
Once this time has passed, there are few merits that can be felt from an individual 
perspective. Therefore, the fields of education and raising and taking care of chil-
dren are those that are prone to causing opposition of interests, depending on the 
presence of children.
(3)		Concerning	Support	for	the	DPJ	Policies
Next, let us examine the awareness of the policies related to education and social 
security that were advanced by the DPJ.
 Figure 7-6 simply shows a distribution of approval and disapproval for each 
field. If we suppose this to be a distribution of opinion toward education and 
raising and taking care of children, like Figure 7-5, then more than a majority is 
in support of child allowance and the dispensing of fees for senior high schools, 
Figure 7-6   Support on DPJ Policies (JGSS 2010)
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which could be considered surprising. However, the rate of agreement is less than 
60% and there is large opposition as well. In particular, the fiscal resources for 
these policies were supposed to be realized from the abolition of spousal tax deduc-
tion. The ideology of the DPJ Government that considered the education and rais-
ing and taking care of children through the creation of a gender equal society was 
not necessarily widely accepted, and there was an overwhelmingly large amount of 
opposition to the abolition of the spousal tax deduction (probably because it was 
understood as effectively increasing the burden).
 Moreover, when one looks at the evaluation of these policies according to the 
political party supported by the respondent there is a particularly large difference 
in support of the child allowance, depending on which political party is supported. 
Although those disagreeing with the policy are limited to 20% among the DPJ 
supporters, close to half of the respondents who support the LDP or other political 
parties are opposed to the policy. The distribution among New Komeito support-
ers is similar to the case of LDP supporters: among JCP supporters, opposition to 
the policy is up by around 40%, which is surprisingly close to the LDP supporters. 
A similar tendency is exhibited for the dispensing of fees for public senior high 
schools, although this is not as clear as for child allowance. Close to half of the 
LDP supporters were opposed, but this opposition was around 30% for DPJ and 
New Komeito supporters. When comparing awareness concerning education and 
the raising of children between the supporters of various parties, the relationship 
of the distribution of DPJ supporters and New Komeito supporters was actually 
closer than between supporters of the LDP and New Komeito, which formed the 
coalition government in 2014.
 On the other hand, issues concerning wages and the abolition of the spousal 
tax deduction system did not produce as clear a difference in awareness based on 
which political party was supported. Nonetheless, with respect to the principle 
of having the same wages for everybody working on the same task in a company, 
while opposition to this policy exceeded 40% only among LDP supporters, oppo-
sition was at 30% among JCP supporters. One can therefore see a hint of an emer-
gence of difference of ideology and stance between the political parties.
 To take a further look at this comparison of awareness, an ordered logit model 
was likewise estimated for awareness of where the responsibility lies (with govern-
ments or families). Table 7-3 shows this result (with respondents answering “Don’t 
know” excluded from the analysis). 
 Looking at the results, although the existence of children is a decisive factor 
is a correlation with marital status. Although it is omitted from the table, if one 
overlaps this analysis with the results of the analysis by sex, interesting findings 
can be identified. The negative result among the unemployed reflects opposition 
among women (stay-at-home wives; the result is not significant when limited to 
males). Moreover, the effect of employment variables is influenced by the male 
sample. On the other hand, there is a lot of opposition (compared with the lowest 
income group) among the comparatively low household income of 2.5–3.5 mil-
lion yen. Meanwhile, when limiting analysis to the male sample, there is a positive 
significance among household incomes of above 10 million yen, where there is a 
tendency toward supporting the abolition of the spousal tax deduction. This is 
probably because among the strata where the husband’s income is not that high 
and wives work in a limited way (utilizing this spousal tax deduction), this merit 
would be lost if spousal tax deduction were to be abolished. However, if the house-
hold income is high, there is a high likelihood that the husband and the wife are 
already both working full-time and they are not receiving any benefit from spousal 
Table 7–3 Estimated Ordered Logit Regression for Support on DPJ Government Policies
 
Child 
allowance
Free senior 
high
Raising  
minimum wage
Same wages  
for same task
Abolishing spousal 
deduction
Coef. S.E Coef. S.E Coef. S.E Coef. S.E Coef. S.E
Women −.233 .084 ** −.153 .084 + .125 .091 .181 .084 * .259 .097 **
30’s .059 .170 −.024 .171 −.046 .183 .313 .173 + .244 .201
40’s −.943 .170 *** −.642 .171 *** .000 .183 .473 .172 ** .114 .201  
50’s −.819 .169 *** −.745 .170 *** .175 .183 .821 .173 *** .235 .196  
60’s −.545 .175 ** −.571 .177 ** −.140 .190 .709 .180 *** .089 .208  
70’s −.505 .196 * −.523 .198 ** −.062 .216 .800 .202 *** −.052 .235  
80’s −.069 .256 −.372 .263 −.216 .286 .866 .274 ** .178 .315  
Grad. senior high −.271 .125 * −.152 .127 −.008 .139 .017 .132 .020 .152  
Grad. 2-year/tech college −.407 .155 ** −.208 .157 −.116 .173 .013 .163 .096 .186  
Grad. university/ 
graduate school −.588 .148 *** −.423 .150 ** −.428 .165 * −.123 .156 .253 .175  
Unemployed −.007 .125 −.142 .126 .046 .137 .024 .128 −.483 .142 **
Professional/management .079 .147 −.092 .146 .212 .158 −.022 .147 −.218 .162  
Sales .059 .157 −.131 .155 .063 .169 .057 .158 −.342 .177 +
Self–employed/agriculture .274 .196 −.035 .194 −.502 .205 * −.252 .191 −.394 .213 +
Skilled worker −.001 .180 −.184 .179 .061 .197 −.189 .180 −.190 .194
Semi–skilled/unskilled −.060 .147 −.076 .149 .058 .160 −.092 .149 −.376 .169 *
Household income
> 2.5 mil. yen −.011 .172 .077 .175 −.467 .189 * −.170 .173 −.470 .209 *
Household income
> 3.5 mil. yen −.197 .179 −.108 .181 −.552 .198 ** .007 .185 −.321 .211
Household income
> 4.5 mil. yen −.073 .159 −.078 .160 −.479 .176 ** −.417 .163 * −.157 .185
Household income
> 6.5 mil. yen −.477 .165 ** −.281 .167 + −.814 .182 *** −.420 .167 * .092 .188
Household income
> 10 mil. yen −.636 .201 ** −.623 .201 ** −1.087 .222 *** −.636 .205 ** .327 .225  
Household income 
undisclosed −.265 .143 + −.172 .145 −.659 .160 *** −.273 .147 + −.229 .169
Married .239 .105 * .073 .106 .075 .116 −.059 .110 −.922 .126 ***
Children < age 20 1.107 .120 *** 1.353 .120 *** .056 .128 −.052 .120 .092 .132
Threshold 1 −2.120 .241 −2.084 .243 −4.286 .292 −1.240 .246 −.585 .279
Threshold 2 −1.168 .238 −1.042 .240 −3.042 .270 −.006 .244 .778 .279
Threshold 3 .108 .236 .337 .239 −.584 .260 1.214 .245 1.802 .285
N 2303 2277 2216 2140 1976
–2 Log Likelihood 5962.594 5865.896 4187.056 5785.537 4269.031
 +p < .10  *p < .05  **p < .01   ***p < .001
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tax deduction.
 From the aforementioned findings, we can conclude that, as mentioned ear-
lier, the reason that the DPJ opted for increased support for child rearing was the 
party’s stance of promoting and supporting the participation of women in society 
based on the premise that child rearing is a social act. Therefore, the abolition of 
spousal tax deduction had a strong correlation with the policy of supporting child
rearing. However, as mentioned in Footnote 5 of this chapter, the facilities were 
with regard to views on child allowance and dispensing with senior high school 
fees, in both cases, support for these issues weakened in the higher level of educa-
tion attained strata and the higher income strata. The relationship with age was 
also significant, with opposition becoming more prevalent as age increased. There 
was also a significantly high level of opposition among women. This point seems 
to contradict the aforementioned result showing a strengthening propensity with 
the increase in age of the respondents to consider responsibility for education to 
lie with the national and local governments. As the question’s wording referred to 
responsibility for “education of children,” it is possible that respondents did not 
necessarily interpret the national and local government responsibility in the con-
text of public finance, instead envisioning it to actually relate to educational con-
tent. Moreover, perhaps the higher the respondents’ educational level, the more 
likely it is that they would have understood the question to refer to the Japanese 
government’s fiscal circumstances. It is therefore possible that their consideration 
represented more of a critical assessment of whether Japan in its current predica-
ment had the fiscal leeway for that particular policy. Moreover, as the elderly 
respondents probably had concerns over the burden for their own pension and 
medical care, they could possibly have interpreted the policies on child allowance 
and dispensing with senior high school fees as simply pork-barreling, unless they 
had an adequate understanding of the policies. As these services were to be pro-
vided universally (i.e., to everyone) under the DPJ’s plan, it is difficult to imag-
ine that there would be intrinsic differences of opinion based on class or strata. 
However, the propensity for opposition based on the higher educational level and 
higher income class needs to be examined. Perhaps this is evidence that awareness 
of the policies had not adequately infiltrated society (i.e., had not been properly 
understood). Child allowance was abolished in the fiscal year 2011 because the 
budget for rebuilding in the wake of the earthquake disaster was inadequate. It was 
decided to accommodate for child allowance within the framework of the preex-
isting Child Allowance Act.11 Moreover, income-based eligibility restrictions were 
also established for dispensing with fees for senior high schools.12 As the ideology 
of universalism has collapsed, there is also the possibility that opposition among 
the middle to higher income strata will rise.
 Views on issues related to wages, as one would expect, had a strong correla-
tion with household income (for the minimum wage policy in particular, the cor-
relation was especially clear; there was also a correlation with educational level 
for this policy). With regard to the same wages being paid to everybody working 
on the same task, the reason that the higher the age, the greater the opposition 
can perhaps be deemed as a reaction to the fact that the wages of elderly who are 
re-employed after retirement age are suppressed. Also, the high propensity to sup-
port the idea among women can be considered as a reflection of discontent over a 
large disparity in wages for the same work tasks based on employment status (regu-
lar employment or contractual employment).
 Concerning the abolition of spousal tax deduction, opposition was overall large 
among women (reflecting a view that there are barriers to social advancement for 
women). However, as only married women benefit from this system, there is a 
correlation with marital status. Although it is omitted from the table, if one over-
laps this analysis with the results of the analysis by sex, interesting findings can be 
identified. The negative result among the unemployed reflects opposition among 
women (stay-at-home wives; the result is not significant when limited to males). 
Moreover, the effect of employment variables is influenced by the male sample. 
On the other hand, there is a lot of opposition (compared with the lowest income 
group) among the comparatively low household income of 2.5–3.5 million yen. 
Meanwhile, , when limiting analysis to the male sample, there is a positive sig-
nificance among household incomes of above 10 million yen, where there is a 
tendency toward supporting the abolition of the spousal tax deduction. This is 
probably because among the strata where the husband’s income is not that high 
and wives work in a limited way (utilizing this spousal tax deduction), this merit 
would be lost if spousal tax deduction were to be abolished. However, if the house-
hold income is high, there is a high likelihood that the husband and the wife are 
already both working full-time and they are not receiving any benefit from spousal 
tax deduction.
 From the aforementioned findings, we can conclude that, as mentioned earlier, 
the reason that the DPJ opted for increased support for child rearing was the party’s 
stance of promoting and supporting the participation of women in society based 
on the premise that child rearing is a social act. Therefore, the abolition of spousal 
tax deduction had a strong correlation with the policy of supporting child rearing. 
However, as mentioned in Footnote 5 of this chapter, the facilities were not in 
place to cope with increased numbers of parents wanting to place their children 
in nursery schools. Due to the failure of sufficiently grasping these needs, it was 
not possible for any understanding of these policies to infiltrate society. Hence, 
widespread support of the policies could not be obtained. Consequently, the vot-
ers evaluated the policies based on their current (immediately apparent) interests 
and concerns, and could not effectively capitalize on the chance to implement a 
grand transformation to the conventional social security and welfare system. The 
next chapter aims to continue on from this point and deepen our understanding of 
changes in peoples’ awareness.
NOTES
1 “Diet Minutes” plenary session of the House of Councilors (January 30, 2012) 
180–183.
2 This represented a method of recording “reserves” in the initial budget beforehand for 
the anticipated amount of the revisions, based on the criticism that revising the budget 
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in the middle of a fiscal year invites the trend of an expanding fiscal deficit.
3 This is according to a “2003 Nationwide Survey on Work and Living.” The survey was 
given to men and women throughout Japan aged 20 to 69 years. The valid sample was 
1,154 respondents (with a response rate of 57.7%).
4 In other words, the function of the influential vote-gathering systems of the party 
members, the labor unions, and the various industry organizations weakened. The 
increase in non-affiliated voters also impacted the cohesiveness within each political 
party and “a market-competition style of democracy” (Nakakita, 2012), which gener-
ated a sense of unity among each political party which began to operate by means of the 
differences of specific policies (or manifesto).
5 With respect to this, the waiting lists for nursery schools in the urban areas became 
an issue, and there were consequently demands for greater efforts to expand nursery 
schools. The DPJ was no longer able to keep up with these demands in its responses.
6 The Japanese General Social Surveys (JGSS) are designed and carried out by the JGSS 
Research Center at Osaka University of Commerce (the Joint Usage/Research Center 
for Japanese General Social Surveys accredited by the Minister of Education, Culture, 
Sports, Science and Technology) in collaboration with the Institute of Social Science 
at the University of Tokyo. The microdata of “Japanese General Social Surveys JGSS-
2010” (JGSS Research Center at Osaka University of Commerce) used in the analysis in 
this book were compiled and distributed by SSJ Data Archive, Information Center for 
Social Science Research on Japan, Institute of Social Science, the University of Tokyo.
7 This does not include so-called “vocational schools.” If someone went from a senior 
high school to a vocational school, then this would be treated as having graduated from 
senior high school in this analysis.
8 These are based on the EGP class scheme proposed by Robert Erikson, John H. 
Goldthorpe, and Lucienne Portocarero. They are the most widely used in international 
comparative stratification research (Erikson et al., 1979).
9 Note, as supplementary information, that there is reference to the distribution of 
political support and education level. Looking at the tendency of political support by 
academic history, there is actually a clear trend. There are a comparatively larger number 
of supporters for the LDP among respondents whose highest level of education was 
junior high school or senior high school. The support for the DPJ was higher among the 
respondents who reached higher levels of education. Support for the New Komeito was 
similar to the LDP, in that there was a tendency for increased support the lower the level 
of education reached. No clear trends were observed for the JCP or other political par-
ties. Although the number of respondents not supporting a political party was small for 
those whose highest academic level was junior high school (at less than half ), there was 
not a clear tendency in the other academic levels, with about 60% of respondents not 
supporting a political party.
10 When this sample is limited to women, the unemployed variable is still significant; 
but when this sample is limited to men, the result is no longer significant.
11 This “Child Allowance” (jidou teate) can be interpreted as being equivalent to the new 
“Child Allowance” (kodomo teate) with income-based eligibility restrictions applied.
12 From the fiscal year 2013, dispensing with fees has come to be limited to households 
with an income of up to 9.1 million yen.
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CHAPTER 8
Realization of Policies and Stance 
toward Political Parties
1.   The Critical Gaze on “Bureaucracy”
(1)		Parliamentary	Cabinet	System	and	Enforcement	of	Policy
One position consistently asserted throughout this book is that Japan’s adoption 
of parliamentary democracy makes the government obliged to ensure that the peo-
ple agree with (and support) the taking of taxes from them. From the citizen’s per-
spective, any increased burden is met with displeasure, which makes it difficult to 
increase taxes. From the perspective of compiling the budget, attention is focused 
on working on its new parts. This implies, in other words, that the existing parts 
of the budget are assumed to be needed, that vested interests arise, and that these 
parts are not easy to whittle down. Such a structure makes the budget nonrespon-
sive to large social reforms, while facilitating the formation of cozy relations within 
pockets of society and industry. In the eyes of ordinary people, this structure can 
appear to be actively resistant to change. Therein is the dilemma of a parliamen-
tary democracy: while relying on the popular will for tax increases, it is difficult to 
reflect the popular will in the budget (Ide, 2011).
 With respect to such parliamentary democracy, Arend Lijphart presents two 
models: the typical decision-by-majority democracy, like the Westminster model 
of the U.K.; and the typical consensus among a coexistence of multi-polar camps, 
like the consensus model of Switzerland. June Burnham and Robert Pyper orga-
nize the particular traits of the two models into nine specific points for each. The 
following summary presents those for the Westminster Model. 
 The first trait of the Westminster model is that the executive power is concen-
trated in a cabinet consisting of a single party with majority rule. The second is 
that, in principle, the relationship between the members of the government 
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Therefore, the prime minister is elected from the representatives (members of par-
liament), who have received their credential to be there by an election. The prime 
minister forms the cabinet, and this cabinet runs the organizations of bureaucracy. 
Through these processes, the electorate prevents bureaucracy from becoming out 
of control; in other words, the parliamentary cabinet system possesses this aspect 
of control.
 In the specific case of Japan, however, the LDP maintained power over a long 
period of time, during which there remained the customary practice of selecting a 
representative (prime minister) by the election of party chairmen, and it came to 
be common practice for the ministers to be selected by internal party logic based 
on “factional dynamics.” Operating under this system, ministerial positions were 
not always filled by the most suitable candidates. It was not at all rare for there to 
be frequent cabinet reshuffles involving the replacement and switching of min-
isters, and it became common practice for ministers to act in accordance with 
bureaucratic will (as if they were a representative of the ministry of which they 
were in charge). Such behavior by ministers was not necessarily the logic of the 
prime minister or the cabinet as a whole. It became usual for ministers to allow 
the logic of their ministry to take precedence, and this made the cabinet prone to 
being often functionally ineffective. Iio calls this state of affairs the “bureaucratic 
cabinet system” (Iio, 2007: 21–25). The bureaucratic group that makes up this 
system includes the relationship with the external organizations in society that 
have ties to these ministries. As such, the bureaucratic cabinet system also reflects 
the will of these organizations in society. In this sense, the politicians (or cabinet) 
do not operate in a way that is entirely the will of the bureaucracy (i.e., the central 
ministries and agencies).
 However, under these situations, even if the bureaucratic cabinet system reflects 
the will of specific industry organization, this does not necessarily mean that it 
reflects the broader popular will. Moreover, even the politicians and political par-
ties of the cabinet do not put up a strong show of holding responsibility for the 
results of their decisions. Yet, criticism directed at the long period of LDP govern-
ment rule concerns how the substance of politics does not reflect popular will, 
but it does not question the responsibility of the LDP government concerning 
the budgets they compiled. This is evidence of a lack of understanding about the 
concept of the parliamentary cabinet system and the correct way it should operate 
(Iio, 2007: 116).
 However the changing of the electoral system for the House of Representatives 
from a multiple-seat to a single-seat constituency system not only subsequently led 
to the government changing hands to the DPJ, it also signified a large change in 
the status of prime minister and the requirements to become one. The strengthen-
ing of the cabinet functions that were enforced during the Hashimoto adminis-
tration (involving the establishment of the Cabinet Office and the reaching of a 
consensus between the ministries by holding an authority one rank higher than 
each of the ministries) also served to strengthen the authority of the prime minis-
ter, and the significance of the conventional factions was also diluted. As a result, 
the choices of the prime minister no longer followed the internal logic of the LDP 
(cabinet) and the parliamentary assembly is in name only. In practice, however, 
the former has the dominating position.1 Third, the structure of political power 
inside the parliament concentrates on one chamber, and when there are two 
chambers, the strong power is in the chamber with unilateral authority. Fourth, 
there is fundamentally a two-party system. Fifth, the type of societies that have a 
two-party system tend to be those with homogeneity in their industrial and social 
structure, as this limits the battleground issues to socioeconomic ones. Take, for 
example, a country where multiple opposing ethnic groups exist. There, it would 
be necessary to decide on a distribution of seats that takes into account these fac-
tors, and as that requires negotiation among heterogeneous groups, a consensus 
type of democracy is easier to adopt. The sixth point is related to the nature of 
government rule. Because elections are held based on simple battleground issues, 
the single-seat constituency system is adopted and elections operate by the voter 
selecting one or the other candidate based on the policies. Seventh, the system and 
structures are unitary. Eighth, sovereignty resides with the parliament, and there 
is no codified constitution to constrain the power of the parliamentary majority. 
Ninth, the members of parliament take on the responsibility as the representatives 
of the people, and referenda by the masses (direct democracy by the people’s ballot 
vote) are treated negatively. 
 The type of public service that serves as a mechanism of government for the 
Westminster model is called the Whitehall model. This type of public service must 
be non-political and neutral. Generalists are hired, reared internally, and promoted 
based on successful outcomes. The accountability for the work of public servants 
resides not with the individual public servant but with the minister (hence, public 
servants have anonymity). On the flipside, because the public servants give neces-
sary advice to the minister on the execution of policy and serve in an assisting role, 
their neutrality is essential. It is only their job to promptly carry out the decided 
policy. The system of command is unitary, the organizations are formed as field-
specific ministries and agencies, and policy is implemented through mutual con-
sensus (Burnham and Pyper, 2008, trans. 2010: 26–36).
 In the U.K., this Whitehall model was quickly lost under the reforms of the 
Thatcher Government. For example, there was a process of delegating authority to 
local governments such as Scotland and Northern Ireland, and through member-
ship in the EU, there was a process of specializing within individual policy fields. 
This splintered the vertical structures inside the country.
 The mechanism of government in Japan is described in text books as a par-
liamentary cabinet system, but its nature is quite different from the same parlia-
mentary cabinet system adopted by the U.K. According to Jun Iio, there is an 
often-heard criticism based on a misconception of the true nature of the parlia-
mentary system, which misses the point of its existence: namely, the assertion that 
the Japanese parliamentary cabinet system rarely represents the popular will and 
might as well be a presidential (or similar) system that concentrates authority. Iio 
argues that with a parliamentary cabinet system, the cabinet and the prime min-
ister derive their existence from an assembly that has been democratically elected, 
and that the relationship between the two is not fundamentally contradictory. 
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colleague of an official.
 When kanryou (=bureaucrat) is used in its original sense, it refers to a “public 
servant of the state,” and the meaning does not include the public servant of a local 
government2 (Omori, 2006). It can often be observed that when the government 
offices of the central ministries are referred to as “Kasumigaseki,” this normally 
implies that the people working there are being alluded to as bureaucrats in a criti-
cal and derisive tone.
 However, as already mentioned in the Introduction and Chapter 3, it is not 
necessarily correct to criticize central government offices under the unitary under-
standing of them as “country” and “bureaucracy.” In practice, there is a tangle 
of various interests among the different central government offices, and it is not 
rare for there even to be conflicts among the ministries and government offices 
(Imamura, 2006). Moreover, sociologically, a bureaucracy signifies nothing more 
than an organization that maintains complicated structures and forms that have 
been observed typically since modern times. Therefore, the word bureaucracy does 
not necessarily include the nuance of a government office organization. Actually, 
bureaucratic organizations refer to organizations that have been provided with 
the particular traits of a so-called bureaucracy, and these include schools, private-
sector corporations, and NGOs. We all ordinarily use the word bureaucracy when 
offering criticism of an existing public servant system (in particular, the central 
government offices of “Kasumigaseki”). As a result, the word bureaucracy is natu-
rally used with pejorative associations. However, the term itself only indicates the 
form of an organization in modern times, and so when it is used academically, it 
does not necessarily carry with it any negative connotations.
 Since modern times have brought with them serious considerations about 
rationality of purpose, any complex, artificial organization formed with a specific 
purpose must inevitably be referred to as a bureaucratic organization. In modern 
society, there is an increase in the execution of complicated and difficult objectives, 
too large for any individual. In order that these objectives can be realized more 
rationally and efficiently, a process of sectionalism is carried out within organiza-
tions. It becomes necessary to more clearly define the allocation of roles, and the 
people who have been trained in areas of specialty must accomplish their respec-
tive duties. Accordingly, people are employed and assigned to roles based on their 
performance in bureaucratic organizations. That is why, in the administration of 
the state, various ministries and government offices of differing function and pur-
pose stand side by side with one another. In sociological terms, however, adding 
to the critical opinion and interpretation of the bureaucratic organizations that we 
are familiar with, is the well-known discussion of Robert K. Merton’s “dysfunction 
of bureaucracy” (Merton, 1957, trans. 1961: 179–207).
 The term “to function” is used to mean to work well, serving a role in accor-
dance with a purpose. In sociology, functional analysis refers to observing various 
organizations, rules, customs, and so forth, and analyzing how they act in society. 
Merton did not consider the term “function” to be necessarily restricted to a posi-
tive meaning. Instead, he used the term dysfunction to describe the performance 
of acts that have negative consequences, such as when an intrinsic purpose has 
because it became impossible to ignore his popularity among ordinary citizens 
and trends of public opinion. Since becoming a single-seat constituency system, 
it has become decidedly more important for electoral candidates to receive offi-
cial approval from the party (Takenaka, 2006). The Koizumi administration was 
formed by thoroughly making use of these changes.
 Masaru Mabuchi adopts Bernard S. Silberman’s idea of categorizing govern-
ment organizations into specialization-oriented and organization-oriented 
bureaucratic systems. This type of categorization, which could be described as an 
ideal type by Weberians, is generally based on whether the succession rules for 
political leaders are stable or not. A typical example of the former is the U.S., and a 
typical example of the latter is Japan.
 In the U.S., the term of office of the president is clearly decided, and the change-
over of power is repeatedly carried out in accordance with fixed procedures. In 
countries such as the U.S., even if the political leaders change, the rules of suc-
cession are clearly prescribed, and there is little uncertainty even when there is 
a change of authority. On the other hand, even when the succession of political 
power is ineffective and an unruly situation like a coup d’état occurs, the bureau-
cracies holding the specialized functions must continue to govern effectively. 
Because the members of these bureaucratic organizations place importance on this 
specialty, if a changeover of authority occurs, the new government appoints effec-
tive personnel who will realize the government’s policies in line with this specialty. 
Thus, there tends to be an exchange of personnel between the bureaucratic organi-
zations and the private sector.
 On the other hand, this kind of regime change has rarely occurred in Japan, 
and there is no way of telling when a prime minister or cabinet will be replaced. 
Moreover, the way this change will occur is dependent on the situation. In this way, 
the legitimacy of the political leader is jeopardized in countries with a high degree 
of uncertainty concerning the succession of leaders. Hence, bureaucratic systems 
with rigid organizations are formed to ensure stable governance. That is why the 
bureaucrats of such a country (while of course requiring a certain level of specialty 
for policy) must have unequivocal loyalty to the organization. In other words, the 
bureaucrat’s primary function is to faithfully execute the policy that the govern-
ment at that time wishes to implement. Because it is necessary to enhance the 
commitment of the members in such an organization, there need to be systems in 
place for promotion and salary raises in the government office organization itself. 
In this way, large replacements will not take place with a change of government 
(Mabuchi, 2010). Therefore, in the case of organization-oriented governmental 
bureaucracy, the organization of government offices can easily be constructed in a 
rigid fashion that is detached from popular will.
(2)		Dysfunctions	of	Bureaucracy	and	Criticism	Directed	at	Public	Servants	
The bureaucracy is a classic theme in the area of sociology that studies organiza-
tions. In the Japanese language, the kanji kan (官), of the word kanryou (官僚), 
originally carried the meaning of “the work of administering politics under the 
service of the monarch.” The word kanryou (官僚) (official + colleague) meant a 
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In other words, in order to correct the irrationality of a rigid bureaucratic system, 
the side opposing it would have to locate people with the specialty and place them 
rationally, draw up strategies, and institutionalize them. Ultimately, however, 
this institutionalizing creates nothing other than bureaucracy (Mabuchi, 2010: 
36–38).
 A more difficult criticism directed at the government services is that against 
the backdrop of the currently severe economic situation, many people look at the 
relatively stable positions of the public servants and comment, rather emotionally, 
“While the private sector is struggling, the public servants have it easy. They have 
it too easy.” This is further exacerbated by politicians who would exploit these 
sentiments when canvassing votes. This is considered to be one factor behind the 
growing distrust toward the Japanese government. This sentiment along with the 
difficulty in increasing taxes are serious problems that are compounded when the 
voters’ representatives, the politicians themselves, exploit these views.
 Moreover, what gives rise to these criticisms is the system of government rule 
in Japan and the characteristics of organization-oriented bureaucratic systems (as 
described by Silberman), which is what this system is assumed to be, as mentioned 
at the start of this chapter. Of course, because the bureaucratic organization seems 
to move further away from the intentions and control of individuals as it gets 
bigger in size, it is important to adopt procedures of always checking and criti-
cally assessing it. However, in terms of the ordinary sentiment of the Japanese 
people, there do not seem to be very many of them who truly wish to see a small 
government. This is made clear from the analysis of the survey data in Chapter 7. 
The bulk of the concerns of voters lies with social security. Or putting it the other 
way around, the insufficiency of the Japanese social security system is the reason it 
attracts the people’s attention. Moreover, just as there can be no discussion of wel-
fare services if removed from the constructs of the state, we cannot contemplate 
putting a more substantial welfare system into operation without the existence of 
a certain number of public servants (i.e., a certain level of bureaucracy) (Noguchi, 
2011).
(3)		Affinity	between	Criticisms	toward	Bureaucracy	and	Neoliberalism
Bureaucratic organizations follow the path of rationalization to achieve smoother 
organizational operation. Following this path, the organization removes soft-
hearted relationships between individuals and promotes formalism and anti-spiri-
tualism. People perceive this behavior as cold and inhuman, calling it a “red-tape” 
response. But part of this is a necessary response in order to run the entire society. 
Moreover, when bureaucratic organizations, aiming to deliver efficient adminis-
tration, proceed down the path of sectionalism, the resulting vertical structures 
can actually be a hindrance to efficient operations. The bureaucratic organizations 
that are meant to be operating rationally and efficiently can, in practice, become 
a symbol of irrationality and inefficiency. This can be interpreted as a dysfunction 
of bureaucracy.
 Rationalization refers to the act of running operations based on a logic that can 
be explained in a way that even a third party can understand it using reason. Hence, 
been lost or smooth communication within society has been hindered due to the 
existence of a certain organization, rule, or custom, for example.
 When a bureaucratic organization grows, that organization’s autonomy will 
strengthen and it will actively work for its self-protection. This can occur for not 
only the organization itself but also for smaller units such as bureaus and depart-
ments in charge within the organization. Moreover, because of the ongoing pro-
cess of functional differentiation inside the organization, the bureau in charge 
becomes thoroughly knowledgeable on its specialty but ignorant about all other 
circumstances. In other words, although an organization that has undergone func-
tional differentiation to achieve large objectives is a bureaucratic organization, the 
people working there lose sight of the overall objectives and primarily only think 
about their own small bureau. Moreover, each of the ministries and bureaus may 
have relations with private-sector organizations in the associated market, and this 
steadily strengthens the territorial nature of their own organization. This is what is 
known as the negative side of the vertical administration system (Imamura, 2006: 
84–88), and it can be interpreted as one kind of dysfunction of bureaucracy.
 The criticism directed at public servants and officials has become very deeply 
rooted in modern-day Japan. Although it is hard to imagine amid the recent din 
of criticism directed at the bureaucrats and public servants, previously in Japan, 
there had been many affirmative evaluations of bureaucrats, such as assertions that 
“high economic growth was made possible in Japan because (even though the poli-
ticians were irresponsible) the bureaucrats were excellent (Nye et al. eds., 1997, 
trans.  2002: 321–340, article by Susan J. Pharr). This reversal of appraisal began 
from the recruitment scandal and developed further with the collapse of the asset 
bubble around 1990 and later. This begs the question of whether the quality of 
the bureaucrats and public servants did, in fact, sharply deteriorate through the 
1990s and thereafter. It is difficult to demonstrate whether or not this was the 
case, as it cannot easily be determined what is meant by deterioration, and it is 
problematic that one must hence become subjective. Moreover, it further depends 
on one’s way of thinking. For example, one quite plausible speculation is that the 
quality of young public servants has actually risen from the 1990s onward because 
of increased competition and a higher entrance bar due to the increase in young 
people wanting to become public servants and enjoy relatively better job security. 
Here, however, we are not concerned about measuring the quality of these public 
servants. Rather, our interest is why criticism of bureaucracy and public employees 
suddenly exploded from this time onward (Noguchi, 2011: 84–87).
 Among the criticisms of “bureaucracy” in Japan, the major ones directed toward 
the government, such as that the bureaucratic functions are too inflated and should 
be reduced, cannot be considered to represent mainstream concerns. Of course, 
there are outspoken views on relaxing regulations and utilizing the power of the 
private sector. These are claims based on bureaucratic inflexibility (i.e., rigid rules) 
or illogical bureaucratic mechanisms. But the paradoxical side to such complaints 
is that even if these bureaucratic organizations had wandered from the intentions 
of the people or had characteristics that were irrational, unless we form different 
bureaucratic organizations to replace them, there is not much that can be done. 
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be done in accordance with these rules, but political initiatives driven by anti-
bureaucracy sentiment could result in parts of such processing being entrusted to 
the judgment of charismatic leaders. Such a leader would bear accountability for 
the policy decision. However, any arbitrary decisions deriving from the irrational-
ity of a leader would lose the support of the people (as persisting in this way would 
be anti-democratic and it would simply represent an autocracy). The desire for 
politicians to avoid the criticism that they are autocratic easily invites the incentive 
to reduce the function of government and follow the policy of leaving it up to mar-
ket mechanisms. By putting emphasis on market mechanisms, it is easy to follow a 
consistent logic and rigid policies (Noguchi, 2011: 94–117).
 However, the idea that governments cannot do anything and that it should be 
left up to the market is an extreme view. If promoted to its end, this idea eventu-
ally negates the very existence of the government and the state. There is absolutely 
no possibility of such a view being accepted, and neoliberalists do not fully negate 
the existence of the state. What they do insist on is the transfer of public services 
to the private sector, the abolition of regulations, and the reduction in the role of 
the state. However, in order to protect private ownership, individual freedoms, 
and the freedom of corporate activities, there needs to be a strong authority that 
is capable of exercising state power if required. Accepting this point, the neolib-
eralists do not deny the role of the state and the government. When justifying 
their strong insistence on maintaining public order and upholding the self-defense 
force (or military), their logic is that they cannot establish anything without exer-
cising state power (Harvey, 2005, trans. 2007: 34).
2.   Reflection of Popular Will in Indirect Democracy
(1)		Toward	a	Political	Power	Assertive	on	Burden	Increase
Around the latter half of the 1970s, fiscal debt reached a crisis point in many 
Western countries. According to Habermas, this predicament had an effect on 
many government decisions concerning economic and social problems in the real 
society. However, due to the way that many countries and phenomena were com-
plexly interconnected, there were no simple solutions. The people’s expectations 
for social security and welfare were becoming higher, but governments could not 
deliver what was being requested without advanced economic growth. Due to the 
complex tangle of interests, if there is one person who benefits from the execution 
of a certain policy, it is not rare for there to be people who are hugely disadvan-
taged. Depending on the government, it can sometimes be very difficult to reach 
a consensus between the parties. Even if a half-finished policy were implemented, 
the effect would probably be diluted; and even if it performed well temporarily, 
the people among the complex tangle of interests disadvantaged by the policy 
would probably show stronger hostility toward the government. This becomes a 
situation in which the people perceive the government not to be answering their 
demands, and trust in the government is greatly diminished. More people begin 
to voice the complaint that “It’s worthless paying taxes to such a government.” 
Then, after diminished taxes, they complain, “This government pension system 
this excludes logic that can only be understood by individuals with close relation-
ships (e.g., harmonious affinity and unspoken understanding). It also decreases 
the possibility of there being charismatic people arbitrarily brandishing power by 
autocratic means. On the other hand, another result will be the rule of democracy, 
based on the bureaucratic mechanisms, adopting a decision-by-majority system as 
a means of persuading people. This will be perceived as impersonal, and although 
the threat of tyranny by individuals disappears, the tyranny by the majority takes 
its place. This is what Tocqueville, who was mentioned in Chapter 1, is referring to 
in “Democracy in America” (Tocqueville, 1888, trans.1987). One can expect that, 
in reaction to this absurd bureaucracy, a new charismatic personality will appear.
 He or she, using powerful charisma, would argue that the “bureaucracy” is no 
good and that it is necessary to break away from this current state of bureaucratic 
rule. Such discourse would have strong appeal (Noguchi, 2011: 16–30). As the 
bureaucratic rule ordinarily necessitates dull, routine work, there will always be a 
latent desire for a reformer to someday come along to break everyone free of the 
situation. That is why the well-known British thinker and utilitarianism-oriented 
economist John Stuart Mill sounds a note of caution concerning the “dangers” of 
bureaucratic rule sometimes accepting strange proposals (Noguchi, 2011: 51–56).
 Masahiro Noguchi is concerned that the “excessive” bashing of public servants 
and bureaucrats in Japan that has been becoming more prominent in recent years 
may inadvertently be shaking the very foundations of democracy. Because rule 
by bureaucracy is irrational and inefficient, slogans arise that advocate putting 
the “popular will” first and “acting” quickly. Efforts to realize these slogans lead 
directly to actions that have affinity with the “small government” of “neoliberal-
ism,” which calls for the slimming down of organizations.
 One of the values at the foundation of democracy is an intrinsic respect for a 
diversity of opinions. In practice, this is something that needs to be paid for with 
the time and trouble of maintaining it (Morishima, 1977). Furthermore, a variety 
of opinions reflect a variety of viewpoints, but if each viewpoint were to be inter-
preted as a “vested interest,” which can easily happen, things can soon get tied up 
in a crude debate that argues for just getting rid of it all. In such a scenario, the 
person striving to consider a variety of viewpoints is considered to be the villain 
caught up in vested interests and becomes an easy target for bashing, while the 
person criticizing the vested interest becomes the hero for making it easy to realize 
the popular will. Understanding this side of the argument is useful in understand-
ing the bashing of public servants and bureaucrats in some local governments 
(although that is not to say that in some cases the bashing may not be justified, or 
that supposedly unavoidable wastefulness and inefficiency in operation does not 
still exist, despite past criticism). 
 However, as the organizations and systems maintaining modern society are 
inherently complicated, simplistic explanations should not be applied to their 
operation. Any attempts to make them easier to understand and explain in simpler 
terms would require some parts of the explanation to be arbitrarily removed, and 
such outcomes would be unreasonable. Because bureaucratic organization exists, 
so too do the rules created for the organization. In theory, all processing would 
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policies that incur ordinary costs is support from the people of the middle class 
even under circumstances where stable tax revenue is secured. Thus, it is neces-
sary to give adequate consideration to how to get the support of these people 
(Miyamoto, 2009: 100–102).
(2)		Political	Party	Support	and	Voting	Behavior
In order to realize policy, it is first necessary to gather supporters. This entails 
building a political party by gathering people with similar opinions on policy and 
having them sell these policy details to the public. Four political scientists from the 
University of Michigan in the U.S., Agnus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren 
E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, shine a light on political support in their book 
The American Voter. In this book, they introduce the Michigan Model, which is 
now well known among political scientists. The key points of this model, as sum-
marized by Ichiro Miyake, are the following: 1) most voters have a sense of attach-
ment to a political party; 2) this sense of attachment is formed by socialization in 
the home; 3) even if leaders, policies, and general plans change, voters continue to 
hold a sense of attachment to the same party; 4) reasons for changing this sense of 
attachment are cases when the parents’ sense of attachment to the political party 
was weak, those in which the reference group changed after becoming adult, or 
times in which there was large-scale social change; 5) the sense of attachment to a 
political party was accurately reflected by the psychological closeness and strength 
of sentiment to the party;4 6) if the sense of attachment to a political party was 
strong, the voter was more likely to vote for the political party; 7) the stronger the 
level of attachment, the more likely it was for the voter’s orientation concerning 
the evaluation and recognition of political phenomena to be in agreement with 
the political party; 8) even if the voting behavior and the sense of attachment to 
a political party were not in agreement, this was temporary because of a specific 
battleground policy issue or the appeal of a candidate.
 This sense of attachment to a political party has a more stable effect on voting 
behavior compared with attitudes on the candidates themselves or on individual 
policies. In Japan, the word political party attachment is not used very much. The 
term that is exclusively used is political party support. However, under a multi-
party system in particular, political party support and support strength may not 
necessarily be in agreement. This is because support of a certain political party may 
not necessarily equate to the non-support of other political parties; and, according 
to a survey that used an actual sentiment thermometer,5 close to 30% of respon-
dents indicated a favorable evaluation of higher than 50 points for multiple politi-
cal parties (Miyake, 1989: 100–114).6
 Surveys of political party support that are measured by normal public opin-
ion polls show no more than the distribution as it existed at the time of the sur-
vey. Even if the change in the rate of support is not that large, when focusing on 
individuals, there are a considerably large number of people who shift their party 
of support over a long time period.7 Although the political support in Japan is 
more unstable than what is assumed by the aforementioned Michigan model, it 
is comparatively stable when compared with other political attitudes. Aside from 
has gone bankrupt. I cannot trust this government.” When more and more people 
believe the rhetoric, the government’s actual ongoing survival becomes threatened 
(Noguchi, 2011: 70–74). If this increases the scale of the problems that the gov-
ernment must deal with, then the people witnessing these problems perceive a 
broader range of things to be the government’s responsibility. The growth of this 
kind of public criticism can be observed even in the U.S., which aims for small 
government (Kettl, 2008, trans. 2011: 33–62).3
 Once an administrative service is offered, rather than people becoming satis-
fied, it counterintuitively leads to a swelling of dissatisfaction. The explanation for 
this is not simply because once people receive a service, they become spoilt and 
no longer appreciate its worth. The actual reason for the dissatisfaction is because 
when a service is provided, this in itself creates a demand; and as that demand 
increases, the supply is perceived as being inadequate by the people wishing to 
receive the service. Say, for instance, that a policy providing assistance for school 
expenses to some people were implemented. When the recipients of this service 
appear in society, it is only natural for people not able to receive this service to 
want to be recipients as well. Thus, unless assistance for school expenses is pro-
vided to everybody, there will always be somebody dissatisfied about the service. 
But to fully remove this dissatisfaction, it would be necessary to commit consider-
able resources (Mabuchi, 2010).
 If the people of Japan set a future course of public burden evasion, the only 
choice ultimately available would be to entrust the welfare and the education 
industries to market mechanisms. Japan’s already high wages, however, would 
make it difficult for a service industry to offer low-priced services. Hence, it is 
doubtful that a service could be supplied to the market that is simple and afford-
able enough, even for middle-class people. That is a reason to be concerned about 
for the future. It is why the rational individual works hard at saving in preparation 
for the risks that lie ahead, and why economic activity wanes (Kenjo, 2004: 163).
 If the government increased the public burden, however, it would accommo-
date increased demand for daycare (thereby increasing the workforce demand), 
promote women’s entry into the workforce, and consumer buying power would 
rise. Thus, the needs of women wishing to juggle both career and family could 
be granted. In urban areas, in particular, dissatisfaction vis-à-vis daycare services, 
mainly for preschool age children, is known to be extreme. If a government made 
it a priority to invest capital in this area, it would surely contribute to reversing the 
declining birthrate (Kenjo, 2004: 184–193). If the current situation is allowed to 
continue, the population structure will become increasingly skewed, and the share 
of the public burden ultimately shouldered by the younger generation who have 
landed in this situation will weigh heavier and likely cause resentment toward such 
perceived unfairness.
 One stream of opinion that cannot be ignored believes that the fiscal crisis 
facing the government justifies imposing income restrictions and some kind of 
exclusion measures. A clear line needs to be drawn here. Otherwise, ultimately 
after such policy effects fade, the end result will increase doubt among the people. 
Conversely, what is indispensable for the education, social security, and welfare 
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people (16.7%) who voted DPJ in the first three elections, 313 actually voted for a 
party other than the DPJ in 2012. That means more than 70% of the people who 
voted DPJ in the first three elections voted for another party in 2012.
 Looking at Table 8-1, although there certainly appear to be many people who 
voted for the same parties in the preceding and subsequent elections, there are also 
a significant number of people who did not. For example, the people who voted 
for the LDP in the House of Councilors election of 2007 swung considerably to 
Table 8-1   Change of Voted Political Party from Panel Study (Change by Individuals)
Comparison of votes of 21st House of Councilors election(2007) and 45th House of Representatives election (2009)
LDP DPJ NK JCP/SDP Other No vote Forgot
LDP 285 201 11 3 15 53 22
DPJ 91 728 4 28 48 46 28
NK 9 23 96 2 3 9 4
JCP/SDP 7 27 0 78 5 5 9
Other 11 11 0 0 21 3 3
No vote 66 192 4 13 11 370 64
Forgot 43 134 15 15 13 61 86
Comparison of votes of 45th House of Representatives election(2009) and 22nd House of Councilors election (2010)
LDP DPJ NK JCP/SDP Other No vote Forgot
LDP 363 38 10 3 48 26 29
DPJ 106 802 16 25 121 125 116
NK 4 3 100 0 4 5 7
JCP/SDP 7 19 1 77 11 7 15
Other 11 9 2 0 73 8 8
No vote 44 33 9 6 18 372 57
Forgot 19 20 1 3 18 41 111
Comparison of votes of 22nd House of Councilors election (2010) and 46th House of Representativeselection (2012)
LDP DPJ NK JCP/SDP Other No vote Forgot
LDP 407 25 10 8 102 98 25
DPJ 238 233 15 40 352 216 50
NK 14 5 97 2 10 20 3
JCP/SDP 14 7 0 91 15 19 6
Other 70 23 1 11 195 40 18
No vote 75 21 5 9 89 514 30
Forgot 60 26 16 21 79 123 102
Source: Japanese Life Course Panel Survey (JLPS) by the Institute of Social Sciences, The University of Tokyo
Notes: LDP=Liberal Democratic Party, DPJ=Democratic Party of Japan
NK=New Komeito, JCP=Japan Communist Party, SDP=Social Democratic Party
the effect of political support based on parties representing industries, or the effect 
of political socialization later in life, the breadth of fundamental political sup-
port is associated with conservative or reformist ideologies. Moreover, according 
to an interpretation based on data at the time of the Cold War, the political party 
image more frequently comes from the ability to rule than from ideology or social 
groups. This is considered to be the factor decisively separating the LDP from the 
other opposition parties (Miyake, 1989: 126–127).
 During elections, voters will end up voting for a political party or a candi-
date. The underlying significance of this in a parliamentary democracy is that the 
political parties that ultimately win seats have the decisive power to sway politics. 
However, it is often said that the stereotypical image of the ideology of the political 
party does not necessarily match the policies that political parties actually put for-
ward. In Japan, the layer of safe political party support is not necessarily composed 
of a majority of the people. There are many people, in fact, who change whom they 
vote for depending on the election. Probably the best way to accurately under-
stand political party support and voting behavior is to study in detail this relation-
ship between voting behavior and voter mindset. This is why it will not suffice to 
use a questionnaire survey that is collected at a single point in time. Instead, it is 
necessary to verify the changes and trends in mindset and voting behavior among 
individuals using panel data that follow the same individual.
3.   Relationship between Political Party Support and  
Attitudes on Policies
(1)		Changes	in	Voting	Behavior	among	Individuals
The data used here stem from the “Japanese Life Course Panel Surveys”8 con-
ducted from 2007 by the Institute of Social Science, Tokyo University. The sources 
of these data are men and women from all over Japan aged 20–40. As of 2014, the 
project is ongoing, and a follow-up survey wave is to be conducted once a year.
 Included in this panel survey are data on voting behavior for the last four 
national elections (the 21st House of Councilors election of July 2007, the 45th 
House of Representatives election of August 2009, the 22nd House of Councilors 
election of July 2010, and the 46th House of Representatives election of December 
2012). In the analysis, the data of the second, fourth, fifth, and seventh waves are 
used, which includes these voting results.
 Table 8-1 follows the change in voting behavior based on the voting behav-
ior of 2,587 people over four elections. Among these results, the most numerous 
sample is that of 216 people (8.3%) who did not vote in any of the four elections. 
After that, there were 153 people (5.9%) who voted LDP in all four elections, 148 
people (5.7%) who voted DPJ in the first three elections but for another political 
party in 2012, 121 people (4.7%) who voted DPJ in all four elections, 77 people 
(3.0%) who voted DPJ in the first three elections but for the LDP in 2012, 67 
people (2.6%) who voted for the DPJ in the first three elections but did not vote 
in 2012, 50 people (1.9%) who voted for New Komeito in all four elections, and 
42 people (1.6%) who voted for the JCP in all four elections. Note that of the 434 
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other parties (e.g., the Japan Restoration Party, Your Party, or the LDP).
 There were also many people who did not vote. The number of people who 
did not vote in both the previous 2010 election and this 2012 election, moreover, 
exceeded 500, which was close to 15% of this cross table sample. Although it is 
not possible to verify the voting behavior for the elections prior to this, by looking 
at this cross table alone, we can tell that there are a certain number of people who 
were not exercising their vote, either because they were disillusioned with politics 
or because they had lost interest. Moreover, as we can also see in Figure 7-3, the 
LDP recovered a large number of seats in this election (winning more than 60% 
of all seats), but their vote ratio did not reach 30% of proportional representa-
tion. The table shows that the LDP voters were certainly the largest number (878 
people). However, this number does not differ much from the other 842 people 
who voted, and the LDP only gained 37% of the entire vote. Moreover, including 
the people who chose not to or forgot to vote, the LDP received just over 25% of 
voter confidence.
 Two particular characteristics of the people who voted DPJ in both 2009 and 
2012 are that 1) significantly more of them were born between 1966–1975 (rather 
than between 1976–1986); and 2) significantly less of them worked in sales, were 
farmers/self-employed, or were blue-collar workers (in contrast to office work). In 
other words, this means that the non-white-collar strata in the younger group had 
a propensity not to vote for the DPJ.
(2)		Political	Party	Favorability	Rating	and	Political	Attitude
According to Yukio Maeda, who analyzed these panel data, the choice of the sup-
ported political party (not the political party voted for in the election) has stability 
to some extent: there are many people who change from supporting a particular 
party to not supporting any party at all, but there are not many people who switch 
allegiances from one party to another or repeatedly change the supported party. 
Among the women, there were many who were unwaveringly independent from 
any party, or who were politically apathetic, while among the people supporting 
a political party, there were many men. The more the number of LDP supporters, 
DPJ supporters, and unwaveringly independent people increased, the higher the 
level of education. However except for the small number of women’s support for 
the DPJ, the overall relationships between social attributes and political party sup-
port are vague. In terms of individual mindset and political policies, for the gap 
mindset (i.e., that it is necessary for the prosperity of Japan that the income gap 
is big) and for the marriage mindset (i.e., generally speaking, a married person is 
happier than a person who is not married), there is a connection with LDP sup-
port and unwaveringly independent people; and for both cases, the more the per-
son agreed with the statement, the stronger the tendency for that person to be an 
LDP supporter. In general, opinions on defense policy are clearly divided between 
LDP supporters and DPJ supporters, and there are no welfare-related grounds 
causing a division between the two. For defense and welfare, the views of LDP and 
DPJ supporters clearly differ from those of New Komeito and the JCP. Among 
the people without a clearly supported political party, there were those who were 
the DPJ; however, notably at the same time, there were a considerable number of 
cases of people not having voted in the previous election deciding to vote for the 
DPJ in 2009. From this, we can well understand that there were enormous expec-
tations for regime change in 2009.
 Looking at a comparison of 2010 with 2009, while there were not many people 
who swung from the LDP to the DPJ, a good number of people swung from 
the DPJ to the LDP. As a whole, however, there were many people who contin-
ued to vote for the the DPJ. In this election, the DPJ’s vote ratio and seat ratio 
fell compared not only with the previous House of Representatives election but 
also with the House of Councilors election of 2007. Despite the air of defeat sur-
rounding the DPJ, which was suffering ongoing party turmoil characterized by 
the Hatoyama administration’s collapse over the relocation of the Futemma Base, 
in terms of the actual vote ratio, this was still higher for the DPJ than the LDP. 
Ultimately, however, due to the nature of the electoral system, the number of LDP 
seats increased (Figure 8-1). In the panel survey’s sample, which is limited to a pro-
portion of the younger generations, and not therefore representative of all of the 
voters, there were 554 proportional representation LDP voters and 924 propor-
tional representation DPJ voters, showing that there were overwhelmingly more 
DPJ voters. It should be pointed out that among the people who voted DPJ in the 
previous House of Representatives election but swung on this election, compared 
with those who swung to voting LDP, there were quite a number of them that 
swung to vote for another party (e.g., Your Party) or chose not to vote at all.
 We see a completely changed situation, however, when we look at the House of 
Representatives election of 2010 and the House of Councilors election of 2012. 
Among the people who voted for the DPJ in 2010, those who voted for DPJ in 
2012 were not the majority; the overwhelming majority had swung to one of the 
Figure 8-1  Trends in Results of House of Councilors Elections
Source: MIC
Notes: YP=Your Party
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This shows that the preferences (or scores) among the individuals are more dis-
persed for these parties.
 Next, Table 8-3 shows the trend of scores for attitudes on policies and political 
opinions. The values range between 1 and -1, with positive scores indicating agree-
ment. The movement that stands out over this period is a sharp increase in agree-
ment for the strengthening of Japan’s military defense and support for the Security 
Treaty, perhaps reflecting, in particular, the deteriorating relationship with 
Table 8-2   Changes in Political Party Favorablity Rating (max score = 100)
2008 2010 2011 2013
LDP   Ave. 42.65 40.48 44.67 52.05
Std. Dev. 20.62 20.29 20.45 20.81
DPJ   Ave. 47.37 44.45 37.60 34.38
Std.Dev. 18.73 20.87 21.40 20.72
NK    Ave. 33.28 30.95 31.88 32.62
Std.Dev. 22.61 22.75 22.89 22.82
JCP    Ave. 33.50 33.78 32.97 32.32
Std.Dev. 21.43 21.39 21.76 21.62
SPJ    Ave. 33.98 33.55 32.99 30.71
Std.Dev. 20.24 20.48 20.60 20.92
N 3785 3070 4071 3675
Source: JLPS
Table 8-3   Changes in Score of Political Attitudes
2008 2010 2011 2013
A) Strengthen defence  Ave. .132 .096 .301 .389
Std. Dev. .738 .714 .682 .674
B) Maintain Security Treaty  Ave. −.017 .034 .193 .290
Std. Dev. .661 .651 .628 .621
C) Narrow income gap  Ave. .350 .293 .275 .276
Std. Dev. .677 .698 .675 .664
D) Secure employment through public   Ave. .370 .439 .454 .448
       works Std. Dev. .688 .686 .670 .667
E) Enhance welfare  Ave. .663 .625 .561 .467
Std. Dev. .571 .590 .639 .674
F) Not entitled to welfare  Ave. −.003 .066 .146 .279
Std. Dev. .774 .773 .753 .732
N 3895 3127 4226 3736
Source: JLPS
repulsed by political parties and others with no feeling of opposition against politi-
cal parties; and there was a strong general tendency among the former to vote LDP 
in 2005 and for the latter to vote DPJ in 2009 (Maeda, 2013).
 Although people can only choose one “supported political party,” as previously 
mentioned, an individual may give a high favorability rating to a political party 
even if it is not their first choice. Under such circumstances, it is conceivable that 
the individual could decide to change which political party to vote for. In this 
survey, there are questions that use the sentiment thermometer. Because the sub-
jects were asked for their favorability ratings of the five parties (LDP, DPJ, New 
Komeito, JCP, and SDP) over the course of four surveys, we will here look at the 
changes in these. Moreover, it is pertinent to investigate whether this change was 
influenced by individual environmental (or attributable) factors and whether it 
relates to a change in mindset toward the policies.
 However, the mindset on education policy, the policy directly relevant to this 
book, is not included in the survey. Instead, we will therefore use these data to ana-
lyze items of mindset related to various attitudes on politics and policy. We exam-
ine here whether there is some kind of relationship between changes in mindset 
and changes in political party favorability ratings. A question concerning mind-
set asked, “Do you agree or disagree with the following opinions? For each opin-
ion, please mark a circle to indicate your degree of agreement/disagreement.” The 
opinions stated on the survey were: A) Japan’s military defense capabilities should 
be strengthened; B) The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the 
United States and Japan should be strengthened; C) It is the responsibility of the 
government to narrow the income gap between people with a high income and 
people with a low income; D) Public works projects are important for securing 
local employment; E) Even when the budget must be tough, social welfare such 
as pensions and healthcare for the elderly should be enriched as much as possible; 
and F) Apart from the elderly and people with mental or physical disabilities, all 
people must live without counting on social welfare. Each opinion had five levels 
from agree to disagree.
 For this analysis, however, “Agree” and “Somewhat agree” were collated and 
given the score of 1, while “Disagree” and “Somewhat disagree” were collated and 
given the score of −1. “Neither agree nor disagree” was given the score of 0. The 
answer “Don’t know” was also an option, and this was also given the score of 0 for 
the sake of convenience.
 First, let us look at the trend of the favorability ratings of the political parties. 
Table 8-2 lists the results. As already stated, using only the data from 2007, 2009, 
and 2012 ensures that the targeted data belong to surveys with data of national-
election voting behavior. Even these can only be treated as a rough trend. The 
favorability rating for the LDP was at its lowest in 2010 directly after the change of 
government. Thereafter, it began to improve, reaching over 50 in 2013. The favor-
ability rating of the DPJ, on the other hand, follows a downward course. There are 
not any significant changes in the favorability rating of the New Komeito, the JCP, 
and the SDP, with each lower than the LDP and the DPJ. New Komeito and the 
JCP show an increase in the standard deviation compared with the other parties. 
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 The explanation of exact details of the analysis is provided in Allison (2009) 
and Nakazawa (2012). One thing that should be mentioned, however, is that the 
coefficients that are constant variables show a relationship between the individ-
ual characteristics that were originally possessed by the respondent and his or her 
favorability ratings towards political parties, which is the dependent variable (in 
other words, it changes between individuals). Allison does not proactively provide 
interpretation for a coefficient of the average among the individuals for the vari-
ables that may change. One thing that should be mentioned, however, is that the 
coefficient shows the difference between the individuals with average scores for 
political attitude as the dependent variable when the average among the individual 
has risen by 1. On the other hand, the coefficient of the variable that took the dif-
ferences between the average among the individuals and the score of each time 
point among the individuals shows the amount of change of the political attitude 
as the dependent variable when there is a change of one explanatory variable for 
an individual. This coefficient matches the coefficient of the fixed effect model in 
the econometric model in the case that data have no loss (balanced panel data). In 
other words, when you want to see “the favorability rating of the political party of 
a person who has had a certain thought from the start” you should look at the coef-
ficient of the average for  the individual, and when you want to see “how favorabil-
ity rating for a political party changes among a person who comes to hold certain 
thoughts” then you should look at the average coefficient for an individual.
 Table 8-4 lists the analysis results. The occupation and household income were 
removed from the list as they had no significant effect on the favorability ratings 
of political parties, and they were unnecessarily complicated. The dummy variable 
coefficients at the time of the survey were also removed from the results because 
they only indicated the changes of the favorability ratings of the political parties 
from 2008, and the general trends can be evaluated from Table 8-2.
 Looking at the differences among individuals, New Komeito and the SDP had 
low scores among people with high academic records. The reason for this was not 
clear, but at least on distribution, compared with junior/senior-high school gradu-
ates, New Komeito received low scores of 2.897 points among two-year/technical 
college graduates and 5.635 points among university/graduate school graduates. 
The SDP received a low score of 1.546 points for university/graduate school grad-
uates. In contrast to this, women tended to give significantly higher points to New 
Komeito, the JCP, and the SDP.
 First, let us take a look at the coefficient of the average for the individual. The 
LDP average for the individual is positively significant by defense capacity, security 
treaty, and public works project, while the income gap cancellation is significantly 
negative. In other words, originally the person with an affirmative opinion gives 
the Liberal Democratic Party a high score with respect to the three former issues 
and has an affirmative opinion of the latter one, giving the Liberal Democratic 
Party a low score. The coefficient of the average for the individual reflects the dif-
ference in ideology between political parties to some extent. People with an affir-
mative stance toward military defense and the Security Treaty tend to give high 
points to the LDP, and they also rate the DPJ highly (although not as much as 
neighboring countries. In addition, the opinion that welfare should be enhanced 
remained dominant, but the score considerably decreased; in contrast, the oppo-
site opinion toward welfare increased. It is not possible to evaluate the vote ratio 
of the House of Representatives election of 2012 as entirely representing a return 
to the LDP. A new conservative, third force in the political arena emerged in the 
shape of the Japan Restoration Party and Your Party, and both these parties advo-
cate small government. We can expect the change in orientation to these political 
parties to be reflective of the trend of political opinions.
(3)		Analysis	of	Panel	Data
In Chapter 7, JGSS data were used to analyze the relationship between social 
attributes and political attitudes. As JGSS represent cross-sectional data (as data 
obtained from one survey), even if some relationship between mindset and social 
attributes were to be detected, the most rigorous assertion that can be made is 
that there is some kind of relationship in the distribution. For example, it is not 
possible to determine whether it is because people originally had that social status 
that they tend to hold these attitudes, or whether people tend to assume these 
attitudes by acquiring such social status. In other words, when there is a relation-
ship between independent variables and dependent variables, it either means that 
dependent-variable change is brought about by independent-variable change, or it 
just means that the person with independent-variable characteristics also tends to 
have specific dependent-variable ones, and that independent-variable changes do 
not necessarily lead to dependent-variables change. Unless panel data are viewed, 
then it is not possible to distinguish which is the case. In order to perform this rig-
orous classification, it is essential to perform panel data analysis.9
 Although there are several methods that can be used for panel data analysis, we 
will examine changes in the favorability ratings of political parties using the hybrid 
model that is advocated by Paul D. Allison (Allison, 2009).
 The explanatory variables used here are sex (the dummy variable of woman = 1), 
birth cohort (the dummy variable assumes 1 if the birth year is within the range 
of 1966–75, with the standard category assigned to birth year within the range 
of 1976–86), educational background (three categories of junior/senior high 
school graduate, two-year/technical college graduate, university/graduate school 
graduate), occupation (as in Chapter 7, occupational classification is based on 
the Erikson-Goldthorpe-Portocarero typology), household income, marital sta-
tus, and dummy variable showing the time of survey (2008 is made the standard 
variable, and 2010, 2011, and 2013 are included as dummy variables). Among 
these variables, sex, birth cohort, and educational background are those that do 
not change in the individual within the observation period. The other variables 
may change within the observation period. Concerning the other variables that 
may change, except the survey time dummies, models were cast for both the aver-
age score among the individuals and the score showing the difference from the 
average among the individuals and the score for each time period. This represents 
the hybrid model. For the calculation, random effect estimation was conducted 
for the analysis of the panel data.
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the LDP). In the case of the Security Treaty, however, the DPJ is significant at the 
10% level, and the coefficient is also small. This may reflect the party’s stance on 
the U.S. base problem in Okinawa. Among the people supporting New Komeito, 
which is in coalition with the LDP, they are negative about strengthening military 
defense, although they are affirmative about the Security Treaty. The JCP and SDP 
supporters are also negative with regard to strengthening military defense, but in 
the SDP, the negative degree is weak and not significant concerning the Security 
Treaty.
 The LDP/New Komeito stance and the JCP/SDP stance are in opposition to 
each other on the issue of the income gap, but the positive coefficient of the DPJ 
is not significant. On the issue of public works projects, opinion was significantly 
negative among the DPJ supporters but significantly positive among the LDP and 
New Komeito supporters. The support base for the SDP, which was in coalition 
with the DPJ when they formed the government, tended to be affirmative about 
securing employment through public works projects. On the issue of the enhance-
ment of welfare, the divide in opinion takes the shape of the LDP on one side and 
the other parties on the other.
 When looking at change within the individual, in other words, the coefficient 
becomes significant for the LDP, as it did for the average for the individual. This 
means that there is a relationship whereby the favorability rating for the LDP tends 
to be higher among people with affirmative opinions on defense, the Security 
Treaty, and public works, and lower among people with affirmative opinions on 
eliminating the income gap and enhancing welfare. Those among the DPJ sup-
porters originally with affirmative opinions on the Security Treaty (at the 10% 
level), had the tendency to give a high favorability rating, although rising only 
by 0.534 points, but when there was a change in the individual toward having an 
affirmative opinion on the Security Treaty, we can see the favorability rating for 
the DPJ lowering by 0.745 points. Looking at New Komeito, the influence on the 
favorability rating from changes in opinion was practically nonexistent. The favor-
ability rating can mostly be explained by the differences in ideology and orienta-
tion held from the start. The same can be said for the JCP, in that the proportion 
that is explained by difference in orientation from the start is large. Concerning 
the opinion that “people in society should subsist without counting on welfare,” it 
is held from the start, although there was not a significant effect for the favorability 
rating itself. If we connect the favorability rating to an affirmative opinion, we 
can understand the favorability rating toward the political party to be low. As for 
the SDP, the average for the individual was positively significant for public works 
projects, but for the change in the individual, it was significantly negative (at the 
10% level); and considering the people who held an affirmative view on securing 
employment through public works projects, we can see that their favorability rat-
ing toward the political party lowered.
 The table does not show the effect of change on the favorability rating toward a 
political party for changes in occupation or income because there was very little. 
However, with respect to occupation, it is worth mentioning that those people 
among New Komeito, JCP, and SDP that were originally blue collar tended to 
Table 8-4  Result of Panel Data Hybrid Model Analysis
LDP DPJ NK JCP SDP
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Female .094 .579 .439 .578 3.665 .703 *** 3.887 .654 *** 5.474 .598 ***
Born 1966–1975 .607 .547 .814 .545 .001 .664 −.977 .616 −1.765 .564 **
2-year/tech college .389 .655 .534 .653 −2.897 .795 *** .234 .739 −.631 .676
University/graduate school .974 .690 .995 .689 −5.624 .839 *** −1.083 .779 −1.546 .713 *
Ave. in individual
Married .037 .643 −.439 .578 *** 2.104 .779 ** .038 .724 .799 .663
Strengthen Defence 1.710 .550 ** .814 .545 *** −5.989 .663 *** −4.271 .618 *** −6.955 .566 ***
Maintain Security Treaty 8.114 .644 *** .534 .653 + 5.606 .777 *** −2.277 .724 ** −.271 .664
Government should reduce 
income gap −5.160 .501 *** .995 .689 −1.334 .606 * 2.583 .564 *** 1.272 .516 **
Local employment by public 
works 6.372 .510 *** −1.113 .510 * 5.873 .616 *** .407 .573 1.573 .525 **
Improve elderly healthcare 
regardless of fiscal state −.844 .574 2.739 .573 *** 1.256 .693 + 1.522 .645 * 3.004 .591 ***
No entitlement to welfare .509 .447 −.753 .447 + −1.319 .539 * −.630 .502 −.519 .461
Change in individual
Married −1.280 .798 1.511 .874 + −1.039 .763 −.633 .794 −.990 .783
Strengthen Defence 1.612 .325 *** −.189 .356 .237 .311 −1.026 .324 ** −1.011 .319 **
Maintain Security Treaty 1.989 .330 *** −.745 .362 * .548 .316 + −.209 .329 −.605 .324 +
Government should reduce 
income gap −.709 .306 * .243 .335 .163 .292 .220 .304 .335 .300
Local employment by public 
works 1.290 .307 *** −1.297 .337 *** .082 .294 −.104 .306 −.498 .301 +
Improve elderly healthcare 
regardless of fiscal state −.654 .326 * 1.165 .357 ** .233 .313 .375 .325 1.112 .320 **
No entitlement to welfare .463 .250 + −.292 .274 −.134 .240 −.545 .249 * −.224 .245
N of observations 12617 12629 12587 12583 12560
N of persons 4055 4057 4049 4048 4047
R2 (within) .122 .135 .007 .006 .017
R2 (between) .145 .056 .099 .065 .113
R2 (overall) .150 .088 .081 .056 .096
 +p < .10   *p < .05   **p < .01   ***p < .001
Note:  Other explanatory variables considered were employment and household income (both ave. in individual and 
change in individual).
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parties in their debates centered specifically on the allocation of resources for edu-
cation and social security. The political parties advocating socialist principles were 
opposed to increasing taxes, and positions like this probably made it hard to com-
municate party intention to the voters due to the entanglement of political party 
ideology and assertions at the time of the elections. The points of difference con-
cerning education policy between the political parties centered on such issues as 
the content of education and the National Flag and National Anthem, while con-
cerns of equalization of educational opportunities and tuition fees did not become 
battleground issues. If equalization of education opportunities and the lightening 
of the tuition fee burden were raised as election slogans, there would have been 
no guarantee that the policies would be supported (it would also have been dif-
ficult to wage an election campaign using a slogan that negated these policies). 
Therefore, from the standpoint of the LDP, which had a long hold on power, the 
party’s true feeling was probably not to consider or mention public burdens in the 
public finance arena.
 The election of 2009 was different from past elections in that issues related to 
education and public finance, such as child allowance and dispensing with fees for 
public senior high schools, became battleground issues. Moreover, as mentioned 
in Chapter 7, fiscal resources were planned so that the policies came in a set with 
the abolition of spousal tax reduction, as well as with the idea to realize gender 
equality in society and to raise children as an entire society. With respect to this 
point, it was very significant that the battleground issues relating to education, 
public finance, and social security were presented in this election. However, the 
political party’s intention was not very well communicated. The mood among vot-
ers in this election was not to vote on social security and education as battleground 
issues but rather to implement regime change. It would be more accurate to say 
that the novelty for a DPJ government was preferred due to the lack of confidence 
in the LDP Government. With respect to education, the DPJ Government cer-
tainly fulfilled some of the election promises, but with respect to the payment of 
the child allowance, it encountered fiscal resource problems and was unable to 
achieve the policy aims.
 When putting forward policy to enhance public services for Japan, which is 
plagued by fiscal issues, it is necessary to consider the deeper issue of public bur-
den. In future, if any policies get put forward that do not thoroughly explain the 
fiscal resources, this will be taken as a further act of irresponsibility. However, the 
LDP and New Komeito returned in a coalition government, child allowance was 
abolished, and means testing was applied to dispensing with senior high school 
fees. This has established new divisions between the stances of the political parties. 
This need not be understood negatively as a failure of policy; instead these divi-
sions should be actively appealed to as battleground issues that show differences 
of stance between the political parties. Up until now in Japan, it has been prob-
lematic that no political party has proposed policies that responsibly and properly 
address the relationship between the public burden and the public services pro-
vided. From its inception, the DPJ has been a motley crew. Inside the party, there 
are people with ideologies more conservative and nationalistic than the LDP, and 
provide a high score for the favorability rating. However, among the people sup-
porting the LDP and DPJ, there were no significant relationships with occupation 
and income.
 What we refer to as “political party support” refers to choosing a specific politi-
cal party. But there are an overwhelmingly large number of people in Japan who 
select “no supported party.” Therefore, the political party favorability rating based 
on the sentiment thermometer studied here has a different index concept, and the 
results that can be observed do not necessarily match the aforementioned survey 
of Maeda (2013). Generally, people who subscribe to a political party do so with 
strong conviction, and this type of people in particular would need some kind of 
strong impetus to make them switch their support to a different political party. 
Favorability rating, on the other hand is considered to be a concept with a much 
higher likelihood of fluctuation. However, if a favorability rating changes toward a 
political party, especially in Japan, where there are many people with no supported 
political party (i.e., a large swinging voter base), this can be expected to directly 
influence voting behavior in an election.10
(4)		What	Should	Be	Done	to	Reflect	the	Popular	Will?
Excluding some political parties, there are cases where political parties have 
labor unions and industry associations that serve as vote gathering mechanisms. 
However, the organizational power of these associations is weakening, and it is 
becoming more difficult for a situation in which people with particular attributes 
support a certain political party to occur. This is because voting behavior can easily 
be swayed by images and media coverage before an election; and due to the single-
seat constituency, the end result tends to be an exaggeration of voter sentiment. In 
prior research on this, there seem to have been many findings that Japanese atti-
tudes toward welfare are not directly connected to political party support or voter 
behavior. When we look at panel surveys of the younger population base, it seems 
that welfare has been actively made a battleground issue, and we see a splitting of 
opinion.
 There was a large drop in the DPJ support ratio in the election of 2012, but 
the battleground issues of the two major parties of the LDP and SPJ, under what 
is referred to as the 55-year system, were concentrated in the ideological arena of 
the constitution, the Security Treaty, and the Self-Defense Force. The oppositional 
structures of the two parties became institutionalized, and the function of elections 
for the selection of policy was not fully realized. Moreover, this ideological divide 
was not necessarily relevant to the lifestyle concerns of the people as a whole. That 
is why issues such as the economy, welfare, and education (even though these are 
considered important by the people and raised as topics of debate) did not surface 
as serious battleground issues in the election. However, after the collapse of the 
Cold War, the ideological divide that existed up until then lost its relevance. Issues 
such as taxes and social security were brought to the foreground. Yet, although 
the differences between Japan’s political parties had been clear in the ideological 
arena with regard to issues such as the constitution, the Security Treaty, and the 
Self-Defense Force, there had never been any clear divide between the political 
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reduce the individual burden for welfare and education, while claiming that there 
is no need to increase the public burden. History has already shown that these pro-
posals do not broaden support.
 Looking at the results presented in this chapter, there appear to be some clear 
differences among the political parties with regard to their political stances on gov-
ernment size and public services. However, it is also a contradiction that the LDP 
and New Komeito have formed a coalition as they represent stances and supporter 
bases quite far apart on the issue of welfare. The people should be offered easy-to-
understand options based on policy stance and not on bringing stability to the 
political situation.
Supplementary Commentary
 As the following digresses from the central theme of this book, I at first hesitated 
to include it, but as it further presents a valuable opportunity to do so, I wish 
to simply mention it here. One of the extremely perturbing observations of the 
results of this panel survey analysis was an increasing trend of support for strength-
ening the defense capacity and the Security Treaty system, which can be referred 
to as a clear tendency for nationalism and conservatism (Table 8-3). It seems obvi-
ous that the background to this is the deteriorating relationship with neighboring 
countries, including China and South Korea.
 As of February 2014, the second Abe administration is gathering considerable 
support, and the support of the DPJ is very low. It now seems strange to refer to 
the LDP and DPJ as the two major parties. It has been stated in this book that the 
results of the House of Representatives election of 2012 did not necessarily suggest 
that there was active support for the LDP. However, it would be on shaky grounds 
to go so far as to assert that the second Abe administration is losing the support of 
the people. Currently, there is a high support rate for the cabinet and the situation 
is still very fluid. Although there may be big changes in the future, the situation 
is different from the first Abe administration in that it is quite noticeable that the 
level of critical appraisal in the media has reduced compared with before. 
 One of the points that can be observed from the panel data analysis of Table 8-4 
is that although people who were nationalistic from the start tended to evaluate 
the LDP highly, people who thought that the military defense capability should be 
reinforced and those who supported the Security Treaty tended also to evaluate the 
LDP highly. It would appear that this is not unrelated to the high level of support 
that the LDP is currently receiving. Although the DPJ Government was character-
ized, in particular, by numerous policy failures, its reputation was also decisively 
damaged by its perceived “cowardly” posture surrounding issues of territory and 
historical recognition and an inability to come up with effective solutions.
 It was the LDP Government that originally left the territorial problem unre-
solved. The responsibility of the LDP Government of that time should also, there-
fore, be brought into question, rather than pushing all of the responsibility onto 
the DPJ. In addition, there is a considerable problem with the strong sentiment of 
nationalism in China and South Korea and the news covering it; and one cannot 
it is certainly not the case that there are no members advocating the principle of 
small government. Although schisms occurred at the end of the term of govern-
ment, this should be understood as a good chance to make political assertions and 
reorganize the party.
 With the arrival of the aging society, if we are to suppose that the social secu-
rity system in Japan will be one that follows a pay-as-you-go plan, then just as 
people talk about the intergenerational divide, we can expect generational inter-
ests to cause intergenerational conflict. There is debate on whether there actually 
is an intergenerational divide, but the formation of public sentiment is based on 
whether or not something exists, as well as whether or not there are many people 
who believe it exists. Hence, public sentiment will form regardless of whether or 
not the gap actually exists. The questions about the tax system, such as whether 
income tax will remain at the center, as it has until now, whether consumption 
tax will come to be considered as the basic tax, or whether taxes will be raised, 
are largely dependent on the social design that the voter envisages. Moreover, the 
question of what to do with the tax system in the future is not unrelated to the 
discussion of the intergenerational gap. With a tax system centered on income tax, 
the burden of the working generation will be the central revenue. However, with 
consumption tax, the tax system is more broadly spread out. Consumption tax 
is discussed as if it were only a regressive tax. However, the regressive characteris-
tics are only highlighted when considering the public burden side. Tax should be 
evaluated based on what it is used for in total. If public services were to be provided 
universally, making consumption tax the basic tax is the only option. Getting the 
public to understand that point was the means by which consumption tax became 
the basic tax in northern Europe.
 Elderly people have a higher share of the vote while the younger people have 
a lower share of the vote. However, all people will become elderly people if they 
survive long enough. As this means that it is easier for votes supporting welfare for 
the elderly to be collected, it is natural that the policies of political parties tend to 
be aware of issues concerning the elderly (Miyake, 1989: 94–95). The impact of a 
policy for education (as far as such policy is thought to be limited to child-rearing 
households) will be limited. It is therefore necessary, particularly for modern-day 
Japan, to appeal to society broadly about the publicness and public benefit of edu-
cation when considering the problem of the public burden of education cost.
 Among the people, there are many who understand that Japan has fiscal prob-
lems. Therefore, unless sold persuasively, even all-round policies for social secu-
rity, welfare, and education will not receive widespread support. As mentioned 
in Chapter 7, it has been unfortunate for the Japanese people that although there 
has been a strong public opinion that it is necessary to enhance welfare and public 
services even if this means higher taxes, there has not been any political party able 
to realize these policies. The political parties should be presenting clear policies 
to the people related to public services as provided by a public burden; and based 
on these policies, they should be giving voters the actual option to either select a 
small government or enhanced public services, even at the cost of an increased 
public burden. Political parties should not be presenting irresponsible policies that 
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(Kettl, 2008, trans. 2011: 47–48).
4 In the case of the U.S., because it is a two-party system, there is a sense that belong-
ing to a political party is a one-dimensional measurement with the Republican Party 
and Democratic Party at two ends of the line, and no supported party in the center. The 
strength of the sense of belonging is shown on the same line.
5 A picture of a thermometer calibrated from 0 to 100 degrees (or points) is drawn on 
the questionnaire. The respondents mark the level of favorable sentiment that they have 
toward the party, with 100 points being the maximum.
6 The political party receiving the highest points on the sentiment thermometer was 
more likely to be the supported political party.
7 According to Ichiro Miyake, in the period from the election of the House of 
Councilors of June 1983 and that of the House of Representatives in December 1983, 
LDP support rose by 5%, “no supported party” rose by 4%, and support for the other 
parties changed by only about 1–2%. However, looking at the individual data, 80% 
of the most stable voter support was for the LDP. The New Liberal Club lost one-third 
of its supporters a half-year later, while only one-quarter of the “no supported party” 
respondents consistently indicated no supported party (Miyake, 1989: 116–17).
8 This study received Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research (S) (18103003, 
22223005). Donations were received from Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research and 
OUTSOURCING Inc. to conduct The University of Tokyo Institute of Social Science’s 
panel survey, and permission was granted from the Research Planning Committee of the 
Japanese Life Course Panel Surveys.
9 Although not mentioned in this book, because it would require a specialized discus-
sion, the author has given separate consideration to the significance of panel data analy-
sis. Please refer to this if interested (Nakazawa, 2012). A simple view of the hybrid model 
used in this chapter is also discussed here.
10 Another point to add regarding the correlation of favorability rating toward a political 
party based on this sentiment thermometer is that there is no correlation between the 
LDP and the DPJ/JCP/SDP through each wave. A high correlation coefficient of around 
0.7 existed between the JCP and SDP for each wave. The LDP and New Komeito are 
joined in coalition, and although a correlation coefficient close to 0.4 existed in 2008, 
this is tending to drop. In the 2013 survey, it was 0.26. Moreover, although a correlation 
hardly existed between the DPJ and New Komeito at the start, in the 2013 survey, it 
exceeded 0.28, and correlation between them and the LDP was rising. The correlation 
between the DPJ and JCP and the correlation between the DPJ and LDP was trending 
from 0.3 to a high range of 0.4, and the relationship with the favorability rating toward 
the SDP in particular was strengthening.
deny that it is not only Japanese conservatism that is the problem. However, as 
there is profit to be had for the party and politicians in the form of gaining seats 
in parliament, if the LDP, which is recovering its political power, is acquiring sup-
port from nationalist hardliners, it is possible that the brakes will not be applied to 
this movement. Opinions on nationalist historical recognition differ considerably 
among the political parties, but there is no great difference in interest between the 
political parties on the issue of territory (although this is not entirely the case). 
Currently, the opposition parties are facing the dilemma that if they make a strong 
assertion externally to gather support, they will lose the people critical of strong 
nationalism, but if they do not make strong assertions, they will not be able to 
gain support. This kind of dilemma is, in fact, a serious problem for those who 
would take a stance on enhancing public services such as education, as discussed 
in this book. As mentioned throughout, public services cannot be thought to exist 
outside of the state, which means that it is impossible to ignore the control of the 
people by the authority of the state. It is necessary to capture personal income for 
taxes that make up fiscal resources, and this necessitates control of personal infor-
mation by the power of the state. Therefore, trust in the government is essential 
for the welfare state. On the basis of the past actions of Japanese governments and 
the behavior of politicians, it may be hard to ask the people to hold such trust. In 
the first place, this kind of confidence is not generated by unilateral orders and 
compulsion. Using the power of force will just destroy the confidence at its core. 
Yet, as will be further discussed in the Epilogue, the people who are choosing such 
politicians are none other than the people of Japan. Of course the general will 
of the people may not match the intentions of the government, but since Japan 
professes to be a democratic society, the Japanese government should, to a certain 
degree, reflect the will of the people. Therefore, we must consider that the people 
of Japan need to shoulder more responsibility for the results of acts performed by 
the Japanese government than before the war. Although this may reflect some of 
my own personal fears, I cannot help but consider these concerns.
NOTE
1 The presidential system is in total contrast to this.
2 When referring to public servants in Japanese, rather than using kanji kan (官), 
the kanji kou (公) [public] is used for local governments. The police departments are 
an example of this. The top-level police personnel who receive their salaries from the 
National Treasury are formally called keisatsukan (警察官) [police officials], while the 
personnel of the local police department are formally called chihoukeisatsushokuinn (地方
警察職員) [local police employees] (Omori, 2006: 14–15).
3 Because the opinion favoring small government is strong in the United States, policies 
to increase public servants can easily meet with resistance from public opinion. However, 
as maintaining a certain level of staff is necessary to meet the citizens’ needs, it becomes 
necessary to outsource some work to private companies. Therefore, the decision not to 
increase public servants does not decrease expenditure; rather, the management strate-
gies for the government (system of orders and directives) become more complicated 
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EPILOGUE
The Responsibility 
to Publicly Support Education
1.   Tolerating “Failure”
(1)  Legacy of the DPJ Government
A report from the pollster Geoffrey Garin in spring 1990 gives us an account 
that, if not a metaphor, nevertheless has representative significance: “When 
we bring up the cost of the savings and loans bailout [the need to repay hun-
dreds of billions of dollars in federally insured accounts in failed savings and 
loan institutions], we often hear people say, ‘Why do the taxpayers have to 
come up with the money? Why can’t the government?’” This anecdote dis-
closes a basic line of tension in our thinking, a deep misunderstanding of 
democracy—as though government could operate without taxpayers! 
 (Bellah et al., 1991, trans. 2000: 114).
 For Japanese, there is a familiar ring to the above commentary. Is the system of 
indirect democracy that we adopted really effectively functioning under any kind 
of premise? This book presents arguments centered on the public burden of educa-
tion expenditure. Ultimately, however, it is underpinned by the very question of 
what democracy is.
 A slogan was put forward when the DPJ executed the change of regime: “Politics 
Take Command.” The background for this slogan can be understood as the dis-
crepancy between the popular will and the intentions of Kasumigaseki (the central 
bureaucracy), wherein bureaucratic actions were diverging from popular will that 
was based on self-interest, leading to the goal of creating a system that directly 
reflects popular will. The intention was to break out of the system of control that 
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they tolerate the current government in general, despite its heavy-handed ways. 
The current situation in which there is no clear opponent to the government poses 
a very big problem for Japan. The DPJ was defeated, and their level of exposure 
in the mass media has significantly dropped. The parties that are attracting the 
media’s attention now are, much rather, the “Japan Restoration Party (JRP)” and 
“Your Party (YP),” both of which have a strong conservative streak, similar to the 
LDP. Among the people, there merely seems to be a growing mindset that: “I have 
had enough of unstable government.” There is also a sentiment that it would have 
been better if the regime change had never happened.
 More than 30 years ago now, the U.K., which had once boasted great prosperity, 
was suffering a serious economic malaise that earned it the nickname of “the sick 
man of Europe.” The prominent economist Michio Morishima, who was study-
ing at university in the U.K. at the time, concluded that once the U.K. became a 
developed country with a decent standard of living, it maintained a democracy 
under which the people gave strictly fair examination and effected change of gov-
ernment even if it meant paying the cost of making a slight sacrifice of economic 
growth (Morishima, 1977: 50–55). The changing of government improves the 
mutual policies and the ability for these to be implemented. But there are sacrifices 
and costs that must be made for these changes to take place. Today’s Japanese are 
being tested as to whether they have enough tolerance to handle this. It will be 
interesting to know how the change in regime by the DPJ will be viewed far into 
the future.
(2)  Filling in the Gaps in Society
The societies that we live in each have their own peculiar history and culture. 
No-one lives in an ideal type of capitalist society or socialist (or communist) soci-
ety. Many communist states failed because they ignored their unique histories 
and cultures and tried to construct a society that was too loyal to the ideal (and 
hence idealistic), or their viewpoint was too overbearing in perceiving society as 
something that could be fully controlled. The same also applies to capitalism. 
Movements that aim to bring the principles of profit and efficiency to all arenas 
of social life ignore its unique history and culture, causing a backlash from the 
people, whereby the situation can become unreasonable (Morishima, 1988: 136).
 If neoliberalism, which advocates the principles of profit and efficiency, became 
more entrenched in society and competition were encouraged, then the functions 
of society would be reduced. An actual reduction of government functions would 
be fine if the people and the local organizations made up for the shortfall, but it 
would also create competition among organizations in the private sector, and links 
with the community and families would no longer be maintained in the same 
way as before. This would cause the advancement of individualism, leading to the 
growth of fragmentation in society. When a society fragments and loses its sense of 
unity in this way, it becomes necessary to have some kind of means of restraining 
it. Conservative thought can take on the role of filling this void, and that is why 
neoliberalism and conservatism fit easily together. For example, at first glance, we 
can see contradictions in talk that combines global competition, patriotism, and 
had been constructed over a long period of time in Japan by the LDP governments 
and the central bureaucracy, as discussed in Chapter 8. Considering the ideas and 
constructs of indirect democratic rule, this in itself is not strange.
 However, the DPJ had not adequately established a mechanism for decision-
making. Consequently, the resulting system was one of decision making by 
individualistic personalities. Human rivalry led to opposition of the originally 
developed policies, representatives were reselected several times, and instead of 
working toward reconciliation, rivalry only intensified. Moreover, as the DPJ rap-
idly grew powerful, assuming power soon after it was founded, the majority of its 
members of parliament had only experienced one or two elections. Meanwhile, 
most of the members of parliament who had experienced three or more elections 
received some kind of role during the term of government, while those who had 
only experienced one or two elections did not receive any role. As a result, there 
was a very large disparity between the members who played central roles in the 
party and the those with very few election wins under their belt who were popular 
amongst the electorate (Nihon Saiken  Inishiachibu, 2013: 212–226). As a pro-
portion of the members of parliament were relying on bureaucratic criticism for its 
centripetal force, there was a revolt from the bureaucrats that made it impossible 
to effectively make use of their specialist knowledge. It must be said that in terms 
of organization and leadership, they had not really matured enough to be chanting 
the slogan “Politics Take Command.” Meanwhile, from the voters’ point of view, 
the reason why the change of regime occurred was because the voters wanted a 
change of government more than anything else. The actual mindset behind this 
desire was anger, resignation, and a pessimistic outlook. Careful examination of 
the issue of disputed territories with neighboring countries and that of nuclear 
power after the earthquake disaster show that these did not simply occur due to 
contemporaneous factors during the DPJ’s reign. Hence, while the DPJ did make 
mistakes in their initial responses, we can understand that the actual issues them-
selves were either neglected or had continued on from the LDP government. It is 
unlikely that if the LDP had remained in power, they would by now have effec-
tively dealt with these currently existing issues.
 What is the lesson to be learned here? Perhaps people thought: “The DPJ 
Government has had a terrible string of failures—enough is enough, I have had 
my fill. If the government can deliver stable growth, it will be fine.”
 Economic issues are certainly directly linked to the people’s daily lives. The 
DPJ government was unable to deliver big results. Moreover, by repeatedly break-
ing various promises, they were guilty of deeply betraying the trust of the people 
who believed in the “manifesto” and the “promises.” However, in the House of 
Representatives election of 2012, although the LDP enjoyed a sweeping win, a 
large part of this victory was caused by the single-seat constituency electoral sys-
tem. In terms of the actual votes, there was not much difference in number with 
that which had previously represented a big electoral loss (Chapter 7). On that 
point, the question of whether the LDP now truly receives support is an entirely 
different matter. Many of the people are hoping to get out of a long-continuing 
recession, and perhaps because they have given the highest priority to this matter, 
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somewhere between 0 and 100%. When a tax rate is higher than the tax rate that 
yields maximum tax revenues, the incentive to work drops because the tax rate is 
too high and the overall tax revenue falls. Therefore, lowering the tax rate increases 
people’s incentive to work, increases people’s incomes, and tax revenues accord-
ingly increase. Based on this reasoning, if the tax rate were lowered to the level 
thought to maximize total tax revenues, it would result in reduced fiscal deficit, 
and savings and investments would increase. The economy would therefore be 
stimulated. However, there is an insufficient amount of actual scientific data to 
support the existence of the Laffer curve (Shindo, 1994). Nevertheless, we still 
hear the argument that reduction of wastefulness is needed before raising taxes. 
The reality of this argument is that tax payers have a lack of trust in the govern-
ment. The European countries, most notably the northern European countries 
that are described as welfare states, have been early in implementing an indirect 
tax system. Meanwhile Japan has met with much resistance to the consumption 
tax, which was finally introduced in 1989. The tax system has various defects, and 
problems have also been pointed out with respect to income tax, for example, such 
as the “9 : 6 : 4” problem. When problems are pointed out with the capture rate, it 
creates a tremendous distrust toward the tax burden.
 When debating tax systems, one must also include discussion on how public 
services are provided. When there is a fiscal crisis, there is strong pressure to provide 
services that are narrowed down to specific targets as a measure of somehow turn-
ing the meagre fiscal resources into services. However, there is no guarantee that 
this will be realized as an efficient fiscal operation. According to Taro Miyamoto, 
the credibility of the government of a welfare state tends to be higher when there is 
provision of universal services to all citizens. When a service is based on targetism, 
it naturally means that selective criteria (such as income-based restrictions) must 
be imposed. This also requires the cost of monitoring to ensure that the services are 
running in accordance with the criteria; and when making such judgement, there 
is room for administrative discretion, which awakens all kinds of suspicions about 
the running of the system in the perception of the community (Miyamoto, 2009: 
18–22).
 People’s attitudes and customs can form over many years, and it is difficult and 
even sometimes impossible to suddenly try to change them. One wonders if suffi-
ciently investing in time and effort from now on and building a new structure that 
supports the entire society will perhaps result in a shortcut to a better system.
(3)  Reconsidering the Structures of Democracy
When discussing the problem of tax, for some reason the mass media talks solely 
about the “burden.” For example, we see only simple conversations that assert that 
an increased consumption tax rate equals a reduced income. Yet, we should be 
thinking of the raising of the tax rate not just in terms of increased burden but also 
as part of a total picture that includes what the money is spent on and the benefits 
that can be received from this. Of course, in today’s Japan, where the fiscal debt 
has become enormous, even if the tax rate were increased, it is possible that these 
funds would be put toward rehabilitating the public finances, and the taxpayers 
family. However, many of the conservatives among the neoliberalists will expli-
cate such points. In practice, the thought of establishing policy measures aimed 
at strengthening the link between patriotism and family—or in other words, con-
trolling phenomena related to the inner aspects of individuals—is dangerous, and 
the idea that this could happen is problematic (Miyamoto, 2009: 11–15). While 
Japan continues to lag behind other countries in social security, the traditional 
family is collapsing, and the private sector does not have the leeway to make up 
for it. In this situation, it is easy to produce an incentive to fill in for something for 
which the government is not expected to play a role, through the indoctrination of 
conservative moral ideologies. The arena of education may increasingly become a 
place where the transmission of such ideologies can be expected. However, could 
such activities of indoctrination be successfully implemented? If we look back to 
Japan just after the war, the social security and welfare system were weak and peo-
ple came to rely on savings, knowing that it was not possible to rely on the govern-
ment. It can even be said that the government actively promoted this. It became 
customary for people to put part of their income into savings as a provision for 
future education costs, housing costs, and life after retirement. However, after the 
collapse of the asset bubble, personal incomes did not rise, and households could 
no longer afford to save. Nevertheless, people feel uneasy about the government’s 
social security system, and they know they will have to pay for the education costs 
for their children. If it is understood that public assistance will be meagre, people 
will work to protect their livelihood and even invest a little money in savings. If 
such a state were to continue, it would only be natural for trust in the government 
to fade. Therefore, it would be completely illogical to implement ideological prin-
ciples such as teaching patriotism through such means as education.
 Public-spiritedness and willingness to help out in society are not softhearted 
ideologies. Rather they encourage fundamental consideration of the problems of 
social mechanisms. It is not practical for us to survive on our own, and we live in a 
society that is a web of organizations, structures, and systems. Moreover, the over-
all society is formed by people fulfilling their roles as individuals. The public bur-
den is one of the mechanisms of maintaining such a society. Therefore, tax is not 
something that is plundered in a one-sided way. On the contrary, if an adequate 
social security system is constructed for education and life after retirement, uneasi-
ness toward the future decreases and it no longer becomes necessary to encourage 
people to be overly frugal with their savings. However, in order to construct such a 
system, everyone must shoulder some part of the burden.
 In Japan, as a grounds against increasing the consumption tax, it is argued that 
if the tax is increased when the economy is in recession, people will be less inclined 
to consume, which would further negatively impact the economy. This was the 
underlying reason behind the Reagan Administration’s tax reduction policy in the 
U.S., based on a theory of the Laffer curve, advocated by Arthur Laffer. In simple 
terms, if the tax rate were 100%, all income would be taken as tax by the govern-
ment and this would take away people’s incentive to work. If the tax rate were 
0%, then the government’s revenue would be zero. Therefore, the tax rate that 
yields the maximum tax revenues for the government should theoretically exist 
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smoothly in organizations, thereby causing dysfunction.
 Also, if we consider the basis and the grounds of a government’s existence, we 
should not be allowed to weaken our support for it because it is not making a 
profit or because of wastefulness. It is easy to call something wasteful, but it is not 
as easy to actually determine if it is wasteful or not (Ihori, 2008). This is because 
the government pays a cost to ensure the continuation of matters that can never 
be measured in terms of efficiency and economic rationality alone. For example, 
there are fields that can be easily linked to productivity and economic profit, and 
there are fields where this is not possible. But how dry would a human society be 
if it only contained the former kind? In a sense, it is the existence of aspects which 
cannot be measured only economically, such as culture, arts, and sports that add 
the humanness to humankind. If we were to replace all of this with economic 
ideas, and call anything that does not yield numerical achievements wasteful, then 
we would be left with nothing but a cramped and intolerant society. Do we really 
want to aspire to such a society?
 What is the purpose of a government, anyway? What kind of ideas are the struc-
tures of the democratic system and the indirect democratic system built on? What 
is the purpose of the tax burden? If society heads in such a direction, I think it is 
time for us to reassess the situation.
2.   Education and Publicness: the Public Burden of Education
The analysis of this book reveals that there is a low recognition of publicness in 
education among the people of Japan. Thus, paying as much as possible for one’s 
children becomes a natural part of parental affection, and educational achieve-
ments are considered to be of private benefit, having been obtained through indi-
vidual effort. As higher education becomes more expensive, the private burden 
becomes heavier, and it is easy to regard the results and benefits obtained from 
higher education as private also. This is one of the problems concerning the bur-
den of education costs in Japan.
 Moreover, another problem is that there are few contexts in Japanese society 
where the public benefit of education is felt. There are many people who share in 
not knowing what function school education serves, and these people probably 
do not feel very strongly that education must be maintained by investing public 
expenditure in it, which does reflect poorly on the people involved in education 
(including the author). Hence, this leads the author to the simple conclusion that 
there must be more effort put into advocating the public significance of education 
from a social perspective and gaining greater understanding from society at large.
 Since the 1990s, while the declining birthrate has advanced, the percentage of 
students going on to higher education has risen. Now only 20% of senior high 
school graduates enter the workplace upon graduating. There are many people 
with a conventional image of university who think there are too many people 
going on to university. However, if we compare the number of students who actu-
ally graduate from a higher education institution internationally, it is about 50%, 
which is lower than the OECD average (about 60%). The three stage theory, which 
would be unable to experience any observable merits. Moreover, the reality of the 
size of government debt has brought about various evaluations among economists 
as to whether this is an urgent problem that could produce some kind of economic 
crisis. At any rate, the current situation cannot be left unattended. In fact, if the 
government really did neglect this problem, Japan would end up being forced to 
spend all tax revenues on fiscal rehabilitation.
 If politicians speak about enhancing public services, then they must speak about 
them as part of the total picture that includes the necessary burden. It is up to the 
voters to make decisions on such informed basis. The voters should consider that 
it is not possible for any public service to be enhanced without increasing the tax 
burden.
 The state and the government maintain enormous power, and this needs to be 
constantly checked. This power is not there to unilaterally control people in a way 
that completely diverges from the popular will. People seem to hold one of two 
images of the state and government: one is of a government holding power that 
monitors and oppresses people, namely, as the other party that should be resisted; 
and the second is of a government with transcendence-like power that people 
should unilaterally follow. With the issue of the tax burden as well, an image tends 
to be painted in which there is a government that has diverged from the people and 
is haphazardly practicing wastefulness. The mass media also enjoys playing up this 
issue. But in reality, compared to their counterparts in other countries around the 
world, public servants working for government agencies in Japan cannot be con-
sidered to be abnormally insincere, propagators of injustice, or even just lazy. All 
members of an organization cannot be expected to be perfect human beings. By 
watching the news, however, one gets the impression that public servants should 
be perfect and flawless. If we demand that public servants be perfect and flawless, 
then they will surely fail to meet our expectations. However, what is it that has led 
to this loss of trust in public services?
 Intolerance has many detrimental consequences. Certainly wastefulness and 
unlawfulness should be avoided. In particular, public servants belong to govern-
ment institutions and wield social power, and so it is perhaps necessary to make 
sure that there are checking functions, such as the mass media, that are constantly 
at work. The public employee might be included as part of a cause that is looked 
down on. Of course, the salaries of public employees are paid from taxes, and 
it is well understood that any wrongdoings by them should not be tolerated. If 
we consider their mistakes in terms of how frequently they occur, the incidence 
rate is probably not that high. That clearly identified mistakes are rare serves as 
evidence that the system is functioning. But often, some of these mistakes are 
suddenly made into a problem of the entire system, leading to the demand that 
a system needs to be built that strengthens supervision. Often people jump to 
such heavy-handed solutions before giving rational consideration of how to avoid 
these problems under the current system. There need to be more prudent decisions 
that consider whether the proposed solution would serve as a deterrent, whether it 
would mean a greater cost in terms of time, mind, and money, or whether it would 
cause the loss of the very human relationships that allow these structures to operate 
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 Finally, if the idea that society should make the cost of education a public bur-
den becomes widely accepted, then it is possible that this will bring about change 
through voting behavior. As the first step toward this, it is important to explain the 
social significance of education and allow the demands and voices advocating this 
to be raised.
was advocated by educational sociologist Martin Trow as a developmental theory 
for higher education, is well known. When the rate of students going on to higher 
education is below 15%, this is called the elite stage. Then, 15–50% is called the 
mass stage, and when the rate exceeds 50%, it becomes the universal stage. The 
social function of higher education institutions is said to change depending on the 
stage of this development.
 There are already more than 700 universities with 4-year degree programs in 
Japan. In practical terms, it is simply not possible for them all to be research-
focused universities. Moreover, when half of the same-age generation advances to 
higher education institutions, the graduates cannot be described as a social elite. 
As a practical issue of concern, it is unavoidable that educational content will 
change to suit the needs and level of the students. Moreover, the universities of 
Japan must push forward to some extent with functional differentiation to suit the 
students who have enrolled. In other words, as in the case of senior high schools 
in the past, when the rate of advancement to high education rises, the role that a 
society expects a school to fulfill will also change. The senior high schools must 
also functionally be specialized based on the schools that students wish to advance 
to, including some degree of vocational education as a specialization. Among such 
students, there may be those who have advanced through school without learning 
the compulsory curriculum. Therefore, if the provided education aims to equip 
these students with solid knowledge and skills, then this type of senior high school 
can step into a new social position, and it may gain societal trust. The policy to 
make senior high school free reflects the current situation in society, where it is 
becoming socially necessary to increase the rate of students advancing to higher 
education and for students on a practical career path to graduate from senior high 
schools.
 Universities do not necessarily need to fit the conventional image of an advanced 
research institution that rears elites. Of course, the need for these universities still 
remains. Actually, these universities are competitive at a global level, and in this 
context, society still expects results. Yet, there are still many people who begrudge 
public support for these universities. The higher education institutions that are 
able to compete at such a level, however, are extremely limited. Therefore, it is nec-
essary to consider that there are other aspects of social contributions from universi-
ties. By understanding the social significance of the existence of universities, it may 
be possible to reassess the public burden.
 At the same time, insufficient preschool education in Japan also needs to be 
given attention. It is common knowledge among sociologists that one’s social 
class and the environment in which one is raised still have an impact on academic 
results and level of education. It is questionable, however, whether this is recog-
nized among the general public. It is thought that the effects of the environment in 
which one is raised can be mitigated by taking steps at an early stage of childhood. 
For this to happen, it is necessary to propagate throughout society a sense of values 
and common understandings of the unfairness of a society in which one’s class 
background can directly affect one’s academic grades and whether one advances to 
higher education.
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